

# Review of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)

Final Report

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## List of Acronyms

ADB – Asian Development Bank  
AIN - Association of International NGOs in Nepal  
BCPR – Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (within UNDP)  
CAP – Consolidated Appeals Process  
CBDRR/M – Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction/Management  
CDRMP – Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Programme  
CHAP – Common Humanitarian Action Plan  
CRM – Climate Risk Management  
DDC – District Development Committee  
DFID – Department for International Development (United Kingdom)  
DHM – Department of Hydrology and Meteorology  
DIPECHO – Disaster Preparedness (ECHO)  
DMA – Disaster Management Act  
DPNet – Disaster Preparedness Network  
DRM – Disaster Risk Management  
DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction  
DUDBC – Department of Urban Development and Building Construction  
DWIDP – Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention  
ECHO – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission (European Community Humanitarian Office)  
EOC – Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC: National EOC; DEOC: District EOC; REOC: Regional EOC)  
GFDRR – Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery  
GoN – Government of Nepal  
HFA – Hyogo Framework for Action  
IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
INSARAG – International Search and Rescue Advisory Group  
IOM – International Organization for Migration  
ISDR – UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction  
MCM – Mass Casualty Management  
MDTF – Multi-Donor Trust Fund  
MoE – Ministry of Education  
MoF – Ministry of Finance  
MoFALD – Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development  
MoHA – Ministry of Home Affairs  
MoHP – Ministry of Health and Population  
MoI – Ministry of Irrigation  
MoSTE – Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment  
MoUD – Ministry of Urban Development  
NDMA – National Disaster Management Authority  
NPC – National Planning Commission  
NRB – Nepal Rastra Bank  
NRCS – Nepal Red Cross Society  
NRRC – Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium  
NSDRM – National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management

OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
PSHA – Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis  
ROAP – Regional Office Asia Pacific (within OCHA)  
RSLUP – Risk Sensitive Land Use Planning  
SAR/USAR – Search and Rescue/Urban Search and Rescue  
SSRP – School Sector Reform Program  
SWAp – Sector Wide Approach  
TIA – Tribhuvan International Airport  
UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework  
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund  
VDC – Village Development Committee  
WFP – World Food Programme  
WHO – World Health Organization

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) is an innovative structure that brings together a wide range of Governmental, development and humanitarian partners, including Ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, donors and international financial institutions. In the absence of approved structures and policy for disaster risk management (DRM), the NRRC aims to support the Government of Nepal in developing a long-term Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan to address the high risk of natural disasters, both large and small in scale, which Nepal faces.

Programmatically, the NRRC comprises five priority areas, or Flagships, each of which is led by a Government Ministry and coordinated by an international organisation. Above the flagship programmes sits a Steering Committee made up of senior officials from Government, donors, UN agencies and key flagship partners, designed to oversee the Flagships by providing strategic guidance, fundraising support, monitoring and evaluation. A Secretariat supports the Steering Committee, providing technical and advisory support within and across flagships.

The NRRC has generated considerable national and international interest. The Flagship programmes incorporate ongoing activities in the majority of Nepal's 75 districts. The NRRC has also supported the mobilisation of significant donor resources, both technical and financial. While the establishment of the NRRC is rooted in the absence of formal national policy and structures to address these issues, it embodies the commitment of the Government of Nepal and international community to mitigate the high disaster risks facing the country.

The Government of Nepal is now beginning to address gaps in structures and capacity. A disaster directorate has been established in the Ministry of Defence, and a new DRM division is being proposed within the Ministry of Home Affairs. In May 2013, the Government commissioned this Review to take stock of the NRRC's progress and achievements, as well as assess whether its strategies, architecture and investments were appropriately aligned with Government priorities and the planned new DRM structures. The Review will also inform current and future DRM work plans and advance planning for the post-2015 context, when the current phase of the NRRC is due to end.

The Review Team explored a range of structural, programmatic and governance issues. The process itself involved desk-based research, a number of rounds of interviews with key stakeholders and a field visit.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### 1. Overall effectiveness of the NRRC

The NRRC has helped create and retain a focus on disaster risk reduction and preparedness nationwide. It has enabled collaboration with the Government of Nepal's largest and most influential development partners and donors. It represents a genuinely innovative case study for coordinated systems among humanitarian, development, national and government approaches.

As such, the NRRC reveals tensions between the various stakeholders' differing approaches to risk reduction. It ensures these tensions remain on the agenda, thereby encouraging solutions.

These factors also make the NRRC's challenges substantial. Some of its more ambitious targets will not be fully met by 2015. This should not, however, deter its continuation and refinement. Many of its challenges are not specific to the NRRC, but are common to other coordinated structures. Because the NRRC brings together representatives of disparate systems unaccustomed to working together, including intra-Governmental collaborations, its work necessitates long-term behavioral change on the part of governmental institutions and partners. There should be little expectation, therefore, of rapid change.

The Review Team was impressed by the level of attention afforded to the NRRC by representatives of the Government of Nepal. A full and genuine sense of ownership and institutionalisation, however, requires additional dedicated capacity and greater engagement overall. Staff turnover in key roles is common, contributing to inconsistent Government capacity. Numerous international actors expressed the view that DRM issues were not prioritised within Government planning processes, as reflected by the relative lack of involvement of the Ministry of Finance in NRRC structures. While the Review was prompted, at least in part, by the need to align the NRRC with the proposed new DRM structures within Government, no concrete details or timeframes were offered to the Review Team during the visit. The NRRC has clearly bolstered Government capacity for disaster management overall, but much more work needs to be done.

It is acknowledged in the Review that many of the NRRCs original goals will not be met by 2015, but this should not be taken as indicative of failure. These goals were acknowledged from the outset to be ambitious. On the contrary, enthusiasm for the mechanism is worth nurturing. Not only does the NRRC demand the complex coordination of actors and budgets, but it also must retrofit key infrastructure on an unusual, even unprecedented scale.

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should extend the timeline of the NRRC to 2020 with the second phase of the NRRC being from 2015-2020. [Action: Steering Committee]**

## **2. Expansion or consolidation?**

NRRC flagship programmes only address a subset of the disaster risks faced by Nepal. Some stakeholders advocated for the establishment of a sixth flagship on critical infrastructure, communications and/or the Kathmandu valley. These calls, however, should be tempered by a realistic assessment of capacity within existing NRRC structures and beyond, at the national level and within the international system, as well as an awareness of the risk of diluting the focus on current programmes.

**The Review argues that the NRRC should focus on implementing its original priorities until 2015. Yet it also should engage in more strategic thinking about risk reduction in Nepal.** Assuming that leadership and coordination can be strengthened, each of the Flagships needs to create multi-stakeholder platforms with improved provision of technical support. This will consolidate policy and technical improvements, as well as prepare the ground for any future

expansion. Critical infrastructure and enforcement would function better now as thematic groups, not as new Flagships.

**Recommendation:** The Steering Committee should task the Secretariat to commission a countrywide risk assessment in 2014 to set a baseline for a review of Flagships and priorities for the period 2015-2020. [Action: Steering Committee/Secretariat]

**Recommendation:** In late 2014 or early 2015 the Steering Committee should commission an assessment of NRRC progress to date and redefine or reprioritise NRRC outcomes and structure. This reprioritisation should be based on: the countrywide risk assessment data from the 2014 survey (see above); the legislative status of the DMA and current levels of Government capacity; the 2015 HFA; and Government and individual member plans and country strategies. As with the current Flagships and workplans, critical needs should be recognised, reflected and budgeted accordingly to represent reality. While fundraising should remain an aim of the NRRC, it should not become the driving motivation, and needs and workplans should not be configured accordingly. [Action: Steering Committee]

### 3. Flagship linkages

As the NRRC matures, cross-Flagship work has been increasing, and the Secretariat has played a key role in encouraging specific Flagship linkages. This progress is evidenced in the 2013 Flagship workshops, including the Flagship 5 workshop, which examined how best other Flagships can be supported on issues related to policy development and implementation. Flagships 4, 3 and 1 have also engaged in specific ad hoc collaborations. Greater dedicated capacity in Flagship leads and coordinators can further strengthen Flagship linkages.

### 4. Flagship leads and coordinators

The Review acknowledges that the NRRC was set up as a voluntary consortium, initially conceived as having a minimal footprint for coordination and support. Yet for the NRRC to achieve its objectives, these functions must be strengthened. Flagship 4 offers a useful prototype, having generated a strong information management platform, shared vision among partners and dedicated partnership between the lead Ministry and Flagship coordinator. Flagships 1, 3 and 5 would benefit from generating similar platforms to project their work onto the national stage and draw a greater range of actors.

**Recommendation:** Flagship coordinating agencies need to allocate appropriate, adequate and dedicated capacity to proactively undertake the minimum functions for Flagship coordination as originally envisaged (coordination, information management, technical support, resource mobilisation, and monitoring reporting and evaluation). How best to do this should remain the responsibility of the coordinating agency, i.e., the functions outlined above could be tasked to one individual OR shared with several at different levels within the agency. This could depend on such factors as the relationship and burden sharing agreed with the lead Ministry, progress to date and number of partners within the Flagship. The Flagship 4 model of having both dedicated staff to oversee day-to-day business combined with senior level

oversight and engagement, however, has been found to work well and is recommended. [Action: Flagship coordinating agencies]

**Recommendation:** Each Flagship coordinator and/or lead should ensure an appropriate information management mechanism and focal point. [Action Flagship coordinators/leads]

**Recommendation:** Based on the Flagship 4 model, consider how best to manage registration of activities, membership, reporting and data-sharing commitments, and activity plans. [Action by Flagship coordinators/leads]

**Recommendation:** The coordinating agencies for Flagships 1: School Safety, Flagship 1: Hospital Safety and Flagships 3 and 5 in particular need to increase the capacity for coordination. This issue must be carefully considered when agreeing to a new Flagship 2 coordinating agency. [Action: named Flagships coordinating agencies]

**Recommendation:** Individual Flagships coordinators and/or donors should accept the need to dedicate capacity and resources to these functions with or without binding commitments. [Action by Flagship coordinators-donors]

**Recommendation:** Flagship coordinators must ensure that senior managers attend the Steering Committee meetings. Additional capacity, even in the form of a dedicated coordinator position, does not preclude the need for continued, high-level engagement from the key partners to ensure that risk reduction does not become de-linked from organisational strategies. [Action by Flagship coordinators]

## 5. NRRC Steering Committee and Secretariat

One of the achievements of the NRRC has been the evolving role played by the Steering Committee. While the primary function of the Steering Committee is not coordination, minutes demonstrate that coordination is enhanced as a result of Steering Committee meetings. Stakeholders, however, ask for the Steering Committee to: play a more strategic and directive role: to strengthen its facilitation of technical assistance and monitoring and evaluation with a view to setting common standards and a stronger drive of the coordination of policy. Here, thematic groups like the Communications Group are key.

**Other priority areas of focus which the Review Team recommends for the Steering Committee are:**

- Risk reduction in the Kathmandu Valley—specifically a group that brings together relevant Ministries from each Flagship and the municipalities to consider look at key strategic linkages between the Flagship areas;
- Critical infrastructure—including the issues of the implementation and enforcement of building codes.

Overall, NRRC stakeholders view the work of the Secretariat positively. Central to the NRRC architecture, the Secretariat is one of the few bodies in the NRRC with full-time, dedicated staffing. Yet it will also require some shifts to better facilitate technical support for monitoring,

reporting and evaluation. Partners in the NRRC, including the Government, expressed strong support for the Secretariat to be more autonomous from the UN. The Secretariat ideally would have its own budget and space, enabling it to be visibly a more autonomous body.

**Recommendation:** The Steering Committee should constitute a short-term sub-committee in keeping with its original remit to identify how within the current structure, the following issues might best be given priority:

- Risk reduction in the Kathmandu valley—specifically a group that brings together relevant Ministries from each Flagship and the municipalities to consider key strategic linkages between the Flagship areas;
- Critical infrastructure—including the issues of the implementation of building codes.

[Action: Steering Committee]

**Recommendation:** The Steering Committee should play a stronger role in bringing in regional expertise in multi-hazard risk, and strive to continually improve links with neighbouring countries, regional academia and technical experts. [Action: Steering Committee]

**Recommendation:** The Secretariat needs to be strengthened to take on its original range of roles: a secretarial function for the Steering Committee; communications within the NRRC; public communications; monitoring, reporting and evaluation; resource mobilisation; and the support and facilitation of technical assistance. Critically, it needs to receive the standing authority from the Steering Committee to undertake these functions without constant negotiation. [Action Steering Committee, Secretariat coordinator]

**Recommendation:** The Secretariat should be a visibly more autonomous body. A first and pragmatic step might be to make space available that could be adjacent to MoHA, as well as retained within the UN and for the Secretariat staff to have a presence in both locations. While a small increase in staffing to meet current demands is recommended, the staffing should be kept flexible to reflect future demands that will be contingent on many factors, primarily the new Division in MoHA and a future NDMA. The NRRC should have an online presence and platform separate to that of the UN and ensure that this presence benefits and reflects all partners equally. [Action: Co-chairs Steering Committee, Secretariat]

**Recommendation:** The Communications Group should continue. As a model for a thematic group it has worked well. These groups should be about setting common standards, as well as linking and driving the coordination of policy (linking with or multiplying the effect of Flagship 5 if and where possible). An appropriate technical coordinator and Ministry must continue to lead these groups. As with the Communications Group, while support from the Secretariat can be requested, it should not become the role of the Secretariat to manage these groups. The Communications Group should be institutionalised and included in official documentation and reporting. Input from Flagships leads and coordinators has been variable, but is essential. The existence of such thematic groups should not absolve the Flagship leads and coordinators from active engagement. [Action: Secretariat and BBC Media Action]

## 6. Information management, monitoring, reporting and evaluation

Monitoring and reporting within the NRRC framework vary in quality and consistency. Except Flagship 4, Flagship lead agencies lack dedicated capacity for this work. The Secretariat coordinates reporting, but it also lacks the necessary delegated authority to ensure effective reporting and analysis, including any evaluation of the impact of the NRRC's components across more than one agency's activities. Here, the NRRC echoes problems in other coordinated systems for development and humanitarian assistance; no models exist on which to base improvements.

Arguably, the voluntary nature of the NRRC discourages cooperation in reporting and enforcing compliance. Because it offers an innovative framework generating (inter)national attention, however, the NRRC needs to better define, demonstrate and quantify its successes. Instigating a monitoring and evaluation framework is a necessary first step. **The Secretariat needs both capacity and a strategy to systematise data handling and presentation across the Flagships**—the basis for a monitoring and evaluation framework. This framework would require the support of the Steering Committee, Resident Coordinator and donors, a framework to be created with, not imposed on, the Flagship leads/coordinators. **The NRRC Steering Committee should task the Secretariat (using external technical support if necessary) to draw up this framework.**

### Recommendations:

**Overall: The Steering Committee and Secretariat must prioritise the issue of evaluation, and specifically impact evaluation. [Action: Steering Committee and Secretariat]**

**On Capacity: Both the Secretariat and Flagship coordinator/lead functions have an identified function in monitoring and reporting. Both need adequate capacity to undertake this function. Each Flagship requires a designated focal point for data management, monitoring and evaluation. [Action Secretariat coordinator and Flagship coordinators]**

**On Information Management/Data: Convene a data management working group comprising Flagship coordinators and leads (and possibly key implementers), limited to discussion of data standards and technical agreements within and across the Flagships. The Secretariat, in conjunction with the data management group should proactively manage a process of review of all Flagship indicators, ensuring that all are time-bound, measurable, disaggregated by gender and in keeping with data standards as agreed by the proposed data management group. [Action: Secretariat]**

**On Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation: The NRRC Steering Committee should task the Secretariat (using external technical support if necessary) to draw up a monitoring and evaluation framework. [Action: Steering Committee]**

## 7. A pooled funding instrument for the NRRC?

In principle, the idea of a Pooled Funding instrument has merit, but it should not be a priority now. The NRRC does not currently have a mechanism to enable prioritisation of outcomes and

outputs in order to allocate funds. Fund management responsibilities also might damage relationships between the Secretariat and other actors in the NRRC.

**Recommendation:** If there is ongoing support for a pooled funding mechanism amongst SC members, the SC should commission a formal and specific study. This should only be considered once the recommendations from this study have been taken forward. A first pragmatic step would be to undertake a survey of potential donors (one that is country-based and/or at regional and global levels) to judge whether a critical mass of funding could be raised. [Action: Steering Committee to reconsider in 2014]

## 8. Individual Flagship areas

### Flagship 1: School Safety

Physical retrofitting of schools has progressed in line with ADB's programme in the Kathmandu valley and separately, in the East. The World Bank supported probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) of community schools, private schools and education-related administration buildings in the Kathmandu valley. This initiative has the potential to address some shortcomings in the current approach to school safety. Notwithstanding recent progress under the education SWAp for Nepal, several partners view progress as too slow and too focused, to date, on physical safety restructuring. ADB has adopted a 'minimalist' approach to Flagship coordination that keeps the Ministry of Education in the lead. Partners advocate for a more proactive role.

**Recommendation:** That the activation of the thematic technical group under the education SWAp is taken forward. That a cross-Flagship thematic group on school safety bringing in partners from beyond the SWAp is initiated. This should include a group of key implementing NGOs, given the limited capacity of AIN to represent member's interests at the technical level. Discussions on physical safety should include the relevant Government bodies. [Action: ADB and MoE]

### Flagship 1: Hospital Safety

Original timeframes for hospital safety work were unrealistic given the complexity of the tasks at hand. Even after scaling the original retrofitting down from 14 to ten hospitals, ongoing progress remains slow. DFID has provided significant technical input, but the approach is too narrow. Overall, the coordinator and lead Ministry have not yet formed a strategy related to risk and cost benefit, and instead, have focused on project implementation. Staff turnover in both WHO and the MoHP contribute to produce varying capacity in Flagship coordination and lead roles. On non-structural issues, coordination has been stronger, given ongoing partnerships.

**Recommendation:** Potentially taking a lead from Flagship 1: School Safety, MoHP, WHO and concerned donors could consider a broader strategic review of health facilities. However, the issues raised in this review about expansion, and the results of the proposed donor conference, need to be taken into consideration. [Action: WHO, MoHP, Flagship 1 Advisory Group]

## Flagship 2

Flagship 2 requires a detailed overview. Most pressing, OCHA plans to draw down to only one (national) post by the end of 2013, and so it will not have the capacity to undertake Flagship coordination. Key issues for prospective leadership of the Flagship include: ensuring that proactive coordination and advanced planning for the international component of a major disaster response at national level is driven forward; and examining how standing capacity to strengthen civil protection (e.g., fire, ambulance and search and rescue) at country level can be developed, and which agency, or agencies, can lead on this task.

The structure of the NRRC holds attention on these truly challenging gaps and ensures that they stay on the agenda, irrespective of the limited progress to date. Flagship 2 has begun to connect various parts of the Government, both intra-Governmentally and internationally. Its own activities and outcomes are important, but Flagship 2's strength is that it brings together humanitarian actors in the international community, the Government's nascent disaster management and response capacities, as well as development actors (including UNDP) to strengthen Government systems in disaster management and response. These efforts need to continue to accomplish the Flagship goals.

In the absence of OCHA, Flagship 2 needs an overall coordinator with dedicated capacity who will be able to deliver on these goals. Yet few viable options exist after OCHA departs. Recognising the importance of a solution that will be owned by the Steering Committee, the Review Team establishes and discusses three options and detailed recommendations to the Steering Committee for their final decision.

**Recommendation (Overall Leadership): That the Steering Committee considers the three viable options at its next meeting. Following this meeting, the Steering Committee should task the Secretariat to follow up with OCHA ROAP, IFRC, NRCS and a group of potential donors with a view to making a firm decision by the end of October 2013. [Action: Steering Committee, Secretariat]**

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should specifically consider the creation of a coordination position for civil protection within Flagship 2. This should include the possibility of a private-sector entity taking the position, and implications of a public tender, which would set a precedent in the context of the NRRC's current voluntary model. [Action: Steering Committee, Secretariat]**

**Recommendation: From the regional level, OCHA must offer a commitment to concrete and regular support to its national post in Nepal, and ensure that its activities under Flagship 2 continue. This should include strengthening inputs to Government for receiving international assistance, including civil/military liaison. [Action Secretariat/OCHA ROAP]**

## Flagship 3

Clear expectations exist that the Flagship 3 lead and coordinator should develop a wider thematic group, one on the structural and non-structural mitigation measures for river basins across Nepal. The specific programmatic targets should not expand what is currently planned

before 2015. Yet it should also work to build a platform for further discussion, enhanced cohesion and strategy on these issues nationally.

Such a platform could be set up as an advisory group for Flagship 3, but a technical group of the Steering Committee, under the leadership of the World Bank or another relevant agency, might be preferable. Government engagement in this Flagship has been problematic: the World Bank noted the challenge of working simultaneously with three key Government bodies, and interviews confirmed that an understanding of the NRRC was particularly lacking.

**Recommendation: A thematic group exploring structural and non-structural mitigation measures that could be applied across the river basins in Nepal should be constituted. Such a group could be formed as an advisory group to Flagship 3, or as a thematic group under the Steering Committee. Such a group should be designed to enhance Government ownership of the issues and cross-Ministry cooperation. [Action: Flagship 3 coordinator/lead]**

#### **Flagship 4**

Flagship 4 is seen as on track and well led from both the Government and its international actors. The IFRC should continue its senior-level engagement in the NRRC beyond the specific coordinator position.

**Recommendation: That the current thoughtful debate regarding geographical reach versus depth of impact is continued, particularly in light of the recommendation about the timeline and extension of the overall NRRC. [Action Flagship 4 coordinator/lead]**

#### **Flagship 5**

It is important for Flagship 5 to create a broader view of risk reduction that would involve establishing an agenda for the Flagship in a way that several agencies could work together and influence the Government, with or without a specific linkage to programme implementation. The workplan and budget should be reviewed to ensure that they more clearly reflect contributions made by all partners.

**Recommendation: Building on the 2013 Flagship workshop the Flagship 5 coordinator and leads should develop a stronger and clearer vision for Flagship 5 beyond its own programmes. It should openly seek the support of other partners in achieving these objectives. [Action Flagship 5 coordinator/lead]**

**Recommendation: Consideration of the value added of the thematic meetings is recommended. Whether framed as a cross-Flagship thematic group on policy and institutions, or as a Flagship 5 advisory group, UNDP should create a forum for ongoing discussions on key issues in these areas.**

**This would not preclude Flagship 5 holding one-off meetings for information sharing on individual issues, but it might reduce the expectations that each meeting should result in action points and follow up. [Action Flagship 5 coordinator/lead]**

**Recommendation:** UNDP should re-organise the support function for Flagship 5 to create a distance from and distinct identity for the Flagship coordination function. [Action: UNDP]

## **Follow up**

To ensure proper process on the recommendations for this report, the Steering Committee should authorise the Secretariat to manage a time-bound plan for follow up.

First meeting of the Steering Committee within one month of the final report. At this meeting:

- Steering Committee endorses the final report and its recommendations;
- Steering Committee mandates the Secretariat to manage the progress of developing implementation plans with each of the actors concerned.

## Report Structure

The structure of the report allows coverage of all of the key questions from the TOR, but acknowledging that most readers will have an interest in individual Flagships, most sections are structured accordingly.

**Section 1** provides background to the Review and the context in Nepal, and explains how the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was established and has evolved. After a general introduction in Section 1.1, Section 1.2 outlines the basic structures of the NRRC as a reference for the report. Section 1.3 provides a brief and general overview of common findings from such reviews, as a means of setting out a framework for analysing the structural aspects of the NRRC.

**Section 2** identifies the outputs and outcomes that will be achieved by the original target date of 2015. Data is based on interviews conducted during the Review and was substantiated by reports provided at the time of the Review Team’s visit by NRRC Flagship coordinators and the Secretariat.

**Section 3** provides an analytical view of each Flagship and the respective institutions—Governmental and non-Governmental—that lead and coordinate them, as well as the other key bodies within the NRRC architecture, i.e., the Steering Committee, Secretariat and the Communications Group.

**Sections 4 and 5** consider the NRRC as a whole, the timeline, the architecture, issues related to capacity, and provide analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

# Section 1: Background—Conception and Evolution of the NRRC

## 1.1 Introduction to the NRRC Review

The NRRC Review was commissioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) within the Government of Nepal (GoN) and had the backing of key stakeholders to the consortium. NRRC stakeholders supported the independently-led Review Team, which consisted of: team leader Glyn Taylor of Humanitarian Outcomes (funded by DFID); Mahendra Gurung, formerly of the Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention (DWIDP) in the GoN (funded by the World Bank); Krishna Vatsa of UNDP BCPR's Regional Office in Delhi (funded by UNDP); and a research assistant with Humanitarian Outcomes, Elisabeth Couture. For the duration of the Review, the Review Team reported to a Task Force comprised of members of the NRRC Steering Committee and co-chaired by the Joint Secretary MoHA and the UN Resident Coordinator. Three meetings were held with the Task Force during the timeframe of the study. The NRRC Secretariat provided logistical and administrative support for the Review Team. Prior to their departure from Nepal, the Review Team shared findings and conclusions with the Taskforce, the Flagship coordinators, and the UN Resident Coordinator.

### 1.1.1 Review methodology

The TOR (in full at Annex J) provided the basis for the study's methodology and scope. The Review Team undertook an extensive desk review of relevant documentation, provided by the NRRC Secretariat and other respondents during the course of the study. Seventy-one semi-structured interviews were held with individuals and groups from a wide range of stakeholders in the NRRC. In total, approximately one hundred individuals were interviewed, the majority on an individual basis either in person or by telephone/Skype, with the remainder in group interviews (a full list of those interviewed is at Annex I). All local and international NGOs were offered the chance to participate through the AIN and DPNET networks. DIPECHO partners were interviewed both collectively and individually on request. Regional offices and individuals with a strong influence on the NRRC but no longer in country were interviewed by telephone. All of the Flagship coordinators/leads had the opportunity to fact-check the information collected. All interviews were undertaken in line with an interview guide derived from the key research questions in the TOR and approved by the Task Force. As per the TOR, the Review Team undertook two field visits between June 14-16, 2013. The visits included: the observation of a masons' training session at Tri-Padma Vidyashram H.R School in Lalitpur municipality; the observation of a mock drill and flood early warning systems in Chhediya Village, Bardiya District; and both observation and interviews at the District Administration Office and Emergency Operations Centre in Nepalgunj, Banke District. These field visits were instrumental to the Review Team's understanding of the implementation of various NRRC Flagship projects and field realities.

The Review's primary purpose, as stated in the TOR, is:

*to take stock of the current progress and achievements, review current capacity and investments in order to ensure that NRRC priorities and structure match Government of Nepal current priorities and can support new Government structures. The Review will*

*also inform current and future workplans and advance the planning phase for the post-2015 DRM context in Nepal and a potential second phase of the NRRC.*

The key questions for the Review Team, as stated in the TOR, are as follows:

- a) *Which of the current operational Flagship objectives and workplan outcomes will not be met by 2015?*
- b) *Whether outcomes (as currently stated) will be adequate to meet the purpose of the NRRC? Do these outcomes match the current priorities of the Government?*
- c) *Whether current outcomes need to be refined or prioritised within Flagships?*
- d) *Whether linkages between Flagships are being adequately highlighted and supported?*
- e) *Whether there are key gaps that should be incorporated—and if so where leadership (including resourcing) for this new work can be sourced?*
- f) *Whether current institutional arrangements and capacity within the NRRC architecture is appropriate and/or adequate to meet requirements? This should include the role of the Steering Committee and Advisory Groups, the role of the Flagship leads, and the role of the Secretariat. With regard to the latter, the Review Team should consider whether the current Secretariat is providing adequate support and appropriate support across the NRRC, including with donors and implementing partners.*
- g) *Whether the current financial mechanisms remain appropriate and if the Secretariat is currently providing adequate reporting and oversight?*

The first draft of the Report was widely shared with Steering Committee members and others (through international and national NGO networks, for example), and comments were requested to inform this final version of the report.

### **1.1.2 Limitations**

As with any Review of a structure of this scope and complexity, the amount of time allocated for the process could be considered inadequate given: the number of stakeholders; the competing priorities faced by the NRRC members; and the significant issues such as risk and programmes associated with climate change, which were not within the scope of this Review but inevitably affect the work and progress of the NRRC.

Each of the five Flagship programmes is organised and outcomes set differently, reflecting the original analysis of the scale of the task, the actions required and the current organisation of the sector. The report will indicate where, in the opinion of the Review Team, outcomes and workplans were better and more inclusively set out (this includes the opportunity for redesign of the workplans which was offered in 2012). Some individual Flagships were able to provide more detail on activity and progress than others. It is acknowledged by the Review Team that

the level of detail provided in this report varies from Flagship to Flagship. While this is not an evaluation, reflection on these variations inevitably forms part of the report.

## **1.2 Evolution of the NRRC**

### **1.2.1 NRRC history**

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was formed in May 2009 to support the Government of Nepal in developing a long-term Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan, one that builds on the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and one that supports the Government in meeting their commitments to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The founding members of the Consortium were the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the World Bank. The Government of Nepal participated in the inaugural meeting of the NRRC, and supported the initiative from its inception.

Given the high level of risk of major natural disasters in Nepal and the vulnerability of its population due to poverty and lack of access to state services, the NRRC was launched with the following objectives:

- To support the Government of Nepal in addressing the short-to-medium-term disaster risk-reduction (DRR) priorities, as identified by the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (approved October 2009);
- To provide a platform for action through which a number of international agencies can partner with the Government of Nepal and civil society organisations in achieving the DRR priorities;
- To raise financial resources and organise technical assistance for DRR by highlighting the importance of these priorities for Nepal, as well as the innovation that the NRRC represents.

The NRRC was built around five thematic areas, known as Flagships. The five Flagship areas were set out on the basis of Government priorities, patterns of risk and vulnerability in Nepal, and the ongoing programmes of the Consortium members. The Flagship areas are:

1. School and hospital safety
2. Emergency preparedness and response capacity
3. Flood management in the Kosi River basin
4. Integrated community-based disaster risk reduction/management
5. Policy/institutional support for disaster risk management

For each area, the lead role was designated to a Government Ministry, and an international agency was assigned as coordinator in support of the relevant Government lead. The Flagships were organised around specific functional areas of risk reduction, preparedness and capacity building in DRR. They cover a range of DRR-related governance reforms, structural and nonstructural mitigation measures, significant enhancement in preparedness and response

capacities across government and international humanitarian actors for major disasters, and improvement of response and early warning capacities at community level.

### 1.2.2 NRRC structures

*Steering Committee:* NRRC Flagship leads report to a Steering Committee, which is an Inter-Ministerial and Consortium body established to provide vision, strategic guidance and technical support to implement the activities identified by Nepal's NSDRM. The Steering Committee is intended to address these functions in the interim period until the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) can be formulated under the new Disaster Management Act. The Committee operates under the direction and guidelines of the Government of Nepal.

*Secretariat:* The NRRC Secretariat was formulated to provide technical and advisory support to the Steering Committee. It functions under the direction of the Steering Committee, and works closely with Consortium focal points for the development and coordination of the Flagship Programme activities.

While the selection of NRRC priorities was not linked to a single specific risk assessment of natural hazards and possible impacts, it was informed by the NSDRM (itself based on existing risk assessments) and by the Global Risk Identification Programme (GRIP) assessment (2010). The formulation of priorities was also acknowledged to be motivated by the desire to have the Flagship programmes be coordinated by influential partners in both development and humanitarian issues.

Two specific risks influenced the early proceedings of the NRRC:

- *Seismic risk:* In 1934, an 8.4 magnitude earthquake struck Kathmandu valley, killing 4,300 people, destroying 20% of all structures and damaging another 40% of the valley's buildings. Both international actors and the GoN recognise that a similar event today could lead to the paralysis of critical infrastructure, and enormous human and economic losses. This would in turn create extraordinary challenges for the launch of a disaster response. While seismic risk exists across the country, the Kathmandu valley is considered especially vulnerable and has been the focus of most earthquake preparedness and risk-reduction measures in Nepal.
- *Flood risk:* Nepal was badly affected by flooding in the Kosi river basin in 2008. The flood, caused by an embankment breach, led to massive inundation and the destruction of houses, crops and agricultural lands, roads, culverts and irrigation infrastructures through heavy siltation.

Flagships 1 and 3 are thematic in the sense that they focus on seismic and flood risk and are geographically-specific in scope. Flagship 1 focuses on the reduction of the impact of earthquakes on schools and hospitals in the Kathmandu valley area. Flagship 3 focuses on the management of floods in the Kosi River Basin. These Flagships did not set out to include risk assessment, preparedness and mitigation measures across these hazards; rather, they limit themselves to certain interventions on the basis of perceived risk. In part, the rationale for the limitations in Flagships 1 and 3 was the need to prioritise specific interventions, make impacts in the most risk-prone areas and demonstrate results in a relatively short time span. Flagship 2

primarily focuses on the Kathmandu valley, recognising not only the largest centre of population in Nepal, but also its central importance, both politically and commercially.

A number of factors helped in promoting the DRR agenda in Nepal. It is widely recognised that in a country vulnerable to multiple hazards, development gains stand to be reversed all too quickly. Because the capacity of the GoN in this area had not been strong, there was justification for donor support. Moreover, nearly two decades of political instability weakened Nepal, and DRR provided a platform where political consensus could be achieved with little opposition from any political formation in the country. Thus, the NRRC provided a coordination arrangement and framework on which international agencies, Government and civil society could work together without much opposition. Although the NRRC pre-dates the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the event provided significant support for the NRRC's formal international launch in 2011.

Leadership was critical in the formation of the NRRC. The previous UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (UN HC/RC), Robert Piper, was able to provide a vision around which an impressive array of international agencies could rally. It was important that the concept of the NRRC was driven by the UN RC/HC as the representative of the whole UN system (including ISDR), mobilising the support of key UN agencies while remaining objective. The GoN perceived it as a wide international effort without political overtones. With GoN backing, the NRRC was bolstered further when three important donors—the European Commission (DIPECHO), UK and the US—extended significant financial and vocal support.

### **1.3 NRRC as a Coordination Structure**

Before looking closely at the NRRC architecture, it is helpful to consider lessons from other evaluations of coordinated structures in humanitarian and development contexts. While the NRRC is highly innovative in the range of actors that it brings together, including its choice of flagship-coordination agencies, it also shares characteristics of other country-level coordination systems. The organisation of activities in thematic areas under lead agencies is a common way of doing business in both humanitarian CAPs and CHAPs (usually utilising the cluster system) and in UNDAFs. In keeping with the original vision of bringing diverse actors together, the NRRC does not always use the most obvious operational agencies from the UN system as Flagship coordinators; rather, it brings in multilateral financial institutions. As a result, and although it is unique in some ways, the NRRC shares some of the challenges of similar structures, most notably:

- Actors within the system are forced to balance the common good with their own self-interest. Agencies in coordination roles can be put in a position where they can influence resource allocation (e.g., the role of humanitarian cluster leads in pooled funding), leading to conflicts of interest. These tensions are exacerbated in resource-scarce environments. The use of financial institutions rather than operational agencies in Flagship-coordination roles appears, in part, to be an effort to lessen conflicts of interest in this system.
- It provides a framework in which pre-existing problems become more clearly visible. Partners in new structures often attribute pre-existing problems to new coordination frameworks, or presume that they can solve some or all of them.

- Coordination roles within such systems require some dedicated capacity. Such capacity is, by definition, additional to any programme function, and needs to be budgeted and funded. The question of how to resource this capacity is often contentious. The extent to which coordination functions should be shared with programme responsibilities as part of one individual's job or be a stand-alone function is debatable.
- Challenges in monitoring, reporting and evaluation are notably hard to resolve through coordinated systems. In keeping with the norms of the humanitarian and development systems, participation is voluntary. Leadership/coordination roles at any level do not come with the authority to enforce reporting, nor do reporting lines flow naturally through the thematic leads. Reporting is one area where the common good can clash with self-interest. Agencies are often uncomfortable sharing financial information, or reports related to their performance. Operational agencies tend to have multiple donors and comply with multiple reporting formats. When new, additional reporting formats are added, especially those that are voluntary, take-up tends to be low in general. At the very least, reporting requires dedicated capacity and positive intent.

As the analysis below demonstrates, the NRRC is typical in a number of these respects.

## Section 2: NRRC Flagship Programmes

This section provides a brief overview and introduction to the individual Flagship aims and structures and some of their major achievements thus far. It also identifies a number of key issues (discussed in more detail in Section 3), including which Joint Programme Outcomes and workplan Outputs (as listed in the NRRC Flagship Programme 2013 Document) are not on track for completion or are not likely to be achieved by 2015. An in-depth breakdown of Flagship achievements by Joint Programme Outcome and workplan Output can be found in Annex G. This section also examines reported financial commitments per Flagship, and major outstanding gaps in funding.

Each Flagship has identified a number of overarching target priorities, referred to as “Joint Programme Outcomes.” Within these Outcomes, target activities and indicators are broken down into a number of Outputs. Together, these Outcomes and Outputs make up the Flagship’s workplan, and are outlined in detail in the NRRC Flagship Programme 2013 Document. It is important to note that these Outcomes and Outputs are broad indicators, that multiple projects and target activities exist within each, and that multiple implementing partners are active in working towards their achievement. Progress has been measured and analysed here according to reported achievements as they fit within these identified Outcomes and Outputs. As a result, this section attempts to provide an objective view of achievements against the targets originally set. In many cases, and with hindsight, these targets were extremely optimistic, and/or set before the inherent technical and bureaucratic challenges to progress were clear.

### 2.1 Flagship 1: School Safety

Flagship 1: School Safety aims to improve the structural integrity of school buildings and the disaster and earthquake resilience of schools and communities through: (i) the physical, seismic retrofitting of school buildings; (ii) operational strengthening through training and workshops for students and teachers; and (iii) awareness raising.

By addressing the resiliency of school structures, the Flagship aims to ensure that lives will be saved, disruption to education will be minimised, and that school buildings will be able to act as locations for coordinating response and recovery, or as emergency shelters for local communities. The Flagship’s primary focus to date has been on the Kathmandu valley. The programme, however, was subsequently expanded to incorporate the rebuilding and retrofitting of schools in Eastern Nepal to address damage caused by the 2011 Sikkim earthquake.

Flagship 1: School Safety aims to achieve these objectives through a workplan consisting of four Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Structural and operational vulnerability assessment
2. Physical and operational strengthening
3. Awareness raising and capacity building
4. Physical and operational strengthening (expansion to address schools affected by the 2011 Sikkim earthquake)

A detailed breakdown of the Flagship's Outcomes and workplan Outputs and achievements against each is provided at Annex G.

### 2.1.1 Flagship structure

Coordination of Flagship 1 (School and Hospital Safety) originally sat with ADB, and the Flagship lead position was jointly held by the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP). The role of coordinator for Hospital Safety has since been delegated to the World Health Organization (WHO), with ADB remaining as the coordinating agency for School Safety. MoE remains the Flagship lead for School Safety, and MoHP the lead for Hospital Safety. While most of the other flagships have an advisory committee, no such body was established for Flagship 1 schools, in recognition of the potential overlap in coordination with a proposed thematic group on school safety under the education SWAp. This thematic group was formed in July 2012, in consultation with other development partners in the SWAp (as recommended by the joint mid-term review of School Sector Reform Program [SSRP] in March 2012). The group was formally endorsed during the Joint Quarterly meeting of the SSRP in September 2012. Furthermore, a steering committee and a technical committee have been established within the Ministry of Education to oversee school safety activities. Flagship 1 has also undertaken coordination of awareness-raising activities with the NRRC Communications Group.

### 2.1.2 Key achievements and issues

Flagship 1 School Safety has reported progress under each of its Joint Programme Outcomes and Workplan Outputs. Major achievements include the retrofitting of 65 school buildings, as well as committed funding and workplans for the retrofitting of a further 260 school buildings by the end of 2014. Additionally, workplans for building assessments and training programs for masons, teachers and students are in place with implementation ongoing. A mapping and initial exposure survey of every school building (public and private schools) is being undertaken for the Kathmandu valley with the support of World Bank/GFDRR (this is explored further in Section 3.4).

Three key issues were identified with Flagship 1: School Safety:

- The slow progress of retrofitting and the ongoing challenge of taking this strategy to scale, including the integration of private schools and new builds
- Expansion beyond the Kathmandu valley
- Poor linkages with activities in the education sector and broader aspects of school safety

These are further addressed in Section 3.4.2.

In relation to these issues, a number of Flagship 1: School Safety Outcomes and workplan Outputs will not be achieved, or will see only limited progress, by 2015. Outcome 2 (Physical and operational strengthening) is seeing ongoing progress, but will not be met by 2015. Outcome 2.1,<sup>1</sup> the retrofitting of 700 school buildings, has seen some progress, but will not be completed

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<sup>1</sup> Outcome 2.1 refers to Joint Programme Outcome 2, workplan Output 1. All Joint Programme Outcomes and workplan Outputs are listed in accordance with the NRRC 2013 Flagship Programme Document.

by 2015. There is no reported action plan or funding for retrofitting committed beyond 2014. Although ADB expects an additional tranche of funding to be released, the amount of time necessary for the design and implementation of the remaining 325 school buildings from the total of 700 schools buildings means that this Outcome is not expected to be met by 2015. Outcome 2.2, the reconstruction of 280 school buildings in the Kathmandu valley for earthquake resiliency, will not be met by 2015. It has no reported progress to date.

In part, delays in implementation have been bureaucratic: for example, the time needed to arrange co-financing for technical assistance, and to mobilise consultants and support for implementation, quality control and future planning. That these issues are now being overcome is an achievement, but more needs to be done.

### 2.1.3 Flagship 1: School Safety—financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>34,290,000</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>10,502,265</b>

Flagship 1: School Safety has a projected budget of US\$ 34,290,000, with US\$ 10,502,265 currently committed. There are, however, major funding gaps in outputs that have not been reported. One of these is the projected US\$ 14,700,000 necessary for the reconstruction of 280 buildings in the Kathmandu valley.

## 2.2 Flagship 1: Hospital Safety

Flagship 1: Hospital Safety aims to improve the resilience of Kathmandu valley hospitals through retrofitting hospital buildings, operational strengthening and training in preparation for a major disaster and awareness raising. This Flagship aims to address the dangers associated with compromised hospital services in the event of a disaster, including unnecessary loss of life and limited care for those injured, by ensuring that hospital buildings can physically withstand a disaster and are prepared to address operationally an increased number of patients and casualties.

Flagship 1: Hospital Safety aims to achieve these objectives through a workplan consisting of three Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Structural and operational vulnerability assessment
2. Physical and operational strengthening
3. Awareness raising

### 2.2.1 Flagship structure

WHO is the coordinating agency for Flagship 1: Hospital Safety, and the Ministry of Health and Population is the Flagship lead. WHO has been actively engaged in DFID-led surveys for structural work on hospitals and with a range of partners on non-structural retrofitting and Mass Casualty Management planning. With donor intervention, work on the physical vulnerability

assessment was bolstered in 2012 and a three-phase plan was developed to ensure strategic implementation of the Flagship workplan. The first phase covered broad-level assessments of 60 hospitals in the Kathmandu valley, and the second phase will engage in more detailed structural and non-structural assessments of 21 hospitals. At the time that the Review took place, six hospitals had been identified for fast-tracked structural assessments. A donor conference is planned to raise funds for the implementation of detailed retrofitting plans for ten of these 21 hospitals. Retrofitting will take place in phase three. For phases one and two, an advisory committee has been established with the aim of offering guidance to the hospital survey team, feedback on survey reports, assist with blockages and to ensure that final recommendations and projects are of a quality that can be endorsed by the GoN.

### 2.2.2 Key achievements and issues

Under Flagship 1: Hospital Safety, major achievements include: the ongoing retrofitting of Patan Hospital as a GoN funded pilot project; the completion of phase one of the DFID-supported hospital assessment; the ECHO-supported structural, non-structural, and functional assessment of TU Teaching Hospital, Civil Service Hospital and Shree Birendra Hospital; and the development of a National Mass Casualty Management Plan. The Hospitals Advisory Committee has successfully guided the DFID-funded survey process. This advisory committee has also been viewed as an opportunity for information sharing and capacity building between the donor-funded private sector and Government workers.

A key issue identified for Flagship 1: Hospital Safety is:

- Slow progress and funding constraints. (This issue is further discussed in Section 3.5.1.)

It is unlikely that Flagship 1: Hospital Safety, Outcome 2 (Physical and operational strengthening) will be completed by 2015. While phase two of the hospital assessment project has begun, there will not be enough time to complete retrofitting work by 2015. The target of ten hospitals during this five-year period (even considering the reduction from the original target of 14 in 2009) would appear extremely ambitious, in line with the acknowledged aspirational nature of the NRRC.

### 2.2.3 Flagship 1: Hospital Safety — Financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>22,840,500</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>2,121,562</b>

Flagship 1 Hospital Safety has an overall projected budget of US\$ 22,800,000 and has US\$ 2,121,562 committed so far. Understandably, in the absence of a detailed surveys and plans, donors were reluctant to fund the structural work. In addition, the total estimated budget for this flagship is likely change once the structural assessments have been completed. The funding committed thus far has gone to assessments, non-structural work and training. Once the results of phase two are clear, active fundraising for phase three will begin.

## 2.3 Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity

Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity aims to enhance the Government of Nepal's response capacities at the national, regional and district levels. It will do this by developing the Government's ability to launch a response using in-country resources (including the armed forces), as well as coordinating incoming international humanitarian and military assistance. The Flagship views first responders as a prerequisite for effective disaster risk management in Nepal, and aims to build a sustainable response capacity through the training of medical first responders, search and rescue teams, and fire and emergency services.

Flagship 2 incorporates a broad ranging set of 75 programmes and activities around the theme of enhancing "Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity." The workplan for Flagship 2 is divided into four Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Institutional capacity building of national and humanitarian partners (including the building of capacity for Civil Protection activities—fire and ambulances services and search and rescue, including significant Urban Search and Rescue (USAR))
2. Disaster preparedness and response-planning activities
3. Warehousing, infrastructure, logistics and stockpiling
4. Preparedness for the facilitation of international humanitarian assistance

A detailed breakdown of the Flagship's Outcomes and workplan Outputs and achievements against each is provided at Annex G.

### 2.3.1 Flagship structure

The current coordinating agency for Flagship 2 is OCHA, and the Flagship lead is the Ministry of Home Affairs. An advisory committee has been established to "act as a decision-making body and oversee the development, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the Joint Programme Outcomes."<sup>2</sup> Further responsibilities of the advisory committee include: stakeholder coordination; technical support; monitoring, evaluation and reporting; advocacy; and resource mobilisation. It has previously been noted that the current formulation of Outcomes and the breadth of the Flagship makes coherent reporting challenging, but this has not yet been addressed by the Advisory Committee.

### 2.3.2 Key achievements and issues

Flagship 2 has reported progress under all of its Joint Program Outcomes, as well as nearly all of its workplan Outputs and key activities. Major achievements include: the finalisation of the Guidance Note for Disaster Preparedness and Response Planning 2011; Dead Body Management Guidelines; National Disaster Response Framework; the establishment of a National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC), 26 District EOCs, five Regional EOCs and five Municipal EOCs; the identification and securing of 83 open spaces (for potential IDP and relief provision post

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<sup>2</sup> Terms of Reference of the Flagship 2 Advisory Committee

disaster); the construction of three regional warehouses (with two more at the planning stage); and the completion of Disaster Preparedness Response Plans in all 75 districts.

Key issues identified with Flagship 2 include:

- The challenging scale and breadth of Flagship 2 outcomes and workplan
- The impending departure of OCHA as Flagship coordinator

These issues are explored further in Section 3.6.2.

Due to the scale and technical issues of Flagship 2, many outputs will not be completed by 2015. Outcome 1.1 (Develop SAR capacities in the country) and Outcome 1.2 (Fire and standard ambulance services to 58 major urban centres) will not be completed. While some progress has been made against light SAR training it is not adequate. It also seems unlikely that the establishment of medium level SAR capacity will be achieved by 2015, despite some funding being made available. For fire and ambulance services, some training has been completed, but little progress has been reported outside of the Kathmandu valley.

Outcome 4.2 (Strengthen the role of the humanitarian country team through coordination, website management and reports) has not been reported against, and it is therefore anticipated that this target will not be achieved by 2015. Furthermore, challenges to achieving this target are likely to persist given OCHA's intention to withdraw from Nepal at the end of 2013. The status of the HCT beyond the end of 2013 remains unclear.

### 2.3.3 Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity—financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>55,242,518</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>19,272,293</b>

Flagship 2 has a projected budget of US\$ 55,000,000, with US\$ 19,272,293 of this committed. While a significant gap in funding remains (approximately US\$ 37,500,000), the Flagship budget doubled in 2012 with the addition of the physical and operational strengthening of Tribhuvan International Airport, and the expansion of activities such as warehouse construction. These additions represented gaps in the analysis in 2009, which represented necessary and overlooked components contributing to the overall outcomes. Some specific Outputs, notably logistics, had no funding, in addition to core agency monies allocated at the time of the Review.

## 2.4 Flagship 3: Flood Management in the Kosi River Basin

Flagship 3: Flood Management in the Kosi River Basin seeks to address issues of flood management in the Kosi River Basin, and more broadly, the annual risk of floods in Nepal. Kosi maintains a prioritised focus as the largest river basin in Nepal, with large portions of the population affected in both Nepal and India during floods. The Flagship has short-term goals related to improving flood management and longer-term goals focused on: implementing effective flood mitigation measures; reducing economic impacts due to floods; improving weather and flood-forecasting capabilities; and strengthening flood-warning dissemination to

communities. The Flagship's focus on the Kosi River Basin aims to develop a design strategy for more comprehensive disaster management in additional river basins throughout the country. Flagship 3 aims to achieve these objectives through a workplan consisting of five Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Flood risk assessment
2. Structural measures for flood mitigation
3. Non-structural measures for flood mitigation
4. Flood forecasting and early warning system
5. Strengthening institutional capacity building

#### **2.4.1 Flagship structure**

The coordinating agency for Flagship 3 is the World Bank and the Flagship lead is the Ministry of Irrigation. An advisory committee has not been developed for Flagship 3, although the World Bank has hosted specific technical workshops for partners.

#### **2.4.2 Key achievements and issues**

Major achievements to date under Flagship 3 include: the strengthening of 15km of Kosi River embankments and spurs; the implementation of the World Bank-supported Building Resilience to Climate Hazards project; and the ongoing work related to flood-risk modeling, forecasting, early-warning mechanisms and CBDRM.

The embankment strengthening and restoration along the Kosi River was completed collectively between the Governments of Nepal and India to mitigate regional flood risk in both countries. The Building Resilience to Climate Hazards project is assisting in building capacity within the GoN, specifically within the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, and aims to contribute to the ongoing improvement of flood forecasting and early warning mechanisms. Additional support for Government capacity building has been provided by both UNDP and ADB.

Key issues identified within Flagship 3 are:

- Geographic expansion and a strategic vision beyond the Kosi Basin
- Government ownership at the central level
- A collective sense expressed amongst stakeholders that the Flagship must broaden its geographical scope and more proactively link with the work of others

These are covered in Section 3.7.2 below.

Overall reporting on the achievements for Flagship 3 has been relatively limited. Outputs that have not yet been explicitly addressed in public reporting include: Outcomes 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5.

However, the World Bank, in communication with the Review Team, has provided information and outlined achievements against all Flagship 3 Joint Programme Outcomes and workplan Outputs, as many are included in larger projects addressing multiple aspects of flood risk

management. Based on this information, the Flagship appears to be on track for ongoing progress in all areas through to 2015. Still, the level of progress remains difficult to determine based on the lack of measurable indicators. Ultimately, the outputs are not disaggregated to a level that allows for the monitoring of progress in a scalable way.

### 2.4.3 Flagship 3: Flood Management in the Kosi River Basin—financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>26,200,000</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>26,516,567</b>

Flagship 3 has a projected budget of US\$ 26,200,000 with approximately US\$ 26,516,567 committed. The amount committed under Flagship 3 already exceeds the projected budget, which highlights several issues.

- The amount committed may not contribute directly to Flagship 3 outcomes but funds do contribute to the broader theme of flood management in the Kosi River. Flagship 3 should identify what funding directly contributes to Flagship 3 outcomes for a clearer picture how much has been committed. As a result, fundraising under this Flagship will be difficult if the projected budget appears fully funded.
- The amount committed versus the projected budget demonstrates the World Bank's limited efforts—as Flagship 3 lead—in coordinating work beyond its own programme. In 2012, each Flagship was given the opportunity to update and revise their respective workplan and budgets. Flagship 3 did not adequately consult with organisations to determine the scale of work happening under Flagship 3 that should have been included in the projected budget.

## 2.5 Flagship 4: Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction/Management

Flagship 4: Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction/Management (CBDRR/M) seeks to capitalise on previously accumulated activities and experience to contribute to a consistent, systematic and harmonised approach to CBDRR/M conducted at Village Development Committee (VDC) level. The Flagship also aims to enable more effective progress tracking in VDCs across the country.

Flagship 4 seeks to achieve these objectives through seven Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Establish a Flagship 4 Coordination Mechanism
2. Identify hazard-prone districts
3. Develop common tools for CBDRR/M projects
4. Conduct training/workshops for National, District and VDC level stakeholders
5. Implement DRM projects in 1,000 VDCs
6. Advocacy
7. Monitoring and Evaluation

### 2.5.1 Flagship structure

The coordinating agency for Flagship 4 is the IFRC and the Flagship lead is the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD). Flagship 4 has established an advisory committee, consultation meetings and information platform. The advisory committee acts as a decision-making body and oversees the development, implementation and monitoring and reporting of the Joint Programme Outcomes. Additional responsibilities include coordination, technical support, advocacy and resource mobilisation. It has held five meetings since February 2012, which have been successful in establishing a working group to develop the project tracking system, survey and handbook for minimum characteristic indicators. The committee has also engaged in progress reporting and discussed annual targets for presentation to the Steering Committee. The web-based information platform includes a project tracking system, which allows implementing partners to register CBDRR/M projects, and which aims to enable broader intra-Flagship information sharing and project coordination.

### 2.5.2 Key achievements and issues

Flagship 4 has seen significant progress throughout its Joint Programme Outcomes. Key achievements include: the development of the “nine characteristics of a disaster resilient community specific to Nepal”; district and municipality consultations (for increasing awareness of CBDRR); detailed CBDRR project mapping; CBDRR projects covering over 500 VDCs and municipalities (565 as of June 2013); and the development of the Flagship 4 website.

The nine characteristics have set a consistent standard for community support for risk reduction, and act as a common means for tracking progress and project implementation across the Flagship. The ongoing district and municipality consultations have been successful in increasing awareness of the need for CBDRR/M among project implementers, donors and Government representatives. The consultations work by facilitating local-level discussions on DRR issues and advocating for the inclusion of the nine minimum characteristics in CBDRR/M projects. These consultations are open to all stakeholders interested in CBDRR/M.

Flagship 4 is on track for continued progress through 2015.

Key issues identified with Flagship 4 include:

- Accurately representing coverage at the ground level and ensuring partners participate in the tracking system
- Sustainability

These issues are further discussed in Section 3.8.2.

### 2.5.3 Flagship 4: Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction/Management— financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>44,380,850</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>28,955,029</b>

Flagship 4 has a projected budget of approximately US\$ 44,000,000, with US\$ 28,955,029 having been committed.

## 2.6 Flagship 5: Policy and Institutional Support for Disaster Risk Management

Flagship 5: Policy and Institutional Support for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) acknowledges that development and growth in Nepal are being undertaken in a haphazard manner, thereby creating new risks. To protect development investments and reduce future risks, the Flagship aims to enhance the DRM capacity of the GoN at all levels. The Flagship also aims to orient disaster policy towards a proactive and comprehensive approach. It focuses specifically on the mainstreaming of DRM in development planning, risk sensitive land use planning and the strengthening and enforcement of building code compliance. As UNDP reconfigured their own Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Programme (CDRMP) to reflect Flagship 5 priorities this programme is extremely prominent in any reporting of the Flagship. There is virtually no distinction between the programme goals within the CDRMP and Flagship 5 Programme targets. Flagship 5 aims to achieve these objectives through five Joint Programme Outcomes:

1. Institutional policy support to bring policies in line with the NSDRM
2. Strengthen the application of building codes and support RSLUP
3. Strengthen national institutions for disaster risk management capacity building
4. Orienting financial mechanisms towards risk reduction and risk management
5. Support mainstreaming DRM and climate change adaptation into development planning processes at all levels

### 2.6.1 Flagship structure

The Flagship 5 coordinating agency is UNDP and the Flagship lead is the Ministry of Home Affairs. Flagship 5 has also run a series of “thematic consultation” meetings, and has in 2013 agreed the TOR for an advisory group. The latter aims to ensure the quality of activities and deliverables, and oversee the implementation, monitoring, and reporting of Outcomes. Additional responsibilities include coordination, technical support, monitoring, evaluation, reporting, advocacy and resource mobilisation. While the Advisory Committee has not yet held a meeting, nine thematic consultation meetings have taken place since March 2012. These aim to identify gaps, progresses, updates and information sharing to strengthen emerging networks in the Flagship. Topics have included RSLUP, DRR mainstreaming, building codes and implementation, gender and social inclusion, policy linkages with CBDRR/M and local level integration and connecting with academia.

## 2.6.2 Key achievements and issues

Flagship 5 has seen ongoing progress against all Outcomes and on many of its workplan Outputs. Major achievements to date include: agreed risk-sensitive land-use planning for Kathmandu with plans for replication outside of the valley; the development of an ongoing action plan for enhancing the implementation of national building codes; the completion of a Government DRM Mainstreaming Plan, with the training and establishment of DRM focal points in 26 Ministries and departments; and Government approval of local- and District-level mainstreaming guidelines.

Key issues identified with Flagship 5 include:

- A perceived lack of strategic vision beyond the CDRMP programme
- Partners' perception that CDRMP programme *is* Flagship 5
- Other Flagships looking for Flagship 5 to proactively support their initiatives in the policy sense

These are each further addressed in Section 3.9.2.

The lack of measurable targets in many of the Flagship's Outcomes and Outputs means that many of these are perceived to be ongoing in nature without a targeted endpoint and measurable milestones. Because of this ongoing work, it is not possible to definitively determine what will and will not be achieved by 2015. Progress towards completion is instead measured by reporting on each Outcome and Output. This information is not always easy to understand.

Several Outcomes and target Outputs have received limited reporting, and are not on track for substantial achievement by 2015. Outcome 2.1 (Review of national building codes, by-laws, regulations and planning acts; enhance GoN and municipalities' capacity to implement the code) has seen some reported progress, but the extent of this progress remains unclear. Reported progress addresses activity related to the implementation of the current building codes, but the extent to which codes, by-laws and regulations have been or will be reviewed, and what capacity building support is planned for the Government's enforcement of potential updates and changes resulting from this review, has not been explicitly addressed. As a result, limited progress by 2015 is expected. Outcome 2.4 (Implement Government building code compliance strategy, including digitisation of the permit approval process and GIS mapping of all buildings in KV) shows that some buildings have been digitised in Kathmandu and Lalitpur, but a compliance strategy is still in development and has not yet been implemented. Outcome 4 has seen limited progress overall. For Outcome 4.1 (Move to proactive risk reduction with MoF, NPC, NRB), there has been no progress reported beyond work with NPC and some discussion with NRB. Outcome 4.2 (Review district and national calamity relief funds; explore budgetary support and options for all levels) has only seen limited reporting as part of the GoN's annual budget process. Outcome 4.3 (Redirect or establish financial mechanisms for VDC, DDC and national DRM activities) has not seen progress beyond the development of the Prime Minister Disaster Fund at the national level, and some efforts to increase financial allocations as part of mainstreaming at other levels.

### 2.6.3 Flagship 5: Policy and Institutional Support for Disaster Risk Management — financing

<b>Total Budget USD</b>	<b>13,000,000</b>
<b>Reported Amount Committed USD</b>	<b>31,995,859</b>

Flagship 5 has a projected budget of US\$ 13,000,000 with US\$ 31,995,859 committed. The amount committed under Flagship 5 already exceeds the projected budget, which highlights several issues:

- The amount committed may not contribute directly to Flagship 5 outcomes, but funds do contribute to the broader theme of policy and institutional support for DRM. Flagship 5 should identify what funding directly contributes to Flagship 5 outcomes. As a result, fundraising under this Flagship will be difficult if the projected budget appears fully funded.
- The amount committed versus the projected budget demonstrates UNDP's (Flagship 5 lead) limited efforts in coordinating work beyond its own CDRMP programme. In 2012, each Flagship was given the opportunity to update and revise their respective workplans and budgets. Flagship 5 did not adequately consult with organisations to determine the scale of work happening under Flagship 5 that should have been included in the projected budget.

## Section 3: NRRC Architecture

This section offers an overview of the NRRC as both an innovation and complete structure before examining the performance of each component part: the Flagships (including the performance of the Flagship leads and coordinators) and linkages between them; the NRRC Steering Committee; the NRRC Secretariat; and the NRRC Communications Group.

### 3.1 The NRRC as an Innovation

The NRRC is unquestionably an innovative framework, notably in the way in which it holds together diverse sets of actors who are unaccustomed to collaborating. From the perspective of international aid architecture, the NRRC sits astride a challenging gap between humanitarian and development architectures. Although much work has been done on smoothing the transition between the relief and development systems, it remains the case that the international system tends to operate in one of these two binary modes. ISDR recognises that this is one of the most challenging aspects of HFA implementation, and ISDR sees the NRRC as a strong positive example of this struggle. It will be important that the relevance of the NRRC is reflected upon in the post-2015 context as the HFA is reconfigured.

Section 3.6 looks in detail at the role of OCHA in the NRRC as Flagship lead. In broad terms, OCHA's relatively heavy presence in Nepal (and its role in strengthening the clusters and managing the Nepal CAP) was due to the ongoing conflict and flood response. The RC/HC advocated strongly for an ongoing OCHA presence, effectively using the NRRC and high levels of disaster risk as a brake. As such, the NRRC framework is unusual in that it has held together significant elements of both the humanitarian and development systems. Although development is clearly the dominant paradigm, the NRRC has maintained a structural tension between the priorities of the GoN, the development community and the humanitarian community. It has required humanitarian actors in the system to consider the following: how to operate in a manner that complements development norms; the need for sustainability in programming; costs that are palatable to Government budgeting; programme objectives and change along longer timeframes; and perhaps above all, the need to work with and through the GoN. Similarly, it has required development actors to consider programming with a humanitarian mindset: targeting and prioritising according to risk and the humanitarian imperative, as well as the need to collapse normal development timeframes for project development and completion. The ultimate challenge of how to ensure mainstreaming throughout key sectors is acknowledged but achievement is still some way off. Again, this issue will be important as related to future iterations of the HFA and the NRRC.

Flagship 2 is one focus of this structural tension in that it looks at disaster preparedness and contains specific roles for OCHA, UNDP, Government and humanitarian and development actors alike. It must be acknowledged that such innovation requires learning and adjustment on the part of institutions and the individuals within them. Such processes of change are slow and require persistent, sustained engagement. There are positive signs. A wide range of Ministries are collaborating, and this has been recognised in some measure resulting from the existence of the NRRC. The National Platform (an obligation for those countries committed to HFA

implementation) has only recently started to meet again, having held two meetings in 2013, though ISDR recognises that many of the functions have been supplied by the NRRC during this time. The diversity of actors in the NRRC adds to its complexity. It is worth noting at the outset that the Flagship programmes look neat when viewed as five coherent thematic areas with a single lead in the GoN and a single international partner in support. This apparent simplicity belies the number and range of partners connected to each Flagship, as well as the complexity of the relationships between them. Inevitably, the NRRC architecture butts against existing coordination structures, both humanitarian (clusters) and development (SWAp related). The NRRC was not intended to (and should not, as a matter of principle) compete with existing coordination structures. In addition, the regional engagement and cooperation related to the NRRC are likely to advance and require support over the next few years.

### **3.2 Stakeholder Views of the NRRC as a Whole**

Overwhelmingly, stakeholders to the NRRC, (including Government, IFIs, donors, UN entities, INGOs and NNGOs) see it as a positive initiative. There is clear consensus that the NRRC has succeeded in:

- Creating and maintaining significant energy around the theme of risk reduction;
- Providing multiple platforms for communication between diverse sets of actors, including the sharing of best practices;
- Facilitating communication across the GoN, as well as between different line Ministries and between federal and local Government institutions;
- Allowing technical Ministries in the GoN, notably MoFALD, to understand, quantify and actively engage with programmes being undertaken by the international system.

The original voluntary principle and deliberately non-committal nature of the NRRC is highly valued by a number of Steering Committee members. These characteristics enable the broadest possible range of actors to cooperate.

While acknowledging clear success in some areas, NRRC members, including Government officials, donors, and implementers, feel that the NRRC has yet to fulfil its potential completely. Symptomatic of its relatively undefined remit at the outset, consortium partners reported mixed expectations in the initial phase. In keeping with the challenges of coordinated structures in Section 1.3, stakeholders in the NRRC, in the absence of clarity, have looked to the structure to resolve pre-existing challenges. Many initially expected funds to flow through the NRRC. Operational agencies felt that it ought to play a strong role in operational coordination (in a similar way to the humanitarian cluster system). Also, those who wanted an advocacy platform, especially in NNGOs and civil society organisations, expected it to provide an open communication channel to Government.

Notably, operational INGOs feel somewhat disconnected from the NRRC as a framework, unrepresented on the Steering Committee and having a variety of experiences in Flagship-coordination meetings. For operationally minded actors, the NRRC still appears to fall short of expectations and the Consortium as whole is viewed as a somewhat amorphous, “ungrounded” body. Amongst a number of similar views from INGOs, one partner questioned the “operational relevance” of the framework. In a similar vein, one Government representative saw the NRRC as

a “floating” body that needs “to put its feet on the ground” to be truly relevant. While this issue refers to the constructive tension referred to above, a continued focus on information sharing mechanisms and discussion will be required during the life of the NRRC in order for all actors to share progress and act coherently.

Representatives from donors and Government consistently saw the need for better reporting and a stronger accountability framework. Implementing partners tended to see the need for better information sharing within and across the Flagships.

The NRRC is considered to have been a success as a platform for raising awareness of risk and risk-reduction efforts in Nepal on the international stage. Although the international visibility of the NRRC was beyond the scope of this study, it was clear from conversations during the course of the exercise that the NRRC is held up as a model for addressing risk reduction in high-risk countries, without a clear understanding of its successes and limitations. One clear school of thought in Nepal is that NRRC is the victim of its own success in this regard. Linked to structural issues described below, stakeholders to the NRRC feel that its overarching success means that key players in the GoN believe that external actors and donors are able to take care of risk-reduction issues. This belief reduces the incentive to centralise the issue as a core priority for the GoN, leaving it generally underserved in national budgeting processes. That said, there have been clear examples of central budget allocations to school and hospital retrofitting in Flagship 1, as well as to warehousing in Flagship 2. There is a continued need to focus on mainstreaming DRR into GoN planning processes.

### **3.3 Flagships: Performance of Lead Agencies and Coordinators**

Clearly, the role of the Flagship lead Ministry and Flagship coordinating agency are critical in the architecture of the NRRC, as is the relationship between the participants. Despite the high levels of expectation on leads and coordinators, the roles were originally conceived as relatively light. Yet there was an expectation that the lead Ministry and coordinating agency would provide dedicated capacity appropriate to the needs of the individual Flagship. In the case of the Flagship coordinators, it was envisaged that one person in the coordinating agency would have the role stipulated in their job description, and would spend a limited amount of their time (approximately 25%) on Flagship-related matters. As widely understood, the agency assumption of Flagship coordinator was voluntary and each individual Flagship coordination agency was expected to devise a ToR for the role (and ideally for the position responsible for it). The expectation was that the Flagship leads and coordinators would undertake three basic functions: coordination; reporting on activities; and fund raising and reporting on financial flows to the Secretariat. In the case of the lead Ministries, respondents to the study were unclear as to original expectations.

Each Flagship lead Ministry and coordinating agency made an initial commitment to the role. It is clear that success in the role on an ongoing basis would be contingent on a number of factors: a lasting institutional commitment on the part of the coordinating agency, as well a personal commitment; a role that was clearly defined and clearly communicated to partners; and an individual coordinator with an appropriate skill set and support. The extent to which each Flagship coordinating agency and lead Ministry has performed is detailed in the sections below. Speaking generally, it was clear in the series of meetings with GoN officials that the issue of risk

reduction had been given significant attention. It was equally clear that it was one priority of many, and that each focal point had a number of other pressing issues at hand. In some cases, policy on risk reduction in the broader sense was not completely aligned with Flagships. The issue of absolute capacity was less problematic than the high turnover reported amongst focal points, including the chair of the Steering Committee.

As noted in Section 1.3, the Flagship coordinators were not chosen on the basis of their track record, experience in coordination, or reporting roles. Each of the coordinators continues to experience challenges entirely in keeping with the nature of the institution. Both OCHA and IFRC are more institutionally experienced. OCHA is a coordinating body and the intuitive choice for the coordinator of Flagship 2. IFRC has institutional experience of coordination in their role as the lead of the global shelter cluster, but its mandate is only to support and coordinate the activities of the National Societies in each respective country. While both WHO and UNDP have experience in leading clusters and networks, they, in common with the global financial institutions, have taken on a new role and this should be recognised.

### **3.4 Flagship 1: School Safety**

#### **3.4.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

The targets of the Flagship are easily quantifiable, especially given the extent to which the Flagship is closely identified with a single target for physical retrofitting. Stakeholders, therefore, saw the goals of the Flagship as relatively well defined. One implementing INGO also noted that involvement in the Flagship allowed for a closer relationship and communication with Government.

Notwithstanding progress towards the target of 260 school buildings, donors and operational partners saw some challenges related to the focus of the Flagship lead on this 'pilot' project and coordination functions beyond these specific activities. There was a clear expectation that reporting from Flagship 1: School Safety could be more responsive, both to the 260 school buildings and other activities. While the Flagship has expanded geographically into the East of the country (via UNDP and DFID funded retrofitting work), donors and other stakeholders perceive that the lead Ministry and coordinator could take a stronger, overarching responsibility for planning and reporting. There is a perception that there should be a stronger push from the Ministry and the ADB to ensure that linkages are made between the two components on issues of quality assurance; and that a cross-Flagship discussion on school safety related to private schools and Flagship 5's work on building codes should be addressed more directly.

The recent launch of the thematic working group on School Safety under the education SWAp is encouraging in that it supports existing coordination structures rather than creating parallel structures. That the group had only met once at the time of the research visit was taken as evidence by donors and other partners of a lack of drive on the issues, and that the Flagship approach appeared too narrowly focused on physical retrofitting. Although the group will liaise with the *education in emergencies* cluster on school safety, there was concern that the membership of the group would remain at a relatively high level (largely Government and donors). Key stakeholders continued to hold the view that a broader platform should be

created, possibly as a thematic working group on school safety across the NRRC. While a discussion on a website based information platform has been happening for some time it does not, as yet, exist.

Ultimately, these policy linkages need a Government lead. Donors and other stakeholders questioned the extent to which the GoN and ADB had adequately dedicated capacity to these issues and were planning for expansion after the pilot project. The original individual coordinator in ADB was clearly personally invested in the role, and partners in Flagship 1 and beyond feel that the current level of institutional commitment to issues beyond the ADB's SSRP programme is open to question. In this Flagship specifically, the lack of a ToR for the coordinator function is seen as problematic.

### **3.4.2 Key issues and analysis**

- Clarity till recently as to why the process of retrofitting has been slow and the ongoing challenge of taking this strategy to scale, including the integration of private schools and new buildings
- Expansion beyond the Kathmandu valley
- Poor linkages with activities in the education sector and broader aspects of school safety

Retrofitting is a complex and time-consuming exercise, which requires detailed planning for each individual building, the continuous supervision of a civil/structural engineer and skilled/trained masons. Retrofitting of each school building thus becomes an independent, technically demanding project by itself, difficult to achieve and expensive at scale. Given the high number of public school buildings in Nepal and leaving aside the complex issue of private schools and challenges related to access, the mass retrofitting of school buildings is a daunting prospect. During the Review there was an evident tension between an increased awareness of real limits of time and resources required for retrofitting versus a sense from some that progress regarding capacity and knowledge was being made and even larger scale up post 2015 would be possible. While there is concern regarding the current pace of retrofitting there is a desire to do more and to work on the policy and legislative side with regard to private schools. One dilemma facing the NRRC is whether projects should be expanded to encompass regions outside of the Kathmandu valley at this point in time. In an attempt to answer many of these questions ADB has recently mobilised a package of technical assistance which will include resources to assess options and strategies for the medium to long term, beyond the present arrangement of engaging communities for retrofitting.

The issue of private schools needs to be addressed from a policy and legislative angle, and has been a standing item on the agenda of Steering Committee policy meetings. A paper has been presented to the Steering Committee for action by the MoE. Moreover, the GoN needs to be enabled to enforce any legislation on building quality and safety. Similarly, legislation on new building standards, including those built with community inputs in and beyond the Kathmandu valley, are seen as equally as important as retrofitting. Here, partners in Flagship 1: School Safety want to see a specific proactive linkage with Flagship 5 to support this work.

In recognition of the challenge of the need to better quantify and prioritise retrofitting, the World Bank is supporting a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) of community schools,

private schools and education-related administration buildings in the Kathmandu valley. The initiative would be overseen by the GoN, supported via the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), and should see results during 2014. This exercise would include not only risk analysis, but also scenario/deterministic impact analysis. It also would have a cost-benefit analysis of various retrofitting options, as well as recommendations on a strategic approach to investment. This is an important initiative, and has the potential to go some way towards addressing the shortcoming of the current linear approach to school safety in Flagship 1. It also will provide data on the safety of individual private schools. Furthermore, it will serve as evidence of an appropriate use of technical assistance in support of the Flagships, and the value of the World Bank's ongoing engagement in the NRRC. It is important that progress on this work is clearly communicated to all stakeholders during 2013/14.

### **3.5 Flagship 1: Hospital Safety**

As with schools, the timelines for the structural retrofitting of hospitals were significantly underestimated at the outset of the NRRC, as was the need for more detailed surveys and designs. Hospital safety has a number of added complexities, including the need to: deal with the existing patient load during physical works; have functioning hospitals after a significant earthquake, and; align the choices made on an engineering basis with the overarching plan for disaster response. The governance of the hospital sector in Nepal is also complex, involving a number of different Ministries and stakeholders. In a similar intervention to the World Bank assessment for schools, DFID has provided significant technical input to drive prioritisation of hospitals for retrofitting. This approach is more narrow, in the sense that it begins with the need for retrofitting as a given. It begins with prioritisation based on structural shortcomings, as opposed to a fuller appraisal of risks and a cost-benefit analysis of different levels of intervention. Ultimately, it speaks to the same issue: the need for the Flagship coordinator and the lead Ministry to think in broad strategic terms beyond a project implementation approach. On non-structural objectives, coordination and planning has been stronger, not least through the ongoing partnership between WHO, MoHP, ECHO, and the collective group of implementers in this area. Linkages between the structural and non-structural components of Flagship 1 need to be strengthened.

#### **3.5.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

In keeping with the progress described above, donors perceived a need for a greater drive from the Flagship coordinator and lead. Concern was also expressed about the feasibility of large-scale retrofitting, given the cost and long timeframe. At the same time, the Government expressed concern about the scope of the Flagship, looking to expand the initiative to all major hospitals and to medical facilities other than hospitals. The issue of safety in private hospitals, including implementation of the building codes, remains challenging. Implementing INGOs saw clear benefits from the coordination around non-structural hospital safety. These included spin-off benefits from ongoing work on mass casualty management, such as, for example, improved protocols for dealing with road traffic accidents, including improved emergency referral procedures.

## **3.6 Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity**

It is important to note that when chosen as the coordinating agency for Flagship 2, OCHA was already scaling down. OCHA had been present throughout the 1996 – 2006 conflict in Nepal, and played a key role in setting up and strengthening cluster coordination, especially in support of the response to the Kosi floods. In keeping with OCHA’s global priorities and institutional norms, the drive from headquarters (albeit against resistance from the country and the regional office) was to scale down and withdraw. During the timeframe of the NRRC, OCHA has downsized dramatically while undertaking its own program of transition to Government. Expectations created by the role of Flagship 2 have risen in parallel with the reduction in capacity. The drawdown has inevitably created a significant gap between expectation and reality. This, however, could have been predicted from the outset.

Over and above the challenge of focusing OCHA’s core functions and the coordination of Flagship 2 without additional capacity, the work required to undertake the basic coordination of Flagship 2 is substantial. MoHA is perceived to have played a strong role and to have dedicated some capacity to the Flagship lead role. Prior to 2012, the lack of funds was considered to be a key blockage. Progress in 2012-13 has improved in a number of policy-related issues, although funding gaps remain. In Flagship 2, this is most strongly evidenced around the disaster planning and preparedness functions, those most central to OCHA’s core business. Challenges related to the scale of Flagship 2 are discussed below.

### **3.6.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

Given the limited capacity that OCHA has been able to bring to this role, they are perceived as being successful in bringing together actors around the issue of disaster preparedness. The advisory committee has been viewed as a positive forum for information exchange and reporting, despite having met infrequently. Government appreciates the role that OCHA has played in supporting the transition of clusters and simulation exercises. As noted, however, and to a significantly greater extent than in any other Flagship, stakeholders feel that the range of activities is too great: they struggle to see a clear focus for this broad thematic area. A number feel that the expansion of activities in 2012 to include the airport exacerbated this problem, while others feel that its initial exclusion was illogical. Flagship 2 demonstrates the essential tension related to the aspirational nature of the NRRC. Should the workplan and budget explain all necessary actions required to fulfill the overall objectives and outcomes, even if it knows that the system is unlikely to support such actions, or should it restrict itself to actions likely to be funded and completed?

Given severe constraints in capacity, OCHA has succeeded in fulfilling “light” coordination. However, capacity at the head of Flagship 2 needs to be strengthened significantly.

### 3.6.2 Key issues and analysis

- Challenging scale and breadth of Flagship 2

Over and above the range and volume of activities in Flagship 2, it is important to acknowledge that a number of the individual activities are technically and institutionally complex in and of themselves. The Flagship sits astride two critical gaps in mandate and capacity within the international system: first, the advanced coordination and planning of the international component of a major disaster response at country level; and second, the standing capacity to strengthen civil protection (search and rescue, fire and ambulance) at country level. Although these areas remain challenging, one of the principle successes of the NRRC is that it forces these gaps to be acknowledged.

Taking each Outcome of Flagship 2 in turn:

1. *Institutional capacity-building of national and humanitarian partners (including the building of capacity for Civil Protection activities — Fire and ambulances services and search and rescue, including significant Urban Search and Rescue (USAR))*

The civil protection components in this outcome have proved some of the hardest to gain traction. The creation of two “medium-level” Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams has long been acknowledged as a priority, given the potential challenges of bringing in external support in the event of a major earthquake. Funding for this component is available, but progress to date has been slow. One problem has been the challenge of parts of the international system in building capacity in non-civilian bodies such as the Nepal Army and Nepal Armed Police. Another is that there is no one body on the ground in Nepal that can offer ongoing technical support in this area. Leadership for this initiative is still reported to be an issue.

Similarly for fire and ambulance services, it is widely acknowledged that both the international and Government bodies in Nepal cannot currently conceptualise what a successful service would look like. For these services, the challenge of working between federal and municipal institutions is also highly complex. Separate from the issue of Flagship 2 lead, discussed below, the civil protection elements of Flagship 2 require dedicated and ongoing in-country support if they are to progress.

2. *Disaster preparedness and response planning activities*

Capacity-building work and contingency planning both report significant progress, and open spaces in Kathmandu valley have been secured. Notwithstanding the securing of these spaces, there is significant work still to be done on incorporating these spaces into preparedness, plans and communications. The new lead of Flagship 2 will have to ensure that the momentum on disaster-preparedness planning continues. The provision of interoperable communications for emergency responders shows limited progress.

3. *Warehousing, infrastructure, logistics and stockpiling*

This Output has been widely discussed and plans put in place, but at the time of the review, there had been no funding for the key logistics components.

#### 4. *Preparedness for the facilitation of international humanitarian assistance*

This Outcome includes the national disaster-simulation exercises, one of which was due to take place during the Review, though severe flooding led to a postponement.

- Impending departure of OCHA as Flagship coordinator

Of all the NRRC's thematic areas, Flagship 2 provides an important case study: how should UNDP, OCHA, the NRCS, IFRC, UN humanitarian agencies and nascent Government disaster-management entities create and negotiate their respective roles in disaster preparedness in the context of a country with very high disaster risk? Setting aside OCHA's role as Flagship 2 coordinator, it clearly has a role alongside other actors in such a context:

- UNDP, in working strictly through Government to build their capacity in disaster management;
- OCHA, in coordinating the planning of international assistance (including civil military coordination) and preparing Government to receive international assistance;
- NRCS, with the support of IFRC, has a key role in disaster preparation as an important, long-term partner to Government across a wide range of activities;
- WFP, UNICEF and WHO (and in this case IOM) in areas of specific technical support.

Arguably the quick withdrawal or absence of OCHA in countries with substantially high natural-disaster risk creates an imbalance in this relationship, leaving UNDP to deal with issues of coordination beyond their institutional skill set. In this instance, and with full respect to their corporate position, the scaling-down of OCHA to one national post will create such an imbalance.

### **3.6.3 Options for replacing OCHA**

There is no single entity with both the mandate and expertise that spans the range of activities within Flagship 2. Although there are numerous options for the Flagship lead, none are perfect. Generally speaking, three alternatives present themselves:

1. One humanitarian actor within the humanitarian system will be required to step beyond their strict mandate. This will require a high level of local commitment, funding and corporate acceptance at some level.
2. A new dedicated entity is created in a "neutral" institutional home, thereby sidestepping the issue of mandate. Assuming that such an entity could be consistently and appropriately staffed, the solution is perhaps neater, but acknowledges the gap in institutional mandates in the system.
3. A private sector entity with specific technical experience. Tentative discussions indicate that at least one experienced international company would be interested in such a role.

In any event, it is critical to the success of the NRRC going forward that any successor in the role of Flagship 2 coordinator has both the capacity and institutional commitment to take on the role in a proactive and energetic fashion.

The viable options in the first category are IOM, UNICEF or WFP, or the NRCS, with strong support from the IFRC Secretariat. However, in the case of IOM, WFP and UNICEF there would be a significant conflict of interest given their large operational stakes in Flagship 2. This is a common dilemma across the cluster system. While the same would be true for the NRCS (and IFRC), they are a more attractive option for a number of reasons. National Red Cross Societies are a partner to government in every country context, irrespective of the presence of OCHA and the strength of the international humanitarian system. NRCS and IFRC (or a strong national society such as the US, Japan or UK) taking on this role in Nepal may provide lessons for similar models elsewhere. On the strength of their participation in Flagship 4, the IFRC Secretariat has been approached to scope out their interest in taking on the Flagship 2 role. On the basis of their ongoing commitment to Flagship 4, they responded negatively.

The second category has one viable option, a dedicated ring-fenced unit in the Resident Coordinator's office. The latter would essentially be a direct replacement for OCHA's international post (possibly with a support function) with no corporate link to OCHA. OCHA's national post would continue to function in support of some of Flagship 2 activities, but there would be no direct linkage with the coordination function. Such an entity could succeed if it was fully funded, appropriately staffed and self-contained with the RC's Office. Given the breadth of the RC function, this unit would need to be self-sustaining and act without constant input from the RC. Its role would also need to be clearly delineated and insulated from that of the NRRC Secretariat, OCHA and any other function of the RC office.

The private sector option appears to offer an innovative solution. A private company in such a position would need to prove that it was cost effective (recognising that its operational costs are expressed explicitly and not as overheads). It would also need to be able to clearly demonstrate the ability to avoid the same conflicts as the UN agencies if it were also seeking an implementation role in the Flagship. In the event that a private entity was considered, the role would certainly be subject to an international tender. Such a tender for coordination services could likely be open to NGOs and UN agencies, and would set a precedent for a competitive rather than selective process. Clearly a supportive donor would need to be identified in advance, and the additional administrative burden and timeframe would also have to be carefully considered. Arguably, the most challenging aspect of a private company taking on the Flagship coordinator role would be that it requires support to Government in developing strategy and policy. Although this is common in consultancy and technical support relationships, the GoN would need to be comfortable with this relationship on an ongoing basis. Consideration of this option would also be of interest to the global international system as it explores how best to work in such contexts. The NRRC Secretariat should consult with donors and groups such as the Political Champions about whether resourcing might be available for this innovative approach.

### **3.7 Flagship 3: Flood Management in the Kosi River Basin**

Flagship 3 is extremely important for Nepal as it addresses flooding, the most frequent hazard. The World Bank (WB), as a major partner to Government in development and risk reduction,

was encouraged to participate in the NRRC in this key role. The WB took on the role of Flagship 3 coordinator around a specific programmatic approach to reducing flood risk in the Kosi River Basin. As is the case with ADB, the WB brings significant weight to the NRRC, but it has a strong institutional mandate to work only in support of Government, and its programmes typically work to long timelines. Government leadership on Flagship 3 sits with the Ministry of Irrigation (MoI), but the Ministries of Environment (MoE) and Finance (MoF) are also key stakeholders. Within the MoI and MoE respectively, the Departments of Water Induced Disaster Prevention (DWIDP) and Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM) are central players too, adding complexity to the required intra-Government linkages. Challenges in communications between the line Ministries involved their respective technical departments, were noted. A key issue in the Flagship, evidenced by the Review Team’s meetings with the GoN, is ensuring that a single strategic approach can be envisaged across the respective parts of Government.

### **3.7.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

Given its specific geographical remit and focus, this Flagship is seen by stakeholders as clear and targeted in the positive sense, or too limited in the negative. Progress was generally perceived as slow and to those not directly involved, unclear. It is worth noting that while Flagship 3 is programmatically focused, there has been some effort to reach beyond this focus. For example, Flagships 3 and 4 have been coordinating with each other to connect the work of the World Bank with community-based work. Above all, donors, national NGOs and the GoN all tended to perceive that the Flagship is running in isolation and missing an overarching vision for how its lessons/successes can be expanded. Agreement has recently been reached to expand into a second river basin.

### **3.7.2 Key issues and analysis**

- Nationwide expansion of lessons from Flagship 3
- Strategic vision beyond WB programmatic approach

The WB has sought to achieve the objectives of Flagship 3 through a stand-alone climate-change adaptation project (for which it has provided loans as well as grants to the GoN). Independently of the project, however, the Flagship does not offer a broader vision or strategy for flood risk management in Nepal. There is no advisory group for Flagship 3, and as a result, no platform for the sharing of information or learning among a wider group of partners. Flagship 3 has held technical meetings on early warning, valued by invitees as inclusive and relevant. These meetings are squarely within the standard programmatic approach of the World Bank, however.

## **3.8 Flagship 4: Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction/Management**

IFRC took on the role of Flagship 4 coordinator with a strong personal commitment from the then-Head of Delegation. Her role in moving forward the Flagship is widely acknowledged. In 2012, the Flagship became the only one with a dedicated coordinator position. The new Head of

Delegation has sustained the institutional commitment to the role, which has now been buttressed by external funding. While the role remains within the IFRC, it is recognised as a special function and sits somewhat apart from IFRC programming. The partnership between MoFALD and IFRC is considered to be strong, and MoFALD owns the Flagship. Although there has been significant turnover in the Ministry, additional dedicated capacity has now been established.

### **3.8.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

Flagship 4 is widely considered to be the success story of the NRRC in Flagship-management terms. To a large extent, a common vision has been created amongst partners, including MoFALD. The minimum characteristics of a resilient community are perceived by partners as a key success. The GoN sees clear value in the development of the minimum characteristics and data tracking. In a practical sense, the operational partners view the coordination and information management efforts within the Flagship as enabling the avoidance of duplication in programming. By the same token, Government values the information management efforts as providing a window into the programming of the international community.

### **3.8.2 Key issues and analysis**

There is awareness across Flagship 4, including by the coordinator, that it is possible to “claim” coverage of a VDC only when one “micro” project might be in evidence. The Flagship is seeking to address this limitation through improved information management. Notwithstanding the successes of Flagship 4 in terms of international projects, NNGOs questioned the extent to which these efforts might be sustainable. Government ownership of this process in budgetary terms also was questioned. Although awareness was seen to have been raised, budgets for DRR at the DDC level do not appear to have risen.

## **3.9 Flagship 5: Policy and Institutional Support for Disaster Risk Management**

UNDP has been working closely with the Ministries of Home Affairs, Local Development and Urban Development (formerly Physical Planning and Works) on several aspects of DRR for more than a decade. It has also worked at district level and with VDCs, providing a level of familiarity with governance at all levels. Given this background and its central role as a development partner to the GoN, UNDP was an obvious candidate for the role of coordinator in Flagship 5.

Flagship 5 is coordinated from the Disaster Risk Management Unit of the UNDP Country Office. The individual Flagship coordinator estimates that approximately 40% of her time is spent on Flagship business. Currently, the GoN and other partners do not perceive Flagship 5 as having made a significant expansion beyond the CDRMP, although the Flagship workshop held in early 2013 strongly indicates the intention to do this and to establish an advisory group for the Flagship.

### **3.9.1 Stakeholder perceptions**

NGOs and INGOs tended to view Flagship 5 in a different light to the other Flagships, namely, as an opportunity to create an advocacy platform on policy issues with GoN. The extent to which this is a realistic expectation is questionable, but the “thematic meetings” fall short of the expectations raised by the concept of the NRRC. These meetings were viewed as useful in terms of information exchange and the topics selected. Overall, however, they generated frustration because they were not perceived to allow for follow-through, sustained dialogue and advocacy on key topics. In a similar fashion, operational partners in each of the Flagship areas clearly see a role for Flagship 5 in assisting with the policy components of their own Flagship areas. To date, partners in other areas of the NRRC have seen UNDP as principally focused on its own programme. The Flagship 5 workshop referenced above was held with the specific intent of understanding how to better support policy and institutional issues in each of the other Flagships. The outcomes of this should influence the Flagship workplan going forward.

### **3.9.2 Key issues and analysis**

- A perceived lack of strategic vision beyond the UNDPs own work
- Other Flagships expecting Flagship 5 to support their initiatives in the policy sense

There are high expectations of Flagship 5; it is perceived as having a key role not only in the institutional strengthening of the DRR system in Nepal in the broad sense, but also in specifically supporting the policy issues in other priority areas addressed by Flagship programmes. When the presentations made by Flagship 5 in the Steering Committee meetings are reviewed, they give a clear sense that UNDP has undertaken a large number of activities, almost exclusively implemented under the CDRMP. These significant achievements notwithstanding, no strategic purpose or broader objective are apparent in these presentations to date. Effectively, partners view Flagship 5 as having two key components: one, the strengthening of systems via the CDRMP; and two, provision of a thematic group on policy and institutions (which could be considered a cross-Flagship component).

### **3.10 A Note on Government Ownership of the Flagship Programmes**

An asymmetrical relationship exists between the Flagship coordinators, international agencies, Flagship leads and Government Ministries or departments. It reflects the real differences in the level of financial and technical resources that these institutions can access. The NRRC was set up in recognition of these differences. It consciously tries to bridge these differences through its emphasis on partnership with Government. Yet success has been variable. The norms of ADB’s operation mean that a strong linkage with the Ministry of Education has been established in relation to its own project, if not more broadly. Flagship 4 has built a strong rapport and relationship with MoFALD. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) has been working closely with Flagships 2 and 5, but its ownership of these Flagships appears somewhat limited, possibly greater in Flagship 2 on issues of disaster planning and coordination. Under Flagship 3, the awareness of the partner institutions such as the Ministry of Irrigation, Department of Water-Induced Disaster Management and the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology appeared rather low regarding initiatives taken by the World Bank. Even allowing for turnover in some positions, these agencies knew little about the World Bank’s project on climate change adaptation or about the NRRC more broadly.

The responsibility for a lack of wholehearted buy-in from the Government cannot be attributed to international agencies alone; it must be shared by the Government Ministries and Departments as well. There is a need to step up the engagement and seek a greater level of consultation on activities being planned under different Flagships. Doing so will make various activities being carried out under different Flagships more politically acceptable and sustainable. The importance of partnership between the coordinators and leads cannot be over-emphasised if the NRRC is to realise objectives and maintain its relevance.

Donors and other NRRC members sent one central and consistent message — that the presence and participation of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was not strong enough. The active participation of the MoF in discussions on priorities and the presence of risk-reduction activities in central budgets are seen as a key indicator of success for the NRRC and there has been limited progress in these areas. This is a particularly important issue for the IFIs, who derive their demand from the MoF's expression of the need for investment in risk reduction, specifically in large infrastructure.

### **3.11 The NRRC Communications Group**

The NRRC Communications Group is made up of interested NRRC members. It is chaired by MoHA, and BBC Media Action has acted as technical lead thus far, supporting the coordination of the group in conjunction with the Secretariat's information focal point.

The principal achievement of the Group has been the discussion and development of standardised messages around risk. In particular, it has worked to standardise the public service announcements (PSAs) used by a variety of actors and programmes in the NRRC. These standard messages are DRR-relevant, specifically addressing earthquake, flood and landslide preparedness and response. The Group has worked successfully across the Flagship areas. At the time of the research visit, the head of BBC Media Action and individual coordinator for the Communications Group was leaving Nepal. The extent to which the incoming head would adopt the Communications Group as an ongoing priority was unclear. This role needs to be continued, and the Secretariat should not be drawn into any vacuum that ensues. Given adequate capacity in the leadership role and engagement from a critical mass of actors, the Communications Group serves as a useful model for cross-Flagship thematic working groups.

### **3.12 NRRC Steering Committee**

The original TOR for the Inter-Ministerial and Consortium Steering Committee states:

*The Ministry of Home Affairs has the responsibility to [...] ensure the effective and result based implementation of the NSDRM based on full cooperation and coordination with the concerned agencies and stakeholders. (See Annex B for full TOR)*

The Committee's mandate is temporary, pending the formulation of a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The formulation and creation of an NDMA in turn would follow the final passing of the Disaster Management Act.

The TOR lists a number of specific functions for the Steering Committee:

- *Fundraising and the identification of funding sources and mechanisms;*
- *Guidance on resource use and mobilisation to implement the five Flagship programs;*
- *Provisions for strategic visioning, guidance, guidelines and prioritisation to the concerned agencies to implement Flagship areas;*
- *Coordination among Government authorities and UN agencies to implement the Flagship programs;*
- *Provisions for technical and administrative support to the concerned authorities to implement five flagships;*
- *Strategic monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of five Flagship programs.*

The Steering Committee is co-chaired by the Secretary of MoHA and the UN Resident Coordinator. The remaining 20+ members are comprised of: concerned GoN Ministries (represented at Joint Secretary level); UN agencies and donors (ideally represented at the level of Resident Representative); the Nepal Red Cross; and DpNet. A full list is in Annex B. The Steering Committee is scheduled to meet every first Monday of every quarter. The TOR provides no standing agenda for the meetings.

The TOR also gives responsibility to the Ministry of Home Affairs to act as a Secretariat for the committee. It also allows for the formation of sub-committees (consisting of representatives from implementing partners) to assist the committee in monitoring and evaluation activities.

### **3.12.1 Performance of the steering committee and stakeholder perceptions**

Meeting minutes from the Steering Committee show a positive trajectory. In the initial phase of the NRRC, the Steering Committee was largely absorbed with procedural issues, such as the selection of lead Ministries for the Flagship programmes. The Steering Committee met infrequently until 2011, when the high-level meeting energised the NRRC and the post of Secretariat coordinator was created and filled. Subsequently, the Steering Committee has met quarterly, in keeping with the schedule originally envisaged. The meetings took on the form of a reporting platform where the Flagship leads have presented progress reports. Since mid-2012, and in recognition of the strategic and policy remit of the steering committee, half of the meetings (two per year) look specifically at issues of policy or specific challenges. For example, the eighth steering committee in February 2013 considered the issue of the safety of private schools and hospitals. The most recent meetings have dedicated time to specifically following up on action points from previous meetings.

Looking at the Steering Committee in terms of its intended functions above, the following points emerge:

- **Coordination among Government authorities and UN agencies:** Steering Committee meeting minutes indicate that coordination has constituted a significant proportion of

Steering Committee business. Government actors are afforded the opportunity for information sharing and understanding the progress, workplans and challenges faced by other Ministries in their implementation of the Flagship Programmes.

Interviews with Government clearly demonstrated that Steering Committee meetings are valued as a forum for information exchange. In particular, the inter-Ministerial function of the Steering Committee is valued by GoN representatives in that it provides a rare opportunity for cross-Government communication on a thematic issue. There is evidence of significant follow-up on action points that involve meetings between Government Ministries. One GoN focal point noted that the Steering Committee meetings provided time-bound motivation for progress because they allowed him to report to peers on a regular basis. Steering Committee meetings were viewed as important for maintaining momentum and encouraging transparency on the part of stakeholders. The standard format of progress reporting also provides an opportunity for international agencies to present their work and better understand how to coordinate it with Government structures. Partners are also able to receive feedback and suggestions from Government.

- **Fundraising:** There has been limited engagement on this issue. The Steering Committee *has* proposed a high-level international meeting to raise the platform of the NRRC, attract new members and secure further funding. However, this has not yet taken place.
- **Guidance on resource use and mobilisation:** Steering Committee meetings have assisted in not only identifying gaps, but also proposing a few action points for addressing these gaps. The meetings have also aided in prioritising some of the Flagship activities to ensure that existing funds are allocated accordingly. Meetings have also encouraged limited discussion on issues of absorption capacity in an effort to increase resource mobilisation for the purposes of programme implementation.
- **Strategic monitoring and evaluation:** This has been undertaken, but to a limited extent. In the narrow sense, monitoring takes place in that the meetings focus on progress reporting. Yet there has been no discussion of evaluation. Clearly the SC would not be expected to undertake evaluation directly, but they should ensure that the Secretariat is tasked with facilitating a strong evaluation function. Simply put, the NRRC needs to be better able to demonstrate results (monitoring, reporting and evaluation are covered in Section 4.4.)
- **Provisions for strategic visioning, guidance, guidelines and prioritisation:** Action here is limited. Beyond regular discussion of gaps and challenges, as well as action planning for what needs to be done, there is little follow-up. Some prioritisation takes place, but it is mostly associated with identifying the gaps and challenges. Beyond this identification, strategic visioning and guidance does not seem to occur.

Steering Committee members reflected that despite its increasing utility, the body itself remained a large and diverse forum better suited for information exchange. Government representatives pointed out that the Committee's makeup (under the Chair of MoHA Chair at Secretary level and other GoN representation at Joint-Secretary

level) cut across the normal hierarchies of Government, and so it was unlikely to be a forum in which strategic thinking and decision-making would normally take place.

- **Provisions for technical and administrative support:** There has been little discussion of technical oversight in the NRRC meetings; this was recognised as a gap on two levels. First, at the Flagship level, a general lack of technical guidance was recognised, especially that the existing advisory groups tend to consist of non-technical people (both Government and outside) and technical issues tend not to be the focus. At a higher level, partners and Government identified a critical gap in seeking adequate technical assistance and cooperation from the region, especially from countries with specific expertise in seismic and flood risk. A general lack of engagement with academia and experienced technical groups (such as the SAARC Disaster Management section and NDMAs in other countries) was identified as a shortfall.

### 3.13 NRRC Secretariat

The NRRC Secretariat is composed of the Joint and Under Secretaries at MoHA, a Secretariat coordinator, a Public Information Focal point and one administrator. In the original TOR for the Secretariat (at Annex B), its overarching objective is stated as follows: “To provide technical and advisory support to the Steering Committee of the NRRC and consortium members for implementation of the five Flagship Programmes.” A number of functions are also specified, which can be broken down into a six broad categories:

1. Secretarial (support to the Steering Committee, e.g., arranging meetings, taking minutes, organising events and other meetings, acting as a repository for documentation)
2. Communications (internal)
3. Communications (public)
4. Monitoring, reporting
5. Resource mobilisation
6. Support/facilitation of technical assistance

The non-Government staffs, including the coordinator, are physically housed in the offices of UNDP; they rely on UNDP for logistics and administrative support. The coordinator position is funded by DFID and contracted directly, rather than through the UN. On paper, the Secretariat has a single reporting line to the Steering Committee. In practice, however, the coordinator of the Secretariat works in close cooperation with the Joint Secretary in MoHA, and functionally reports to the UN RC. Authority to act is delegated in the formal sense from the Steering Committee, and on a day-to-day basis from the UN RC. It is worth noting that the RC function in the UN system has limits to its direct authority over actors within the UN system.

#### 3.13.1 Secretariat performance and stakeholder perceptions

Across the range of stakeholders interviewed, there was a universally positive view of the role played by the coordinator. As noted for other NRRC structures, views of the Secretariat function are somewhat asymmetrical in the sense that the non-Government part of the Secretariat is

more visible. The Secretariat is seen as highly proactive. Although partners are generally unaware of its specific terms of reference, the Secretariat is seen as successful in creating linkages either across the NRRRC, from one Flagship to another, between implementers and donors or between Government and other stakeholders. Representatives of Government consistently saw the need to strengthen the Secretariat and ensure that it was fully empowered to undertake its key functions.

Operational partners strongly associate the Secretariat with UNDP and/or the RC's office. Non-Government secretariat staff use *one.un.org* e-mail addresses, in part to maintain an identity distinct from UNDP. Although the NRRRC maintains a separate identity on Facebook and Twitter, the main website of the NRRRC, supported by the Secretariat, is hosted on the UN Information Platform and perceived to be "lost" in the larger UN Platform (not least because of a long domain name that many potential users do not access). Several stakeholders, including Government, supported stronger independence for the Secretariat; a number of them suggested co-location with MoHA or a separate office and logistical support.

Generally speaking, the Secretariat plays a clearly pivotal role at the centre of the NRRRC architecture. The Secretariat is widely perceived as successfully managing its original functions to the extent that the system in which it sits allows for that. Notably, many of the functions of the Secretariat are expressed in terms of "support to" and/or "facilitation of" the actions of other bodies of the NRRRC (notably the Steering Committee and the Flagship heads and Flagship advisory groups.) Again, referring back to Section 1.3, certain challenges and tensions within the Secretariat's role are predictable. As one of the few parts of the NRRRC with dedicated capacity, the Secretariat relies on two key factors to successfully undertake its functions:

- To act as the delegated authority of the Steering Committee (and, based on its current location with the UN RC's office, the delegated authority of the UN RC himself);
- To ensure that other bodies in the NRRRC have adequate capacity and undertake their own functions in a full and proactive manner.

Given the noted lack of capacity across the Flagship leads, the Secretariat has experienced challenges in undertaking its reporting function. In 2013, the reporting mechanism was re-crafted so that one overall report is made to the Steering Committee, as opposed to six individual reports. While this streamlining allows for linkages to be drawn and raising macro issues, it arguably places the Secretariat, who draft this report, in a role that was not originally intended for them. Yet it is difficult to see how else analysis could be drawn to focus SC discussion on more strategic issues. The Secretariat has not undertaken its function of facilitating evaluation to date. Monitoring and evaluation are discussed in Section 4.4.

MoHA has engaged strongly in its Secretariat function, but a general lack of capacity has seen it rely heavily on the individual Secretariat coordinator. Aside from evaluation, and as noted above, the Secretariat has not been tasked with the support and facilitation of technical assistance.

## Section 4: The Flagship Programmes — Coherence, Linkages, Gaps and Timespan

This section aims to address a number of the key questions from the TOR. It looks specifically at the focus of the NRRC Flagship programmes and whether the programmes remain priorities or if key gaps exist that should be addressed (Questions B, C and E on page 19 on this report). It considers linkages between the Flagships and whether these are adequately supported by the Secretariat (Questions D and F). It also looks at some of the other questions in the TOR, including the potential timeline of the NRRC.

### 4.1 NRRC as a Reflection of Risk Reduction Priorities in Nepal?

As noted in previous sections, the Flagships of the NRRC represent GoN priorities as identified in 2009. These priorities were developed after extensive consultation with partners. They are broadly aligned with the HFA and derived from the NSDRM. This strategy does not constitute a fully scientific approach based on a single specific assessment of risk severity or frequency (although the NSDRM makes reference to existing assessment and was influenced by the GRIP assessment in 2010). In part, the framing of the NRRC Flagships also sought to bring together actors with political weight in risk reduction.

In considering whether the NRRC Flagship priorities remain relevant, as well as whether gaps exist, the following areas are considered:

- Is the thematic and geographic focus justifiable — should the NRRC prioritise other major risks or other parts of Nepal?
- What are the views of Flagship partners on expansion?
- The expansion dilemma: the NRRC Flagships are designed to focus attention on priorities, so would expansion of the Flagship areas dilute the intention of the NRRC to draw resources to priority areas and show results?
- Are the support structures and current leadership (of Flagships and the Steering Committee) strong enough to support expansion?

#### 4.1.1. Is the current thematic and geographical focus appropriate?

Nepal faces high seismic-risk, but earthquakes as a hazard occur relatively infrequently. Although the geographic focus of Flagships 1 and 2 is the Kathmandu valley, the two major earthquakes in the recent past have struck eastern Nepal. It is clear that seismic risks in Nepal are spread across the country, and so arguably, earthquake preparedness and risk-reduction measures should reach beyond the Kathmandu valley.

The NRRC supports the idea of managing flood risk through a river basin approach. The massive Kosi floods in 2008 caused extensive damage and undoubtedly drew attention to this particular basin for flood management. In 2006 and 2007, flooding affected central and western Nepal, and during the research period for this study, western Nepal was severely affected by floods.

This raises the issue of how flood risk management should be prioritised in Nepal. Given that the Kosi basin has not experienced any floods in the last five years, it appears appropriate to argue that flood management is a country-wide issue, and that Flagship 3 could expand not just to one other basin as proposed in their 2013 target, but rather, all river basins by 2020.

The impact of climate change is becoming increasingly visible in Nepal. An early monsoon this year led to flash floods and landslides. Such events are becoming increasingly frequent, and beyond the loss of life and damage to infrastructure, they disrupt economic activities. The impacts are limited in geographical terms, concentrated in central Nepal between Pokhara and Kathmandu, where the mean annual rainfall is high. It is critical for the NRRC to recognise the impact of climate change and assess whether the flagship areas can address these frequent risks of flash floods and landslides in addition to other principal hazards.

#### **4.1.2 Stakeholder views**

A number of respondents had strong views on the expansion or refocus of the Flagship areas. These views covered both geographic and thematic expansion. Depending on their thematic or geographical focus, Governmental and non-Governmental partners in the NRRC advocated strongly for expansion of the Flagships to include what they perceive as critical gaps.

One view dominated opinions across the GoN, donors and operational partners: that Flagship 3 be extended beyond the Kosi basin to a nationwide approach to flood risk management.

As noted above, Flagship 1: School Safety has a phased approach, and in its pilot phase, a current focus on the Kathmandu valley. It has been extended to include activities related to the 2011 earthquake in Eastern Nepal. Among partners, however, it is strongly associated only with the work in the valley and there is a call for the programme to expand beyond the valley. At a minimum, this could ensure that lessons learned and policy implications of the work in the valley are expanded countrywide.

Although Flagship 5 has no geographical limitation, it necessarily has clear areas of focus. UNDP has taken steps to engage in dialogue with interested parties beyond the strict remit of its own CDRMP through thematic meetings and the recent workshop.

In all three cases, however, partners clearly expect that each should do more to ensure that any evolution in policy, technical improvements and other lessons be proactively pushed: in the case of school safety, onto programming in other parts of the country; in support of other Flagships in the case of Flagship 5; and with the engagement of the widest possible group of operational partners in all cases.

Phase 1 assessments for Flagship 1: Hospital Safety looked at hospital buildings outside of the Kathmandu valley, but again, a strong perception exists that the work is heavily focused only in the Valley and that this calls for nationwide expansion. In this respect, there was a clear call from the GoN to expand the Flagship to include health facilities of all sizes and denominations.

As noted above, Flagship 2 has a wide ranging set of projects, and although there is a clear, overarching theme, it is the Flagship with the broadest set of programmatic outputs. Flagship 2, in incorporating the strengthening of Nepal's main airport, was the only Flagship to see a very

significant budget shift. Views on this expansion were mixed. The basic dilemma around expansion is discussed more below.

Flagship 4 offers a clear contrast to Flagship 2. Over and above having a full time, dedicated coordinator, Flagship 4 has clearly benefitted from having a single target and goal that is tangible, time bound and achievable within eighteen months per VDC. Arguably, this might seem to support an argument for consolidation, rather than expansion.

During the course of the review, a number of suggestions for a sixth flagship were put forward. The most frequent suggestions were for Flagships on “critical infrastructure,” the Kathmandu valley and/or communications. Clearly, Kathmandu valley is exposed to a number of risks over and above the earthquake threat, including floods, landslides, and rapid urbanisation. Any serious disruption within Kathmandu valley will have serious impact upon the national economy and political systems, and as such, deserves special attention. Infrastructure as a theme, however, came up in two guises. First, Government and donors felt there needed to be a focus on the safety of some critical infrastructure (for example, Government buildings, communications networks and water supply). Second, and notwithstanding the progress on building codes via Flagship 5, Government, donors and operational agencies alike saw the need for an overarching strategy to drive enforcement. It was seen as critical that this issue be driven proactively across all of the Flagships, as well as more generally. Lastly, communication as a topic is currently managed through the Communications Group, the only crosscutting thematic group within the NRRC architecture.

#### **4.1.3 The expansion dilemma and leadership capacity**

While there was enthusiasm for expansion, a second set of counter-balancing views recognised the risks of doing so. They pointed out that a fundamental premise of the NRRC is to focus on a relatively small set of priorities so that investment is clear and results demonstrable. The dilemma related to the airport in Flagship 2 is characteristic of this general case. The obvious risks of expansion include a dilution of focus, as well as the expansion of budgets beyond realistic levels of funding and the addition of work to the Flagships, work that has no realistic prospect of being achieved in the stated timeframes.

In each Flagship, high expectations need to be balanced with the realistic capacity of both the Flagship leads and coordinators. Obviously, a large part of the respective Flagships’ ability to expand either geographically or thematically depends on a high level of capacity and proactive engagement on the part of both coordinators and leads. Overall, the prospect of leadership for expansion is questionable.

When looking at the logic of expansion, it is important to consider the perspective of the Flagship leads and coordinators. In terms of the basic Flagship lead functions, donors perceive that neither Flagships 1 nor 3 have demonstrated interest in the reporting function (beyond the Kathmandu valley for the DFID-funded reconstruction and retrofitting of schools in Eastern Nepal in Flagship 1, and beyond the BRCH programme in Flagship 3.) Flagship 2 leadership has been under-capacitated to date. Notwithstanding the efforts made by Flagship 5 to go beyond their own areas of programmatic interest and link with other Flagships, the general consensus among partners is that more capacity is required.

As noted above, Flagship 5 is perceived to have a role in supporting policy or legislative issues across the Flagship programmes. Where such issues in other Flagships coincide with elements of UNDP programming, these linkages have been apparent, especially in Flagship 2. For example, one partner noted that work on securing open spaces for disaster-response planning would not have happened if not for UNDP's work on RSLUP. Flagship 5's workshop in early 2013 shows clear intent to move beyond the confines of the current UNDP programming.

## **4.2 Timeline for the NRRC: How to Move Forward?**

The issue of the duration of the NRRC, which was designed as an interim body, cuts across all of the issues addressed in this review. The current targets of the NRRC were originally set to be reached by 2015, a date that does not align specifically with any specific planning cycles of the Government though the successor to the HFA should be effective from the end of 2015. The NSDRM, which the NRRC was established to support, does not have an end date. One stipulation designed to limit the duration of the NRRC at its outset was the phasing out of the NRRC Steering Committee on creation of an NDMA (itself contingent on the passing of the DMA). Throughout the research visit, there was a significant amount of discussion about the creation of a number of new posts in MoHA (specifically to handle disaster management) as an interim step towards an NDMA. At the time of the visit, there was no clarity on either the specific formulation of the new posts or a realistic timeframe for the passing of the Act.

The GoN has engaged with the issue of risk-reduction via the NRRC and strongly supports the initiative overall. Ownership of the initiative at all levels remains lacking; however, institutional change cannot be expected overnight. The NRRC is a mechanism which warrants continued engagement of all partners and should be continued. The introduction of new posts in MoHA and the ultimate initiation of the DMA and NDMA are likely to require an adjustment in the way that the NRRC's support is structured. Neither event, however, is likely to reduce the need for the NRRC structures in the immediate term.

As discussed previously, many of the NRRCs original targets will not be met by 2015. Calls for expansion in many areas need to be carefully considered and treated with caution. Speaking generally, there should an ongoing focus on existing programmatic outcomes and outputs until the original target date of 2015. It would be appropriate at this juncture to consider a second review, with stronger programmatic focus, to look at the need for the adjustment of priorities (as well as adjustments to structures in light of the potential for new posts in MoHA). The Steering Committee might consider a countrywide risk assessment in 2014 to set a baseline for such a review.

## 4.3 Information Management, Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation

### 4.3.1 Reporting

As noted in Section 1.3, monitoring, reporting and evaluation through coordinated structures such as the NRRC are notoriously challenging. The NRRC suffers from the typical afflictions of these systems in that:

- Reporting is required of Flagship partners to Flagship coordinators, and from Flagship coordinators and leads to the Steering Committee via the Secretariat. As the NRRC is a voluntary structure, neither the Flagship coordinators nor the Secretariat has the authority to enforce reporting. While the UN RC and/or MoHA can lend their weight behind the Secretariat, doing so involves a political calculation: withdrawal of participation can be a risk, and the senior figures in the system may wish to use their political capital elsewhere.
- There is no culture of data sharing; agencies are often uncomfortable sharing details that relate to their own finances or performance.
- There are no clear data standards across the Flagships. Although the Secretariat has encouraged a standard template for reporting, this does not necessarily match with the mechanisms through which the Flagship coordinators collect data.
- Many of the Joint Programme Outcomes, and the workplan Outputs within them, are ill-defined making reporting against them challenging.
- Information management, especially against a backdrop of poor standards and ill-defined reporting criteria, is time-consuming and requires dedicated capacity.

In principle, neither implementers nor Flagship coordinators claimed to have an issue with reporting. They felt that they have complied with the requests of the Secretariat. Interactions with the Secretariat team, as well as email chains that were shared with the research team for reports connected to the review, however, demonstrate that reporting is of a mixed standard, subject to delays and often incomplete. In 2013 the reporting mechanism was re-crafted so that one overall report is made to the Steering Committee rather than six individual reports.

### 4.3.2 Information management

At the time of the research visit, only Flagship 4 had a functioning IM platform. The Flagship 4 website is impressive, with a range of information functions, including project mapping, knowledge products and other activities in which Flagship 4 is involved. As noted above, the project-mapping function is highly valued by partners and Government alike for purposes of deconfliction, active coordination, and for allowing Government to access data on activities. Flagship 2, with assistance from the Secretariat, has subsequently established its own platform and Flagship 5 is working on its own model.

### 4.3.3 Evaluation

Although individual actors undertake project-level monitoring and some evaluation, there is no Flagship-led or inter-Flagship multi-stakeholder evaluation at present. An improved evaluation function is critical to the NRRC going forward. Coordinated frameworks such as the NRRC provide a golden opportunity, rarely taken, to bring together multiple actors in evaluations.

Given the regularity of disasters in Nepal, it would be possible to measure, in real-time or ex-post, the impact in risk-reduction measures.

#### **4.4 Should There Be a Pooled Funding Instrument to Support the NRRC?**

In principle, the idea has merit. The concept of a trust fund was explored, and a provisional concept drawn up in 2011. The model proposed was to all intents and purposes a standard MDTF model: a relatively small, time-bound fund through which donors would provide funding (preferably earmarked) to projects within Flagship areas. Unearmarked funds would be allocated through Flagship leads with oversight from the Steering Committee, and all decisions would be made in a consensual fashion with Government.

Pooled funds have been shown to strengthen systems that already demonstrate strong leadership, a clear strategy and functioning coordination mechanisms, all of which enhance the capacity to allocate funds effectively. In its current form, the NRRC would not be a strong candidate for such a fund. Arguably, however, if the modalities for funding allocations were well designed, the 'flow' of funding through NRRC structures could overcome some of its perceived shortcomings.

The issue of pooled funding warrants a specific study once recommendations from this Review have been implemented (in particular the strengthening of capacity at the Flagship lead and coordinator level).

A number of key questions should be considered:

- Recognising that pooled funding allocation and disbursement processes can be labour-intensive, is this a genuine priority in an environment of limited resources?
- Would the Fund attract a critical mass of resources that would justify the investment?
- Would Fund management responsibilities negatively affect relationships between the Secretariat and other actors in the NRRC.

## Section 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1 NRRC Overarching Conclusion

The NRRC is a success in terms of a number of its original functions. It has brought together a range of diverse actors together around the issue of risk reduction and raised awareness of the issue both within and outside the Government. In the sense that it holds together the actors, principles and approaches from the humanitarian and development systems, the NRRC is an innovative and interesting case study. On the whole, however, success at the midpoint can only be described as partial. Overall, Government capacity has not been adequately developed; the Government stakeholders generally lack a sense of full engagement, and thus require more dedicated capacity. Undoubtedly, the NRRC has improved Government capacity for disaster management, but this success remains some way from constituting full and effective systems. Each of the Flagships has seen progress (recommendations for each of the Flagships are below), but each requires further institutionalisation and redoubled engagement on the part of both Flagship leads and coordinators during the current phase (until 2015).

#### 5.1.1 Conclusions — timeline for the NRRC and the expansion dilemma

The strengthening of MoHA and the prospect of a Disaster Management Act were very much on the agenda during the research visit, but no details and no possible timeframe were available. The NRRC has been partially successful, and it is an important initiative that warrants the continued engagement of all partners. The introduction of a new Division and posts in MoHA and the ultimate initiation of the DMA and NDMA will require an adjustment in the way that the NRRC is structured and will have implications for funding requirements and strategy. Neither event, however, is likely to reduce the need for the NRRC structures in the immediate term as the NRRC is the most viable model for the support that a new Division or NDMA would require during its initial period. This conclusion was supported by the Government during the Review period and in comments made by the Government to the first draft of the report.

Many of the NRRCs original outcomes and outputs will not be met during the initial time period agreed (2015). This has been widely accepted for some time and this statement is not intended to indicate failure as the outcomes reflect the original ambitious and aspirational nature of the NRRC. It is clear however that given the above need to support the evolution of the new MoHA Division and eventual NDMA and the expressed desire of the Government that this becomes a function of the NRRC, and the success to date, the need to extend the timeline of the NRRC should be accepted now.

For the most part, the NRRC and individual Flagships should continue to focus on existing programmatic Outcomes and Outputs until the original target date of 2015. Where exceptions to this exist they are indicated under the individual Flagship headings.

Ongoing updating of the workplans should continue to take place in consultation with partners with significant review of Flagships and workplans towards the end of 2014. The Steering Committee should then be presented with a 'Second Phase' plan of action for Flagships and

Workplans in early 2015. This should be informed by a comprehensive risk assessment conducted in 2014.

In order to further the current workplans and priorities consideration should be given to the current Flagship leads and coordinator functions to ensure that adequate and appropriate levels of capacity are being committed, as discussed throughout the report.

Finally, it is essential that the work done within the Flagship programmes proactively links to similar work being done nationwide, outside the NRRC framework. At the very least this requires continued and possibly enhanced visibility for the NRRC and individual Flagships together with active outreach to those not currently working within the NRRC framework. Consideration should also be given to the most appropriate way for the NRRC (and individual Flagships) to draw on regional experience including academic and technical experts.

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should extend the timeline of the NRRC to 2020 with the second phase of the NRRC being from 2015-2020. [Action: Steering Committee]**

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should task the Secretariat to commission a countrywide risk assessment in 2014 to set a baseline for a review of Flagships and priorities for the period 2015-2020. [Action: Steering Committee/Secretariat]**

**Recommendation: In late 2014 or early 2015 the Steering Committee should commission an assessment of NRRC progress to date and redefine or reprioritise NRRC outcomes and structure. This reprioritisation should be based on the countrywide risk assessment data from the 2014 survey (see above), the legislative status of the DMA and current levels of Government capacity, the 2015 HFA, and Government and individual member plans and country strategies. As with the current Flagships and workplans critical needs should be recognised, reflected, and budgeted accordingly to represent reality. While fundraising should remain an aim of the NRRC it should not become the driving motivation and needs and workplans should not be configured accordingly. [Action: Steering Committee]**

### **5.1.2 Conclusions – Flagship leads and coordinators**

The Review Team fully recognises and acknowledges that the NRRC was set up as a voluntary consortium, conceived to have a minimum possible footprint for coordination and support functions. These principles are important. For the NRRC to reach its potential, however, such coordination and support functions need to be strengthened.

It is reasonable to say that the Flagship coordinators have interpreted the role in keeping with their institutional norms and personalities. As noted above, only Flagship 4 has generated a strategy and common vision among partners. It also has the strongest partnership between the lead Ministry and the Flagship coordinator, as well as the strongest information management platform. In large part, these achievements have occurred because of the dedicated post for the Flagship coordinator, and that, in the creation of this post, the role has retained strong institutional support.

While there is a need to remain focused on their original programmatic Outputs and Outcomes, Flagships 1, 3 and 5 need to be able to generate broad ranging strategies. Specifically, the Flagship coordinators and lead Ministries need to generate a vision that clearly projects beyond the limits of their current programmatic approaches, and brings in a broader range of actors. It is critical to note that within each Flagship, and to lesser extent across the Flagships, single vertical approaches in the absence of a broader strategy can be considered to have perpetuated supply-driven programming. The broad ranging strategies should address mainstreaming within relevant sectors and line Ministries and this should be undertaken in conjunction with Flagship 5's work in this regard.

**Recommendation:** Flagship coordinating agencies need to allocate appropriate, adequate and dedicated capacity to proactively undertake the minimum functions for Flagship coordination as originally envisaged (coordination, information management, technical support, resource mobilisation, and monitoring reporting and evaluation). How best to do this should remain the responsibility of the coordinating agency, i.e. the functions outlined above could be tasked to one individual OR shared with several at different levels within the agency. This could depend on such factors as the relationship and burden sharing agreed with the lead Ministry, progress to date, and number of partners within the Flagship. The Flagship 4 model of having both dedicated staff to oversee day to day business combined with senior level oversight and engagement has however been found to work well and is recommended. [Action: Flagship coordinating agencies].

**Recommendation:** Each Flagship coordinator and/or lead should ensure an appropriate information management mechanism and focal point. [Action Flagship coordinators/leads]

**Recommendation:** Based on the Flagship 4 model, consider how best to manage: registration of activities, membership, reporting and data sharing commitments, activity plans. [Action Flagship coordinators/leads].

**Recommendation:** The coordinating agencies for Flagships 1: School Safety, Flagship 1: Hospital Safety, and Flagships 3 and 5 in particular need to increase the capacity for coordination. This issue must be carefully considered when agreeing a new Flagship 2 coordinating agency. [Action: named Flagships coordinating agencies]

**Recommendation:** Individual Flagships coordinators and/or donors should accept the need to dedicate capacity and resources to these functions with or without binding commitments [Action by Flagship coordinators – donors].

**Recommendation:** Flagship coordinators must ensure that senior managers attend the Steering Committee meetings. Additional capacity, even in the form of a dedicated coordinator position, does not preclude the need for continued, high-level engagement from the key partners, to ensure that risk reduction does not become de-linked from organisational strategies [Action by Flagship coordinators].

### 5.1.3 Conclusions – Steering Committee

One of the achievements of the NRRC has been the evolving role played by the Steering

Committee. While the primary function of the Steering Committee is not coordination, minutes demonstrate that coordination is enhanced as a result of Steering Committee meetings.

In relation to its original functions, the Steering Committee has become increasingly valuable as a forum for discussion. It also has improved its orientation towards action. Yet it has fallen short of the expectations of some stakeholders. Multilateral donors in particular expressed a desire for the Steering Committee to play a significantly more strategic and directive role. The Steering Committee, in conjunction with the Secretariat, also needs to strengthen its facilitation of technical assistance and monitoring and evaluation (See below, Section 5.1.5). The new 2013 reporting format, which provides a consolidated report to the Steering Committee, should enable focused consideration of key identified blockages and allow the Steering Committee to operate at the appropriate strategic level. This will only be possible, however, if Advisory Committees and Technical Committees/Groups are active and engaged to support reporting.

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should continue to meet quarterly. The co-Chairs of the Steering Committee should ensure that all members are present and whether in the Steering Committee or the Advisory Groups, key Government actors (primarily related to Flagship 3) are included. [Action Co-Chairs Steering Committee]**

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should constitute a short-term sub-committee in keeping with its original remit to identify how within the current structure the following issues might best be given priority:**

- Risk reduction in the Kathmandu valley — specifically a group that brings together relevant Ministries from each Flagship and the municipalities to consider key strategic linkages between the Flagship areas;
  - Critical infrastructure — including the issues of the implementation of building codes.
- [Action: Steering Committee]

**Recommendation: The Communications Group should continue. As a model for a thematic group it has worked well. These groups should be about setting common standards, as well as linking and driving the coordination of policy (linking with or multiplying the effect of Flagship 5 if and where possible). An appropriate technical coordinator and Ministry must continue to lead these groups. As with the Communications Group, while support from the Secretariat can be requested; it should not become the role of the Secretariat to manage these groups. The Communications Group should be institutionalised and included in official documentation and reporting. Input from Flagships leads and coordinators has been variable but is essential. The existence of such thematic groups should not absolve the Flagship leads and coordinators from active engagement. [Action: Secretariat and BBC Media Action]**

**Recommendation: The Steering Committee should play a stronger role in bringing in regional expertise in multi-hazard risk, and strive to continually improve links with neighbouring countries, regional academia and technical experts. [Action: Steering Committee]**

#### **5.1.4 Conclusions – Secretariat**

The Review Team recognises that the balance between the Secretariat and the other bodies in the NRRC is critical. The Secretariat plays a key role at the centre of the NRRC architecture and

has offered proactive support to the NRRC across its key functional areas. The Secretariat should continue to maintain a light presence with the ability to offer support wherever required across the NRRC structure. Ongoing and inevitable challenges will continue with regard to the facilitation of technical support, monitoring, and reporting.

**Recommendation: The Secretariat needs to be strengthened to take on its original range of roles: a secretarial function for the Steering Committee, communications within the NRRC, public communications; monitoring, reporting and evaluation; resource mobilisation; and the support and facilitation of technical assistance. Critically, it needs to receive the standing authority from the Steering Committee to undertake these functions without constant negotiation. [Action Steering Committee, Secretariat coordinator]**

**Recommendation: The Secretariat should be a visibly more autonomous body. A first and pragmatic step might be space being made available adjacent to MoHA and retained within the UN and for the Secretariat staff to have a presence in both locations. While a small increase in staffing to meet current demands is recommended, the staffing should be kept flexible to reflect future demands which will be contingent on many factors primarily the new Division in MoHA and a future NDMA. The NRRC should have an online presence and platform separate to that of the UN and ensure that this presence benefits and reflects all partners equally. [Action: Co-chairs Steering Committee, Secretariat].**

#### **5.1.5 Conclusions — information management, monitoring, reporting and evaluation**

Monitoring and reporting within the NRRC framework is of varying quality across Flagships and inconsistent in general. Other than in Flagship 4, there is inadequate dedicated capacity in the Flagship lead agencies to information management. This sets up a challenging dynamic with the Secretariat who is tasked with collating reporting but who has no real authority. In 2013, the Secretariat has overseen the first consolidated report to the Steering Committee which may result in enhanced understanding of the overall progress and challenges.

No attempt has been made thus far to evaluate the impact of the NRRC's component parts across more than one agency's activities. In each of these areas, the NRRC shares characteristics of coordinated systems for development and humanitarian assistance. There are no obvious models on which to base an improved system.

The loose and voluntary nature of the NRRC arguably makes for a more challenging environment in which to encourage cooperation in reporting. The idea of enforcing compliance does not fit with the ethos of the framework. That said, as an innovative framework with a high level of attention at national and international levels, it is absolutely imperative that the NRRC begin to better define, demonstrate and quantify success. Instigating a monitoring and evaluation framework is a necessary first step, but given the weaknesses of the NRRC noted in the review, a phased and realistic approach is required.

The Secretariat needs both capacity and a strategy to bring together the Flagship leads in improving the consistency of data handling and presentation across the Flagships, as the basis for creating a monitoring and evaluation framework. The consolidated reporting mechanism being piloted is a good first step though it places a considerable burden on the Secretariat. The Framework being proposed would need the support of the Steering Committee, RC and donors,

and it would need to be created in conjunction with the Flagship leads/coordinators, rather than being imposed on them.

**Recommendations:**

**Overall:** The Steering Committee and Secretariat must prioritise the issue of evaluation, and specifically impact evaluation [Action: Steering Committee and Secretariat]

**On capacity:**

- Both the Secretariat and Flagship coordinator/lead functions have an identified function in monitoring and reporting. Both need adequate capacity to undertake this function. Each Flagship requires a designated focal point for data management, monitoring and evaluation. [Action Secretariat coordinator and Flagship coordinators]

**Information Management/data**

- Convene a data management working group comprising Flagship coordinators and leads (and possibly key implementers), limited to discussion of data standards and technical agreements within and across the Flagships. Topics might include: mapping of information relations and collation of baseline datasets where appropriate, and must include agreement on data standards.<sup>3</sup> The Secretariat, in conjunction with the data management group should proactively manage a process of review of all Flagship indicators, ensuring that all are time-bound, measurable, disaggregated by gender and in keeping with data standards as agreed by the proposed data management group. [Action: Secretariat]

**Monitoring, reporting and evaluation**

- The NRRC Steering Committee should task the Secretariat (using external technical support if necessary) to draw up a monitoring and evaluation framework. The following are *suggestions* for an indicator set (based on models used for other coordinated systems) that would constitute a balanced approach to evaluating the NRRC, i.e., taking a range of measurements and stakeholder views that would give a rounded assessment of achievements of projects contained within the Flagships, as well as an ongoing assessment of the performance of component parts of the NRRC architecture:
  - Efficiency and effectiveness — regular measurement of progress across a selected set of improved indicators for each Flagship (building on the work of the data management group).
  - Process perspectives — developed via consensus amongst the Flagship leads and the Secretariat, a small set of process indicators (e.g., frequency of advisory group meetings, stakeholder satisfaction with consultations), to be measured by stakeholder surveys.

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<sup>3</sup> This support should not insist on standard, one-size-fits-all approaches. Rather, it should encourage the Flagships to develop their own systems or adopt standards for partners, as long as the end results are consistent with data standards (for example, gender disaggregated data for supported populations) and there is commitment to data sharing.

- **Relevance** — assessment rooted in available data and stakeholder perspectives, (especially affected populations, national and international NGOs and Government).
- **Impact** — given the regularity of disasters in Nepal, it should be possible to measure in real-time or ex-post the impact of some risk-reduction measures. This would require pre-agreement of an evaluation tool, an evaluation team (comprised of Flagship members, Government and possibly local independent capacity), as well as resources. The views of affected populations would be critical in assessing change attributable to DRR and other programming. [Action: Steering Committee]

### 5.1.6 Conclusions — pooled funding instrument

While the idea of a pooled funding instrument has merit in principle, it should not be prioritised at this time. The NRRC in its current format lacks the strategic coordination and mechanism for prioritising outcomes and outputs that would facilitate a straightforward process for allocating funds. It is also unclear that the Fund would attract a critical mass of resources that would justify the investment. Furthermore, there is a real risk that fund management responsibilities might negatively affect the relationships between the Secretariat and other actors in the NRRC.

**Recommendation:** If there is ongoing support for a pooled funding mechanism amongst SC members, the SC should commission a formal and specific study. This should only be considered once the recommendations from this study have been taken forward. A first pragmatic step would be to undertake a survey of potential donors (either country-based and at regional and global levels) to judge whether a critical mass of funding could be raised. [Action: Steering Committee to reconsider in 2014]

## 5.2 Individual Flagship Areas

### 5.2.1 Conclusions - Flagship 1: School Safety

Flagship 1 has been seen as offering a narrow approach and being overly focused on the targets for physical restructuring. In this sense, ADB have taken what could be described as a minimalist approach to the role of Flagship coordination, with a focus on the original targets, with a clear intention to keep the Ministry of Education in the lead. There is a strong expectation from partners, however, that the role be played more proactively.

The issue of safety in private schools has been taken up from a legislative angle and should remain a priority for the Steering Committee and the newly formed thematic group on school safety. Here, partners in Flagship 1 want to see a specific proactive linkage with Flagship 5 to support this work.

**Recommendation:** That the activation of the thematic technical group under the education SWAp is taken forward. That a cross-Flagship thematic group on school safety bringing in partners from beyond the SWAp is initiated. This should include a group of key implementing

**NGOs, given the limited capacity of AIN to represent member's interests at the technical level. Discussions on physical safety should include the relevant Government bodies. [Action: ADB and MoE]**

### **5.2.2 Conclusions — Flagship 1: Hospital Safety**

The original timeframes for hospital safety work were unrealistic given the complexities and scale of the task. Overall, the Flagship coordinator and lead Ministry have not delivered a broader strategic position beyond the project implementation approach. Due to the turnover of staff in both WHO and the MoHP, there has been varying capacity in the Flagship coordination and lead roles. On non-structural issues, coordination has been stronger, not least through the ongoing partnership between WHO, MoHP, ECHO and the collective group of implementers in this area. The GoN is keen to expand the programme of retrofitting. Taking into consideration the expansion dilemma, the addition of outcomes should be carefully considered, including the response from the proposed donor conference, as well as conditions after actual retrofitting has begun.

**Recommendation: Potentially taking a lead from Flagship 1: School Safety, MoHP, WHO and concerned donors could consider a broader strategic review of health facilities. However, the issues raised in this review about expansion, and the results of the proposed donor conference, need to be taken into consideration. [Action: WHO, MoHP, Flagship 1 Advisory Group]**

### **5.2.3 Conclusions – Flagship 2**

OCHA is scheduled to remove its remaining international post by the end of 2013, leaving one national position for the duration of 2014. This position will continue to liaise with Government and form a link to the OCHA's regional office (ROAP) in Bangkok. The national position will be fully occupied with OCHA core business; it will not have the capacity to undertake the Flagship coordination role. Although there are those within OCHA who strongly believe that OCHA could, and should, play a strong role in the coordination of response preparedness at the national level, corporate priorities ultimately lie elsewhere.

Whilst the activities and outcomes are important in and of themselves, Flagship 2 is critical in that it brings together humanitarian actors in the international community, the GoN's nascent disaster management and response capacities, and development actors. A balanced approach needs to be taken that simultaneously addresses the following: the coordination of international actors in preparation for a major disaster response (including a strong civil-military component); the development of capacity in Government to manage and respond to disasters; the critical strengthening of "civil protection" functions in Nepal (including fire and ambulance services, as well as urban search and rescue [USAR] capacity), and key logistical elements of disaster planning (for which funding has been hard to generate). In the absence of OCHA, Flagship 2 needs an overall coordinator with dedicated capacity. Moreover, each of its key components needs to be given specific recognition and coordination capacity.

Of the few viable options available, the dedicated ring-fenced unit inside the RC's office seems to afford the best chance of a smooth transition from OCHA by the end of 2013. Again, it must

be stressed that this option will only work if it is fully resourced, self-sufficient and insulated from the other work of the RC's office. The idea of the NRCS taking over the role, with strong support from the IFRC or via one or more national societies, arguably represents a better long-term solution. It is also one that would offer a valuable case study for other high-risk countries. Ultimately, it should be acknowledged that the IFRC has been approached regarding a role in Flagship 2 but declined. The idea would warrant, however, further discussion with the Federation at headquarters, and may offer a solution in the longer term. Additionally or alternatively, the Review Team supports private-sector engagement. In this instance, however, it seems better suited the role of dedicated support to the civil protection function. While the ring-fenced unit inside the RC's office is put forward by the Review Team as the preferred option, this is a critical decision and best taken by the Steering Committee with full input from the incoming Resident Coordinator.

**Recommendation (overall leadership):** That the Steering Committee considers the three viable options at its next meeting. Following this meeting, the Steering Committee should task the Secretariat to follow up with OCHA ROAP, IFRC and NRCS and a group of potential donors with a view to making a firm decision by the end of October 2013 [Action: Steering Committee, Secretariat].

**Recommendation:** The Steering Committee should specifically consider the creation of a coordination position for civil protection within Flagship 2. This should include the possibility of a private-sector entity taking the position, and implications of a public tender, which would set a precedent in the context of the NRRC's current voluntary model [Action: Steering Committee, Secretariat].

**Recommendation:** From the regional level, OCHA must offer a commitment to concrete and regular support to its national post in Nepal, and ensure that its activities under Flagship 2 continue. This should include strengthening inputs to Government for receiving international assistance, including civil/military liaison [Action Secretariat/OCHA ROAP].

#### 5.2.4 Conclusions – Flagship 3

Notwithstanding progress towards the current targets of the Flagship, clear expectations exist that the Flagship lead and coordinator should develop a wider thematic group to consider structural and non-structural mitigation measures that could be applied across the river basins in Nepal. Bearing in mind the expansion dilemma, the specific programmatic targets should not expand what is currently planned before 2015. Yet a platform that supports discussion and drives both cohesion and strategy of these issues countrywide is required. Such a platform could be set up in the form of an advisory group for Flagship 3. A technical group under the Steering Committee, World Bank or other relevant agency might be a preferred option. The engagement of Government partners has been problematic. The World Bank noted the challenge of working simultaneously with three key Government bodies, and interviews demonstrated that engagement and understanding of the NRRC was particularly lacking for Flagship 3. A thematic platform on flood risk should be specifically designed to enhance ownership and partnership amongst the relevant parts of Government.

**Recommendation:** A thematic group exploring structural and non-structural mitigation measures that could be applied across the river basins in Nepal should be constituted. Such a group could be formed as an advisory group to Flagship 3, or as a thematic group under the Steering Committee. Such a group should be designed to enhance Government ownership of the issues and cross-Ministry cooperation. [Action: Flagship 3 coordinator/lead]

#### 5.2.5. Conclusions — Flagship 4

Flagship 4 is seen as being on track and well-led from the GoN and international side. It is important that beyond the coordinator position, the IFRC continues its senior-level engagement in the NRRC.

**Recommendation:** that the current thoughtful debate regarding geographical reach vs depth of impact is continued particularly in light of the recommendation about the timeline and extension of the overall NRRC. [Action Flagship 4 coordinator/lead].

#### 5.2.6. Conclusions — Flagship 5

It is important for Flagship 5 to create a broader view of risk reduction which would involve establishing an agenda for the Flagship in a way that several agencies could work together and influence the Government, with or without a specific linkage to programme implementation. The workplan and budget should be reviewed to ensure that they more clearly reflect contributions made by all partners.

**Recommendation:** Building on the 2013 Flagship workshop the Flagship 5 coordinator and leads should develop stronger and clearer vision for Flagship 5 beyond its own programmes. It should openly seek the support of other partners in achieving these objectives. [Action Flagship 5 coordinator/lead]

**Recommendation:** Consideration of the value added of the thematic meetings is recommended. Whether framed as a cross-Flagship thematic group on policy and institutions, or as a Flagship 5 advisory group, UNDP should create a forum for ongoing discussions on key issues in these areas, which might include:

- a legal system for DRR (based on the legislation enacted in many South Asian countries);
- the institutional system for DRR at the national and district level (based on the institutional innovations in recent years);
- public finance aspects of DRR;
  - a broader regulatory regime for urban development (land use planning and building codes).
  - Private sector engagement

This would not preclude Flagship 5 holding one off meetings for information sharing on individual issues but might reduce the expectations that each meeting should result in action points and follow up. [Action Flagship 5 coordinator/lead]

**Recommendation:** UNDP should re-organise the support function for Flagship 5 to create a distance and distinct identity for the Flagship coordination function. [Action: UNDP]

### 5.3 Follow-up on the Recommendations for This Report

**Recommendation:** To ensure proper process on the recommendations for this report, the Steering Committee should authorise the Secretariat to manage a time-bound plan for follow-up.

First meeting of the Steering Committee within one month of the final report. At this meeting:

- Steering Committee endorses the final report and its recommendations;
- Steering Committee mandates the Secretariat to manage the progress of developing implementation plans with each of the actors concerned.

# Annexes

## Annex A

### Composition and Function of NRRC Steering Committee

#### Composition of Steering Committee

The Ministry of Home Affairs has a responsibility to make a congenial and comfortable environment to ensure the effective and result based implementation of the NSDRM followed by a full cooperation and coordination with the concerned agencies and stakeholders. The strategy has suggested the constitution of a National Disaster Management Authority to coordinate with concerned government authorities and agencies in implementing the strategy. To form the Authority, legal provision is essential. In this regard, the Ministry of Home Affairs is in the final stages on giving proper shape to a new Bill to replace the current Natural Calamities Act, 1982. To manage the interim period, the Ministry of Home Affairs in consultation with the Consortium proposed the Inter-Ministerial and Consortium Steering Committee to provide vision, strategic guidelines and technical support to implement the activities identified by the NSDRM. In this regard, the Ministry proposed the composition of the Steering Committee, which follows:

#### National Steering Committee for Implementation of Flagship

Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (Coordinator)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Education (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Local Development (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Physical Planning and Works (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health and Population (Member)  
Joint Secretary, National Planning Commission (Member)  
Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations (Member)  
Resident Representative, AusAid (Member)  
Resident Representative, ADB (Member)  
Resident Representative, DFID (Member)  
Resident Representative, EU (Member)  
Resident Representative, IFRC (Member)  
Resident Representative, Japanese Embassy (Member)  
Resident Representative, UNDP (Member)  
Resident Representative, UNOCHA (Member)  
Resident Representative, USAID (Member)  
Resident Representative, WB (Member)  
Resident Representative, WHO (Member)  
Nepal Red Cross (Member)  
DP-Net (Member)  
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (Member Secretary)

#### Functions of the National Steering Committee

- Fundraising and identification of funding sources and mechanisms
- Guidance on resource utilization and mobilization to implement five flagship programmes
- Provide strategic visioning, guidance, guidelines and prioritization to the concerned agencies to implement flagship areas
- Coordinate among the government authorities and UN agencies to implement five flagships
- Provide technical and administrative support to the concerned authorities to implement five flagships
- Strategic monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of five flagships

### **Operational Modalities**

The committee shall function under the direction and guidelines of the government as specifically directed under the approved National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM). The committee shall meet every first Monday of each quarter. The Ministry of Home Affairs shall function as a secretariat office of the committee. To support the secretariat the consortium member shall deploy a senior officer as a national liaison officer.

Given that the nature of each of the identified flagship areas are different, it is expected that sectoral authorities will guide and provide technical and administrative support. For proper implementation of the activities the National Steering Committee shall suggest that relevant sectoral authorities form a sub-committee comprised of representatives from the implementation partners. The sub-committee shall assist the National Steering Committee for regular monitoring and evaluation activities.

## Annex B

### Terms of Reference NRRC Secretariat

#### Objective

To provide technical and advisory support to the NRRC Steering Committee and consortium members for implementation of the Flagship Programmes.

#### Functions

- Support the strategic planning functions of the Steering Committee (arrange meetings, minutes, etc.)
- Act as liaison between the Steering Committee, consortium members and relevant ministries
- Conduct joint work-planning activities and support coordinators of each Flagship in managing annual work-planning processes
- Develop and implement a communications/media strategy in coordination with NRRC communication focal points as needed
- Support the development and implementation of a resource mobilization strategy and explore financial mechanisms
- Organise events as required (donor meetings, public information, trainings, etc.)
- Provide templates for tracking ongoing activities related to the programme, assist in tracking overall activities
- Prepare Consortium-wide reporting on progress and results
- Develop and provide regular updates of the Flagships internally to the consortium
- Develop and maintain a financial database of income and expenditures on behalf of the consortium
- Support monitoring and evaluation on the progress of project implementation
- Maintain documentation related to consortium activities and programmes, online and available in hard copy as needed
- Ensure coordination of NRRC efforts with other risk reduction efforts in Nepal
- Mobilise and supervise technical support as required

#### Operational Modalities

The Secretariat shall function under the direction of the Steering Committee and in close cooperation with designated consortium focal points to develop and coordinate programme activities with all implementing partners.

#### Composition

- Joint Secretary, MOHA
- Under Secretary, MOHA
- Senior Disaster Risk Reduction Advisor, UN ISDR
- Additional members may be designated as needed

#### Support

Contributions from consortium members, both financial and in kind (e.g. office space, computers, information management support, etc.) are expected.

## Annex C

### Terms of Reference NRRC Flagship 1: Hospital Safety Advisory Group

#### Background

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was launched by the Government of Nepal (GoN) to implement the key priorities set out in the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM). The strategy, which was finalized in 2009, is the product of a government-led consultative process. It outlines priority actions for the establishment of a national DRM framework that promotes a holistic approach to ensure sustainable DRM at the national, regional and local level. It also supports the GoN commitments to the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters* (HFA) which promotes a systematic and strategic approach to reducing vulnerability to natural disasters. The aim is to reduce Nepal's vulnerability to natural disasters and protect the people of Nepal when those disasters do strike. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) is the Ministry responsible for overall coordination of the NRRC.

The need for hospital services after a major disaster is evident. Compromised hospital service can result in unnecessary loss of life and limited care for the injured. In addition to the immediate need for hospital service after a major disaster, sustainable recovery efforts and health-driven development goals require operational hospitals.

To enhance disaster preparedness of health institutions and the overall health system, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), with support from WHO, developed the *Health Sector Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response Plan* for Nepal in 2003. Two related studies revealed that approximately 80% of the assessed hospitals are classed 'unacceptable' for new construction, with the remaining 20% of hospitals at 'high risk of life-threatening collapse'. (NSET, WHO-Nepal, 2003).

Consequently hospital resilience and safety was high within priorities set for the NRRC. Flagship 1: Hospital Safety consists of both structural and non-structural safety activities designed both to ensure better functioning hospitals now and the critical hospital infrastructure that will be required post-emergency. This includes the commitment to conduct a comprehensive seismic assessment of major hospitals (in the Kathmandu Valley) and undertake the retrofitting and/or reconstruction of ten or more such hospitals. DipECHO is already supporting non-structural safety work in three hospitals.

In 2010, the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), with support from WHO, led a consultative process that included participation from the major hospitals in the Kathmandu Valley (those with 50 or more beds). Seven hospitals were prioritised for consideration for retrofitting and this data together with the data from multiple studies conducted during the past decade will inform the initial thinking and guidance from the Advisory Committee. The GoN has committed to the retrofitting of Patan Hospital and it is expected that access to this project by the DFID survey team will inform the forthcoming comprehensive survey (see below).

Following much discussion through 2011 as to the appropriate way ahead, DFID has now agreed to procure a survey team which will undertake comprehensive surveys on behalf of the MoHP, the Ministry of Public Planning and Works (MoPPW), the Department of Urban Development and Building COstruction (DUDBC) and the WHO. The procurement process was completed June 2012. These *Comprehensive Vulnerability Surveys* and *Structural Surveys* (see attached ToR) will be conducted through 2012-2013 in a process beginning in August 2012. The assessments will be completed in a 3-stage process beginning with the review of 50 hospitals, including the 7 priority hospitals, to identify 20 hospitals for detail structural surveying. This will be followed by the development of detailed plans and budgets for 10 hospitals. The engineering team will be guided by both medical and humanitarian expertise to ensure that the hospitals finally selected for retrofitting will support response. A critical aspect of this work is the commitment to work with and develop Nepalese capacity.

A conference will then be held in 2013 to present detailed plans and budgets to donors and implementing partners to encourage funding for structural retrofitting and operational improvements to the 10 public hospitals.

### **Purpose of the Advisory Group**

The purpose of the Advisory Group is to offer direction and guidance to the Survey team; to receive reports from the Survey team and offer feedback; to support the Survey team and work to address any blockages that the Survey team may experience; and to ensure that the final recommendations and products are of sufficient quality to be endorsed by the GoN. It is expected that the issues that the Survey team will require guidance on will include:

- scope of the survey, including on the location of the 50 hospitals (i.e. within the Valley or outside the Valley)
- Criteria for prioritisation of hospitals (based on information already known and work already undertaken)
- National capacity including private sector and capacity building needs
- Standards for hospital safety
- Identifying broad linkages with other work underway in Nepal disaster management policy, building codes and construction practices and seismic safety in schools, information on the resilience of critical infrastructure such as roads and bridges)
- Appropriate technical inputs on humanitarian and emergency medical planning

### **Composition of the Advisory Group**

- Representative from MoHP
- Representative from MoPPW
- Representative from DUDBC/Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)
- Representative from MoHA
- Representative from DFID
- Representative from ECHO
- Representative from WHO
- Representative from NRRC Secretariat
- WHO in collaboration with the MOHP will facilitate/convene the Advisory Group

**Timeline for the Advisory Group**

The first meeting of the Advisory Group should be in June 2012 with the primary purpose of endorsing this TOR. The group should then meet monthly from August 2012 until the completion of the Survey (expected to be April/May 2013).

## Annex D

### Terms of Reference of the Flagship 2 Advisory Committee

#### Background

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) is an international consortium of Asian Development Bank, IFRC, UNDP, UNOCHA, UNISDR, and World Bank. The NRRC was formed in May 2009 to support the Government of Nepal in developing a long term disaster risk reduction action plan building on the anticipated new National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM). The NRRC initiated a multi-stakeholder participatory process with the Government of Nepal and civil society organizations to identify short to medium term disaster risk reduction priorities that are both urgent and viable within the current institutional and policy arrangements in the country. The US Government and the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), DFID, and AusAid have also recently formally joined the NRRC. Based on government priorities and discussions with multi stakeholder groups, the NRRC and Government identified five flagship areas of immediate intervention for disaster risk management in Nepal, coordinated by one of the partner organisations:

1. School and hospital safety - structural and non-structural aspects of making schools and hospitals earthquake resilient (ADB)
2. Emergency preparedness and response capacity (UNOCHA)
3. Flood management in the Kosi River Basin (World Bank)
4. Integrated community based disaster risk reduction/management (IFRC)
5. Policy/institutional support for disaster risk management (UNDP)

Flagship coordinators and their Government focal points are responsible for coordinating activities, sharing information about ongoing and planned projects, and ensuring appropriate consultation among relevant partners. Additionally, the Government formally established the NRRC Steering Committee, coordinated by the Secretary of Home Affairs (MoHA) including a number of ministries and the consortium partners. A Secretariat was also created to support the work of the Steering Committee and is comprised of the Joint-Secretary and Under-Secretary of MoHA and an NRRC Coordinator financed by DFID.

Flagship 2 seeks to enhance the Government of Nepal's response capacity at the national, regional, and district level. This involves developing the capacity of the Government to respond in a coordinated manner with all in-country resources including the armed forces as well as incoming international humanitarian and military assistance. The program will build upon the ongoing efforts to enhance the capacity of medical first responders (MFR), collapsed structure search and rescue (CSSR) and Fire and Emergency services in order to build a sustainable response capacity. Activities will also include a major effort in conducting disaster preparedness workshops in all Districts and Regions of Nepal to ensure an effective emergency response to those affected by natural disasters and to guarantee the operational continuity of major critical facilities.

This programme area seeks to support the objectives outlined above by implementing a series of measures and activities grouped into four main components: *Institutional Capacity Building of First Responders; Disaster Information, Response, and Management Planning; Warehousing and Stockpiling of Food and Non-food Items for Emergency Response; and Strengthening the Preparedness for Facilitation of International Assistance.* These activities will involve

consultation and agreement for implementation with all partners, especially with Government of Nepal line ministries, Nepal Army and Armed Police, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) partner organisations and the donor community.

To achieve this target, there is a need to generate some consensus among the DRR actors in Nepal. To facilitate this process, a Flagship 2 Advisory Committee is proposed.

### **Overall Purpose**

The Advisory Committee will act as the decision-making body for Flagship 2, and oversee the development, implementation, monitoring and reporting of the Flagship 2 Joint Programme Results. The Advisory Committee will also provide technical guidance on specific aspects of emergency first responder disaster reduction activities.

### **Composition of the Committee**

Chair: Representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs

Secretary: Flagship 2 Coordinator (UNOCHA)

Members:

Representative of IASC clusters (as appropriate)

Representative from Nepal Red Cross Society (as appropriate)

Representative from UNDP

Representative of AIN/DPNET

Representative from USAID/OFDA

Standing Invitee: NRRC Secretariat Coordinator

### **Meeting Schedule**

The Advisory Committee will meet on a quarterly basis or more frequently as required

### **Specific tasks and responsibilities**

Coordination:

- Ensuring the effective coordination with the wider stakeholder group of Flagship 2 through regular meetings
- develop a more detailed work plan for Flagship 2 based on actual and expected funding and planned projects
- set priorities for implementation, identify gaps in response activities, and funding gaps.

Technical Support:

- Develop and adopt any additional standardized guidelines, tools, trainings and methodologies as deemed appropriate for the implementation of Flagship 2
- review project proposals, guidelines and materials of implementing partners to ensure conformity with proposals in Flagship 2
- provide suggestions on methodologies and project design to facilitate the implementation of emergency preparedness and response projects when requested by Flagship 2 partners.

Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting:

- Provide input into the establishment and maintenance of an effective tracking system for Flagship 2 projects (capturing key data such as geographical location, funding donors/implementing partners, and scope of activities) in line with other NRRC tracking and reporting mechanisms
- provide input on Flagship 2 activities for NRRC Quarterly Updates
- provide input into Flagship 2 annual reports to the NRRC Steering Committee

- develop and implement an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism to measure the overall progress of Flagship 2 Joint Programme Results
- encourage Flagship 2 implementing partners to implement a system of self-monitoring and evaluation to ensure that projects meet the agreed minimum standards for Flagship 2

Advocacy:

- provide input into development of a web-based information platform for Flagship 2
- actively promote the work of Flagship 2 and the NRRC to donors and other interested parties through the development of promotion materials, presentation, and information sharing
- support strategic planning, advocacy, and other initiatives of the NRRC as required.

Resource mobilisation:

- Support the identification of potential new funding sources for the Flagship's activities and provide linkages with potential implementing partners
- support the development of a pooled funding mechanism for Flagship 2 partners if required, in consultation with the Flagship 2 Coordinator, NRRC Secretariat, and NRRC Steering Committee

## Annex E

### Terms of Reference of the Flagship 4 Advisory Committee

#### Background

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) is an international consortium of Asian Development Bank, IFRC, UNDP, UNOCHA, UNISDR, and World Bank. The NRRC was formed in May 2009 to support the Government of Nepal in developing a long term disaster risk reduction action plan building on the anticipated new National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM). The NRRC initiated a multi-stakeholder participatory process with the Government of Nepal and civil society organizations to identify short to medium term disaster risk reduction priorities that are both urgent and viable within the current institutional and policy arrangements in the country. The US Government and the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), DFID, and AusAid have also recently formally joined the NRRC. Based on government priorities and discussions with multi stakeholder groups, the NRRC and Government identified five flagship areas of immediate intervention for disaster risk management in Nepal, coordinated by one of the partner organisations:

1. School and hospital safety - structural and non-structural aspects of making schools and hospitals earthquake resilient (ADB)
2. Emergency preparedness and response capacity (UNOCHA)
3. Flood management in the Kosi River Basin (World Bank)
4. Integrated community based disaster risk reduction/management (IFRC)
5. Policy/institutional support for disaster risk management (UNDP)

Flagship coordinators and their Government focal points are responsible for coordinating activities, sharing information about ongoing and planned projects, and ensuring appropriate consultation among relevant partners. Additionally, the Government formally established the NRRC Steering Committee, coordinated by the Secretary of Home Affairs (MoHA) including a number of ministries and the consortium partners. A Secretariat was also created to support the work of the Steering Committee and is comprised of the Joint-Secretary and Under-Secretary of MoHA and an NRRC Coordinator financed by DFID.

Flagship 4 seeks to capitalise on the community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) activities and experience which has already accumulated in Nepal to create a more consistent, systematic and harmonised approach to CBDRM which will be conducted at VDC level. By following a set of minimum characteristics for disaster-resilient communities and adopting a minimum package of common elements to be included in all CBDRM projects, the Flagship will help to ensure that communities receive consistent CBDRM support and will enable more effective tracking of progress in VDCs across the country. The Flagship aims to target 1000 VDCs using this approach over a 5-year period.

To achieve this ambitious target, there is a need to generate some consensus among the DRR actors in Nepal. To facilitate this process a coordination mechanism has been developed including a Flagship 4 Advisory Committee.

#### Overall Purpose

The Advisory Committee will act as the decision-making body for Flagship 4 and will oversee the development, implementation, monitoring, and reporting of the Flagship 4 Joint Programme

Results. The Advisory Committee will also provide technical guidance on specific aspects of community-based disaster risk reduction based on feedback from the Flagship 4 Consultation Group.

Composition of the Committee

Chair: Representative of the Ministry of Local Development

Secretary: Flagship 4 Coordinator (IFRC)

Members:

Representative of Ministry of Home Affairs

Representative from nepal Red Cross Society

Representative from UNDP

Representative of DIPECHO partners

Representative of AIN

Representative from DFID

Standing Invitee: NRRC Secretariat Coordinator

### **Meeting Schedule**

The Advisory Committee will meet on a bi-monthly basis, or more frequently as required. An annual meeting schedule with proposed dates and venues will be prepared and circulated in advance.

### **Specific tasks and responsibilities**

Coordination:

- Ensure effective coordination with the wider stakeholder group of Flagship 4 through regular meetings of the Flagship 4 Consultation Group
- develop a more detailed annual work plan for Flagship 4 based on actual and expected funding and planned projects.

Technical Support:

- Finalise and adopt a set of minimum characteristics for disaster resilient communities and minimum common elements to be included in all Flagship 4 CBDRM projects (after receiving necessary input from Flagship 4 Consultation Group)
- develop and adopt any additional standardized guidelines, tools, training and methodologies as deemed appropriate for the implementation of Flagship 4 (based on recommendations from the Flagship 4 Consultation Group)
- Review project proposals, guidelines, and materials of donors and implementing partners to determine conformity with the minimum characteristics and other standards
- provide suggestions on methodologies and project design to facilitate the implementation of CBDRM projects when requested by Flagship 4 partners.

Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting:

- Provide input into the establishment and maintenance of an effective tracking system for Flagship 4 projects to capture key data (such as geographical location, funding, donors/implementing partners and scope of activities) in line with other NRRC tracking and reporting mechanisms
- provide input on Flagship 4 activities for NRRC Quarterly Updates
- provide input into Flagship 4 annual reports to the NRRC Steering Committee
- develop and implement an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism to measure the overall progress of Flagship 4 Joint Program Results

- encourage Flagship 4 implementing partners to implement a system of self-monitoring and evaluation to ensure that projects meet the agreed minimum standards for Flagship 4.

Advocacy:

- Provide input into the development of a web-based information platform for Flagship 4
- Actively promote the work of Flagship 4 and the NRRC, to donors and other interested parties through the development of promotion materials, presentation and information sharing
- Encourage Flagship 4 partners to share new knowledge and learning on CDBRR and other key issues such as climate change, for dissemination at the national and international level
- Support strategic planning, advocacy and other initiatives of the NRRC as required

Resource Mobilisation

- Support the identification of potential new funding sources for Flagship 4 activities and provide linkages with potential implementing partners
- Support the development of a pooled funding mechanism for Flagship 4 partners if required, in consultation with the Flagship 4 Coordinator, NRRC Secretariat and NRRC Steering Committee

## Annex F

### Terms of Reference of the Flagship 5 Advisory Group

#### Background

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) is a consortium of the Government of Nepal, Asian Development Bank, AusAid, DFID, ECHO, the Red Cross, JICA, UNDP, UNOCHA, UNISDR, US Embassy, and World Bank. The NRRC was formed in May 2009 to support the Government of Nepal in developing a long term disaster risk reduction action plan building on the anticipated new National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM). The NRRC initiated a multi-stakeholder participatory process with the Government of Nepal and civil society organizations to identify short to medium term disaster risk reduction priorities that are both urgent and viable within the current institutional and policy arrangements in the country. Based on government priorities and discussions with multi stakeholder groups, the NRRC and Government identified five flagship areas of immediate intervention for disaster risk management in Nepal, each of which is coordinated by one of the partner organisations together with appropriate line ministries:

6. School and hospital safety - structural and non-structural aspects of making schools and hospitals earthquake resilient (ADB)
7. Emergency preparedness and response capacity (UNOCHA)
8. Flood management in the Kosi River Basin (World Bank)
9. Integrated community based disaster risk reduction/management (IFRC)
10. Policy/institutional support for disaster risk management (UNDP)

Flagship coordinators and their Government focal points are responsible for coordinating activities, sharing information about ongoing and planned projects, and ensuring appropriate consultation among relevant partners. Additionally, the Government formally established the NRRC Steering Committee, coordinated by the Secretary of Home Affairs (MoHA) including a number of ministries and the consortium partners. A Secretariat was also created to support the work of the Steering Committee and is comprised of the Joint-Secretary and Under-Secretary of MOHA and an NRRC Coordinator financed by DFID.

#### Purpose of the Flagship 5 Advisory Group

The Advisory Committee will act as an advisory body for Flagship 5 to ensure quality of Joint Programmes' activities and their deliverables. It will oversee the implementation, monitoring and reporting of the Flagship 5 Joint Programme Results. In consultation with partner organizations, the Committee will also suggest adjustments to programme results as required and help with prioritizations. It will also play a role in contributing to/agreeing progress reports to Steering Committee and in contributing to the formulation of achievement statements.

Given that the focus of Flagship Five's actions are primarily on Government policy, the advisory committee for Flagship 5 will be comprised primarily of Government experts, as well as representatives from organisations active in Flagship 5 implementation.

#### Composition of the Flagship 5 Advisory Group

Chair: Representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs

Members:

Ministry of Health (Flagship Area 1 - Hospitals)

Ministry of Education (Flagship Area 1 - Schools)

Ministry of Irrigation (Flagship Area 3)  
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (Flagship Area 4)  
Ministry of Home Affairs (Flagship Area 5)  
Ministry of Urban Development  
Ministry of Environment  
National Planning Commission  
Secretariat: UNDP (Flagship 5)  
Standing Invitee: NRRC Secretariat  
The Advisory board will invite technical inputs from civil society organisations/NGOs and experts as required.

### **Meeting Schedule**

The Advisory Committee will meet three times per year, or more frequently as required. An annual meeting schedule with proposed dates and venues will be prepared and circulated in advance. The Flagship Coordinator will also share all documents for Flagship 5 that will be submitted to the Steering Committee with the Advisory Group by email, and where necessary will convene meetings to review and discuss as deemed necessary by the Chair. The Advisory Committee will also receive regular updates from the thematic meetings and any task force meetings held to support Flagship 5 implementation.

### **Specific tasks and responsibilities**

Coordination:

- Ensure effective coordination with the wider stakeholder group of the overall Flagship programme in the areas of policy and institutional support
- Review, and if necessary enhance the work plan for Flagship 5 based on actual and expected funding and planned projects. Agree on critical issues/gaps to be brought to the attention of the Steering Committee
- Identify gap areas or areas where additional capacity is required and actively seek appropriate new partners if required
- Oversee schedule of Flagship 5 thematic meetings
- Request or disband task forces or organize ad-hoc consultation on Flagship 5 related issues as required. (Task forces would be led by relevant government stakeholders and would comprise relevant NRRC partners if required)

Technical Support

- Provide advice to NRRC stakeholders on existing government policies/frameworks and activities that are relevant to their particular Flagship areas and if necessary identify relevant organizations to undertake proactive dissemination
- Help ensure that Flagship interventions are in line with the NSDRM and National Adaptation Plan of Action and ensure coherence across efforts to support institutional and policy development to reduce duplication of efforts and enhance effectiveness
- Identify potential gaps in policy required to ensure continued effective implementation of the NSDRM
- Provide suggestions on methodologies and project design to facilitate the implementation of Flagship 5 activities when requested by F5 partners
- Where necessary, the Advisory Group may establish ad-hoc temporary task forces to provide more consolidated support to achieving particular joint outcomes or to resolving complex challenges as required

Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting

- Provide input into the establishment and maintenance of an effective tracking system for Flagship 5 activities to capture key data (geographical location, funding,

donors/implementing partners, and scope of activities) in line with other NRRC tracking and reporting mechanisms

- Provide input on Flagship 5 activities for NRRC Quarterly Updates
- Provide input into Flagship 5 annual reports to the NRRC Steering Committee
- Develop and implement an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to measure the overall progress of Flagship 5 Joint Programme Results
- Encourage Flagship 5 implementing partners to implement a system of self-monitoring and evaluation to ensure that projects meet the agreed minimum standards for Flagship 4 or other relevant NRRC agreed benchmarks

#### Advocacy

- Provide input into the development of a web-based information platform for Flagship 5 as part of a coherent NRRC-wide approach
- Actively promote the work of Flagship 5 and the NRRC to donors and other interested parties through the development of promotional materials, presentation, and information-sharing with the support/cooperation of the NRRC Secretariat
- Encourage Flagship 5 partners to share new knowledge and learning on institutional and legislative systems and mainstreaming for DRR and other key issues such as climate change, for dissemination at the national and international level
- Support the strategic planning, advocacy and other initiatives of the NRRC as required

#### Resource Mobilization

- Support the NRRC Secretaria in basic quarterly fund tracking
- Support the identification of potential new funding sources for Flagship 5 activities and provide linkages with potential implementing partners

## Annex G

### Flagship Progress and Achievements

#### Flagship 1: School Safety

Outcome 1 - Structural and operational vulnerability assessment: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 - Seismic risk assessment of school building stock in KV resulting in documentation, consistency with design codes, and remedial actions:** Ongoing progress.

- An action plan is in place for the ongoing assessment of 1800 school buildings in the Kathmandu Valley.
- World Bank mapping and initial exposure survey of all school buildings in the Kathmandu Valley (public and private) through the Pilot Project for Seismic School Safety in Kathmandu
- Priority list has been prepared by the Government based on a qualitative assessment in which 236 school buildings have been identified for retrofitting and rebuilding; detailed designing of 85 school buildings completed

Outcome 2 - Physical and operational strengthening: Ongoing progress; will not be completed by 2015.

**Output 1 - retrofit 700 school buildings:** Ongoing progress; will not be completed by 2015

- Action plan in place for the retrofitting of 260 school buildings by the end of 2014 has been approved by the Ministry of Education
- 65 school buildings retrofitted to date

**Output 2 - Re-construct 280 school buildings in KV for earthquake resiliency:** Will not be completed by 2015

- Has not been reported against

**Output 3 - Training of masons and engineers in KV:** Ongoing progress.

- Masons training programs are ongoing, and an action plan is in place for the training of an additional 1050 masons; 156 trained so far.

Outcome 3 - Awareness raising and capacity building: Ongoing progress through 2015.

**Output 1 - Develop a community based awareness program with “self-help” materials:** Partial progress

- A joint national level workshop has been held with Flagship 4.

**Output 2 - Raise awareness of teachers, students and parents on school safety and disaster risk reduction:** Ongoing progress.

- Action plan in place for the training of 4000 teachers and 50 000 students.

Outcome 4 - Physical and operational strengthening: On track for completion.

**Output 1 - Reconstruct 162 schools damaged from the Sikkim earthquake in September 2011:** On track for completion.

- 70 school blocks reconstructed; 31 retrofitted; work initiated in 48 of the remaining 53 blocks to be completed by end of 2013.

Additional Achievements:

- The Government of Nepal and various development partners have approved a thematic working group on school safety within the Sector Wide Approach

- Two Committees have been established within the Ministry of Education: a Steering Committee chaired by the Secretary and a Technical Committee chaired by the Director General

### **Flagship 1 Hospitals**

Outcome 1 - Structural and operational vulnerability assessment: on track for completion by 2015.

**Output 1 - Conduct structural surveys of 60 hospital buildings in KV:** Completed

- The MoHP has approved the list of 60 hospitals for phase 1 survey; phase 1 surveys are now complete
- Structural and non-structural assessments completed TU Teaching Hospital, Civil Service Hospital, and Shree Birendra Hospital
- Non-structural and functional assessments completed in Maternity Hospital, Kanti Children and Bir Hospital

**Output 2 - Conduct detailed surveys of 20 hospitals in KV:** Ongoing and on track

- Action plan in place and on track for completion; phase 2 of the vulnerability assessment survey.
- Identification of 20 hospitals for detailed structural surveying in Phase 2 underway; priority hospitals fast-tracked.

**Output 3 - Develop detailed plans and budgets for 10 hospitals in KV:** Ongoing and on track

- Action plan in place and on track for completion; phase 3 of the vulnerability assessment survey.

**Output 4 - Hold a donor conference to showcase 10 detailed plans to secure resources:** Ongoing and on track

- Action plan in place and on track for completion

Outcome 2 - Physical and operational strengthening: Ongoing progress; will not be completed by 2015

**Output 1 - Develop an MCM Strategy and MCM plans for the 7 priority hospitals identified by the GoN:** On track for completion.

- Three hospitals have developed MCM plans and a national MCM plan is in place.

**Output 2 - Develop guidelines for structural and operational strengthening:** Completed.

- Guidelines on the design of disaster-resilient hospitals and health facilities have been developed.

**Output 3 - Implement pilot retrofitting project in Patan Hospital:** Ongoing and on track

- Retrofitting of Patan Hospital is ongoing .

**Output 4 - Retrofit 10 hospitals based on seismic vulnerability and structural surveys:** No current progress; will not be completed by 2015.

- Retrofitting will begin following the development of detailed retrofitting plans and once funding has been committed through the donor conference.

**Output 5 - Implement ECHO-funded non-structural hospital safety project:** Ongoing and on track.

- The ECHO-funded non-structural hospital safety project is underway.

Outcome 3 - Awareness raising: Ongoing and on track

**Output 1 – Train hospital administrators on safety and risk reduction:** Ongoing

- Training and capacity building is underway in order to ensure capacity to respond to earthquakes and other disasters.

**Output 2 – Train masons and engineers on structural and operational guidelines to construction:** Ongoing

**Output 3 – Support awareness raising activities that will reach communities regarding key DRR messages:** Ongoing

- The ECHO-funded program supporting community preparedness and awareness raising in the DIPECHO VI cycle will continue into the DIPECHO VII cycle

**Additional Achievements**

- Non-structural retrofitting at TU Teaching Hospital has been completed; non-structural retrofitting has been completed at Civil Service Hospital
- Emergency preparedness plans have been completed in 4 of the 7 priority hospitals identified by the government

**Flagship 2**

Outcome 1 – Institutional capacity building of national and humanitarian partners: Partial progress through 2015, limited targets

**Output 1 – Develop Search and Rescue (SAR) capacities in the country:** Ongoing progress; not on track for completion.

- Some light SAR training and equipment have been provided, but it has been acknowledged that additional equipment is required to meet SAR needs. No national medium level SAR capacity has been built.

**Output 2 – Fire and standard ambulance services to 58 major urban centres:** Not on track for completion.

- Donation of 6 Italian fire engines with more expected from India.
- Basic fire service training has been supported by UNDP, and fire services support to Lalitpur has been supported by JICA.

**Output 3 – Emergency Operation Centre at all levels – District, Regional and National:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- A National EOC has been established, as well as 26 District EOCs, 5 Regional EOCs, and 5 Municipal EOCs.

**Output 4 – First aid training to NRCS volunteers and CHVs in all districts and MFR training to First Responders:** Some progress through 2015.

- Emergency health training and first aid training ongoing as per plan.

**Output 5 - Mass casualty incidents management including trauma care, triage, and other specific health issues:** On track for completion.

- Health Sector Contingency Plans and MCM planning have been established, and Disaster Preparedness Response Plans have been completed in all 75 Districts.

**Output 6 – Capacity building of the TIA staff on logistics through training and simulation exercises:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- Get Airports Ready (GARD) training and surge capacity assessment of the airport has been carried out by UNDP and DHL with support from GoN.

- Assessment of TIA Airport completed and Emergency Earthquake Plan awaiting GoN endorsement.
- Funding secured for two Humanitarian Staging Areas at TIA. This is awaiting GON endorsement.

Outcome 2 – Disaster Preparedness and Response planning activities: Ongoing progress through 2015, limited targets

**Output 1 - Capacity building of the national partners through workshops, trainings and simulations:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- Disaster Preparedness Response Plans have been completed in all 75 districts.
- Five regional workshops completed with the Plan of Actions of Regional Authorities.
- GoN regionally trained on Guidance Note for Disaster Managers.
- MOHA, NP, AFP participation in Indian Emergency Management simulation exercise.

**Output 2 – Review and update of IASC Contingency Plan and Cluster contingency plans:** On track for completion.

- Health Sector Contingency Plans, MCM planning, Referral systems established as per plan.
- IASC Contingency Plan completed in 2011; under annual review.

**Output 3 – Radio station, satellite and mobile phone coverage in Nepal and effective radio public service announcements (PSA):** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- Completed survey of existing mobile phones, radio stations, satellite and their coverage.
- BBC Media Action is engaged in ongoing work for the preparation of PSAs with one campaign completed.

**Output 4 – Development of interoperable communications system amongst emergency responders and data centres:** Partial progress through 2015.

- In 2012, 16 district EOCs received communications tools, 7 district EOCs began HF radio communication with the NEOC, and EOC staff were trained in SAHANA and DM communications techniques.

**Output 5 – Detailed planning of the Open Spaces for humanitarian purposes:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- As of June 2013, Cabinet has approved 83 open spaces for humanitarian purposes to use during major disasters within the Kathmandu Valley
- Funding secured for the deconflict phase of open spaces work

Outcome 3 – Warehousing, infrastructures, logistics and stockpiling supports: Ongoing progress through 2015, limited targets

**Output 1 – Development of logistics hubs, warehouse construction and rehabilitation:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- 2 warehouses are under construction while the GoN has allocated NPR \$5 million for the construction of 3 more warehouses. The NRCS are currently assessing all of their warehouses and will develop a renovation plan.

**Output 2 – Open space management and stock piling for prepositioning of the relief items (NFI):** Ongoing progress.

- Equipment, such as Emergency WASH kits and tarpaulins, has been ordered, while a new warehouse software program is being developed by NRCS.

**Output 3 – Managing the WASH activities within the identified Open Spaces:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- 4 boreholes identified for open spaces but work stalled pending completion of gazetting process.
- Oxfam is planning for WASH services in 2 of the prioritized 7 open spaces including pre-positioning of water bladders and supporting equipments for district EOCs.
- Save the Children is planning for repositioning of WASH facilities and DP training with district authorities and NRCS established GIS Centre and Red Cross EOC at Kathmandu.

**Output 4 – Health sector stockpiling of essential medical supplies:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- Ongoing capacity building of health cluster partners
- Ongoing repositioning and stockpiling of medical supplies

Outcome 4 – Preparedness for the facilitation of International Humanitarian Assistance: Partial progress through 2015, limited targets

**Output 1 – Strengthen national capacities to coordinate and integrate incoming international assistance:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- The National Disaster Response Framework has been finalized
- There have been a series of discussions and workshops throughout 2010 to 2013 between major international humanitarian and military responders and national partners to effectively coordinate the response effort.

**Output 2 – Strengthen the role of the Humanitarian Country Team through coordination, website management, and reports:** Not on track for completion. No reporting on this output.

Additional achievements:

- The 2007 Model Agreement between the GoN and the UN (on behalf of international actors) has been signed in order to expedite customs clearance procedures during major disasters.

### **Flagship 3**

Outcome 1 – Flood risk assessment: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 - Probabilistic risk and vulnerability assessment for flood and landslide hazards in the entire Kosi River Basin:** Ongoing progress.

- Risk assessment of Kosi embankments and spurs has been completed; probabilistic risk assessment of the Kosi Basin is ongoing

**Output 2 – Develop hydrological-hydrodynamic model in Koshi Basin:** Ongoing and on track.

- Development of a hydrological-hydrodynamic model has been initiated.

**Output 3 – Develop spatial database for flood management for Nepal and the Kosi Basin:** Ongoing

- Ongoing; to be completed by 2014

**Output 4 – Assessment of river morphology including bed level rising and cross-sectional survey of the Koshi River in the flood plain section:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- A detailed report on Kosi Flood Management identifying long-term interventions required for reducing flood risk in the Kosi River has been prepared and shared with stakeholders

Outcome 2 – Structural measures for flood mitigation: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 – River bank protection works including strengthening of existing river training measures:** Partial completion.

- Repair and maintenance of the 15km section of the GoN managed Koshi embankments and restoration of critical spurs has been completed with support from the GoI
- Emergency repair and rehabilitation of Eastern Koshi embankments is complete

**Output 2 – Construct minor drainage channels:**

- Completed in Flood affected areas through ADB’s Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Support Programme

**Output 3 – Provide culverts, flood-ways:**

- Completed in flood affected areas through ADB’s Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Support Programme

Outcome 3 – Non-structural measures for flood mitigation: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 – Prepare flood-inundation maps:** Ongoing

- Ongoing as part of Kosi Flood Risk Modeling; to be completed by 2014

**Output 2 – Improve watershed management:** Ongoing progress.

- UNDP has assisted preparation of watershed management plans and supported CBDRM in select communities within the Kosi Basin

**Output 3 – Improve resiliency of local communities:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- UNDP has assisted preparation of watershed management plans and supported CBDRM in select communities within the Kosi Basin.
- The World Bank/GFDRR supports CDRM works in 10 VDCs in the Kosi River Basin.

Outcome 4 – Flood forecasting and early warning system: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 – Strengthening hydrological and meteorological data observation network:** Ongoing progress.

- A total of nine real time stations (5 hydrological stations, 2 meteorological stations, and 2 rainfall stations) have been installed in the Kosi Basin.

**Output 2 – Development of telemetric systems for real-time data transmission:** Ongoing

- Action plan in place for the development of telemetric systems for real-time data transmission

**Output 3 – Development of weather forecasting and flood forecasting model:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- World Bank supported PPCR Project Building Resilience to Climate-Related Hazards is helping to modernize Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology’s observation networks, and improve the accuracy of weather and flood forecasts (including piloting of end-to-end early warning systems)

**Output 4 – Flood warning mechanism and community outreach for flood forecast dissemination:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- World Bank supported CBDRM in 10 VDCs
- UNDP supports the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology for establishing an early warning system for Tsho Rolpa Glacier Lake.

**Output 5 – Equipment purchase for enhanced weather forecast:** Ongoing progress as part of Flagship programmes

**Output 6 – CBDRM Component in the Kosi Basin:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- World Bank supported CBDRM in 10 VDCs; UNDP and ICIMOD community outreach identified.

Outcome 5 – Strengthening institutional capacity building: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 – Strengthening DWIDP and DHM including training:** Ongoing progress through 2015.

- The ADB supported Technical Assistance to the Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention through the Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project
- The World Bank supported Building Resilience to Climate-Related Hazards Project provides institutional strengthening and capacity building support to the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology

**Output 2 – Establish flood forecasting centre:** Ongoing

- Action plan in place for the development of a Flood Forecasting Centre

**Output 3 – Training to DHM staff:** Ongoing progress.

- World Bank support to Department.

**Output 4 – System Design and integration, project management and monitoring:** Ongoing progress through Flagship programs.

**Output 5 – ‘Twinning’ operation support from advanced NMSs and WMO:** Ongoing progress

- Ongoing through 2015 (will be completed in 2017); addressed under Building Resilience to Climate-Related Hazards Project

Additional Achievements:

- Project to rehabilitate and restore the damage caused by the 2008 floods with support for the ADB has been completed.

#### **Flagship 4**

Outcome 1 – Establish a Flagship 4 coordination mechanism: Completed

**Output 1 – Appoint Flagship 4 Coordinator:** Completed

**Output 2 – Establish F4 Advisory Committee with regular meetings:** Completed

**Output 3 – Establish F4 Consultation group with at least 1 meeting per quarter:** Completed

- 35 consultations to date.

**Output 4 – Establish a web-based information platform:** Completed.

- Launched 2011; updated 2012

Outcome 2 – Identify hazard prone district using secondary data: Completed

Outcome 3 – Develop common tools for CBDRM projects: On track for completion

**Output 1 – Adopt a minimum set of indicators or characteristics of a disaster resilient community in Nepal:** Ongoing.

- Characteristics completed
- Flagship 4 Handbook, 25 case studies and indicators awaiting publication.

**Output 2 – Develop a training package on the minimum characteristics for staff and volunteers:** Completed

- A training package has been developed for partners that can be integrated into partner organization trainings of project staff and incorporated into planning discussions with community government members.

Outcome 4 – Trainings/workshops for national, district, and VDC/Municipality level stakeholders: Ongoing

**Output 1 – Training/workshops on thematic areas for all levels including urban disaster risk management:** Ongoing.

- 35 municipal/district consultations held between 2012-2013
- National level workshops held in 2011 and 2013
- Joint national workshop with Flagship 1 Hospital safety in March 2013
- Joint national workshop with Flagship 1 School safety in June 2013

Outcome 5 – Implementation of DRM projects in 1000 VDCs: Ongoing progress through 2015

- Progress against individual outputs recorded by implementing partners
- Projects active in 565 VDCs/Municipalities; ongoing and on track through 2015

Outcome 6 – Additional implementation activities: Optional

Outcome 7 – Advocacy: Ongoing through 2015

**Output 1 – National level workshops:** Ongoing.

- National level workshops held in 2011 and 2013
- Joint national workshop with Flagship 1 Hospital safety in March 2013
- Joint national workshop with Flagship 1 School safety in June 2013

**Output 2 – District level consultations and workshops:** Ongoing.

- 35 municipal/district consultations held between 2012-2013

**Output 3 – Website development and maintenance:** Ongoing and on track.

**Output 4 – Materials for training and advocacy:** Ongoing and on track.

- Flagship 4 handbook set for publication.

Outcome 8 – Monitoring and Evaluation: Ongoing and on track

**Output 1 – Establish project tracking working group:** Completed

- Established technical working group for project inspired tracking system

**Output 2 – Develop and implement project tracking survey:** Completed

- Project tracking survey launched

**Output 3 – Field visits to 50 VDCs/municipalities (5 per year):** Ongoing.

- Conducted a donor field visit to 4 Flagship 4 implementing agency projects

Additional Achievements:

- Output indicators have been developed in consultation with Government, INGOs, UN and RC/RC movement. Initial draft indicators have been distributed with final indicators awaiting publication.
- Translated and published all key documents (Flagship 4 overview, ToR, minimum characteristics) into Nepali
- Designed and produced a minimum characteristics flyer with over 8000 copies distributed in Nepali
- Flagship 4 handbook set for publication in July 2013. Will act as a guide for Government and implementing agencies on how to incorporate CBDRR into interventions

### **Flagship 5**

Outcome 1 – Institutional and policy support to bring policies in line with the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management: Ongoing progress to 2015

**Output 1 – Upgrade relevant policies at local and national levels; integrate DRM into periodic planning process:** Ongoing progress

- District mainstreaming guidelines have been approved and NPC committed to including DRM in the 3-year planning process.

**Output 2 – Mainstream DRR guidelines in strategies for NPC, MoPPW, MoFALD, MOHA and key sectoral ministries and departments:** Ongoing progress.

- District mainstreaming guidelines have been approved; joint system of DRM/CRM focal points in 26 ministries.
- Completion of DRM Mainstreaming Plans in the Ministry of Agriculture, MoHA, MoFALD, MoUD, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Environment

**Output 3 – Capacity building for MOHA for the implementation of NSDRM, including data management upgrades:** Ongoing progress.

- Standard operating procedures have been drafted for MoHA, MoPPW, and MoLD and information management systems are being prepared and aligned.
- Implementation of various DRM training programs (throughout Flagship)

**Output 4 – Develop and update government system and database for disaster information:** Ongoing progress

- Integrated GoN DRM information portal expected to be launched in 2013
- Database for masons training under development

**Output 5 – Strengthen systems of DRM/CRM focal points in key government ministries through targeted training and advocacy:** Ongoing progress.

- Agreement reached between key ministries on joint system of DRM/CRM focal points in 26 ministries, and work plan for mainstreaming action and capacity enhancement agreed; joint ToR being agreed upon between ministries.
- A training course for mainstreaming DRM in the district development process is now being piloted in partnership with the Local Development Training Academy in 20 districts.

**Output 6 – Support government change processes as per the Emergency Response Framework, and key new policies and legislation based on the NSDRM:** Ongoing progress

- Ongoing support to various GoN ministries and departments for implementing the Emergency Response Framework priority follow up actions, and follow up is being coordinated through the now Government-led cluster system.

Outcome 2 – Strengthen the application of building codes and support risk sensitive land use planning: Ongoing progress to 2015.

**Output 1 – Review of National Building Codes, by-laws, regulations and planning acts; enhance GoN and municipalities’ capacity to implement the code:** Limited progress.

- Urban Growth Trends Study Draft is completed and under review by the Government; will inform future RSLUP in the Valley
- Approval of an action plan for enhancing the implementation of national building codes

**Output 2 – Scale up certified masons training in line with curricula; expand technical training opportunities in seismic resilience for Engineers and specialists:** Ongoing progress.

- Masons training ongoing (more than 1000 masons)
- The DUDBC has approved a skills upgrading curriculum for masons, which is being applied in Kathmandu and Eastern Nepal; plans are being developed to scale up training for a further 2000 masons in the Valley by 2015

**Output 3 – Development of RSLUPs for Kathmandu City and KV Megacity:** Ongoing progress.

- A framework for Kathmandu Valley wide RSLUP has been developed, with replication underway outside of the Valley.

**Output 4 – Implement government building code compliance strategy, including digitization of the permit approval process and GIS mapping of all buildings in KV:** Some progress reported and ongoing.

- Kathmandu Municipality currently in the process of digitizing 10 000 buildings; Lalitpur Municipality digitizing 5000 buildings.
- Automated building code approval process implemented in Kathmandu and Lalitpur municipalities

Outcome 3 – Strengthen national institutions for disaster risk management capacity building: Ongoing progress through 2015

**Output 1 – Assess municipal, district, and national DR training needs; develop programmes and implement training:** Ongoing progress.

- National training institutions for training and capacity building have been established with DRR training and needs assessment completed for key stakeholders.

**Output 2 – Extend training program to state institutions – police and civil service:** Ongoing progress.

- The APF, Police and army have each established DRM training units and are collaborating to host joint fire and USAR training; three rounds of basic fire fighting training have been completed

**Output 3 – Develop certified technical programs for the construction sector – planners, designers, engineers, masons:** Ongoing progress

- 7 masons’ trainings completed with KMC and Lalitpur municipalities, including one exclusively for women working in manual labor to upgrade their skills, and database system under discussion

- An technical skills-based e-learning course on RSLUP was completed by Government engineers (municipality, DUDBC, academics)
- Capacity development training for engineers/planners on going for up-scaling RSLUP in valley
- 200 engineers trained

**Output 4 – DRM in school curriculum:** Ongoing progress

- DRM is now compulsory in the school curriculum (important to note that many stakeholders were not aware of this and made reference to the need for the incorporation of DRR into school curriculum)
- MOE with UNICEF and UNESCO developed a DRM mainstreaming plan for MoE; included a workplan now under implementation for strengthening coverage and quality
- Partnerships developed with Nepal Administrative Staff College and Local Development Training Academy to integrate DRM in their curricula, and to provide a range of targeted trainings for more than 300 Government staff per year at national and district levels

**Output 5 – Expand higher education opportunities on improved disaster resilience; improve access to small academic research grants for Nepal focused DRM related analysis:** Ongoing progress.

- 2 new masters courses, partnership with Tribhuvan University, Institute of Engineering, and others
- Research grant programme on DRM for graduate students underway

Outcome 4 – Orienting financial mechanisms towards risk reduction and risk management: Limited progress through 2015

**Output 1 – Move to proactive risk reduction with MoF, NPC, and NRB:** Limited reporting.

- NPC has initiated the inclusion of DRM in 3 year plan.
- Initial discussions have been held with Nepal Rastra Bank to incorporate building codes in home/real estate financing

**Output 2 – Review district and national calamity relief funds; explore budgetary support and options for all levels:** Limited progress

- Some work ongoing as part of the annual budget process

**Output 3 – Redirect or establish financial mechanisms for VDC, DDC and national DRM activities:** Limited progress

- Points related to mainstreaming of DRM in the district development process include efforts to increase financial allocations; Prime Ministers disaster fund was also established at national level

**Output 4 – Work with key private sectors to assess and develop initiatives to expand the range of risk transfer products in Nepal:** Ongoing progress.

- Bilateral meetings have been held with banks, insurance companies, and municipalities on a self-regulatory building monitoring system for the private sector.

Outcome 5 – Support mainstreaming DRM and Climate Change Adaptation into development planning processes at all levels: Ongoing progress to 2015.

**Output 1 - Supporting mainstream DRM and CCA with MOHA, MoEST, and focal agencies:**  
Ongoing progress.

- District mainstreaming guidelines and CCA incorporated into development planning processes at all levels.

**Output 2 – Review environment impact assessments to include DRR and CCA; train and mentor government departments:** Ongoing progress.

- DRM and climate change adaptation mainstreamed and supported into development planning processes at all levels; VDC level guidelines approved and being implemented.
- Agreement reached between key ministries on joint system of DRM/CRM focal points in 26 ministries, and work plan for mainstreaming action and capacity enhancement agreed

**Output 3 – Develop minimum standards for hazard analysis and risk assessment across government:** Ongoing progress.

- Standard operating procedures have been drafted for MoHA, MoPPW, and MoLD and information management systems are being prepared and aligned.
- Guidelines have been developed and are being tested in 6 districts in partnership with key government departments

Additional Achievements:

- UNDP seconding a full-time IT expert to the NEOC for 12 months to support the information portal
- MOHA and other Government staff prioritized for a range of capacity development activities; have benefited from exposure visits to India (EOC implementation), Indonesia (Early Recovery and HFA) and Bangladesh (flood response). A delegation was also supported to attend the Global Platform on DRR in Geneva, and senior Government counterparts have attended global ALNAP and other meetings

## Annex H

### Report on Field Trip to Lalitpur, Banke and Bardiya, June 14-16

The Review Team engaged in the observation of an ongoing mason training session at Tri-Padma Vidyashram H.R School in Lalitpur, as well as a field visit to Chhediya Village. These visits took place in order to observe and gain a better understanding of ongoing community based activities contributing to disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response. Specifically in Chhediya Village, the field visit examined community preparedness against the flood risk posed by the Karnali River. Additionally in Nepalgunj, the Review Team met with local officials and visited the District Administration Office and District Emergency Operation Centre in order to gain a better understanding of the DEOC's operations.

The purpose of all visits was to gain a better understanding of the ground-level success of NRRC Flagship programme implementation. The masons training and school building retrofitting were being conducted under the support of ADB and Flagship 1, the community-based preparedness in Chhediya was occurring with support from Flagship 4, and the development of the DEOC under Flagship 2. Engagement in all activities took place between June 14<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>. The following is a description of the Team's interactions with various actors and stakeholders during these visits.

#### **1. Mason Training at Tri- Padma, Lalitpur**

The Team visited Tri-Padma Vidyashram Higher Education School, Lalitpur, in order to observe a masons training programme as well as ongoing retrofitting work. Persons met during the visit included Mr. Tikaram Timsena, Principal of the School; Mr. Sanu Lal Maharjan, Accountant of the School; Er. Ranjan Dhungel, NSET; Mr. Balkrishn Khadgi and Bhai Krishn Khadgi, supervisors; and 33 training participants.

Discussion with participants in the training was informative, and highlighted a number of the skills and techniques used throughout the retrofitting of school buildings. Participants indicated that through the training they learned techniques such as jacketing, splint and bandage, tie beams, drilling through beams, and reinforcing foundation. These skills were determined to be transferrable to the retrofitting of other vulnerable structures as well.

Discussion with the school Principal highlighted a number of challenges faced through the retrofitting process. These mainly included difficulties meeting funding targets, as well as the need for ongoing design and retrofitting of the multiple buildings in the school. It was indicated that 15% of the total estimated cost for retrofitting must be raised and mobilized by the school in order to be eligible for additional funding through the ADB program.

The Team also visited a classroom in order to gain a better understanding of the seismic risk awareness raising taking place within the school through workshops and school programming. Students demonstrated their knowledge of earthquake response techniques such as 'duck and cover', and answered questions about how to respond to victims in the event of an earthquake.

#### **2. Mock Drill at Chhediya Village, Bardiya**

The field visit to Chhediya Village required air travel to Nepalgunj, Banke District, followed by road travel into Bardiya District in order to cross the Geruwa River and continue on to Rajapur VDC.

#### Individuals Met

The Team met with Prakash Kafle of Practical Action's Regional Office in Nepalgunj as a guide and local early warning system project implementer. Additionally, for the visit to Chhediya Village, the Team was joined by Mr. Mukesh Gautam, NRCS, Bardiya, Mr. Nirmal Chaudhary, Radha-Krishan Tharu Jana Sewa Kendra Society and Mr Bir Bahadur Budhathoki, also from NRCS. Chhediya in the Rajapur VDC has approximately 600 households with a population of 2500. The Village's Shri Saraswati Padma Primary School is situated only 40 m away from the mighty Karnali River, which has a normal flow level only few meters below surface. This contributes to the overall vulnerability of the village tole and the village downstream.

Once in Chhediya Village, the Team met with a number of people through their participation in the mock flood warning demonstration. Leading and energetic figures present included Mr. Khushiram Chaudhary, Coordinator of Local Early-Warning Committee, Mr. Janakram Chaudhary and Lautan Chaudhary.

#### Early-warning System

While in Rajapur tole, Prakash Kafley from Practical Action explained the structure of the early warning system that had been put in place. The different actors involved, as well as the structure of information flow and dissemination of information in the event of floods in Mahakali were all described. It was explained that a gauge station has been installed at Chisapani where data on flood surface levels are monitored by staff within the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology. A chart showed that key warning levels are fixed at 9m for 'alert', 10m for 'prepare', and 11m for 'evacuate'.

The river gauge level at Chisapani has been automated for recording and connected to the District Police Office in Bardiya, where the current river levels are displayed and updated every 10 minutes. Data readings are also passed through mobile sets to vulnerable villages including Rajapur, Chhediya and Sangharsh nagar tole; the district administration office (DAO) and the district development office, Bardiya, security forces such as Nepal Army (Gorakhdal Gan), district police office, and armed police force at the district and area administration office at Rajapur, and to local Red Cross society Chapter and local media such as Fulbari FM and Babai FM. The message is also sent across the Indian border through a joint initiative between Christian Aid and Poovanchal Gramin Vikash Sanstha.

It was reported that the flood's lead time to extend from Chisapani to Rajapur (around 24 km) is three and half hours. Thus, the information of rising levels and the lead time serve as an early warning for the village people downstream to prepare for and manage the incoming flood.

#### The Mock Drill

A mock drill was organized with the participation of villagers at Sangharsh nagar tole of Chhedia Village, Rajapur VDC, Ward no. 6. Key persons present included Khushiram Chaudhary, the coordinator of early warning committee, Sangharshnagar, Raju Chaudhary, Janakram Chaudhary and Lautan Chaudhary. The drill proceeded according to the following steps:

1. The village connects with the gauge station to receive information about the rising flood level of the Karnali River.
2. The early warning committee coordinator comes to the Machan (an elevated RCC shade built as a temporary shelter and situated on relatively high ground) and sounds a siren several times.
3. He transmits information about the danger level of the river to the village using his loudspeaker and alerts them to come out with their valuable property and important goods and papers.
4. Trained volunteers, first aid persons, and the early warning committee members are mobilized.
5. Community inhabitants begin to make their way to the shelter. The Machan is designed to give shelter to people until evacuation and rescue teams arrive, possibly taking up to eight hours. People capable of evacuating on their own will plan to make their way to Rajapur. (It is anticipated that those able to reach higher ground without assistance will do so on their own, while more vulnerable people will make their way to the Machan)
6. The coordinator continues to sound the alarm in order to alert people that have not yet made their way to the shelter.

#### The Response

People left their homes carrying their valuable goods such as rice packs, livestock, luggage, and property papers. Able-bodied individuals were seen helping elders, injured people, and anyone vulnerable or needing assistance in reaching the Machan. Volunteers were easily identifiable in their reflective vests and were seen administering first aid to those in need, including injured children. Overall, community response and participation appeared widespread and well informed.

### **3. District Emergency Operation Centre (DEOC), Nepalgunj, Banke**

Persons met during the visit to the DEOC included Mr. Basant Kumar Kanojia, administration officer and disaster focal person at DAO, Lok Narayan Pokhrel from Center for Social Development and Research (CSDR), Karna B. Chand, Assistant Sub Inspector. The DEOC was equipped with a VHF set and supplied with 3 persons, 2 from Armed Police Force and 1 from Nepal Police. The key river levels set were 5m for alert and 5.4m for evacuation.

It was reported that the flood lead time from Kusum to Holiya (where a number of vulnerable villages are located) is around five hours, and it takes another hour to reach Laxmanpur barrage in Indian territory. Communication has been established between the DEOC, Kusum, Holiya, Narainapur and also with the Sarbasti District in India, and information passed regularly in order to operate the gates to manage floods.

#### Two Specific Notes

One issue is that in Terai districts there is little to no formal mechanism for the identification and allocation of open spaces for use in a disaster context. Related to this, there has been minimal planning for building the resiliency or for the use of health related institutions and infrastructure, including hospitals, medical colleges, and ambulance services.

The second note is that the NRRC initiative has evidently brought more actors and stakeholders together and encouraged coordination while responding to disasters such as floods. Village

Development Committees, Police and Nepal Red Cross Society share information, work and report together. The Red Cross coordinates with data supply for information sharing and police take the lead in rescue, contributing to a unified response process.

### **Analysis**

In the Tri-Padma Vidyashram Higher Education School, Lalitpur, the observation of the masons training provided insight into the ongoing progress against Flagship 1 school retrofitting, and the capacity building of individual workers in order to carry out retrofitting works and projects throughout the implementation of the Flagship workplan. Additionally, interaction with students and teachers highlighted the awareness raising surrounding disaster preparedness that has been taking place within schools, contributing to the success of the software component of the Flagship.

In Chhediya village, there was evidence of strong information sharing and positive response to the training and planning offered through CBDRM initiatives. The engagement and level of participation among Village residents, as well as the level of training exemplified by the early warning committee coordinator and the first aid volunteers, was evidence of the success of the local CBDRM initiative.

The DAO and DEOC provided examples of some of the successful achievements under Flagship 2. Interaction with the DRR focal person revealed that the information sharing was expanding not only within the district and the country's capital but also across the border. An example of how this information sharing and establishment of the DEOC had been useful was last year in Holiya and Narainpur. It was reported that the early warning systems in place alerted vulnerable villages and allowed for timely evacuation. Information sharing with the management team of Laxmanpur barrage and its subsequent operation to manage floods can be taken as the strength of the NRRC arrangement that is gaining momentum.

## Annex I

### Stakeholders Interviewed

Stakeholder Interviewed	Title/Position	Organization
<b>Donor Agencies</b>		
Santosh Gyawali	Senior Development Program Specialist	USAID
Brett Jones	Director, Disaster Risk Reduction Office	USAID
Sheila Roquitte	Senior Advisor for DRRP	USAID
Piush Kayastha	Programme Officer	EU/ECHO
Samuel Marie-Fanon	Rapid Response Coordinator	EU/ECHO
Benjamin Reese	Head of Post	AusAid
Krishna Lamsal	Program Manager	AusAid
Yokito Sugimura	Project Formulation Advisor	JICA
Hisashi Hoshino	First Secretary	Embassy of Japan
Toshio Shirahata	Overseas Program Section	Shapla Neer
Kailash M. Pradhan	Program Manager	Embassy of Japan
Ram Bhandari	Associate Program Manager	JICA
Samir Ilme	First Secretary	Embassy of India
Sam Rose	Humanitarian Advisor	DFID
Philip Smith	Acting Head of Office	DFID
Simon Little	Former Humanitarian Advisor	DFID
<b>Implementing Agencies/Programme Partners</b>		

Christian Clark	Country Director	BBC
Christopher Ganpatsingh	Associate Director	Turner & Townsend
Jason Layfield	Team Associate	Ramboll
Amod Mani Dixit	General Secretary and Executive Director	NSET
Kirsteen Merrilees	Deputy Program Officer	RAP 3
Deepak Gyawali	Interdisciplinary Analysts	NAST
Hari Krishna Shrestha	Professor	NEC
Lex Kassenburg	Country Director	CARE Nepal
Rajesh Srivastava	Project Manager	CARE Nepal
Nicole Menage	Country Representative	World Food Programme
Andreas Wuestenburg	Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer	World Food Programme
Bhawana Upadhyay	National ICT Officer	World Food Programme
Rajendra Kumar Lal	Logistics Unit	World Food Programme
Kedar Babu Dhungana	Programme Manager - Emergency	Save the Children
Scott Faiia	Country Director	OXFAM
Sanjay Karki	Country Director	MercyCorps
Hanaa Singer	Country Representative	UNICEF
Overtoun Mgemzulu	DRR Specialist	UNICEF
Sabina Joshi	Education Cluster Coordinator	UNICEF
Sunita Kayasta	Chief of Emergency Programme Unit	UNICEF
Hari Krishna Nibanupudi	Action Area Team Leader	ICIMOD
Enrica Leresche	Country Health Director	Merlin
Sanjeeb K. Shakya	DRR- Programme Coordinator	Merlin
Ram Bhattarai		National Disaster Risk

		Reduction Centre
Laxmi Raj Joshi	Disaster Project Coordinator	Caritas Nepal
Meen B. Poudyal Chhetri	Chairperson	DPNet
Ramesh Guragain	Director, Earthquake Engineering Research & Training Centre	NSET
Madhukar Upadhyay		PEI
Vishnu Dangol	General Secretary	NELS
Ratindra Khatri	General Secretary	SCDRR Nepal
Manoj Baral	Programme Manager	ECO Nepal
Deepak Paudel	Chairperson	NDMF Nepal
Surendra Gautam		WHH
Gehendra Bahadur Gurung	Head of DRR Programme Unit	Practical Action
Sunil Gurung	Program officer	OXFAM (AIN)
Shyam Gyawali	DRM Coordinator	Plan (AIN)
Christophe Belperron	Country Representative	Mission East (AIN)
Suresh Thapa	Human Security and Urban Program Coordinator	ActionAid (AIN)
Bidya Mahat	Programme Director	ADRA Nepal (AIN)
Madhavi Ariyabandu Malalgoda	Regional Programme Officer	ISDR
Prajwal Sharma	Programme Assistant	IOM
Prakash Kaphle	Project Manager	Practical Action Regional Office, Nepalgunj
Basant Kumar Kanojia	Disaster Focal Point	District Administration Office, Banke, Nepalgunj
Karna B. Chand	Assistant Inspector	Security In-Charge, DEOC, Banke, Nepalgunj

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Mukesh Gautam	Staff	NRCS, Bardiya
Nirmal Chaudhary	Project Coordinator	RKJS, Bardiya
Bir Bahadur Budhathoki	Project Coordinator	NRCS, Bardiya
Khushiram Chaudhary	Member	Early Warning Committee (CDMC) Chhediya, Rajapur
Lautan Chaudhary	Field supervisor	NRCS, Bardiya
Janak Ram Chaudhary	Field supervisor	NRCS, Bardiya
Tika Ram Timalisina	Principal	Tri-Padma Vidyashram, Lalitpur
Ranjan Dhungel	Civil Engineer	NSET
Jens Poul Madsen	International Director	Falck
<b>NRRC and Flagship Coordinating Agencies</b>		
Andrew Martin	Head of OCHA	OCHA
Ram Prasad Leutel	Coordination Analyst, Disaster Response Specialist	OCHA
Hannes Goegele	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA, ROAP
Anil Pokhrel	Disaster Risk Management Specialist	World Bank
Marc Forni	Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist	World Bank
Ritva Lahti	Country Representative, Nepal	IFRC
Becky-Jay Harrington	Flagship 4 Coordinator	IFRC
Victoria Bannon	Former Flagship 4 Coordinator	IFRC
Anders Skjelmoose	Country Coordinator	Danish Red Cross
Julia Brothwell	Programme Advisor	British Red Cross
Shoko Noda	Country Director	UNDP

Jorn Sorensen	Deputy Country Director	UNDP
Jenty Kirsch-Wood	Head, Disaster Management Unit	UNDP
Man B. Thapa	Programme Manager CDRMP	UNDP
Avani Dixit	Programme Analyst, DRM unit	UNDP
Damodar Adhikari	National Operational Officer	WHO
Kenichi Yokoyama	Country Director	ADB
Smita Gyawali	Associate Project Officer	ADB
Sreejana Rajbhandari	Programs Analyst	ADB
Paolo Spantigati	Principal Country Specialist	ADB
Mahendra Adhikari	Humanitarian Coordination Analyst	Field Coordination Office
Prem Awasthi	Field Coordinator	Field Coordination Office
Terry Jones	Resident Coordinator, Nepal	United Nations
Robert Piper	Former Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Nepal	United Nations
Giovanni Congi	Public Information Coordinator	NRRC
Moira Reddick	Coordinator	NRRC
<b>Government Representatives</b>		
Lakshmi Prasad Dhakal	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Home Affairs
Suresh Acharya	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Urban Development
Reshmi Raj Pandey	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development
Kamal Prasad Regmi	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Irrigation
Tirtha Raj Burlakoti	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Health and Population

Pradeep Koirala	Under Secretary	Ministry of Home Affairs
Chakra Pani Sharma	Under Secretary	Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development
Mahendra Subba	Director General	Department of Urban Development and Building Construction
Rishi Ram Sharma	Director General	Department of Hydrology and Meteorology
Shiv Kumar Sharma	Director General	Department of Irrigation
Pradeep Raj Pandey	Director General	Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention
Jhapper Singh Vishokarma	Senior Divisional Engineer	Department of Education

## Annex J

### Terms of Reference: NRRRC Review

#### Background

##### **1 The Context**

With a diverse landscape, ranging from the massive Himalayan range to the fertile *Terai* region, the people of Nepal face a variety of life-threatening hazards. Classified as a global ‘hotspot’ (World Bank, 2005), Nepal is vulnerable to multiple natural disasters, suffering an average of 900 natural disasters each year resulting in lost lives and damaged livelihoods (MoHA, 2009). These disasters include earthquakes, floods, landslides, windstorms, hailstorms, fire, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) and avalanches. In terms of relative vulnerability, Nepal has been ranked as the 11<sup>th</sup> most at-risk country in the world to earthquakes and 30<sup>th</sup> most at-risk to floods and landslides (UNDP, BCPR, 2004). This vulnerability to natural disasters results in preventable deaths and injuries and puts investments made in development at risk.

Kathmandu is the most at-risk city in the world to a major earthquake, as the Indian Plate continues to push under the Tibetan Plate (GeoHazards International, 2001). Current assessments suggest that a magnitude 8.0 earthquake in KV would result in 100,000 deaths, 300,000 injured, and over 1 million persons displaced. In addition, major bridges and critical infrastructure, such as the only international airport, would be severely affected, posing significant challenges for an immediate and effective response[1]. Recent assessments have led the logistics cluster to believe that the Government and the International community will face significant challenges in mounting an immediate response to such an earthquake with the airport compromised, the three main access roads into the valley blocked by secondary impacts for weeks if not months, and surface transportation within the valley closed for a least one to three weeks[2] Local elections have not taken place in Nepal for over a decade and Kathmandu is central to decision making. We can expect a Haiti-type scenario where 25% of the civil servants will die as a result of the earthquake with inevitable consequences for speed and coordination of GoN response.

The impact of the decade long conflict has made it difficult to isolate evidence on the economic impact of disasters on the formal economy but available evidence suggests that, cumulatively, disasters are economically significant for the country resulting in an average annual loss equivalent to some 1% of GDP with much higher losses in some years. It is widely held that the impact of disasters is increasing in Nepal due to rising vulnerability linked to factors such as demographic growth, urban expansion, poor land use planning, poor construction methods and lack of compliance to the building code, steep land farming practices, encroachment of river banks and forest areas, environmental degradation and the impact of climate change[3].

As the emphasis on DRM has grown and investments have increased, there has been an increasing acknowledgement that there is insufficient absorptive capacity for implementation. This issue has been frankly addressed and recorded in the past two Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Steering Committee meetings. While action is being taken to address this by the GoN (see below) the Review will consider how best support can be offered.

## **2. The Policy Environment**

Currently Nepal is subject to the 1982 Natural Calamity Relief Act. The need for a more comprehensive approach to DRM has been acknowledged in consecutive development plans and the Draft Disaster Management Act (draft finalized 2009). While the Act has not yet passed into law the accompanying Draft National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management has been approved and is being implemented (see below). The new Act will clarify the GoN's understanding of DRM and outline the role of all authorities with regard to DRM while providing the legitimacy for the creation of a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

Nepal is a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and both the NSDRM and the NRRC reflect the commitments made by Nepal to the HFA and contribute to Nepal's reporting on these commitments.

One challenge for the NRRC and, in particular, for Flagship 5, has been the continued lack of the Disaster Management Act. As it is impossible to predict when this Act might be passed it has become necessary for the DRM community to consider other possibilities for ensuring sustained capacity for implementation of scaled up programming on risk reduction and preparedness. At the time of writing this TOR (end March 2013) new Disaster Directorates were being put in place in the Ministry of Defence and also a new DRM Division was being proposed in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It seems likely that this new MOHA Division would come into being in 2013. The shape and reach of this new Division should significantly positively impact the ability of the Government to oversee comprehensive DRM within the country and to ensure a coherent approach across Government. The Review will consider how the NRRC can best support the new MOHA DRM Division, the Disaster Directorates and plan for the eventual NDMA.

## **3. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium**

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was conceived in 2009 when a small group of individuals representing the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the international community met and agreed upon i) a common set of priorities from the Draft National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM), and ii) a mechanism for collective working. Overall governance is through a Steering Committee which meets quarterly. The Steering Committee is jointly chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. [4] Current members of the Steering Committee are: Ministry of Home Affairs, Finance, Physical Planning and Works, Federal Affairs and Local Development, Health and Population, Irrigation, Education, National Planning Commission, RC/HC, UNDP, UNOCHA, ADB, WHO, DFID, IFRC, US Embassy, World Bank, AusAid, ECHO, Embassy of Japan, DPNET and the Nepal Red Cross Society. The Indian Embassy is a standing observer.

The Terms of Reference for a small Secretariat was agreed by the Steering Committee in 2010. The Joint Secretary and Under Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs comprise the Secretariat together with a NRRC Coordinator. This latter post was filled part time in 2010/2011 by representatives from OCHA and UNDP until DFID provided a full time Coordinator in 2011. DFID commitment to this post will continue until first quarter 2014.

The common set of priorities agreed from the Draft NSDRM became the five Flagship programmes of the NRRC[5] while key Ministries of the GoN and international agencies accepted the responsibility to lead each of the Flagships. Flagship leads (as they are known) do

not work according to an agreed terms of reference, have no agreed responsibility for funding or fundraising. No formal baseline was agreed at the outset of the NRRC. A fund tracking system was put in place in 2012 but there is to date no comprehensive monitoring and reporting system. Individual Flagships do have their own mechanisms and a format exists for reporting to the Steering Committee (reports are available).

Although the original Flagship documentation stated that the timeline for the NRRC would be three years, the start and end point were not formally agreed at that time. At a MOHA-led meeting in 2012 it was agreed that the official start point should be agreed to be 2011 (when the launch meetings were held and when key partners made significant financial contributions) and the end point agreed to be 2015.

At the launch in 2011 the total iterative budget for the NRRC was c148 million USD. An updating of the Flagship document in late 2012 led to a revised budget of c198 million USD. The last fund tracking exercise in mid 2012 found that approximately 68 million USD could be ascribed to the NRRC. A new fund tracking exercise will be carried out in April/May 2013 to inform this review. It is expected that approximately 100 million will be found to have been committed. At the outset of the NRRC it was decided that a trust fund (or similar mechanism) would not be established.

Given the range of actors the NRRC faces constant change and turnover both within the GoN and within the international community. At the time of writing this Terms of Reference a major challenge facing the NRRC is the planning phasing down of OCHA at the end of 2013 with a request from OCHA that another lead agency comes forward to run Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response. This issue needs to be considered as part of the Review.

### **Purpose of Review**

The primary purpose of the review is to take stock of the current progress and achievements, review current capacity and investments in order to ensure that NRRC priorities and structure match Government of Nepal current priorities and can support new Government structures. The review will also inform current and future work plans and advance the planning phase for the post-2015 DRM context in Nepal and a potential second phase of the NRRC. Specific questions for the team to address are as follows:

- a) Which of the current operational Flagship objectives and workplan outcomes will not be met by 2015?
- b) Whether outcomes (as currently stated) will be adequate to meet to meet the purpose of the NRRC? Do these outcomes match the current priorities of the Government?
- c) Whether current outcomes need to be refined or prioritized within Flagships
- d) Whether linkages between Flagships are being adequately highlighted and supported?
- e) Whether there are key gaps that should be incorporated – and if so where leadership (including resourcing) for this new work can be sourced?
- f) Whether current institutional arrangements and capacity within the NRRC architecture is appropriate and/or adequate to meet requirements. This should include the role of the Steering Committee and Advisory Groups, the role of the Flagship leads, and the role of the Secretariat. With regard to the latter the Review team should consider whether the current Secretariat is providing adequate support and appropriate support across the NRRC, including with donors and implementing partners.

- g) Whether the current financial mechanisms remain appropriate and if the Secretariat is currently providing adequate reporting and oversight?

The review team should additionally:

- a) Consider the issue of absorption capacity which has already been identified as a key blockage and make recommendations with regard to how the GoN's initiatives to overcome this can best be supported.
- b) Consider how best the NRRC Steering Committee can measure progress and results over the next few years in order to sustain engagement and inputs and make appropriate recommendations which consider the demands of such a mechanism on the individual Ministries/organizations and the various institutional cultures involved. Make recommendations for the key elements of a future results framework.
- c) (Re)consider whether the NRRC should establish a trust fund mechanism or some form of collective funding system. Previous research has been done on this which can inform the Review team. Both political and operational considerations should be taken into account.
- d) Offer recommendations for reconfiguring the NRRC now or for the structure and priorities of a second phase (post 2015). This should include the immediate matter of leadership of Flagship 2 and the likely impact of the creation of the new Government DRM structures.

This is a review not an evaluation and the team is not charged therefore with making a judgement on past decisions, performance of individuals, or institutions. In line with the intent that the review should be forward looking however appropriate recommendations on more detailed review or reflections are welcome.

### **Approach**

The Review team will present their report and recommendations to a Taskforce comprising of Steering Committee members. The Taskforce will brief the Review team and meet several times with them during the review. The draft report and recommendations will be submitted to the Taskforce for feedback before submission to the Steering Committee. The taskforce will be made up of the Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee, key Ministries and Donors (the formulation of the Taskforce and meetings with the Taskforce will be facilitated by the Secretariat). If timing allows the team may present to the Steering Committee at the end of their Review.

It is expected that most of those who will contribute to the Review will be based in Kathmandu. One field visit to a location where two or more of the Flagships have been active will be made. The location for the field visit will be determined by the Taskforce. Phone/Skype calls will be arranged with key individuals who are no longer present in Kathmandu.

The NRRC Secretariat will provide the Review team with a key documentation set and will draw up a timeline. The NRRC Secretariat will also draw up an initial list of primary and secondary interviewees. Once the list of interviewees has been agreed by the Taskforce and the Review Team the Secretariat will schedule the interviews on behalf of the Review Team. As part of this process it will be agreed which interviews should be individual interviews and which should be group interviews.

While it is understood that most interviews will be semi-structured it is expected that the Review team will share a list of key issue/question in advance with the Taskforce so that these can be discussed and it can be understood how the Review team is expecting to gather a

diversity of viewpoints. It is expected that most (if not all) of these interviews will take place in English but the Secretariat will provide a translator when it is needed/requested.

As stated above the Review team will provide a draft report to the Taskforce and make a presentation to elicit feedback. Overall feedback provided by the Taskforce will be considered in finalizing the report which will then be submitted to the Steering Committee.

#### **Review Timeline**

Desk study of Documentation – 2 days to be undertaken prior to the arrival in country of the Team Leader

Interviews – 5 days

Field Visit – 3 days

Preparation of draft report and recommendations to Taskforce – 5 days

Consideration of Taskforce feedback and revision of report and recommendations – 2 days

Presentation to Steering Committee – 1 day

*Note: with the exception of the field visit travel times have not been considered.*

#### **Team Composition**

A team of three is recommended though it may be that team members could combine roles.

- One national or international team leader with significant experience of working with complex consortia models, experience of disaster management, excellent analytical skills, experience of South Asian contexts and DRM debates, diplomacy and tact. Excellent report writing and communication skills. Demonstrated experienced in conducting and team leading reviews of this nature. An understanding of the application of results frameworks across consortia is essential. Experience of working in Nepal would be an advantage.
- Two national or international team members who collectively should offer the following: a strong understanding of the Nepali context and, in particular, of the governance issues related to the evolution of DRM in Nepal, experience of working in disaster management both in Nepal and elsewhere in South Asia in both urban and rural contexts, excellent analytical and writing skills, and demonstrated experience in conducting reviews.

#### **Timeline**

The review should be conducted in June 2013 in order to present recommendations to the NRRC Steering Committee at the end of June.

#### **Support to the Review Team**

The review team will be provided with logistical and practical support by the NRRC Secretariat.

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[1] Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Flagship Programmes Document March 2013 edition

[2] Power Point Presentation re Logistics Cluster Readiness Status, January 2011

[3] Economic and Financial Decision Making in Disaster Risk Management, Nepal Case Study, UNDP (no date)

[4] Note that the RC/HC in place from the inception of the NRRC in 2009 to date left his post February 2011. The replacement will not be an HC.

[5] 1 School and Hospital Safety, 2Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity, 3 Flood Management in the Kosi River Basin, 4 Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction, 5 Policy and Institutional Support for Disaster Risk Management.

## Annex K

### **NRRC Multi Donor Trust Fund Mechanism**

While the preferred mode of funding allocation to the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium is by direct agreement either to the Government of Nepal or through a consortium participant organisation, there is interest by several donors to contribute to the work of the consortium through a small pass-through fund management mechanism

#### **Key**

#### **Principles**

The preferred mode of allocation of resources to the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium is by 1) direct agreement between a donor and the Government of Nepal or 2) donor and participant organisation. Donors are encouraged to first consider these two options, and only if these are not feasible to consider contributions to the Nepal DRR Flagship Multi-Donor Trust Fund

#### **Administration of the MDTF**

UNDP serves as Administrative Agent (AA) for the fund, and is responsible for receiving donor contributions and disbursing these funds to eligible organisations in support of flagship approved projects.

#### **Contributions**

Contributions to the trust fund are encouraged to be earmarked either to a specific activity in the trust fund, or to one of the five flagship areas.

Allocation of any un-earmarked contributions within a flagship area will be decided based in the recommendation of the flagship coordinator, and reviewed by the Steering Committee.

#### **Eligibility**

United Nations organizations may participate in the MDTF by signing a standardized Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the AA that sets out the terms and conditions of the fund and which enables them to be eligible for funding. Non UN entities will have access to the fund through participating UN agencies, in which case the latter will use their standard NGO cooperation modalities.

#### **Proposal Submission and Approval Process**

Projects submitted for funding must contribute to one of the programme areas outline in the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Flagship Programme Document and must fall within the document's overall budget plan.

Project submissions must be in the form of the approved 3 page project summary format. Additional project details, technical assessments etc. may be attached as annexes.

Projects should be submitted to the relevant Flagship Technical Committee. On recommendation of the Flagship Technical Committee projects will be submitted to the NRRC Steering Committee for consideration at its quarterly meetings. Submissions must be accompanied by information regarding which flagship activity area the project addresses and must have been recommended for funding the relevant flagship coordinator/technical review committee within the flagship area. The NRRC Steering Committee reserves the right to return projects for further clarification/budget review/redrafting if necessary. Decisions regarding project funding will be transmitted to the participating organisations by email within two weeks of the Steering Committee meeting.

On approval of the Steering Committee, a full proposal will be developed by the participating organisation and submitted to the NRRC Secretariat for technical review. Proposal technical reviews will be conducted by the NRRC Secretariat and relevant flagship technical committee members.

The vetted full proposal will then be submitted for funding authorisation to the relevant Flagship Coordinator and UN Resident Coordinator.

### **Administrative Costs**

The Administrative Agent will be entitled to allocate an administrative fee of one % (1%) of the amount contributed by each donor signing an Administrative Arrangement, to meet the Administrative Agent's cost of performing the Administrative Agent's functions. The indirect costs of the Participating Organisations recovered through programme support costs will be seven % (7%).

### **Functions of the Administrative Agent**

The AA will accept the appointment on the understanding that the Participating UN Organisations assume full programmatic and financial accountability of the funds disbursed to them by the AA. The Administrative Agent will enter into a Standard Administrative Arrangement with each donor that wishes to provide financial support. In behalf of the Participating UN Organisations, the AA will:

- Receive contributions from donors that wish to provide financial support to the MDTF through the AA
- Administer such funds received, in accordance with the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the AA and Participating UN Organisations, including the provisions relating to winding up the MDTF and related matters; and the Standard Administrative Arrangement between each donor and the AA;
- Subject to availability of funds, disburse such funds to each of the Participating UN Organisations in accordance with instructions from the Steering Committee/Resident Coordinator (on behalf of the Steering Committee), taking into account the budget set out in the approved programmatic document/Joint Programme Document, as may be amended in writing from time to time by the Steering Committee;
- Consolidate statements and reports, based on submissions provided to the AA by each Participating UN Organisation, as set forth in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and provide

- these to each donor that has contributed to the MDTF and to the Steering Committee/Resident Coordinator for One UN Funds;
- The Administrative Agent shall submit quarterly progress updates and Consolidated Annual Progress reports to the Steering Committee containing progress towards achieved results against approved indicators and financial status data.
  - Provide financial reporting, including notification that the MDTF has been operationally completed;
  - Disburse funds to any Participating UN Organisation for any additional costs of the task that the Steering Committee may decide in accordance with TOR; and
  - Provide certified annual and final financial statement (“Source and Use of Funds”)
  - no later than 5 months (31 May) and seven months (31 July) after the end of the calendar year following the financial closing of the fund.

### **Monitoring and evaluation and audit arrangements**

Project supervision and monitoring will be done in accordance with the policy and procedures of the Participating Organisations. All Participating Organisations will be audited in accordance with their own financial regulations and rules. The Administrative Agency can also be subject to audit based on a request from the Steering Committee.

For each project approved for funding, the Participating Organisation will provide to the Administrative Agent an annual progress report (or final report in the case of projects lasting less than one year) not more than three months after year/project end. A full financial statement must also be submitted as part of this report.