



Oxford Policy Management

# **Strategic Research into National and Local Capacity Building for DRM**

## Pakistan Fieldwork Report

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## List of Abbreviations

ACT	Action by Churches Together
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
CB	Capacity Building
CBDRM	Community Based DRM
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CWSA	Community World Service Asia
CWS P/A	Church World Service Pakistan/Afghanistan
DCO	District Coordination Officer
DDMA	District Disaster Management Authority
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
EDO	Executive District Officer
ERC	Emergency Relief Cell
ERRA	Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
ERRP	Earthquake Risk Reduction and Preparedness Programme
EWS	Early Warning System
FFC	Federal Flood Commission
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MKRC	Mobile Knowledge Resource Centre
NCBDRM	National Capacity Building for DRM
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NIDM	National Institute for Disaster Management
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PCM	Policy Coordination Meeting
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society

Q&A	Quality and Accountability
RC/RC	Red Cross/Red Crescent
SHA	Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance
TWG	Thematic Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VDMC	Village Disaster Management Committee
WFP	World Food Programme



# 1 Introduction and methodology

## 1.1 Introduction to the research

In September 2013, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) contracted Oxford Policy Management and the University of East Anglia to conduct Strategic Research into National and Local Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management.

To date there has been little formal, empirical research that has been conducted on capacity building for disaster risk management (DRM), and as a result international actors lack robust, evidence-based guidance on how capacity for DRM can be effectively generated at national and local levels. The research project has been designed as an initial step towards filling that knowledge and evidence gap.

Our central aim in the research is therefore to draw lessons and guidance on ‘how to’ build DRM capacity in a range of contexts. We will do this by analysing the characteristics, effectiveness and relative importance of a range of capacity building for DRM interventions across a variety of country contexts.

Our objectives are to research the following overarching issues of concern:

1. How is capacity for DRM generated most effectively at both national and local levels?
2. What factors enable or constrain the building of national and local capacity for DRM?
3. How and why does this vary across different environments?
4. How is the international community currently approaching the task of building national and local capacities for DRM?
5. How can we identify and measure improving capacity for DRM?

The core research is based on a country case study approach. A pilot study was conducted in March / April 2014 in Ethiopia. The second case study was conducted in Pakistan in June 2014 using the refined standardised methodological framework for data collection and analysis. This report sets out the approach taken and the findings of the case study. Five further case studies will take place which will enable comparative analysis across countries and interventions. In each case study we look in-depth at 1-3 programmes that involve capacity building for disaster risk management.

The Research Team is led by Dr. Roger Few, Senior Research Fellow at the School of International Development (DEV) in the University of East Anglia. The Project Manager is Zoë Scott who is a full-time staff member at Oxford Policy Management and the Fieldwork Leader is Kelly Wooster who was assisted in Pakistan by Zubair Faisal Abbasi, Maqsood Jan and Usman Qazi.

## 1.2 Methodology

In Pakistan, as in each case study country, we aim to analyse the following themes:

- Context/dynamics
- Specific examples of capacity-building activities for DRM
- Actors/programme characteristics

- Approach to CB process
- Content of CB activities
- Effectiveness
- Capacity development for DRM (in general)

In order to investigate CB activities for DRM we selected two capacity-oriented DRM intervention programmes for in-depth study. In each case study the programmes are selected with consideration for the research as a whole - they are not intended to give a representative picture of the situation in Pakistan but are intended to combine with the selections made in other case study countries to give a broad overview of different types of intervention to feed into the final synthesis report. Overall the selection of case studies will enable us to look at a balance of different scales, contexts, disasters and CB for DRM activities. On occasion we will select programmes that are similar to facilitate comparison, at other times we will select unusual projects which could offer lessons learned to a wider scale audience.

When selecting interventions the following criteria are applied:

- The programme should have both capacity building and disaster risk management as a central focus.
- The programme should aim to enable government, organisations, communities or individuals to make better decisions regarding disaster risk management in a sustainable way.
- The programme should be nearly finished or recently finished (ideally evaluations will have already been done) so there has been adequate time to reflect on lessons learned and observe impact. The project should not have finished many years earlier as it will then be difficult to track down stakeholders and budget information.
- The programme should not be exclusively training, provision of equipment or building of infrastructure (training may be considered if it is followed up with action planning, development of DRM committees and follow-up support).
- The programme should not be exclusively or mainly located in areas in which the research team cannot travel due to security constraints.

In the case of Pakistan the following steps were taken to identify and select appropriate programmes:

1. A web-based search and literature review identified a long-list of possible programmes.
2. This list was supplemented with information from IFRC, PRC and from Zafar Qadir (former head of the NDMA in Pakistan).

Several programmes were ruled out for the following reasons:

- The research team was not able to travel to many parts of Pakistan including KPK where many CB for DRM programmes were located as a result of the 2005 earthquakes.
- The PRCS CBDRR programme suggested by IFRC was completed two years prior and was therefore less attractive as a potential case study.

- The Punjab Emergency Services programme, at closer inspection, focused mainly on provision of equipment and was funded by an individual.

Two programmes emerged as appropriate case studies:

- UNDP's One UN DRM project
- Community World Service Asia's (CWSA)<sup>1</sup> Capacity Building Programme

Upon closer investigation the team noted that while CWSA was a small operation, they had a positive reputation amongst the humanitarian community, with a significant part of their operations on capacity building for DRM. CWSA's partnerships with global initiatives such as The Sphere Project and HAP (in the SHA programme) enabled them to become capacity builders for DRM to INGOs, their implementing partners and to a lesser degree with UN agencies, Red Cross and government. CWSA also offered community level trainings and from the available literature seemed to excel in making training sustainable at both organisational and community levels. The One UN DRM programme provided a complete contrast in terms of size of operation, budget, type of organisation and focus, with DRM being just one component of a large, complex programme. The combination of the two initiatives reached from national to community levels and was deemed to be an opportunity for rich findings for the fieldwork report.

### 1.2.1 Data collection tools

During the case study we used the following tools for data collection:

- Desk review of secondary data sources** (documents and databases) such as programme reports, financial data and review articles, which provided key information for several of the research questions.
- Key informant interviews and group interviews** at a range of scales (national / subnational / community). Semi-structured interviews (individual and group) were the primary research tool, and were guided by question schedules (see Annex A). These were flexibly applied according to the interviewee(s). The group interviews were divided by gender.<sup>2</sup>
- Rating exercise** conducted with interviewees and groups. At the close of each interview a brief exercise component was included that asks interviewees to rate the importance of the six proposed principles of effective capacity building identified in the 'conceptual framework of change'<sup>3</sup> on a scale of 1-4.

### 1.2.2 Case study procedure

During the case study we undertook the following steps in data collection and analysis:

<sup>1</sup> This organisation was formerly known as Church World Service Pakistan / Afghanistan (CWS P/A). CWS-P/A began operations in Pakistan in 1954 and subsequently grew considerably in program areas, scale of operation, organisational capacity and technical expertise. In November 2014, the CWS Global Board of Directors is expected to formally approve the separation of CWS-P/A to form a new, independent organization called Community World Service Asia.

<sup>2</sup> The group interviews were divided by gender, following the methodology set out in our Inception Report. This is to facilitate open discussion, particularly around questions of women's participation in the programmes. In Pakistan the team were also advised that this was culturally appropriate.

<sup>3</sup> The six principles were identified from a global literature review conducted during the inception phase of the research. The principles are flexibility and adaptability, comprehensive planning, ownership, attention to functional capacity, integration of actors and scales and contribution to disaster resilience. Please see the Inception Report for detailed explanations of each principle.

- a) Preliminary desk-based study. During the month preceding the field visit we undertook a desk-based search and analysis of secondary sources and a preliminary stakeholder mapping exercise. Documents such as programme reports, evaluation reports, review articles and general contextual and policy documents on disaster risk, DRM and governance were accessed via internet searches and through liaison with in-country partners and wider networks. Relevant text from these sources was coded and collated in relation to the research questions. The mapping of key stakeholders formed an initial list for the key informant interviews which was refined and added to as the fieldwork progressed.
- b) Main data collection in country. The main data collection phase comprised the collection of additional secondary sources (including non-electronic sources not previously accessed) and financial data relating to selected programmes, key informant interviews (semi-structured) at a mix of scales, and group interviews divided by gender.
- Week 1: The first week was spent in the capital, Islamabad, where we had preliminary meetings with PRCS, the current chairman of NDMA, the chairman of NDMA during UNDP's One UN DRM programme and CWSA. An initial workshop for key stakeholders was held with representatives from RC/RC and DFID to help the research team to validate their understanding of the context for disaster risk management in Pakistan. The initial workshop participants also provided further relevant secondary data and suggested additional key informants to engage in the research. Five CB Actor interviews on the two selected initiatives were conducted during Week 1. Interviews conducted throughout data collection period ended with the structured rating exercise outlined above.
  - Week 2: During the second week the research team split into two sub-teams. One team stayed in Islamabad to focus on secondary data collection and review and interviews for One UN DRM. The other sub-team travelled to Sindh province to conduct individual and group interviews for the CWSA programmes and One UN DRM at the sub-national and community levels. 11 CB Actor interviews, two Commentator interviews and five Group Interviews were conducted during Week 2.
  - Week 3: The third week in-country was completed in Islamabad and involved the initial analysis of findings which were presented at the final workshop. The final workshop was held for a wider range of national level stakeholders from government, UN, RC/RC, INGOs, NGOs and a consultant. The final workshop served to get a broader perspective on the DRM context and to test the M&E framework. Three further key informant interviews were conducted in Islamabad during Week 3.
  - Week 4: Final interviews were conducted by the national partners to ensure the team has sufficient data for the One UN DRM programme at sub-national level and to have a specific interview with M&E experts on the proposed M&E framework.
- c) Final workshop. At the close of the fieldwork a final workshop was organised with stakeholders at national scale. The workshop's purpose was to provide an update/debrief and feedback/validation on the preliminary findings of the case study, and provide an opportunity to undertake a large-scale M&E framework testing exercise with national experts. The workshop lasted for a half-day and 19 individuals attended.
- d) M&E Framework Testing. The final workshop provided a forum to discuss and reflect on the M&E framework which had been revised and refined based on the experience of the Ethiopia pilot case study. During the workshop a group activity was undertaken whereby

participants were introduced to the proposed M&E framework and asked to provide feedback on tools created for one core outcome indicator. Groups reported back on the ease of use, measurability, the guidance tool and were also asked whether they could suggest other core indicators that could measure the outcome area. After the workshop, four M&E experts from the Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) participated in an M&E-specific interview to provide further in-depth feedback.

- e) Initial analysis. Preliminary analysis of primary data sources commenced whilst in the field. For qualitative data sources the initial analysis entailed coding/collation of interview transcripts. The coding scheme has a shared core component to facilitate comparative analysis.
- f) Integrated analysis. Data from across data sources has been compiled for each selected activity and for the Pakistan context as a whole to provide a narrative analysis. Triangulation of data sources has been employed wherever possible to maximise robustness of the analytical points drawn; and where interpretations of evidence are more speculative this is clearly indicated.

### 1.2.3 Coverage

In total 31 key informants (4 of whom were women) were interviewed during the fieldwork and five group interviews (one male and one female Village Disaster Management Committee, a group of adult DRR trainees and two groups of student DRR trainees ) were conducted.

Of the key informant interviews, 28 were interviewed as actors in the two selected CB programmes, two were interviewed as commentators on the programmes and four were interviewed specifically to discuss the proposed M&E framework. Information on context was gathered during the two workshops representing 23 key informants.

Therefore 58% of the individual informants were actors directly engaged in the DRM capacity building activity, including those engaged primarily as programme implementers and those engaged primarily as programme beneficiaries.<sup>4</sup> The remaining key individual informants provided contextual information or commentary on the selected programmes. There were 19 attendees at the workshop, 7 of whom had previously been interviewed.

The Research Team adhered strictly to our ethical guidelines whilst in country, which included gaining verbal consent from all participants in the research prior to interviews. The research was conducted on the basis of anonymity, and therefore in this report we do not disclose the identity of those making statements that are reported.

## 1.3 Revisions to the methodology and tools

Following the Ethiopia pilot, the Research Team debriefed and identified ways in which to refine the case study approach. Below is a summary of the revisions and how they were applied in the Pakistan case study:

**Selection of CB programmes for in-depth analysis:** In the Inception Report we proposed selecting 1-3 programmes per country for in-depth study. Given that stakeholders of selected programmes are required to freely give a considerable amount of time and effort to the research,

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<sup>4</sup> This is in line with our aims as stated in the Inception report for the majority of interviews, approximately 60%, to be undertaken with actors in the CB programmes, with the remaining 40% of informants being commentators or individuals able to provide broader contextual information.

we decided to initially select three programmes for each country to minimise risks. In each case study country, we will aim to study two and have one as a back-up, if necessary. For Pakistan three programmes were selected: One UN DRM, CWSA and Punjab 1122 Emergency services. Upon having initial meetings in Pakistan, it became clear that the first two were more appropriate for the research so they were chosen for the study.

**Initial workshop:** The team was unable to hold the initial workshop in Ethiopia due to time constraints, but they found that it would have helped them to be more efficient in terms of understanding the context in the early stages of the case study visit. In Pakistan, the initial workshop was held with 4 representatives from the IFRC, Danish Red Cross, German Red Cross and DFID. These key stakeholders helped to provide early validation of findings from the preliminary desk study and to confirm the appropriateness of the selection of programmes for in-depth study. One of our initial workshop participants had only been in country for 4 months which limited his ability to contribute.

**Key informant interviews:** During the pilot it was felt that ultimately too much interview time was spent collecting background information and conducting general context interviews. For the Pakistan case study, the preliminary desk review served to provide most of the contextual information and the two workshops were used to verify our understanding. This allowed us to use interview time more efficiently and ask more specific research questions relevant to the interviewees. Regarding more analytical questions, we asked various key informants the same questions to ensure we had collected a range of perspectives.

**The M&E Framework:** A new simplified framework for M&E has been developed based on the experience from the pilot. We have developed guidance notes to cover the first core indicator initially. The notes include the rationale for including the core indicator, a technical definition, a methodology for data collection and possible data sources.

The research team has presented the first core indicator in interviews in Pakistan to test both the functionality of the core indicators and of draft guidance notes. The M&E framework was the subject of a 1.5 hour session in the national workshop. Participants worked in groups to discuss how they would measure one core indicator, and whether the guidance notes are sufficiently comprehensive. Generally they felt the indicators were easy to use. There was a dynamic discussion on how to measure against the indicators from our diverse group of participants. There are five remaining case studies which will give the opportunity of discussing each outcome at least twice. The guidance notes will be refined according to feedback received.

## 1.4 Challenges and limitations

There were a number of challenges that the team encountered during the fieldwork:

**Security:** The security situation was very challenging, with rioting and demonstrations in the lead up to the fieldwork, an attack on the Karachi airport by the Taliban on the team's day of arrival, with a second attack during the visit to Thatta district. Rigorous security measures were followed by the team including extensive risk assessments prior to travel and oversight of activities by CWSA and Spearfish security advisors.

**Gender:** it was difficult to get a balanced gender perspective as key informants were selected from those who took part in the two projects selected, and most stakeholders were men. At the community level the interviews were conducted specifically with women, men, boys and girls in separate interviews.

**Involvement of PRCS:** PRCS and IFRC had other constraints and priorities during the fieldwork period which impacted on the research. For example, PRCS were not able to fully engage with the workshop planning or in providing input to the selection of programmes for in-depth study.

**Financial analysis:** We were able to collect some budget information from the selected CB programmes but such data is typically considered sensitive and is not always broken down in a way that facilitates analysis of CB or DRM expenditure. In addition to budget figures we requested information on staffing numbers for different CB activities. We hope that this information may well be less sensitive and therefore easier for us to access, and it may be easier to compare across countries e.g. percentage of staff working on M&E as opposed to financial data which will be presented in different currencies.

## 2 Country context

### 2.1 General background

Though Pakistan has made some positive strides towards improved development, the country remains categorised as a fragile state where there is weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions (OECD 2014). Conflict, economic instability, rapid population growth and the number of disasters over the past 10 years have contributed to development constraints. Pakistan received 2% of total overseas development aid distributed by multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors to fragile states in 2011 and has been described as a “forgotten crisis.” (OECD 2014: 24-26).

Currently, Pakistan ranks 146 out of 187 on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2013a). The country is struggling to meet its MDG indicators and is unlikely to meet the majority of its goals by 2015. Some sources argue that since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the war on extremism has had a devastating effect on development strategies and goals. Increased expenditure to bolster security and defence to fight militancy has diverted resources from other much needed sectoral allocations such as education, health and the environment. However there have been some recent improvements in poverty levels which can partially be credited to programmes such as the Benazir Income Support Programme (UNDP 2013b: 7).

### 2.2 Disaster risk

Pakistan is a geographically and climatologically diverse country. The landscape ranges between the frigid Karakoram Range (including the world’s second tallest peak, K 2) to the coastal desert along the Arabian Sea. Most of the geographical area is categorised as arid or semi-arid and the country also lies along the meeting point of the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates. These specific geographical features make Pakistan vulnerable to natural disaster risks from a range of hazards including avalanches, cyclones/storms, droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, floods, glacial lake outbursts, landslides, pest attacks, river erosion and tsunamis. High priority hazards in terms of their frequency and scale of impact are: earthquakes, droughts, flooding, wind storms and landslides<sup>5</sup>.

On average, in Pakistan between 1980 and 2010, 1.87 million people per annum were affected by disasters, resulting in economic damage of USD593 million each year. Pakistan has experienced several major disasters in the last nine years including the earthquake of October 2005 which killed over 73,000 people and the floods of 2010 and 2011 which affected over 18 million and 9 million people respectively<sup>6</sup>.

### 2.3 DRM governance structure and policies

Pakistan inherited the colonial system of disaster risk management (DRM) which was primarily predicated on responding to disasters when they occurred, with a component of preparedness, especially for the recurring climatic events. Under this system, the conventional institutional set up for DRM, under the Calamity Act of 1958, was an extended function of the (provincial) Revenue Department wherein the Senior Member Board of Revenue was designated as the sitting Relief Commissioner of the province. At the district level, the Deputy Commissioner (in his/her capacity as the District Collector) was the focal person for DRM. In the event of a disaster, the village based revenue officials (called *Patwaris*) gather data on the extent of damage and the district-wide data, reported through the District Collector, is collated by the Relief Commissioner and presented to the policy makers for response action. At the federal level, the Prime Minister’s own Cabinet Division operates an Emergency Relief Cell that maintains two large warehouses of relief supplies

<sup>5</sup> Please see the NDMA Strategy for more detail: <http://www.ndma.gov.pk/new/aboutus/SDM.php>

<sup>6</sup> Data from the OFDA / CRED International Database



in Islamabad and Karachi, and releases them to the provinces according to the demands expressed by the provincial Relief Commissioners.

This reactive approach to disaster management underwent a fundamental change in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and Northern parts of today's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, that killed around 76,000 people and rendered around half a million homeless. The 2005 earthquake can be termed a water-shed event for Pakistan that sparked national and international interest in promoting a DRR approach. The Government established the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in April 2006 under a presidential ordinance (made an act of the parliament in 2010) with an equal emphasis on Disaster Risk Reduction as on response.

The NDMA is governed by the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) chaired by the Prime Minister as the highest policy making body in the field of disaster management. As an executive arm of the NDMC, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has been made operational to coordinate and monitor implementation of National Policies and Strategies on disaster management. Pakistan being a federal state, a similar arrangement exists at the provincial level where the Chief Ministers chair the Provincial Disaster Management Commissions (PDMCs) and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) act as their executive entities. At the district level, District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) are established under the law, which are headed by the head<sup>7</sup> of district government and the district heads of line departments are the members.

During the same period that the institutional system for DRM was being established, NDMA compiled a National Disaster Management Plan, finalized in 2012. The plan identifies roles and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders in emergency response and defines the measures to be considered necessary for disaster management and risk reduction, including human resource development, and investment in early warning systems and community-based DRM. NDMA also developed a National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy more closely oriented toward building resilience, which was approved in February 2013. This sets out priorities and guidance for disaster risk assessment, prevention, mitigation and preparedness.

## 2.4 Recent history of DRM interventions

In addition to the One UN DRM and CWSA Capacity Building programmes which were selected by the research team for in-depth study, there are multiple ongoing projects taking place in the area of disaster risk management in Pakistan. Some examples of current DRM programmes are described below.

- International development partners are assisting Pakistan in dealing with the impacts of insurgency, terrorism related violence and the development issues underlying extremism. The funding vehicle for this assistance is the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for FATA, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The World Bank is managing the Fund on behalf of several donors. One component of the MDTF sponsored activities is the support to the DRM system in Pakistan in general and the province of Balochistan in particular. The US\$ 5 million programme has four main components: a) Institutional Strengthening of the PDMA covering the provision of technical experts, infrastructure, training and equipment; b) Hazard and Risk Assessment, using remote sensing data, on-site verification and structural assessment; c) Community Based Disaster Risk Management as a pilot in select areas, for up-scaling later, and, d)

<sup>7</sup> Pakistan's Local Government Ordinance 2001 provides for elected district governments, headed by an elected Mayor (*Nazim*). The elected district governments remained in place till 2008 but the elections have not been held since then and the district governments are headed by a bureaucrat, called Deputy Commissioner/ District Coordination Officer. (Source: <http://pide.org.pk/pdr/index.php/pdr/article/viewFile/1851/1824>)

Contingency Planning for Rapid Response, creating a stand-by funding window to be used for emergency response.

- Since 2005 GFDRR has since helped to build the leadership role of the National Disaster Management Commission of Pakistan. This has included work to establish a national risk assessment platform to develop capacity for hazard and risk assessment nationwide, and to provide a tool for key stakeholders to aid decision-making and planning. Other linked initiatives are being funded by GFDRR to improve capacity for economic recovery at the national level and to improve DRM in urban areas and at the sub-national level (GFDRR 2013).

Many other actors, including the state agencies, NGOs, INGOs and bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated capacity building programmes in Pakistan during the last decade. Much of the investment through NGOs and INGOs is at the grassroots level focusing on Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) programmes. These initiatives are typically small in financial terms. The main actors in the area of CBDRM are Oxfam (GB and Novib), Care International, Save the Children Alliance and Church World Service (Afghanistan and Pakistan) who work through their national and local partners. Most of the CBDRM activity is primarily focused on preparedness for response and covers training in search and rescue, evacuation planning and stockpiling of basic rescue equipment and essential supplies.

## 2.5 Existing status of DRM capacity in Pakistan

In this subsection we provide a brief analysis of the state of overall DRM capacity in Pakistan, as expressed by the research participants and the documents accessed. It is important to stress that this is not a comprehensive assessment of capacity, but it serves to provide a context with which to view the lessons drawn from the more detailed studies.

### 2.5.1 Progress towards DRR

Several individuals highlighted that the bulk of investment over the past decade in Pakistan has been in response to natural and man-made disasters. The focus of funding and policy making in Pakistan remains on disaster response or, at best, preparedness. Capacity building has not been a major focus, apart from building the capacity required to implement the various response and recovery programmes. International funding has historically been skewed towards response although donors are now becoming more interested in funding resilience and DRM initiatives. Interviewees argued that government funding, however, still focuses on disaster response and humanitarian needs are seen as taking priority.

Despite the focus on response, and the myriad of social, political and economic challenges described above, Pakistan has made progress in developing its capacity for disaster risk management in recent years. The establishment of DRM institutions at all levels, national policy development and wide-spread hazard and vulnerability assessments have contributed towards a better functioning DRR system. According to interviewees and written sources, DRR Mainstreaming has seen a wide range of government ministries' taking elements of disaster risk management into account through their planning activities (DFID 2012). On a wider level DRM has a more recognised place in academia including the development of related degrees.

Attention now needs to be paid to implementation of policies, legislation and tools. Whilst the policies and legislation have been developed, they are not always consistently applied and enforcement mechanisms are lacking, for example in relation to building codes.

## 2.5.2 Skills and knowledge for DRM

Capacity building is mostly viewed as training of staff and communities, together with the provision of physical assets (e.g. boats, vehicles, warehouses, equipment), mostly in the area of preparedness for response. Existing DRM capacity is not perceived to be high and has been negatively impacted by staff turnovers and shortages. Interviewees strongly argued that continual staff turnover and the system of staff transfer within the government was highly detrimental for DRM capacity. Although policies state that staff should stay in post for a “reasonable” period (stipulated in the government rules as 3 years), political interference means that they are sometimes transferred after very short periods. It was argued that DRM offices should be subject to very strict staff transfer procedures as organisational relationships and institutional memory could play a critical role in reducing loss of life from a disaster.

## 2.5.3 Structures and coordination – general / national

The National Disaster Management Act (2010) does not replace, subsume or override the Calamity Act 1958 and an overlap of mandate for disaster response exists. This sometimes leads to confusion, gaps and duplications between the NDMA, the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority and the Civil Defence Department. Also, the Emergency Relief Cell of the Cabinet Division exists independently, and creates an institutional overlap with the NDMA.

Pakistan has not established a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (a national coordinating multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary mechanism for advocacy, coordination, analysis and advice on disaster risk reduction) to UNISDR. Some interviewees commented that coordination between DRR actors has taken place at different levels, but tends to be for short time periods or for specific tasks.

## 2.5.4 Structures and coordination – subnational / local

The bulk of capacity building support provided by the bilateral or multilateral development partners has been largely focussed at the NDMA, with some support provided to the PDMAs and least investment at the DDMA level. Many interviewees argued that there is a general lack of resources and DRM capacity at the provincial and district levels. Needs were identified in relation to financial support and training. There is no specialised DRM personnel at district level – instead the DC acts as the focal point which was identified as problematic. Also, provinces have a high degree of difference in their structures and procedures for DRM. For example, KP has DDMUs not DDMA which are structured differently, and Sindh has a building control authority but there is no equivalent in Punjab. One interviewee noted a tendency towards centralisation, meaning that coordination between the levels of government is weak or confused. A No-Objection Certificate system<sup>8</sup> from the government has been used in certain provinces such as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to ensure coordination of disaster risk management activities at the provincial level, but it is not implemented consistently.

## 2.5.5 Enabling environment

Interviewees listed a number of contextual factors that impact negatively on DRM capacity. Some felt that corruption hindered progress with DRM in relation to construction. Others mentioned poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy. Several interviewees mentioned the impact of religious beliefs on DRM, in particular a belief that disasters are retribution for one’s sins.

<sup>8</sup> No-objection certificate is a system whereby the provincial government requires humanitarian actors to register their organisation and its employees and gain permission for conducting proposed interventions. The purpose of the no-objection certificate is to coordinate activities and avoid duplication of efforts.

One interviewee argued that the lack of capacity of DMAs is linked to their inability to access programme funding for DRM capacity building from the Public Sector Development Programme. The only non-response programme funds made available to the DMAs have been from the UN (One DRM) and some bilateral donors. Accessing public sector funding requires a cumbersome process with the Ministry of Finance.

### 3 One UN DRM: UNDP's contribution to the One UN Joint Programme on Disaster Risk Management

Table 1: UNDP One UN DRM at a glance

Research question	Overview at a glance
Which actors are involved in the CB activity?	Funding for capacity building is mainly from UNDP and implemented by the NDMA
What is the funding level and duration?	USD 2.8 million for a period of 3 years
What is the scope of the activities?	Strengthening institutional DRM capacities at federal, provincial and local levels. Capacity building activities included training of individuals, establishment of organisational infrastructure, policy development, technical advice, advocacy and DRR mainstreaming.
What is the geographical focus?	National level programme covering all provinces and areas of Pakistan. 51 vulnerable districts across the country were prioritised in the overall programme.

The first programme selected as a case study is the DRM component of the One UN programme in Pakistan. The One UN programme aimed to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the UN by implementing coordinated programmes in five thematic areas across 19 UN agencies. Disaster Risk Management was one of the thematic areas chosen to be addressed through the joint programmes in Pakistan.

The One UN Joint Programme on DRM (hereafter referred to as One UN DRM) builds upon existing capacity to support the government's efforts in improving emergency response and post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation. The programme's activities were targeted at the institutional, organisational and community levels and included provision of material resources, training, support to policy and institutional development and coordination mechanisms. The activities are described in sections 3.1 to 3.4, followed by an extended analysis in relation to the the 6 principles of CB<sup>9</sup> in section 3.5.

#### 3.1 Programme actors

The One UN DRM programme had 13 participating UN agencies led by two co-chairs: UNDP and WFP. UNDP and WFP were chosen as the lead agencies through a consensus within the UN Country Team. UNDP had long prior experience and set protocols to work with the government on bilateral projects and also had a footprint and existing partnership with NDMA by virtue of the preceding National Capacity Building for DRM project that started in 2006 and was subsumed into One UN DRM. Because UNDP played the central supporting role in the CB elements of One UN DRM our research therefore focused mainly on the UNDP-supported aspects of the programme.

<sup>9</sup> The six principles were identified following a global literature review early in the research. A definition for each one is included in the text below.

The One UN DRM programme was targeted on the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) as well as the provincial and district disaster management authorities. Community-level disaster risk management initiatives also played an important role in the programme.

In UNDP terminology, NDMA was the “Executing Partner” and the other ministries and divisions are considered “Implementing Agencies”. One UN DRM had multiple national-level implementing partners<sup>10</sup> which were responsible for integrating elements of disaster risk management into their own policies and for contributing to the understanding of disaster risk in the country. NDMA had overall responsibility for implementation.

### 3.2 Funding and timescales

One UN’s first phase was referred to as OP-1. The DRM programme for OP-1 was originally conceived to run for two years from January 1, 2009 to December 2010. Due to some challenges in meeting timeframes the programme remained operational till December 2012. Most of the initiatives of OP-1 have been carried forward to a current OP-2 with an increased focus on work at the provincial levels<sup>11</sup>. However, because OP-2 is currently being established the research here focussed on activities during OP-1.

Funding for One UN DRM came from a complex mix of bilateral, domestic and UN sources. Much of the total funding was directed to technical interventions and infrastructural support – for example under two post-disaster components, the Earthquake Risk Reduction project and the Flood and Cyclone Mitigation Project. Unfortunately the available figures show funding for the whole One UN Programme and it is not possible to tease out how much of the expenditure relates to the DRM component or CB activities within that. Information is provided in a consolidated form and CB is not a separate budget line or clearly disaggregated. However, our understanding is that the majority of UNDP funding was directed to building skills, institutions, coordination and political support for DRM/DRR and it is these UNDP-supported aspects that are the focus of our analysis.

**Table 2: One UN DRM Funding Breakdown**

**Joint Programme Component I (US\$) (One UN Annual Report 2012 page 43 for 2010 and for 2009 One UN Annual Report 2011 page 57)**

2009		2010		2011		2012	
Transfer	Expenditure	Transfer	Expenditure	Transfer	Expenditure	Transfer	Expenditure
1,481,520	36,373	990,000	1,435,093	600,001	816,745	750,000	516,168

The following table is taken from the 2011 Annual Report of OneUN programme (page 66) and gives a breakdown of contributions by donor. Unfortunately the 2012 Annual Report does not contain the same table. We note that the amount for UNDP differs from the 2012 Annual Report expenditure data given above which throws the reliability of the figures into question. No alternative data was available.

<sup>10</sup> These comprised: the Planning Commission; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Housing and Works; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives; Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development; Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education; Ministry of Youth Affairs; Ministry of Water and Power; Ministry of Women’s Development; Federal Flood Commission; Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (HEPR); NAVTEC; Pakistan Meteorological Department – SUPARCO.

<sup>11</sup> OP-2 has not yet come up with an overarching coordination mechanism like the Steering Committee and the TWG of OP-1, and is struggling with the challenge to balance the emphasis between the provincial and federal level DRM entities. For the moment, the participating agencies of OP-2 are engaging bilaterally with the government without necessarily closely coordinating among themselves.

JP DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT									
Agency	Estimated Budget (USD)	Available Funds (USD)				Expenditures (USD)			
		Core	Non-Core	One Fund	Total	Core	Non-Core	One Fund	Total
<b>JPC 1: Disaster Risk Management</b>									
FAO	400,000			75,000.40	75,000.40		57,085	24,157.69	81,242.69
IOM	2,344,820		1,835,820	125,000	1,960,820		1,829,499	85,162	1,914,661
UNDP	5,800,000	2,137,802	2,248,467	120,313	4,506,582	1,370,697	1,817,927	78,766	3,267,390
UNESCO	3,075,000	39,701	3,490,937	75,000	3,605,639	39,701	324,326	93,729	457,756
UNFPA	450,000			9,375	9,375			6,156	6,156
UNHABITAT	780,000			75,000	75,000			232,340	232,340
UNWOMEN	776,818		590,418	0	590,418		194,696	-8	194,688
WFP	1,608,000	1,500,000		45,312	1,545,312	920,000		214,943	1,134,943
WHO	980,000		338,000	75,000	413,000		328,500	81,499	409,999
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,214,638</b>	<b>3,677,503</b>	<b>8,503,642</b>	<b>600,001</b>	<b>12,781,147</b>	<b>2,330,399</b>	<b>4,552,033</b>	<b>816,745</b>	<b>7,699,177</b>

### 3.3 Geographical coverage

The geographical coverage of One UN DRM was the whole of Pakistan. As a national level programme, considerable work was undertaken at the policy level in Islamabad and then filtered down to the provincial and district levels.

At the provincial level the programme ran different activities in different places according to the assessed level of risk and hazards in the geographic area. 51 districts of Pakistan were prioritised for programme activities based on a hazard, risk and vulnerability assessment conducted by NDMA as part of the One UN DRM programme. In earlier stages of the programme, activities were focused in the earthquake-affected and earthquake-prone areas of Pakistan such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Azad, Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Many flood mitigation aspects of the programme took place in those areas affected by the floods of 2010 and 2011 focusing in Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh.

### 3.4 CB activities

One UN DRM worked across all DRM territorial levels during OP-1. These activities are described below by scale.

#### 3.4.1 National / institutional level

At the national level One UN DRM was focused on strengthening the foundations of a disaster risk management system in Pakistan. This involved the UN assisting government in strengthening the institutional and policy framework, understanding and monitoring risk, supporting information management and communication and developing a community-based disaster risk management system which included training, promoting volunteerism and raising public awareness of DRM issues (UNDP 2012).

The programme also sought to improve human resource capacity for DRM. As part of the programme the National Institute for Disaster Management (NIDM) was created to establish a centre of excellence for providing training and research services on disaster risk management to public and private sectors. Initially the institute focused on development of DRM curriculum and establishing a network of master trainers. Learning events have been held for government officials, private sector, media, UN, I/NGOs and community organisations. NIDM has continued to function after the close of OP-1 with continued support from NDMA and WFP (and, at the time of our case study, it was expected that UNDP funding would resume).

A 'Mainstreaming DRR into Development Process' was conceived as one of the priority initiatives in the National Disaster Risk Management Framework of Pakistan 2007. Its implementation was started under the One UN DRM programme. Considerable work has been undertaken at policy level

to promote the mainstreaming of DRM in priority sectors such as education, food and agriculture, communication, and to integrate DRM and climate risk management. The component included training and awareness-raising of stakeholders and the establishment of inter-ministerial working groups for policy development. For example, via OP-1, a DRR Checklist is now included in the PC-1 (a standard government planning document applied to project appraisal) to influence development sector projects. As a result of the DRR Mainstreaming component of One UN DRM, a chapter on DRR Mainstreaming has been included in the Government's 10th Five-Year Plan.

### 3.4.2 Regional and district level

Much of the activity carried out at subnational scales under One UN DRM was a mix of structural and non-structural intervention, with CB elements integrated into the action, though not always central to it. In the earlier stages of the One UN programme, efforts were focused in areas that were affected by the earthquake of 2005. The Earthquake Risk Reduction and Preparedness Programme (ERRP) was initiated in the cities of Muzaffarabad and Mansehra. Building surveys, the establishment of safer construction guidelines, trainings and risk mapping were conducted to improve resilience to earthquakes and other shocks. Later in the programme, activities were expanded to other earthquake-prone areas of the country.

Later, the Flood, Cyclone Mitigation and Institutional Development component was conceptualized and began activities in the year 2012. The project aimed to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities in 37 districts to minimize risks to their lives, properties and livelihoods. Other regional activities focused around improving warehouse facilities, provision of equipment, school safety campaigns, camp coordination, setting up emergency operation centres and response teams.

One key subnational activity that we would argue was unambiguously oriented to CB was support for the development of Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). This included employment of consultant coordinators to help operationalise the DDMAs and provide support to administrative local authorities (See Box 2).

### 3.4.3 Community level

Community-based DRM is a key outcome area under the programme and a number of training and awareness activities were held in various communities. In 2011 community-based DRM was strengthened in 20 high risk districts through various initiatives including set up of search and rescue teams, volunteer networks for disaster response, and construction of evacuation routes.

Community-based DRM initiatives also included training of artisans in hazard resistant construction in all four provinces, and construction/retrofitting of large community physical infrastructure schemes in Sindh.

## 3.5 Analysis in relation to the six principles

In this section, the above described programme is analysed in relation to six principles for effective capacity building in disaster risk management.

### 3.5.1 Flexibility/Adaptability

**Definition:** *The need to approach capacity building interventions flexibly, ensuring that the design of the programme can be adapted to the context in which it is applied rather than applied as an externally-imposed 'blueprint'. It includes working with and reinforcing existing skills, strategies, systems and capacities. It also includes understanding and accounting for the political and power dimensions that can contribute to or undermine capacity building.*



**Research question:** *How has the programme approached capacity development in a flexible manner, adapting the approach to context?*

- One UN DRM was designed entirely to support and build on existing or nascent DRM governance structures, as set out in the DRM Ordinance and subsequent DRM Act. The CB activities were therefore geared toward support for the NDMA at national level, and development of the PDMA and DDMA system at provincial and district levels. There was a newly-developing initiative at subnational level that the programme did not directly support – namely the Rescue 1122 initiative in Punjab, which is a dedicated resource at district level for rescue and response to disasters. However, the establishment of PDMAS and DDMA was set out in the emerging legislation and it was this that formed a key focus of support from UNDP (see Box 2). One UN DRM also provided CB support for DRR mainstreaming (see Box 4), a commitment to which had been set out in the NDRM.
- By supporting establishment of the NIDM, One UN DRM also enabled the development of skills of existing and new DRM staff from a range of institutions and scales (see Box 3). Though training support was geared mainly to governmental actors, this CB aspect has also extended to NGOs and other DRM actors.
- It is also useful to note that UNDP’s contribution to One UN DRM itself built on an existing support programme. Before Pakistan became a “One UN” pilot country, UNDP was already running the National Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management (NCBDRM) Programme that was subsumed into the OP-1.
- Actors both from the government and from UNDP indicated that One UN DRM was closely aligned with domestic priorities on DRM. It was suggested that, though there was considerable discussion about the design of the programme, there was no fundamental difference of perceptions in approaches to and content of capacity building. According to one government officer: “NDMA was interested in capacity building both for training and organisational development of government offices and community. So the project responded to fill the gaps.”
- One interviewee also stated that the One UN DRM programme had responded to priorities emerging from NDMA during the course of the intervention, including greater attention to supporting risk assessment and, following the 2011 floods, activities related to early recovery.
- However, no evidence emerged that One UN DRM had actively undertaken an analysis of potential impediments to CB progress in the design stage. Instead, from the statements of several interviewees about sustainability (see below), we can draw an inference that the ambition inherent in the CB plans underestimated the political, coordinating and financial constraints that arose both at donor and implementing levels.

### 3.5.2 Comprehensive Planning

**Definition:** *The need to carefully design interventions so that they are appropriate, responsive and sustainable. It includes planning on the basis of existing capacity and capacity gaps, and appropriate scheduling of interventions so that pressure to show visible results does not undermine capacity development. Also critical is planning for the long-term sustainability of capacity gains after the withdrawal of interventions.*

**Research question:** *What has been the approach to full programme planning?*

- At the early stage of One UN DRM experts were engaged to develop the programme design based on a gap analysis, including review of existing policy documents, and extensive consultations took place between national government and the UN agencies involved. However, it was indicated that the OP-1 phase was not a product of wider consultations, because of the time pressure both from government and from donors to launch a programme. Moreover, two interviewees emphasized that no systematic, structured capacity needs assessment was carried out across the DRM system and especially not at local scales.
- Additional capacity assessment has been initiated in the follow-up activities to OP-1 and under OP-2. After the flood response in 2012 a joint capacity needs assessment took place between NDMA, UN actors and PDMA to discuss short/long term needs, structures/non-structural needs. According to one interviewee, new capacity gaps are being articulated: for instance, the PDMA of Balochistan province has expressed a need for CB assistance from legal experts, policy specialists and GIS experts.
- Timetabling for the 3-year programme of activity initially designed under OP-1 appears to have been too short, and by 2012, most of the UN agencies could not complete their planned activities. This related in part to internal administrative delays associated with the consensus-based precepts of One UN and attendant financial shortfalls that delayed implementation. Negotiations between UN agencies appeared to have been prolonged, because there was insufficient alignment of mechanisms and resources across the participating UN agencies (UNDP 2010). Strategic coordination of funding mobilization was difficult without dedicated staff tasked jointly to organize fund-raising, and the DRM component of OP-1 was therefore perceived not to be as effective as others in mobilizing donor support. Some agencies, including WFP, utilized core funds to support CB for DRM and/or continued with projects without fully integrating them within the One UN DRM initiative.
- Sustainability of the CB gains planned or achieved under OP-1 for the DRM component has emerged as a major issue. Several interviewees from government and UNDP stated that no true sustainability plan or effective exit strategies were put in place. This problem was then compounded by a weakening of the relationship between NDMA and UNDP which brought support to an abrupt end and was said to have undermined some gains made under OP-1.
- However, UNDP engagement is being resumed now under OP-2. At the time of our study UNDP support was also expected to recommence for NIDM following an interim 12 months of support from WFP in 2013/2014. NDMA has also attempted to sustain the gains made under One UN DRM by lobbying central and provincial government for allocation of funds for DRM to be earmarked in annual budgets. According to one government interviewee a budget line of 5 billion PKR was approved in 2013 at federal level, and similar provisions also exist in three provinces.
- The sustainability thinking that lay behind One UN DRM was that government departments should become the centre of capacity building. Capacity building was seen not as a one-time activity but as an activity that has to be continuous. Hence, the capacity to train others must be developed in the government departments (especially in the PDMA) so that there is no gap or loss in capacity when individual people move on. As one government officer commented: "Our understanding is that government officers carry capacity with them wherever they are, whether

in district A or B. Trained manpower is always useful and never goes to waste even if people move elsewhere in the system. But you always get new people and they must be trained”.

- However, the only formal contribution to an exit strategy referred to by any interviewees was a 3-page document that was circulated to PDMAs that requested governments to have back up support for CB ready for when the OneUN DRM project ended. According to one interviewee, only the KP government followed this advice.
- According to two interviewees, following the close of OP-1, there has already been a tendency for both PDMAs and DDMAAs to lose capacity – especially in terms of staff. Erosion of capacity was linked to a pattern of staff not being allowed to complete their tenure and shifting from one department to the other. It appears that in few cases were trained staff given time to build capacity of the person succeeding them.
- Interviewees from WFP also referred to concerns about the material support they provided to districts under One UN DRM. In an absence of follow-up activity there are uncertainties, for example, over present-day usage and maintenance of boats, wireless equipment and storage facilities provided.
- Monitoring and evaluation was also poorly addressed and resourced under One UN DRM. There was no specific arrangement for M&E and for lesson-learning, other than the fact that programmes were developed with a logframe and results-based management systems. Though monitoring reports were produced, these focussed on activities and outputs not outcomes or impact. A review of the DRM project was conducted and later a global evaluation across the One UN programme was also conducted, but there was no established protocol for M&E. Because no benchmark/baseline was set up, it was not possible to evaluate the impact of any changes that might have been made.

## Ownership/Partnership

**Definition:** *The need to ensure that those targeted for capacity development have a clear stake in the initiative and its design and implementation, again to help ensure it is appropriate, effective and sustainable. Ownership is likely to rest on active participation, clear statements of responsibilities, engagement of leaders, and alignment with existing DRM/DRR strategies.*

**Research question:** *How has ownership been fostered?*

- Governmental actors actively participated in the establishment and development of One UN DRM. The design was led by UNDP in terms of staffing inputs – two consultants, one international and one national, were hired to develop the draft. But the draft was developed through consultation with government, UN agencies, World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and NGOs. From the government side senior officials in five federal ministries were involved in the initial consultations.
- There is a strong indication that this was not merely a consultative exercise but that governmental actors actively shaped the initial design and the subsequent development of the CB plans. This engagement appears to have been galvanized in part by disaster events. According to one interviewee, recognition of the need to broaden DRM toward prevention and mitigation became widespread through the relief and rehabilitation efforts required after the 2010 floods. NDMA began to consider DRR more proactively. Referring to One UN DRM the

interviewee said: “So we started looking into the future. In reality things moved fast and everyone was learning - the whole thing evolved as did contributions of all”.

- A joint governance structure was developed to oversee One UN DRM during OP-1, with a Steering Committee composed of government and agency staff for strategic direction and a Thematic Working Group (TWG) composed of the participating UN agencies and the NDMA for operational decisions<sup>12</sup>. Both were viewed as effective platforms for information exchange and coordination. It was reported that an expanded national forum for DRM later evolved out of the project Steering Committee – it became a Policy Coordination Meeting (PCM) body, chaired by the NDMA Chairman, and composed of the Resident Coordinator of UN (UNRC), leading donors, international NGOs and lead government agencies. National ownership of the structures emerging via One UN DRM has also been heightened by engagement of the Prime Minister: for some important decisions that needed political backing, the PCM has referred cases to the PM.
- Some interviewees directly referred to the importance of leadership on the side of both the UN and the government as the most crucial factor for success. The NIDM is an example in which commitment and interest of high-level staff within NDMA and UNDP played a major role in its establishment. Subsequently, under change of leadership in UNDP, withdrawal of support created financial problems that the NIDM is now trying to overcome. At subnational level, active leadership on DRM within the KP government appears to account for much of the CB progress within this province, prompting one interviewee to say: “Perhaps the person sitting at the helm of affairs matters more than anything else”.
- At provincial and district levels it was a challenge in many cases to forge a sense of ownership in the activities supported by One UN DRM. There was often an expectation that UNDP would implement all the activities, and agency staff tried to reverse this through an expectation that DMAs actively engage in decisions and allocate budgets to help fund them. For example, PDMA were intended to be closely involved in the selection of districts where capacity building activities were to take place. At district level, the district coordinators hired by UNDP were provided with a salary plus a laptop and printer, but all other operational costs were due to be provided by the district government in order to avoid a situation of financial dependency of CB on external agencies. The idea was not to offer the usual range of supports and equipment provided under UNDP programmes in the hope that this would heighten ownership by the district government and sustainability of the project intervention.
- One commentator underlined the need for government commitment at all levels if sustainability of CB gains is to be achieved. He argued that funding should be made contingent on DMAs fulfilling certain conditions, including commitments to recruiting people for agreed positions and operationalizing provisions such as the development of DRM plans. If requests for financial support are granted without such conditions this can lead to the erosion of capacity and willingness for longer term planning and structural reform.

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<sup>12</sup> The Steering Committee was a high level decision making forum co-chaired by the Chairman NDMA and the UNRC. It took strategic decisions and convened twice a year. The TWG was a working level group, often Co-chaired by one of Members NDMA and a UNDP/ WFP representative. TWG met more frequently to take practical decisions, often on quarterly basis.

### Box 1 The Relationship Between NDMA and the Co-chairing Agencies

Evidence suggests that there was a strong sense of partnership and ownership by NDMA through most of OP-1 in terms of decision-making. NDMA co-chaired the Thematic Working Group (TWG) - the working level forum including the participating UN agencies that discussed day-to-day operations. There was a two-way and regular communication between lead UN agencies and NDMA and active shaping of ideas and plans by NDMA. Though relative expertise in DRR meant that the initiation of ideas and advice was largely generated by UNDP and then considered and decided upon by NDMA, there were some individuals within NDMA who more actively shaped the agenda. Extensive discussions took place around the elements of CB, but the final decision on whether drafted plans went ahead lay with NDMA. Decisions such as the geographical focus of activities and the target population were said to be particular aspects in which NDMA insisted on control. An example provided by interviewees was a case when NDMA insisted UNDP undertake a needs assessment before approving funding of activities in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) region. Independence of decision-making also seems to characterize the functions of NIDM. Though budgets and training schedules are agreed with donors on an annual basis, inputs from UNDP and WFP on the content of training courses are limited to advice, and the decisions on this are made internally by NIDM and NDMA.

### 3.5.3 Integration of Actors and Scales

**Definition:** *The need to build capacity to coordinate across scales and to work with other stakeholders. Capacity building can act to bridge capacity and communication gaps that commonly exist between national and local levels. Initiatives can focus on building capacity of coalitions of stakeholders, and on building local people's capacity to interact with other stakeholders.*

**Research question:** *How has the programme built capacity across scales and actors?*

- The central focus in One UN DRM has been CB support to government actors in and around the DMA system. This has taken place at (and to a lesser extent between) different scales, from national NDMA through provincial level PDMAs to district level DDMA. The basic idea was institutional development for effective DRM system in Pakistan. After the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, the government had already established the NDMA, but the country did not have PDMAs and DDMA in place and this is where government thought that the main institutional development gap was located.
- With support from One UN DRM, NDMA worked to persuade provinces to establish PDMAs, starting with KP (which welcomed the intervention because it had been severely affected by the 2005 earthquake), and by the end of 2011 all PDMAs were in place. Formal establishment was accompanied by CB of the new institutions with assistance from One-UN DRM consultants. These individuals, known as regional DRM coordinators, were engaged by the end of 2011 to assist with planning and transfer of skills in each one of the 4 provinces (KP, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan) and the 3 other regional areas (Northern Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Federally Administered Tribal Areas).
- One UN DRM's CB support for establishment of DDMA can be traced to earlier interventions, and was increased gradually through the course of OP-1. The approach was to target selected districts for initial support and progressively increase the development to other districts. The process of establishing DDMA was often challenging, in that there was some resistance from the existing bureaucratic structures for emergency response and the implication of increased resources (or replication of power) associated with a new 'Authority'. In KP province the

government resolved to establish District Disaster Management Units instead of DDMA: these are similar structures that avoid the need to establish an 'Authority' that must have its own administrative structure, since 'Units' can be managed with additional responsibility assigned to existing staff. By the close of OP-1, however, One UN DRM was working to build capacity in 35 districts, including assistance in the development of district disaster management plans through the provision of district DRM coordinators (see Box 2).

## Box 2: Support to the District Level and the Role of District Coordinators

As a result of the 18th Amendment<sup>13</sup>, the establishment of a DMA structure was required at subnational levels. A key CB task of One UN DRM was therefore seen to be the provision of a network of experts assigned to support the development of DMAs (or their equivalent) at different levels to help establish working structures and help formulate policies and regulations. A major feature of this approach was the provision of DRM coordinators at district level for a period of around two years. This initiative had its origins in earlier UNDP work. Under NCBDRM, CB pilots were undertaken in 4 districts intending to establish District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). Two were in Balochistan (Makran and Quetta) while two were in Sindh (Thatta and Badin). At that time, there was no concept of a district level disaster management authority. The UNDP team prepared and presented frameworks for DRM, and also conducted departmental training in those districts. In 2009, the One UN DRM project selected 10 districts and started replicating the work started in the previous project. The initial rollout of this initiative was considered a significant success during OP-1, and by the end of 2011 35 districts had coordinators (including Northern Areas and Kashmir) while 7 extra requests from additional districts had been received.

The rationale for appointing a network of consultants based at district offices was to help bring about the step change that was required in order to develop a functioning DDMA (or its equivalent). At the district level, the DDMA was initially chaired by the District Coordination Officer (DCO) and/or an Executive District Officer (EDO) [each DCO has subordinate EDOs for every sectoral department]. UNDP believed that one or two trainings of these staff were not sufficient to bring change in the way a district handles disaster situations. So it was decided to place a consultant in selected districts to facilitate the transition. Finding sufficiently skilled experts for these positions was a challenge, and it was stated that UNDP had to relax selection criteria for district coordinators most of the time. However, efforts were made to horizontally link district coordinators with one another and they were also provided support through the 7 regional coordinators. According to a former UNDP national staff member who managed the initiative up to 2011, "the district coordinators were very important anchors for our project". They helped to circumvent the institutional resistance to the development of DDMA that was often in place initially, and demonstrated the value both of their CB presence in the districts and the value of the new approach. One key CB value they provided was in working with DDMA staff to develop customized district DRM plans out of a standardized template. They provide technical advice to DDMA and developed mechanisms for information management. Through this, momentum was built up and more and more districts came on board. At the same time, (as already noted above) UNDP decided to keep the level of material and financial inputs to districts to a minimum, with the aim that districts would be expected to support the coordinators and thereby have a mechanism in place that meant the inputs could be sustained after One UN DRM. This strategy appears to have been successful in KP province which appointed its own officials on these positions after the withdrawal

<sup>13</sup> The 18th Constitutional Amendment was passed by the parliament in 2010, providing a clearer division of responsibilities between subnational and federal levels. All development work was devolved to the provinces and their related ministries. Therefore disaster management needed a provincial component for coordination and implementation, with agencies established down to the district level.

of external support. However, in some cases as in Sindh province, the initiative may have raised issues over communication channels, in that district DRM coordinators tended to communicate directly to national level (UNDP and NDMA) and bypass PDMA – according to one interviewee.

- At the time of this study, specific areas of Pakistan continued to show a progressive development of the DMA system. The PDMA in KP province is generally considered to be effective, and is also providing active support to districts such as Naushehra’s DDMA in developing its disaster risk management plan. It was suggested by one commentator that KP province may have a more strengthened DRM structure primarily because of the funding targeted to the government in the wake of the conflict happening there.
- However, sustainability of institutional CB gains appears to be an issue in some provinces and targeted districts, which do not yet have strongly functioning DMAs in the present day. According to one commentator, at the provincial level many training and awareness raising activities were carried out, but a structural reform did not proceed: in some cases, even “the investment that was made in short-term expertise has now gone – there is no legacy [of One UN DRM]”. The same commentator suggested that only a few districts that One UN DRM assisted with DRM coordinators had been able to translate CB efforts into physical DRM assets such as tsunami EWS (Gawadar in Balochistan) and storm shelters (Thatta and Badin in Sindh).
- In terms of specific training activities, NIDM offers courses intended to draw participants from a range of scales. In the OP-1 phase NIDM used to offer both on-campus and off-campus training courses including outreach in districts and communities. A large part of the CB for community-based DRM offered under One UN DRM was a grassroots training of teachers and students, with the aim that students would then transfer knowledge to their parents.
- Currently, NIDM courses are all on-campus. Though this limits access for local level actors, it is still feasible to attract a minor proportion of attendees from districts - a recent course on DRM project formulation, project appraisal and report writing, for example, had 11 out of 25 attendees from district level. Mostly government officers benefit from the training – national, provincial and district DMAs and line ministries at all levels are invited to the courses. However, if there is space available the course directors invite CSOs, INGOs and the private sector to nominate individuals. Some training on how to coordinate information and implementation of projects between levels (community to national level) is also included in the course portfolio.

### 3.5.4 Attention to Functional Capacity

**Definition:** *The need to focus on functional capacity building - i.e. building the managerial and organizational capabilities needed to ensure effective decisions and actions can flow from technical know-how. It includes aspects such as improving coordination and decision-making processes. It also includes fostering an enabling environment, such as developing incentive structures for good performance and to ensure staff retention, as well as promoting the wider political conditions to support DRR as a priority.*

**Research question:** *How is the mix of potential elements for CB targeted?*

One UN DRM combined technical and functional aspects of CB. The programme included investments in material support such as provision through WFP of automatic weather forecasting equipment, storage facilities, boats and search and rescue equipment to specific

districts. UNDP also supported structural measures such as school shelters and provided technical input into non-structural interventions such as risk assessment, through the ERRP and FMP projects. The support to the running of the NIDM was another important source of CB, in that it fostered human skills development in a wide range of subjects. Though training should principally be regarded as support for technical aspects of CB, the mix of subjects also arguably means that the work of NIDM crossed over into functional CB (See Box 3).

### **Box 3: NIDM's Role in Enhancing Functional (as well as Technical) Capacity**

NIDM was formally inaugurated in February 2009 with UNDP support under the One UN DRM project. The institute was established with an expert director (formerly working with ADPC), initially using one separate room and a meeting hall within the government offices occupied by NDMP, but subsequently with a dedicated building in Islamabad. During OP-1, training was provided on various aspects of DRM and DRR, based on modules derived from development of training guides, manuals and handbooks. Information, education and communication (IEC) material was also developed for dissemination through workshops and seminars. Included within this early work were the series of awareness-raising seminars noted above that targeted national and provincial parliamentarians, together with workshops for the media. Thus NIDM became more visible in policy circles. Following the close of OP-1, continuing support for NIDM has been provided by WFP, and at the time of the study the institute was expecting donor support to revert back to UNDP. The budget for the NIDM is combination of training costs (training staff and training delivery costs) provided by the UN donor and administration/building costs covered by NDMA. For the period from July 2014 onward, NIDM has a planned budget of PRK 2.447 million per month, of which NDMA is expected to contribute PKR 1.03 million and the donors PKR 1.417 million per month.

According to a senior interviewee in NIDM, the donors do not expect to influence the annual training calendar plans, which are designed by the institute and approved by NDMA. Training materials and modules are being revised to reflect changes in DRM since 2011. There are currently two permanent training personnel, together with a roster of consultants for training on short-term contracts, providing two to three courses per month. There are three categories of training offered: a) background to DRR-DRM (concepts, mainstreaming – including scope for action by districts and provinces), b) disaster mitigation aspects (more technical, and some looking at specific hazards such as earthquakes), and c) general management skills (including district level planning). One 5-day training course costs around 235,000 rupees to run (trainings are normally 3-5 days), and courses are currently free for participants. NIDM is currently establishing MoUs with universities around the country to co-run courses – in order to widen and deepen the input at a more advanced level. It is also providing training inputs to the Civil Services Academy, including ToT approaches for DRM – which is seen as a key way of maximizing the chance that training will be put into practice. NIDM does not have the resources to directly monitor how training is used, but one mechanism could be via province and district level contingency plans and DRM plans. NIDM trains people to develop these plans and copies of these may be sent back to training staff to review – via this it may be possible to judge continuity of training gains. Though the courses are open to district level staff from around the country, it is currently a challenge to get people to attend from afar, because when OP-1 closed there was not the funding available to cover travel expenses and per diems, and district offices were not prepared to fund the costs. NIDM also stresses that it is better to undertake training off-campus as well as on-campus, in order to target CB to districts and communities.

- But the focus of CB under One UN DRM was particularly on supporting the operationalization of the NDM Ordinance (later an Act), through policy development and institutional development



(including establishment of PDMA, DDMA and the NIDM). According to one of its former senior staff: “There was a system for dealing with disasters in place, but not a modern DRM system. One-UN DRM recognized that we needed institutions first and then to build capacity of individuals in them”. According to Ahmad et al (2013), the programme catalysed both the development of DRM policy and the institutional regime.

- In working closely with the NDMA, One UN DRM strengthened capacity at national level. The programme helped develop the initial steps in mainstreaming of DRR, and the joint governance structure established for the programme later came to form a broader multi-stakeholder mechanism for DRM coordination, the PCM. Particular emphasis was also placed on building and strengthening the subnational system of PDMA and DDMA. This included appointing DRM coordinators to province and district levels as a vehicle for institutional and skills development, and assistance in the development of district disaster management plans.
- Though not necessarily ‘badged’ as such, advocacy through awareness-raising of politicians and other stakeholders within and outside government was a key element within the work of One UN DRM at all scales. Tangible activities in this included 5 awareness-raising seminars held in conjunction with NIDM in Islamabad and at provincial centres with members of national and provincial assemblies. Approximately 20 parliamentarians attended the Punjab seminar, according to one interviewee who felt the event was key in persuading them to support the development of the PDMA. These events also attracted civil society groups. According to another interviewee, the biggest achievement of OP-1 and its preceding programme is that it changed the conceptual landscape of Pakistan and popularised the concept of integrated DRM for the first time.

### 3.5.5 Contribution to Disaster Resilience

**Definition:** *The need for a more holistic DRR-influenced approach to DRM capacity. This includes attention to: understanding and planning for long-term changes in risk; moving beyond a focus on short-term emergency management to capacity in disaster prevention, mitigation and long-term recovery; prioritizing the reduction of vulnerability; targeting the needs of vulnerable groups; and addressing gender disparities in both vulnerability and capacity.*

**Research question:** *How has the programme captured wider aspects of the DRR approach?*

- In the initial stage of One UN DRM, particularly in the 2010 floods, the focus in the country and in NDMA was largely oriented to relief, recovery and rehabilitation. However, the scale of that disaster helped to galvanize thinking toward the value of mitigation and a broader DRR approach developed within the programme, prompted both by NDMA and by UNDP. The move toward DRR as a policy agenda may also have been aided by appointments of key senior staff in NDMA and in NIDM who had experience of strategic approaches to DRM, as well as by the growing international discourse on DRR.

Since then progress slowly developed under One UN DRM in preparing the political ground for DRR mainstreaming (ie the enabling environment). Initially there was some resistance from government entities. The Ministry of Defence, for example, was reluctant to see the added value of a DRR approach at first, but UNDP indicated evidence of the need (for example, the MoD’s own hospitals, schools and military buildings were not hazard-proof), and advocated for the need to develop policy changes and improve in-house capacity. Similarly, based on the learning from OP-1, the humanitarian sector pushed for mainstreaming DRR across all sectors of response – one success in this way has been agreement within the Shelter Cluster to

integrate DRR aspects in shelter provision following disasters. Aspects of DRR feature in the courses provided by NIDM, including capacity assessment, vulnerability assessment and livelihood assessment. Perhaps the most striking gains in terms of DRR mainstreaming have come in the insertion of DRR components into planning instruments (see Box 4).

#### **Box 4: Support for Mainstreaming DRR in the Planning System**

Several interviewees pointed to advances in the incorporation of DRR into planning mechanisms as one of the notable achievements of One UN DRM and its active partnership inputs from NDMA. That these gains are regarded as qualified successes is a testament to the acknowledged difficulty of DRR mainstreaming in many contexts. One UN DRM worked with 10 ministries to lobby for the advancement of DRR in governance, and a national working group on DRR was established with cross-ministry representation to advocate, propose joint implementation measures and monitor progress. Earlier analysis and experience had shown that working through the Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance was the best way to approach mainstreaming, and one significant achievement of lobbying under OP-1 was getting a chapter on DRM included for the first time in the national development plan. It was NDMA that reached out to the Planning Commission and convinced them to include a chapter in the Medium Term Development Framework for 2010-2015. Equivalent chapters should be produced also in provincial plans. Another achievement regarded as highly significant was development of a DRR checklist in 2010 for inclusion in the Planning Commission's PC-1 and PC-2 forms for project appraisal. The Planning Commission requires the provinces and 5 ministries to apply these proformas for social, infrastructure and economic projects at all levels. In this way, the inclusion of the checklist provides a mechanism to identify potential impacts of projects such as dams, highways, and irrigation projects on disaster risk. Though inclusion of a checklist in the PC-1 was a major step, however, the capacity to utilize the process to plan effectively also needs to be built in order to avoid the checklist becoming simply a box-ticking exercise. Under OP-1 there was no programmatic follow up in the form of training and technical support to the related staff at the ministries and the Planning Commission. In the more progressive DDMA's effort is being made to support training for staff of line departments to engage more effectively in planning that is informed by the results of the DRR checklist. (DFID 2012 and NDMA 2011).

- However, it is clear that continuing sustained CB effort is required if broad aspects of DRR and disaster resilience are to continue to be integrated into DRM approaches (UNDP 2012). One interviewee remarked that after periods without major disaster events, DRR can no longer be a political priority and hence becomes an easy target for budget cuts. There may also remain structural impediments in the governance system at national and provincial levels that undermine the ability of DRM agencies to maintain the support for DRR achieved under One UN DRM.
- One commentator discussed these impediments at length, arguing that though NDMA, under the National Disaster Management Act (2010) is envisaged to be the premier national entity for both mainstreaming DRR as well as coordinating disaster response at the national level, that institutionally it is in a weak position to influence other branches of government. NDMA has now been made a subordinate entity to the Climate Change Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, departing from the legislative provision of it being governed by the National Disaster Management Commission, led by the Prime Minister. Moreover, a number of parallel entities exist with overlapping mandates (but not necessarily equivalent DRR capacity) including: the Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) of the Cabinet Division, the Earthquake

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) and the Federal Flood Commission (FFC). The former two are especially powerful because of their position in the institutional landscape: ERRA is governed by its board chaired by the Prime Minister and ERC is under the powerful Cabinet Division (the Prime Minister's own division). Their existence potentially weakens the coordinating power of NDMA.

- Similarly, the PDMA, which are seen as having a key role in building DRR capacity at subnational scales, are effectively subordinate entities to various provincial ministries. According to the same commentator, this has translated into all the DMAs concentrating almost exclusively on disaster response rather than the wider functions of DRM. The lack of capacity of all the DMAs is reflected in the fact that they have not been able to access any programme funding from the Public Sector Development Programme and only get funds for normal operating expenses and disaster response. The only non-response programme funds made available to the DMAs have been through One UN DRM Programme (OP-1) and some bilateral donors, not exceeding US\$ 20 million in total.
- Within the One UN DRM actions there was little evidence of a focus of capacity around **gender** and other dimensions of differential underlying vulnerability. According to one senior government figure, gender was not really a primary focus of the One UN DRM, in part because of the way cross-UN engagement did not materialize under OP-1 for DRM. Some UN agencies like WFP and UNICEF did disaster-related interventions such as nutritional support for pregnant women but these were operated as part of their regular activities and not specially designed for One UN DRM. There may also have been issues of receptivity within government staff. One interviewee with special responsibility in this area argued that there was commonly a lack of understanding even in NDMA of the gendered nature of vulnerability and a reluctance to address differential needs of capacity building. In this way, gender mainstreaming remained a constant struggle for UN.
- However, the interviewee added that despite all the resistance the word “gender sensitive” created space for UN to place gender advisors and coordinators in disaster-related institutions. Gender was a cross-cutting theme of OP-1 and gender coordinators deployed by UN Women to NDMA were expected to ensure mainstreaming of gender in all OP-1 processes and products. A Senior Gender Advisor was placed at the UNRC Office to oversee the gender mainstreaming process across all the five One UN Ops, including the one on DRM.

## 4 CWSA's Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management Programme

Table 3: CWSA Capacity Building Programme at a glance

Research question	Overview at a glance
Which actors are involved in the CB activity?	Programme has been funded by multiple donors and is implemented by CWSA for humanitarian actors and communities.
What is the funding level and duration?	<p>The Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance (SHA) component of the programme has had multiple donors over nine years (2005-present). Between 2010-2014 it received USD342,000 from three donors and is now partially self-funded.</p> <p>The Alleviating Poverty through Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Development with a Disaster Resilient Approach component had a budget of USD566,088 for a period of 2 years.</p>
What is the scope of the activities?	<p>Provision of training, joint needs assessments, technical support, deployments, research, development of learning materials, translations, support to Sphere focal points, promotion of globally-accepted quality and accountability principles, benchmarks and standards to improve disaster risk management capacity of humanitarian actors.</p> <p>At the district level, communities and schools were mobilised and trained to improve their disaster resilience, livelihoods, literacy, and health awareness.</p>
What is the geographical focus?	The national and sub- national programme has offered services in Islamabad and 20 other locations in all four provinces of Pakistan <sup>14</sup> . CBDRR was implemented in 27 union councils in Thatta district, Sindh province only.

Community World Service Asia was formerly Church World Service Pakistan / Afghanistan and is a non-governmental organisation which has implemented humanitarian and development activities across Pakistan and Afghanistan since 1954. CWSA's thematic priorities include: emergency response; water, sanitation, and the environment; health; education; livelihoods; peace and governance; and quality and accountability.

<sup>14</sup> This information relates only to activities in Pakistan. The SHA programme is operational in 14 countries in the region.

CWSA has received ISO 9001:2000<sup>15</sup> (revised to ISO 9001:2008) accreditation and is a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) Alliance<sup>16</sup>. In 2008, CWS-P/A became a full member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership<sup>17</sup> (HAP) and received HAP certification in 2011. CWSA has been the Focal Point for The Sphere Project<sup>18</sup> in Pakistan since 2006 and became the Regional Partner for Sphere in December 2010.

The CWSA Capacity Building Programme is a programme which has capacity building for disaster risk management as a central aim and incorporates activities at all levels (from national through to community). At the national and sub-national level, CWSA conducts quality and accountability work through the Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance programme. The objectives of the programme are to:

- Mainstream quality and accountability within the organisation.
- Build the capacity in quality and accountability of CWSA staff and its implementing partners.
- Organise and mobilise disaster-affected communities to access aid services by ensuring quality and accountability
- Improve coordination among stakeholders at all levels.

At the district / community level, the Alleviating Poverty through Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Development with a Disaster Resilient Approach is a programme with two phases. Phase I aimed to reduce poverty and promote gender equality through economic empowerment, adult literacy and awareness-raising on sexual and reproductive health, and provide DRR trainings over a period of 12 months.

Phase II programme objectives are to provide:

- Vocational training and adult literacy program for 120 new beneficiaries
- Product development trainings for 16 Women's Enterprise Groups formed in both Phases I and II
- Selection of community health activists from target area and their training of trainers (TOT) on health issues enabling them to deliver sessions for the communities
- DRR training and mobilisation for 1700 participants; including students, teachers, members of community organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs) and Local Support Organisations (LSOs).

This research focused on the DRR element of the programme.

## 4.1 Programme actors

The SHA programme has been funded by multiple donors over nine years with many from the ACT Alliance. The target audience for SHA learning events are individuals, groups and organizations such as Sphere Focal Points, ACT Alliance Members, NGOs/INGOs, network bodies, forums,

<sup>15</sup> ISO 9001 is a family of quality management standards established by the International Organisation for Standardisation to ensure an organisation can consistently provide products and services that enhance customer satisfaction and meet applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. (Source: <http://www.iso.org>)

<sup>16</sup> The ACT Alliance is a coalition of more than 140 churches and affiliated organisations in 140 countries. ACT Alliance mobilises approximately USD1.5 billion for its work each year in humanitarian aid, development and advocacy. (Source: [www.actalliance.org](http://www.actalliance.org))

<sup>17</sup> HAP is a partnership of humanitarian and development organisations dedicated to ensuring greater accountability to people affected by crises through promotion and certification against a Standard on Quality and Accountability. (Source: [www.hapinternational.org](http://www.hapinternational.org))

<sup>18</sup> The Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that establishes a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response to promote and improve accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and affected populations.

clusters, cluster working groups (ex. Accountability and Learning Working Group) and CWSA staff. Secondary target audiences are UN agencies, government authorities, donor agencies, HAP, Sphere and People in Aid secretariats and universities.

For the community level initiatives under the DRR programme component, CWSA maintains close coordination with Deputy Commissioner of the Social Welfare and Education Department in Thatta district, Sindh. In addition the programme also liaises with PDMA and DDMA, INGO/NGOs and communities. The CBDRR programme is funded by UMCOR and Christian Aid. In 2011 CWSA signed an agreement with SEEDS Asia, a Japanese INGO, and the two organisations worked together for a year to build the capacity of communities, children and teachers. The beneficiaries for the DRR element of the programme included school staff, students and community members.

## 4.2 Funding and timescales

Funding for the SHA programme has involved multiple donors for short periods from 2005-present. When the programme began after the 2005 earthquake 12 agencies jointly shared funding for the activities. Funding levels have increased and decreased with the occurrence of disasters in Pakistan, but improving global awareness and appreciation of quality and accountability standards has led the SHA programme to become somewhat self-sufficient in the last two years as many of CWSA's beneficiaries have become willing to pay CWSA for the services they provide.

The SHA programme now receives donor funding for specific capacity building activities such as development and translation of quality and accountability tools and provision of specific learning events. The table below gives an example of external funding received over the last four years.

**Table 4: Donor funding of the SHA Programme from 2010-present**

Description	Donor	Total Cost in USD:
Review of Quality & Accountability (Q&A) Standards	Lutheran World Relief	25,320
Strengthening Q&A for Flood Affected Communities	Christian Aid/Act for Peace	228,563
Translation of Q&A Capacity Building Tools into Sindhi	Act for Peace	10,240
Enhancing Q&A in Pakistan and Afghanistan (training)	Act for Peace	28,122
Enhancing Q&A in Pakistan Floods	Bread for the World	49,619
<b>Total:</b>		<b>341,855</b>

In the SHA budget between 2010 and 2012, 49% of the budget was spent directly on capacity building activities. 42% was spent on personnel and the remaining on operational costs, travel and financial management.

**Table 5: SHA budget November 2010 to October 2012**

Description	Total Cost in USD:
Capacity Building Activities	88,715
Personnel	76,450
Operational Costs	10,951
Travel and Transportation	5,070
Other Costs (Financial Management)	1,521
<b>Total:</b>	<b>182,706</b>

The overall budget for the Alleviating Poverty through Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Development with a Disaster Resilient Approach for a 2 year period is USD566,088. The CBDRR element of the capacity building programme has been funded by UMCOR and Christian Aid. The first phase of the programme was for 12 months and then second phase has been for five months. The budget for the CBDRR element of the programme (the Mobile Knowledge Resource Centre) during the second phase (2014) was USD39,905 for a 5-month period. CBDRR programme activities accounted for 41% of the total cost, personnel was 33% and 25% was spent on travel.

### **4.3 Geographical coverage**

In Pakistan, the SHA programme has conducted 145 learning events over the last nine years with 19% of those being offered in Islamabad. Other learning events have been offered at the sub-national level in 20 locations in all four provinces of Pakistan often corresponding to the location of the most recent disasters and areas determined to be at high risk. After the earthquake in 2005, learning activities were focused in KP, Azad Jammu and Kashmir as well as Islamabad. After 2007 the majority of activities were conducted in flood-prone and flood-affected areas of Pakistan such as Balochistan, Sindh and KP.

The CBDRM programme is implemented in communities and schools in 27 villages in District Thatta of Sindh province.

### **4.4 CB activities**

#### **4.4.1 National / sub-national / organisational level**

At the national and sub-national levels CWSA conducts a programme component entitled Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance which aims to improve quality and accountability of humanitarian relief services in Pakistan. The project promotes observance and implementation of international standards for humanitarian assistance through educational and technical support to organisations.

The project began shortly after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan after management observed a lack of quality in the humanitarian services for earthquake-affected people. In coordination with the Sphere Project office in Geneva, a Sphere Focal Point<sup>19</sup> was assigned as a support service to humanitarian agencies working in earthquake relief. The programme offered short awareness raising sessions initially and then over the next three years expanded services and began to offer longer, more in-depth trainings and training of trainers, translation of the Sphere Handbook and training materials into local languages, distribution of materials and technical advice. Shortly thereafter, CWSA became a HAP member and began promoting HAP benchmarks and standards through their programme.

While promoting these initiatives, management elected to undertake several activities to mainstream quality and accountability within the organisation. This involved a series of self-assessments followed by action planning and implementation to bring the organisation itself and its disaster relief programmes closer to global standards.

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<sup>19</sup> A Sphere Focal Point is self-appointed agency which provides Sphere support services to humanitarian actors such as technical assistance, distribution of Sphere handbooks and provision/coordination of learning events.

The Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance programme now offers a spectrum of quality and accountability support services which help organisations to be better prepared for and to respond to disasters in an accountable way. Aside from the aforementioned activities, CWSA:

- Provides technical services to organisations who wish to improve their quality and accountability in humanitarian programmes. The service involves CWSA providing awareness trainings on quality and accountability initiatives followed by a facilitated organisational/programme self-assessment and action planning exercise with senior management. Since CWSA staff has experienced quality and accountability mainstreaming for themselves, they are able to share their own experiences and present options for action with their clients.
- Conducts lessons learned events to bring humanitarian actors together at various stages of disaster response phases to share experiences and document lessons learned.
- Conducts standard and bespoke quality and accountability training services for humanitarian agencies.
- Published a research report on the observance of quality and accountability principles in Pakistan.
- Develop and disseminate quality and accountability related standards and tools in local languages.
- Advocate quality and accountability through networks, clusters and forums.
- Deploy quality and accountability teams in post-emergency situations.

#### **4.4.2 District / community level**

At the district/community level, we studied the programme component entitled Building Resilience and Capacity of Flood Affectees in Sindh through DRR Education using a Mobile Knowledge Resource Centre (MKRC). The MKRC is a mobile museum in the form of a colourful lorry that travels to remote vulnerable areas, opens up and becomes the stage and central focus for community based disaster training. It provides practical workshops, uses simulation models and posters to aid learning about disasters. Exercises are conducted on hazard, vulnerability and capacity assessment to produce village disaster risk management plans. This CBDRR component targets schools and communities taking an integrated approach to DRR where practical skills training and community mobilisation activities are complimented by livelihoods programmes and support from other external actors. The CBDRM activities include:

- Learning needs assessment of target communities
- Production and dissemination of a wide variety of information and educational materials including booklets, games, posters / banners all designed to reflect the local culture and social environment
- Interactive training
- Formation of male and female Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMCs), School Disaster Management Committees and action plans for improving resilience
- Distribution of individual DRM kits which include a radio, torch/light, a protective pouch to keep important documents and learning booklet
- Distribution of first aid kits, a DRR game, floatation devices and posters for each community and school
- Follow-up visits to check progress on the plans and provide necessary support to the VDMCs
- Lesson learned workshop to ensure continuous learning and improvement



One of the key elements of the programme is linking communities to government departments to ensure sustainability and functioning of VDMCs as community level institutions. Each village/school that has participated now displays emergency contact information for the district authority / DDMA and educational materials. The VDMC has the role of reporting disaster-related information to the government and performs activates emergency response teams to reduce dependency on external sources.

In two of the beneficiary villages visited by our research team, the VDMCs have created a fund to invest in DRM-related equipment such as mega-phones. Community-led DRR activities since the training have included raising the level of buildings, making village building structures more hazard-resistant through mud-plastering and one village built a training centre which is now used to display DRR-related information and hold community trainings/meetings.

## 4.5 Analysis in relation to the six principles

In this section, the above described programme is analysed in relation to the six principles for effective capacity building in disaster risk management.

### 4.5.1 Flexibility/Adaptability

#### Flexibility/Adaptability

**Definition:** *The need to approach capacity building interventions flexibly, ensuring that the design of the programme can be adapted to the context in which it is applied rather than applied as an externally-imposed 'blueprint'. It includes working with and reinforcing existing skills, strategies, systems and capacities. It also includes understanding and accounting for the political and power dimensions that can undermine capacity building.*

**Research question:** *How has the programme approached capacity development in a flexible manner, adapting the approach to context?*

- The nature of training events is widely shaped by the context in which they are being delivered. The SHA team began in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake. Short awareness sessions were offered initially and many times were used as a way of orienting new humanitarian workers to the concept of humanitarianism. As the relief efforts became established, more in-depth trainings and training of trainers courses were offered to maximise impact.
- The geographic location of activities has been directly related to the location of the most recent disasters. The flexibility of donors was much appreciated by CWSA staff because it enabled them to move quickly to the most relevant location for implementing their capacity building activities.
- CWSA staff at the national and district level expressed the importance of offering training and learning materials in local languages. Use of images is also seen to be integral for those communities where there is illiteracy.
- The DRR trainers and other stakeholders suggested that their success could be attributed to the fact that they emphasised practical activities and demonstrations for community-level trainings. It was felt that it helps people to relate what is being taught to their own village. While content of DRR training is standard, interviewees appreciated the fact that trainers adapted the

programme to the context. For example, the trainings reflected examples of hazards present in the geographic area and took into account social norms and culture (See Box 5).

- In an effort to include females in the process, CWSA originally tried to do hazard, vulnerability assessments with women and girls from the outset, but discovered it was not appropriate. They found in the context, it was better to approach men first, build a relationship with them and then determine how to best engage with the women and girls. This staged approach eventually led to the active participation of women and girls.

### Box 5: Drawing on Culture, Religion and Indigenous Knowledge in CBDRM

Insights from the work of CWSA and other organizations in Pakistan demonstrate the value of linking efforts to build community capacity with appeal to local cultural norms. When approaching a community with a new objective it is useful to be able to demonstrate how the mobilisation objective connects with the community's existing values. When the community can see how the activity is connected to their own beliefs, they tend to value it more and give it priority. Though it is sometimes associated with conservatism and fatalism, religion can also be a powerful entry point for advocacy. Practitioners have used the story of Noah's Ark to introduce the concept of DRR to a community or used examples from the Koran to link DRR concepts to religious beliefs. During a community mobilization dialogue under the MKRC project, the community asked CWSA field staff why they were providing training on disaster risk reduction because nothing can be done to avert natural disasters. So the field staff discussed the story of Adam and how he built a home for his family to protect them from rains, storm, and wild animals – introducing the concept of shelter and protection to the world.

CWSA also encouraged community members to share their indigenous knowledge about hazards and disaster as part of the advocacy and training to help galvanize interest as well as to build on people's understanding. Villagers referred to the behaviour of animals, birds and insects, unusual sounds, changes in vegetation and the colour of cloud, changes in water flow and in the colour, smell and taste of water, all as signs of potential hazards. Examples included: 'when a snake starts roaming around and climb up to the tree, people start to expect flood'; 'when ants start moving to higher places such as trees, carrying their eggs, flood is expected very soon'; and 'when the pelican birds start flying south to north, rain is expected in the coming days'. CWSA trainers developed a PowerPoint presentation using photographs to demonstrate how to observe environmental indicators and animal behaviour as a means of sharing this indigenous knowledge between communities.

### 4.5.2 Comprehensive Planning

**Definition:** *The need to carefully design interventions so that they are appropriate, responsive and sustainable. It includes planning on the basis of existing capacity and capacity gaps, and appropriate scheduling of interventions so that pressure to show visible results does not undermine capacity development. Also critical is planning for the long-term sustainability of capacity gains after the withdrawal of interventions.*

**Research question:** *What has been the approach to full programme planning?*

- CWSA has developed step-by-step guidance for staff members for implementing their capacity building for disaster risk management activities. For example one interviewee shared that after experimenting with different methodologies with organisational clients, there is now a clear ten-step quality and accountability strengthening plan to be implemented with client organisations.

The step-by-step plans within the organisation help to mitigate the impact of staff turnover and ensure consistent quality in service delivery.

- Before training events at all levels, a learning needs assessment is conducted. For example, in SHA HAP implementation consultancy services, any learning event is preceded by an assessment with the full participation of the organisation. The assessment is used to adapt training provision and facilitate organisations to eventually develop action plans to bring them closer to the standards. In CBDRR an assessment of knowledge, attitudes and practices was conducted before training. Interviewees expressed that the training services they received showed an appreciation of existing knowledge and capacities. Safety and security assessments are also an essential element for CWSA when working in a new location. A risk assessment is performed to take into account both natural hazards and threats in the environment. The risk assessments guide programme staff to make safe programme-related decisions.
- **Monitoring and evaluation** of the CWSA capacity building programme is the responsibility of the project managers. Where logical frameworks have been required by donors, these are used as the basis for monitoring and evaluation. According to interviewees, the focus of M&E at CWSA is mainly on outputs and activities. CWSA state that they also use several approaches for measuring outcomes and impact including 'most significant change' approach, identification of success stories and follow up interviews. At CWSA monitoring involves assessing whether activities are carried out as planned on a regular basis, and identifying and dealing with problems during implementation.
- Measuring the impact of trainings is seen to be complex and to require rigorous follow-up. For each training event, SHA staff follow up with organisations and individual participants to find out the impact of the training and to offer further support, as needed. Follow-up with Pakistan participants is fairly established, but it has been less feasible with the participants of trainings in other countries. Impact evaluations have periodically been conducted and to a large extent are anecdotal. CWSA uses these impact evaluations to improve their own performance and communicate lessons learned and success stories with stakeholders. As one example of an impact survey, CWSA set up an online survey where 77% of the respondents stated they had applied the learning and concepts in their organizations for improving the quality.
- With regards to the **sustainability** of DRR initiatives, CWSA has put significant efforts into coordination and capacity building of community leaders using a 3-tier community mobilisation model. Those elected to a leadership role acted as agents of change for their union council. This included building capacity through the development of community funds to invest in materials to improve disaster resilience.
- The CBDRR programme was designed to ensure sustainability through:
  - Formation of community mobilization infrastructure based on proven mobilization methodology
  - Ownership and local decision making
  - Equipping women with employable skills
  - Linkage with market
  - Awareness and capacity building

- Some of the key programme challenges faced by CWSA during programme implementation were mobilising community members for the creation of sustainable market linkages, identifying competent community health activists and managing the community expectations of handouts.
- Over the years CWSA has built their own capacity and a reputation for providing support for quality and accountability in the humanitarian sector which has enhanced their own sustainability. They have also become official partners of two globally recognised quality and accountability initiatives (Sphere and HAP). As a result of this other INGOs, the UN and donor agencies pay them for services improving the sustainability of the programme. Several interviewees expressed that their official relationship with global quality and accountability initiatives gives them the credibility they need to engage peers for their capacity building activity.

### Box 6: Curbing the Impacts of Staff Turnover

Internally, CWSA has found the impact of staff turnover to be a challenge across all CB programmes. Staff turnover can be attributed to the competition with other agencies especially in times of disaster response, the need to travel for work and the cultural limitations for females doing the role of training and community mobilisation. CWSA has strived to offer gender-balance in their staff, but it is especially challenging in the Pakistani context.

For example, the CBDRR programme initially could not identify local female DRR trainers and therefore hired them from a neighbouring district. The situation was found to be unsustainable as the families' of female staff members were concerned about their safety, security and honour. The nature of the CBDRR programme meant that female staff members were actively engaging with male and female strangers without the protection of their families which proved to be too difficult over time. CWSA management negotiated with the families of female workers to ensure their cultural needs were met in terms of the working condition for females, but they experienced limited success. Over time the CBDRR team has been able to identify staff from the local area.

Management has devised some strategic methods for retaining all staff members which includes:

- Improving salary packages and benefits for those staff members who are living away from home
- Providing exposure visits for staff members to attend trainings or meet other CWSA programmes in different parts of the country
- Limiting the number of trainings conducted by each trainer in the planned time period to make the workload more manageable
- Regular coaching and mentoring of staff to keep them motivated in their work
- Documentation of step-by-step work processes so there is less reliance on individual knowledge and memory.

CWSA has struggled to keep the SHA service going when there have been longer periods without disaster response funding available. When there have been gaps in funding CWSA management has used their own core funding to cover the cost of the service. One interviewee stated that donors expect NGOs to be accountable for the quality of their programmes and to meet international standards such as Sphere, but they have been reluctant to financially support them to achieve this, for example they do not provide funding for Sphere resources and training or translation of Sphere into local languages. In several humanitarian response programmes, the CB for DRM elements have been cut by donors in favour of working in disaster relief only.

### 4.5.3 Ownership/Partnership

**Definition:** *The need to ensure that those targeted for capacity development have a clear stake in the initiative and its design and implementation, again to help ensure it is appropriate, effective and sustainable. Ownership is likely to rest on active participation, clear statements of responsibilities, engagement of leaders, and alignment with existing DRM/DRR strategies.*

**Research question:** *How has ownership been fostered?*

- The CBDRR training design included several features to improve the sustainability and ownership of their training programme. Firstly, they allowed communities to select participants for the DRR trainings using CWSA guidelines. They offered trainings in a way that respected local customs using a mixed-gender training team. In addition, each training ended with the participants creating a Village Disaster Management Committee (VDMC) defining roles and responsibilities of each member and the development of an action plan for improving the resilience of the community.
- The VDMCs in the two villages interviewed were facilitated in creating their own fund for improving disaster resilience of the community. Activities such as mud-plastering of homes, raising the level of buildings, purchasing equipment and building of a training centre have all been sponsored by VDMC's using their own community funds. CWSA also helped to link communities to opportunities for small grants from government and other INGOs for community-level projects.
- The CWSA DRR trainings explicitly encouraged participants to share their DRR knowledge with others, which according to interviews, helped to increase the reach of the programme. In particular school DRR programmes were seen as improving awareness of children who then shared DRR knowledge with their families and neighbours. A group of seven adult DRR trainees estimated that they shared their DRR knowledge with total of 104 people. Interviewees showed a high awareness and acceptance of their responsibility to pass on what they learned, for example, one interviewee shared DRR knowledge with 49 other teachers in a regional meeting.
- Effective government coordination and partnership was most evident at the district level. In district and provincial level interviews CWSA was reported to have effective, open and positive relationships with stakeholder organisations and the government. One district level official suggested that CWSA has "revised how the department views DRR and has demonstrated a positive way of working with communities". At the national level, CWSA actively engages in coordination mechanisms with other humanitarian actors, but rarely has been able to engage the government in their activities.
- The CWSA approach and content of training activities has been guided by global initiatives more so than being aligned to government DRM approaches and policies. For example, the CBDRR training from CWSA employed the Knowledge, Interest, Desire, Actions (KIDA) model which was developed by Kyoto University in 2009. Interviewees suggested that I/NGOs roughly coordinated the content of CBDRR with each other, but there is no evidence of coordinating CBDRR content or approaches that were being used by the One UN DRM programme.

- While the training curriculum is standard in terms of certain content related to DRR or humanitarian standards, the existing knowledge and specific learning needs of participants has been taken into account. In the CBDRR programme, for example, DRR trainers have facilitated village members in presenting their own experience of using observation of environmental indicators and animal behaviour to predict disasters.

### Box 7: Self-determination Fosters Ownership of Training Activities

Interviewees across the DRM CB activities of CWSA suggest that self-determination fosters ownership of training activities. Where beneficiaries identified their own training needs and performed organisational/community self-evaluations followed by creating an action plan with follow-up support and advice were seen as contributing to better decision-making and actions related to DRM.

CWSA interviewees also underlined the importance of a holistic training approach where engagement with trainees was seen as a long-term process rather than a one-off training event. A form of needs assessment is conducted before each learning event which guides the selection of training content and self-assessment activities. Several beneficiary interviewees described the CWSA approach to learning as effective and sustainable.

## 4.5.4 Integration of Actors and Scales

### Integration of Actors and Scales

**Definition:** *The need to build capacity to coordinate across scales and to work with other stakeholders. Capacity building can act to bridge capacity and communication gaps that commonly exist between national and local levels. Initiatives can focus on building capacity of coalitions of stakeholders, and on building local people's capacity to interact with other stakeholders.*

**Research question:** *How has the programme built capacity across scales and actors?*

- At the national, provincial and district levels, CWSA engages in DRM coordination and networking mechanisms however, they have had a mixed level of success. Interviewees who have worked directly with the CB programme suggested that CWSA has fostered positive relationships. They described CWSA as open to working with others, proactively engaging in coordination and communication and as having sufficient technical skills to do their work. At the national and provincial level CWSA appeared from interviews to be less successful in engaging the government and the RC/RC for coordination and partnership. While at the provincial level, government acknowledged awareness of the programme, there was little knowledge of the organisation or its activities. One interviewee at the national level described CWSA as tending to work separately from national government.
- Linkages at the district level appear to be stronger. As CWSA opened operations at the district level, they approached stakeholders to discuss their planned activities. They took advice from the government and from the coordination mechanism as part of the assessment and then targeted areas with high levels of risk where there were gaps in humanitarian services. Continued coordination throughout project implementation allowed CWSA to improve links between communities, governments and other I/NGOs such as facilitating access to small grants for communities as mentioned previously.

- Several interviewees attributed improved linkages between the community and government as a direct result of CWSA interventions. In each CWSA CBDRR training location, an emergency contact sheet has been formulated and is displayed on the wall for the community to use for DRR and response activities. Community level interviewees have said they now understand the government's role in DRR and response activities and know who to contact in the government and how for the first time in their history. The district level government has also received a VDMC directory so they are now aware of how to connect with VDMCs.

#### 4.5.5 Attentional to Functional Capacity

**Definition:** *The need to focus on functional capacity building - i.e. building the managerial and organizational capabilities needed to ensure effective decisions and actions can flow from technical know-how. It includes aspects such as improving coordination and decision-making processes. It also includes fostering an enabling environment, such as developing incentive structures for good performance and to ensure staff retention, as well as promoting the wider political conditions to support DRR as a priority.*

**Research question:** *How is the mix of potential elements for CB targeted?*

- The CWSA programme aims to contribute to CB at two levels: organisational development and training for individuals. An example of the first level is the support to organisations to reach the HAP standards. HAP sets out standards to improve organisational functions and humanitarian services to beneficiaries. At the individual level, humanitarian staff members are trained in global standards for humanitarian response and community members are trained in DRR approaches and concepts.
- Part of the SHA programme is to work as a consultancy service providing customised capacity building services to peer agencies who are interested in mainstreaming quality and accountability through implementation of globally recognised standards, for example the HAP standard. These standards are essentially designed to improve the enabling environment for effective delivery of humanitarian and development services by meeting organisational benchmarks. For SHA this is a ten-step mainstreaming process which involves offering awareness-raising sessions, facilitated meetings with senior management that include self-assessment, action planning and follow-up support. During consultations, CWSA can share their own experiences and experiences of other organisations in implementing these standards which according to interviewees was an important advantage.
- Other SHA training raises the awareness of organisations and staff members on global standards in terms of humanitarian response such as the Sphere Project. Sphere and other quality and accountability initiative trainings aim to enable humanitarian actors to make better programme-related decisions for disaster risk management.
- At the community level and in schools, CWSA facilitates groups of individuals to form their own mechanisms for improving disaster resilience. For schools, a School Disaster Management Committee is formed to discuss issues and prioritise DRR-related activities. At the community level, interviewees suggested that the VDMC has improved communities' abilities to plan, make decisions collectively, prioritise activities and manage pooled funds for the common purpose of disaster resilience.

## 4.5.6 Contribution to Disaster Resilience

### Contribution to Disaster Resilience

**Definition:** *The need for a more holistic DRR-influenced approach to DRM capacity. This includes attention to: understanding and planning for long-term changes in risk; moving beyond a focus on short-term emergency management to capacity in disaster prevention, mitigation and long-term recovery; prioritizing the reduction of vulnerability; targeting the needs of vulnerable groups; and addressing gender disparities in both vulnerability and capacity.*

**Research question:** *How has the programme captured wider aspects of the DRR approach?*

- The CBDRR programme was designed in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 in that it addresses “the relationship between disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and poverty eradication and the need for building capacity at all levels to build a culture for disaster prevention and increased community resilience in all required fields” (CWSA DRR Concept Note).
- School DRR education was cited in several interviews as the foundation for long-term resilience to disasters. It was felt that children had the power to influence family decisions related to DRR and spread their knowledge to all ages within the community.
- Interviewees suggested that the MKRC approach to improving DRR knowledge and skills was particularly effective. The colourful lorry with practical demonstrations and models that was taken into villages and schools grounds for each DRR training made the event more appealing, more memorable and therefore more sustainable for the future. Interviewees also said that MKRC was equally appealing to literate and illiterate groups and people of all ages.

### Box 8: Engaging Women and Girls in DRM

Reaching out to women and girls was a priority of the CBDRR programme. Engaging men initially and building trust with them was found to be the appropriate way to begin to engage women. Once trust had been established through conducting assessments and training with men, CWSA worked with communities to identify appropriate ways to include females. Men helped to identify a female representative who worked with CWSA staff for activities. The women elected the leader and other positions of females on the VDMC.

Interviews suggested that provision of female trainers for female participants improved the organisations’ and programmes’ acceptability in communities and in schools. Interviewees also suggested that before the CBDRR training women would sit and wait for the men to come when disasters happened. Now, women are empowered to save themselves and their children.

One government interviewee shared that he witnessed a 75-year old woman sharing her knowledge about disasters in a CWSA training which he felt not have happened previously.

- CWSA’s DRR training programme was integrated with other programme elements to assist in reducing vulnerability. Communities reported that they also learned skills in alternative livelihoods such as women’s embroidery, masonry, carpentry and agriculture from CWSA which complimented and enhanced the impact of DRR trainings.



- At the end of DRR trainings, participants received a disaster kit which they felt improved their preparedness for disasters. For example, solar-powered radios were provided. Female interviewees reported that before CWSA they did not have or know how to use radios, but now they listen to the radio every day and share weather-related information with others in the village and with neighbouring villages. Villages also received first aid boxes, a DRM game and colourful posters with DRM messages regarding all types of hazards.
- All group interviewees had a level of awareness regarding people who were more vulnerable within communities. Villages recognised who was most vulnerable and indicated that specific plans had been made to provide special assistance where needed.
- CWSA interviewees shared several mitigation and preparedness measures that were put in place after the CWSA trainings. In one village, DRR trainees reported that 20% of houses have raised the level of their house to protect them from floods. In another village approximately 11 new houses and a mosque have been built using hazard-resistant materials. A CWSA school interviewee attributed higher awareness of risk as a result of the training. After the DRR training, students and teachers assessed the structural risks within the school building and marked off areas of high risk so students would not be exposed.

## 5 Towards capacity building – key lessons from the Pakistan case study

This concluding section brings together a series of key lessons on CB for DRM derived from the case study – drawing both from discussion of the specific programmes and from the wider context of DRM intervention in Pakistan. The material here is organized on the basis of the six ‘principles’ of CB for DRM, already introduced in sections 3 and 4, and is accompanied by a set of summary statements with associated levels of confidence<sup>20</sup>.

These lessons will be cross referenced with findings from other country case studies conducted for this research project and so are presented here as tentative, initial lessons learned that will evolve and be refined using evidence from other countries. They should not be viewed as final conclusions but as stepping stones that will shape our future research and contribute to the conclusions and policy implications that will be set out in the final analytical report that will be published at the end of the research. With this in mind, after each ‘lesson’, there is a short statement in italics indicating how it relates to other case studies and how we intend to take the finding forward during the rest of the research.

### 5.1.1 Flexibility and adaptability

**Programme implementers can foster ownership and sustainability by aligning their approaches with domestic priorities from the outset (High).** One UN DRM’s responsive and adaptable approach to capacity building helped sow the seeds for ownership and sustainability at national level. The approach was aligned with domestic priorities from the outset, and responded to fill the perceived gaps, including new thematic priorities articulated by NDMA during the course of the intervention. (See 3.5.1).

*This was similar to the approach taken by UNDP DRR/LR programme in Ethiopia. In the next case study (Myanmar) we will investigate whether and how similar levels of ownership can be achieved in contexts where there is not a strong domestic agenda for DRM.*

**Connecting DRM as an objective with local cultural norms and existing values / belief systems is very effective, and in some cases essential, for community based DRM capacity building (High).** Insights from the work of CWSA and other organizations in Pakistan demonstrate the value of linking efforts to build community capacity with appeal to local cultural and religious values. CWSA’s grassroots work on DRR drew on religious values, customs and teachings to enhance the acceptability of the programme and to overcome fatalism as a barrier. The programme design also enabled “room” for recognition and appreciation of community members’ indigenous knowledge in DRR. For example, CWSA facilitated peer learning between villages and encouraged sharing of knowledge such as observation of natural indicators of disasters. (See Box 5).

*In the other case studies it will be important to collect additional examples of how CBDRM can be linked successfully with cultural and religious practices and indigenous knowledge. It will be interesting to understand how widespread such an approach is and if there are examples of it not working as well and for what reasons.*

<sup>20</sup> High confidence = conclusion drawn from multiple inputs (3 or more independent sources) with no prominent contradictory views expressed;

Medium confidence = conclusion drawn from more limited inputs (1-2 independent but authoritative sources) with no prominent contradictory views expressed;

(Low confidence (seldom used) = statement drawn from 1 source for which there is doubt over authoritativeness of the source, OR from 1 authoritative source that is countered by contradictory views.)

### 5.1.2 Attention to planning

**Funding for DRM tends to wane unless there are regular high profile disasters. This has a negative effect on DRM CB programmes (High).** CWSA noted that they have to rely on post-disaster funding for financing DRM CB programmes. When disaster relief funding runs out they use core funding or have to scale back their DRM CB activities until the next disaster brings an influx of funding opportunities.

*This is a familiar complaint in the DRM literature but it is still an important point to note because of the scale of its impact. There is a need for the international community to create some financial security and sustainability for DRM CB initiatives.*

**Preliminary capacity needs assessments are recognised as important but can get squeezed when programmes are under pressure from government and donor agencies to deliver quickly (High).** Both the programmes studied appreciated the importance of conducting capacity needs assessments prior to activities commencing, but in one case these were not carried out systematically and across stakeholders due to insufficient time and a perceived need to meet pressure to deliver from donors and government. In contrast, preliminary capacity needs assessment is built into the training work of CWSA. CWSA allocates time, human resources and travel for learning needs assessments in their planning. It is documented in their CB for DRM work processes and used consistently for planning of learning events. (See 4.5.2).

*In future case studies we will seek to understand how typical it is for capacity needs assessments to be overlooked, and build our understanding of why this happens and what measures can be put in place to ensure these important assessments are carried out effectively.*

**In fragile states, security assessments are an important step in programme design that should be encouraged and donors should give organisations the flexibility to act on the assessments despite possible impacts on programme objectives (Medium).** Security assessments are important to help determine the viability of activities and protect the staff and beneficiaries of programmes. For example, CWSA originally planned to conduct their CBDRR training in three locations. As a result of a security assessment, they determined that they did not have the capacity to cope with the high risks in two of the targeted areas. CWSA interviewees appreciated that donors were flexible in the situation and allowed them to offer an expanded programme in one location where the risks were manageable. (See 4.5.2).

*During the case studies in other fragile contexts we need to investigate how widely security assessments are used in DRM, and how effective / necessary they are for improving the quality of CB programmes.*

**The sustainability of CB efforts is difficult to achieve without a carefully-formulated sustainability plan and exit strategy planning and yet these are not routinely developed by programmes (High).** One UN DRM set out with the objective that the capacity to train others should be forged within government departments, enabling them to become the centres of CB. However, no effective plan was developed to ensure that this would take place. Indications are that some PDMA and DDMA have subsequently lost capacity since the close of OP-1, especially through the loss of staff. (See 3.5.2).

*In other case studies we will seek to understand how typical this is, and look for solid examples of how sustainability plans / exit strategies are successfully implemented and what difference they can make.*

**DRM capacity development nationally has been negatively impacted by staff turnover and transfers, though measures can be introduced to try to retain staff (High).** Some interviewees argued that, from a system-wide perspective, staff movements do not necessarily result in lost capacity. Nevertheless loss of staff following CB activities is generally perceived as a sustainability issue and some interviewees argued that regular rotation of public servants is detrimental for DRM capacity. One interviewee stated, following their experience from the management of the 2010 floods, “institutional memory and a solid understanding of the agencies involved and actors with resources can have an impact on whether lives are saved or not”. Internally, CWSA uses both remuneration and motivational support as incentives for staff retention, and carefully documents work processes to help reduce the impacts of loss of staff. CWSA management believe that these measures have been successful in curbing loss of capacity due to turnover. (See 2.5, 3.5.2 and Box 6).

*This was a similar finding to that set out in the Ethiopia pilot report – turnover has a strong negative impact on DRM capacity. We will continue to collect examples of both how high staff turnover can be mitigated and how the effects of such turnover can be reduced.*

**Lack of consistent and effective monitoring and evaluation of CB for DRM undermines the ability of actors to both determine their impact and communicate it to others. Organisations of differing size and type struggle to implement systems to measure and evaluate DRM CB. (High).** There is no evidence that One UN DRM has successfully utilized systematic forms of M&E. While CWSA actively engages in lessons learned activities and continually examines ways of improving their programmes internally (at the activity and output level), there is little emphasis on rigorous impact or outcome evaluation. (See 3.5.2 and 4.5.2).

*This is a similar finding to the Ethiopia pilot and is further evidence of the need for the M&E tools that we are developing as part of this research project. We will continue to search for examples of where M&E for DRM CB has successfully been implemented in order to draw lessons to share.*

### 5.1.3 Ownership/partnership

**A sense of ownership and national level capacity gains are more likely when the national disaster management authority leads on CB for DRM implementation and is closely involved in a particular programme’s governance structure (High).** In Pakistan, NDMA’s strong partnership in the activities of One UN DRM has facilitated the process of capacity development at national level. The close alliance of UNDP’s work in OP-1 with the priorities of the NDMA, the chairing role of NDMA on key decision bodies and NDMA’s ultimate responsibility for implementation all ensured a powerful sense of ownership and strengthened the capacity gains at national level. (See 2.5, 3.5.3 and Box 1).

Most capacity building attention in Pakistan has been focused on the national level and this is where most progress has been made. The 2005 earthquake focused more attention on integrated DRM and the country has made some significant progress since then including the development of policies, laws, manuals, tools and frameworks, particularly during the One UN DRM OP-1 period.

*In future case studies we will look for other examples of a national disaster authority participating in the governance structure of a programme and assess the merits of such an arrangement in a different context. Although this evidence will be useful for programmes operating in environments with strong NDMA’s, we will also look for evidence of what works in countries where the DRM infrastructure is weak.*

**Deliberately providing low levels of material / financial support to districts may be an appropriate strategy to avoid donor dependency (Medium).** UNDP strategically opted not to provide high levels of material/financial support to districts in order to avoid creating dependency on external support. UNDP deployed consultant coordinators to districts to assist with CB, but decided to keep the level of other inputs to districts to a minimum. The aim was that districts would themselves support the coordinators and thereby have a mechanism in place that meant the inputs could be sustained after One UN DRM. This strategy appears to have been successful in KP province which appointed its own officials on these positions after the withdrawal of external support. (See 3.5.3 and Box 2).

*We will look for similar approaches in other countries to ascertain the effectiveness of this strategy further, and can ask interviewees directly for their experience and views on such an approach.*

**Self-determination in DRM training activities is important for enhancing ownership and sustainability (High).** CWSA has been refining its approach to DRM training activities over many years. One of their lessons learned has been that learners are more inclined to act on what they have learned if they take an active role in identifying their own gaps and needs followed by identifying their own solutions to meeting these needs. This is reflected in their SHA programme for implementing HAP standards and benchmarks and in their community-based DRR programme where bespoke training courses are offered following interviews with management (See Box 7).

*Although this is a fairly obvious 'lesson', it will be interesting to see in other countries whether self-assessment of training needs and self-identification of training are widely used or not, especially at community level.*

**Active support from those in a senior government leadership role is fundamentally important in raising organisational capacity (High).** Examples from activities associated with One UN DRM, the establishment of the NIDM and the successful capacity development within KP province, underline the key role that the commitment and experience of leaders can make to successful CB. In these cases a key catalyst for that commitment to CB appears to have been recent experience/responsibility for managing the impacts of major disaster events (See 3.5.3).

*In future case studies we will look for examples of where support for DRM CB programmes amongst leaders can be generated, and try to understand the factors that help to foster or motivate that sense of commitment (see also the point in 5.1.4 regarding advocacy work).*

#### 5.1.4 Role of functional capacity building

**Advocacy events hosted by institutes such as NIDM can help to generate a supportive political environment for DRM (High).** NIDM contributes to functional CB through providing courses in various aspects of DRM planning, management, coordination and DRR mainstreaming (as well as providing technical training). The institute also has hosted advocacy events in the form of seminars targeted to national and provincial parliamentarians, which in some cases have been seen as key events in generating the political enabling environment for integrated DRM. (See Box 3 and 3.5.5).

*The equivalent institute discussed in the Ethiopia report organized similar events with parliamentarians. In the future case studies we will collect other examples of how an enabling environment for DRM CB has been developed.*

**There has been increasing, but insufficient, financial support from donors to enable implementing agencies to use global standards effectively (Medium).** The increasing focus of donors on following quality and accountability initiatives such as Sphere and HAP has put pressure

on implementing agencies to improve performance, but more support is needed to build the capacity of agencies to do so, for example by providing funding for staff training and translation of materials into local languages (See 4.5.2).

### 5.1.5 Scales/interactions

**DRM capacity building is constrained where there is an unclear separation of mandates and responsibilities between DRM institutions (Medium).** The CB impacts of One UN DRM overall were constrained by the overlapping mandates of institutions other than the main partner in OP-1. Whilst Pakistan has a DRM policy, the mandate and implementation remains dispersed between different institutions. One UN DRM worked with NDMA because it is the institution intended to forge an integrated, holistic approach to disaster management. However, the relative position of NDMA in the power structure appears to be lower than other institutions associated with DRM, and this makes it difficult for the authority to promote DRR as opposed to emergency response. (See 3.5.6).

*The success of capacity development for DRR depends on an enabling institutional power structure, but arguably functional CB can also be directed at developing such a structure. In further case studies we hope to investigate examples of CB activity that has been directed to this end.*

**Government and NGOs frequently work on DRM capacity building in silos, without effective coordination and communication between them (Medium).** National level government interviewees recognised that there were several DRR capacity building programmes being conducted across the country, but these were often perceived as having little impact unless they were coordinated and eventually handed over to government. Equally, the INGOs interviewed had little awareness of government DRR initiatives at any scale. While the interviewees from INGOs generally felt that they were working towards the same goals for disaster resilience, there was no specific alignment with government DRR policies. (See 4.5.4).

*We will investigate whether this finding is Pakistan specific or applies to other contexts and hope to find examples of how it can be overcome for example through coordination and communication mechanisms.*

**Development of district level organizational capacity under One UN DRM relied heavily on a large team of consultants assigned to work with district authorities (High).** UNDP's inputs at district level were oriented toward the establishment and capacity development of DDMA's in 35 key districts of Pakistan. This was achieved largely through the appointment of a team of specialist consultants to act as DRM Coordinators in districts for two years, working with their governmental counterparts to help establish working structures and help formulate policies and regulations. This form of CB support was widely regarded by interviewees as a key contribution of One UN DRM in galvanizing the development of DDMA's. However, the recruitment of a network of people with sufficient skills was challenging, and represents a significant resource investment – although UNDP ensured that associated costs were kept to a minimum in an effort to maximize ownership by the local authorities. Not all of these CB gains at district level have been sustained. (See Box 2).

*This could be viewed as an expanded version of the mentoring activity observed in Ethiopia. The indication from Pakistan is that this type of support, though possibly resource intensive in terms of staffing, can bring major gains. Given the difficulty in developing capacity at district level observed in both countries, even if these gains end up being sustained only in some cases, this still perhaps represents a significant achievement. It also might sow the seeds for future replication through demonstration of the value that district-level capacity can bring to management of disaster risk.*

### 5.1.6 Linkage to disaster resilience

**An effective strategy for building DRM capacity can be to focus support on specific activities for mainstreaming DRR into existing development strategies and planning processes (High).** The main focus of disaster management in Pakistan, as in most countries, tends to be on disaster response rather than the more preventive and mitigative aspects of DRR. In the light of this, significant specific gains in DRR mainstreaming were achieved through the CB support of One UN DRM. Support to the government via UNDP helped NDMA lobby for the inclusion of a chapter on disaster risk in the national development plan of Pakistan and the inclusion of a DRR checklist within the project appraisal document PC-1. (See Box 4).

*It may be that building capacity to promote a DRR approach may best be achieved by supporting relatively small but significant, specific measures that can help to initiate a longer-term step-change in practice. We will investigate where this approach has been taken in other countries to ascertain if it is a generalizable lesson.*

**In a context of high gender inequality CB initiatives may need to strategically engage men before they can target women (High).** CWSA found that reaching out to women required them to first engage with men. In their work on community-based DRR, CWSA prioritized working with women and girls, but realized that they first had to build trust through activities with local men before effectively working with women. (See Box 8).

*We will investigate whether this strategy is also used effectively in other countries to see whether the lesson can be transferred to other geographical contexts.*

**Learning messages presented in unusual and creative ways and that appeal to literate and illiterate groups alike make community based DRR programmes more effective (High).** The MKRC approach used by CWSA was seen as an engaging and memorable way to present practical DRR knowledge. The mobile demonstration vehicle utilized for this appealed equally to illiterate and literate villagers. (See 4.5.6).

*In Ethiopia we also found the ACCRA programme used specially designed board games for teaching DRM principles at the community level where the materials were either picture based or translated into multiple local languages. We will collate examples from the other country case studies of creative, unusual approaches to DRM training that are regarded as effective.*

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## Annex A Perspectives of Interviewees on Key Factors in CB

As part of the research, interviewees were asked to discuss the factors they felt were most important for the success of CB for DRM. The following table lists the responses given, organized in relation to the 6 principles identified in the inception phase of this research project as key for effective CB.

**Table 4: interviewee perspectives on DRM CB success factors**

Principle	Key factors as expressed by interviewees
Flexibility and adaptability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBDRR is more effective when appropriate religious injunctions are included in the message.</li> <li>• Scientific information and statistics do not appeal to common people and they believe more deeply in indigenous knowledge. The key to promoting community based capacity for DRR is to combine them both.</li> </ul> <p><b>Tailored training:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generic trainings are not useful. More focused trainings with specific examples are needed. Mostly the training offered are generic - there is need for focused training according to client need. Application of generic training is difficult.</li> <li>• More practical, less theoretical, training is required, particularly for the community level.</li> <li>• Training is too general and hard to apply.</li> <li>• Follow-up systems are important in terms of monitoring to capture changes because one size doesn't fit all.</li> </ul> <p>Peer learning has helped us a lot in terms of connecting with our clients. Because we have been through implementing Q&amp;A [Quality and Accountability] initiatives, we know about the challenges and have directly experienced it ourselves. Many agencies right now have pressure from their</p>

	<p>own headquarters to improve Q&amp;A and we can help them do it using examples and showing them options of what other organisations have done too.</p>
<p><b>Attention to planning</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme should be well-defined</li> <li>• Should have a 10-year time span with a step-by-step plan</li> </ul> <p><b>Needs assessments:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong needs assessments are required.</li> <li>• There should be proper capacity building needs assessments before launching any CB activity anywhere.</li> <li>• Need to include assessment as part of the plan with a budget attached. Include localised assessments too.</li> <li>• Know why you are doing it. Have clear expectations and clear goals. Know what the needs are on the ground at community level.</li> </ul> <p><b>Finance:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• You need to have enough finance for CB. Donors are reluctant to entertain our proposals.</li> <li>• There is not enough finance. Money is not allocated for CB of line departments.</li> <li>• There needs to be enough finance that the focus can move beyond just meeting basic needs onto DRR</li> </ul>
<p><b>Ownership/ partnership</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have a demand-driven approach.</li> <li>• To have the best results we need to mobilise and communicate with people in the right way. We should always respect the self-esteem of people in all of our work.</li> </ul> <p><b>Government ownership:</b></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensuring the government's ownership of the programme is the most important factor and it is best demonstrated by the government starting to share some costs of the programme.</li> <li>• Government departments must be the focus of capacity. Everything goes but government stays. This is sustainability. Links with NGOs must be established but they should not work in isolation. They should work with the government and their activities must be monitored.</li> <li>• We must have to have the will of top level decision-makers.</li> <li>• It is important to have the ability to access the government budget rather than depend on donor funds for a prolonged period of time.</li> <li>• For sustainability one needs to lower expectations, to ensure that what is done can be continued by government.</li> </ul>
<p>Role of functional CB</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Robust procurement, financial and project management procedures are required.</li> <li>• Clear job descriptions which give employees responsibilities related to the work that is required. If they attend a training, they should be held responsible by their manager for implementing what they learned and sharing what they learned with others.</li> <li>• Dedicated and permanently appointed technical experts, as opposed to general civil servants with a rapid turnover or externally funded consultants.</li> <li>• Teams must be relevant, qualified. The recruiting process should be strong.</li> <li>• Training for government staff, and a complaint information system at district level.</li> <li>• Senior managers are the key drivers of change and they should show commitment.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committed leadership who understand needs and have the ability to articulate needs and constraints.</li> <li>• Follow up of training and its utilization</li> <li>• Changing govt. structures and staff transfers is a big issue.</li> <li>• Minimize staff transfers.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Scales/interactions</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expectations of the partners need to be kept at a realistic level.</li> <li>• Commitment from every level is required.</li> </ul> <p><b>Coordination:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The local level organizations should access funding by forming consortiums as technical partners, this will further enhance strong coordination among them.</li> <li>• Communication gaps result in duplication of work - it should be avoided. All organizations should go to same coordination.</li> <li>• Coordination and liaison with regular meetings. More information sharing with partners.</li> <li>• Enhanced coordination among stakeholders so after end of project the communities should be linked with other organizations.</li> </ul> <p><b>UN Agencies:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP and all UN agencies have weak coordination. Need well-defined roles</li> <li>• UN agencies must work according to their comparative advantage to avoid duplication of efforts and resultant resource waste.</li> </ul>

## Linkage to disaster resilience

- The best time to advocate for DRR at any level is in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, when people are more receptive to such advocacy.

After this open discussion, key informants were then asked to undertake a scoring exercise for the 6 principles. They were asked to give each of the principles a score of 1-4 according to their importance, with 1 as the highest rating. A total of 38 interviewees produced complete versions of the exercise. The results are summarized in the following table which shows how many people scored 1, 2, 3 or 4 for each principle, and the average score for each principle.

**Comprehensive planning** emerges strongly as the principle most vital for success of a cb for drm programme (with 32 out of 38 people giving it the top rating). **Ownership/partnership** and **contribution to disaster resilience** are also seen as important factors with 21 and 22 people giving it the top rating respectively. On average, **integration of actors and scales** was seen as the least important factor contributing to the success of cb for drm.

**Table 5: Results of principles rating exercise**

	score 1	score 2	score 3	score 4	Ave.
<b>Flexibility &amp; adaptability</b>	10	26	2	0	1.79
<b>Comprehensive planning</b>	32	5	1	0	1.18
<b>Ownership &amp; Partnership</b>	21	14	3	0	1.53
<b>Attention to functional capacity</b>	11	20	7	0	1.89
<b>Integration of actors &amp; scales</b>	11	19	7	1	1.95
<b>Contribution to disaster resilience</b>	22	13	3	0	1.50



## Annex B Interview Questionnaire Schedules

### B.1 Initial Workshop/Key Stakeholders' Meeting (and/or contextual interviews as required)

*Introduce the project*

*Ask questions based on the list below*

*Request any further secondary sources (documents, data)*

*Request ideas for additional key contacts/interviewees*

Module	Questions	Links to RQ
CONTEXT	What are the main types of hazard affecting the country (frequency and magnitude over last 30 years)?	1
	What have been the main recent changes in disaster risk (re hazard, vulnerability)?	1
	What are the anticipated changes in disaster risk?	1
	What other social, economic or political changes are important for understanding current DRM?	2
	Where does DRM fit within the structure of governance?	3
	How does the quality of overall governance in the country affect the work of DRM organizations?	3



	What is the extent of civil society and citizen engagement in DRM?	3
	How do wider social and political issues impinge on DRM?	3
	What recent DRM/DRR programmes have been implemented in the last 15 years (external and internal)?	4
	What other major external assistance programmes relating to disaster risk have been implemented in the country in the last 15 years?	4
PROGRAMME CHARACTERISTICS	<i>Refer to the CB activities that are being studied.</i> What role have different actors played in shaping/designing and managing each of these initiatives? Who have been the main actors in this process?	5
CAPACITY	What level of DRM capacity exists generally in the country and what are the main shortfalls?	20
	Has this capacity changed recently?	20

## B.2 Interview Question Schedule: CB Actors

*Introduce the project & consent procedure*

*Ask questions based on the list below*

*Undertake ‘principles’ exercise*

*(where appropriate...)*

*Ask for financial on the project (budget & breakdowns for CB, plus staffing and staff roles – see note \*)*

*Ask for information on M&E procedures (see note \*\*)*

*Request any further secondary sources (documents, data)*

*Request ideas for additional key contacts/interviewees*

\* We need to compile as detailed **financial**/staffing information as possible for each project. It is likely that a specific data collection activity on this may need to be undertaken with an administrative officer of the project (see Additional note).

\*\* We require detailed information on **M&E** and it is likely that that a specific data collection activity on this may need to be undertaken with an administrative officer of the project (see Additional note)

Module	Question guide	Links to RQ
Programme characteristics	<p>What aspect of DRM is the main focus of the programme - preparedness/relief, prevention/mitigation, recovery, or a combination of those?</p> <p>What is the intended operational objective of the capacity (to educate, train, plan, decide or overall action)?</p> <p>What is/was the level of funding for the CB activity, and what was the allocation of funds between different aspects? <i>(see also Additional note)</i></p>	7, 7, 6

Approach to CB process	How was the time-frame for the activity decided, and is this adequate?	9, 8, 10, 10,	
	How were capacity needs assessed before the start of the programme?		
	At what stage were key national/local stakeholders identified and engaged in the programme development?		
	What roles have national/local partners played in design, implementation and management of the programme?		
	Are there existing skills and resources that were strengthened through the programme?		
	Has the programme been able to work with existing DRM institutions - formal and informal?		
	Has the CB activity been aligned with national DRM/DRR strategy?		8, 8, 8, 8,
	Did any political/power constraints exist, and how were they managed?		
	What mechanisms are there to ensure sustainability of capacity gains after the programme ends? Is staff turnover likely to be a problem?		
	How has the activity ensured participation/inclusion of women in the CB activity?		
Was a theory of change developed for the programme?	9, 10, 9, 9		
Please describe the M&E procedures and the ideas behind their design? ( <i>see also Additional note</i> )			

<p><b>Content of CB activities</b></p>	<p>On what elements of CB does the programme place most emphasis (focus on training/individuals, organizational change/institutions, coordination and on power structures, enabling environment)?</p> <p>Has the activity sought to develop incentives for good performance or staff retention?</p> <p>Has the activity involved any kind of political advocacy to reinforce DRR as a public priority?</p> <p>Has the programme sought to build capacity at more than one scale?</p> <p>How has the programme sought to build capacity for coordination and interaction between different groups of stakeholders?</p> <p>How has the issue of capacity to manage long-term change in risk been addressed?</p> <p>Has the CB programme paid attention to reduction of underlying vulnerability of people?</p>	<p>11, 11, 11,</p> <p>12, 12,</p> <p>13, 13</p>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>	<p>What worked well, and why in the programme?</p> <p>What did not work well, and why?</p> <p>What were the enabling factors?</p> <p>What were the barriers/limitations?</p>	<p>19,19,19,19</p>

Capacity (general)	<p>What factors would you say are key in ensuring the success of capacity building for DRM?</p> <p><i>Provide matrix of principles for rating exercise with explanation of what each means and the rating categories</i></p> <p>How would you rate the importance of the following 'principles' in enabling effective CB?</p>	21, 21

## B.3 Interview Question Schedule: Commentators

*Introduce the project & consent procedure*

*Ask questions based on the list below*

*Undertake 'principles' exercise*

*Request any further secondary sources (documents, data)*

*Request ideas for additional key contacts/interviewees*

Module	Question guide	Links to RQ
Programme characteristics	<p>Describe the relationship between the actors funding the CB activity and the actors they are working with</p> <p>What role have different actors played in shaping/designing and managing each of these initiatives? Who have been the main actors in this process?</p>	5, 5
Approach to CB process	<p>What roles have national/local partners played in design, implementation and management of the programme?</p> <p>How has the programme engaged political commitment and local leadership to build ownership?</p> <p>Are there existing skills and resources that were strengthened through the programme?</p> <p>Has the programme been able to work with existing DRM institutions - formal and informal?</p>	10,10, 8, 8, 8,

	<p>Has the CB activity been aligned with national DRM/DRR strategy?</p> <p>Did any political/power constraints exist, and how were they managed?</p> <p>Are the M&amp;E procedures oriented to activities/outputs or to outcomes/impact?</p>	<p>8, 9</p>
<p><b>Content of CB activities</b></p>	<p>Has the activity involved any kind of political advocacy to reinforce DRR as a public priority?</p>	<p>11</p>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>	<p>Has the CB activity been considered effective in addressing its capacity building objectives?</p> <p>Has this been sufficient to raise functional capacity, and what lessons can be learned in this respect?</p> <p>What lessons can be learned about how effectively the activity integrated CD across scales of DRM?</p> <p>What lessons can be learned about how effectively the activity fostered interaction and coordination between actors?</p> <p>What lessons can be learned about how effectively capacity has been raised to address long-term changes in risk?</p> <p>What lessons can be learned about how effectively capacity to reduce vulnerability has been raised?</p> <p>Whose capacity has been raised?</p>	<p>14, 14,</p> <p>15, 15,</p> <p>16, 16, 16,</p>

	<p>Is the capacity gain sustained/likely to be sustained?</p> <p>How closely has the activity addressed pre-existing capacity needs?</p> <p>What worked well, and why in the programme?</p> <p>What did not work well, and why?</p> <p>What were the enabling factors?</p> <p>What were the barriers/limitations?</p>	<p>17, 18, 19, 19, 19, 19</p>
<p>Capacity (general)</p>	<p>What factors would you say are key in ensuring the success of capacity building for DRM?</p> <p><i>Provide matrix of principles for rating exercise with explanation of what each means and the rating categories</i></p> <p>How would you rate the importance of the following ‘principles’ in enabling effective CB?</p>	<p>21, 21</p>



## B.4 Interview Question Schedule: Group interviews

*Introduce the project & consent procedure*

*Ask questions based on the list below*

*Undertake 'principles' exercise*

*(Undertake M&E exercise - if appropriate)*

Module	Question guide	Links to RQ
Approach to CB process	<p>How has the programme engaged political commitment and local leadership to build ownership?</p> <p>How has the activity fostered a culture of reflection and flexible learning among DRM actors in how they plan and undertake their work?</p> <p>Did any political/power constraints exist, and how were they managed?</p> <p>What mechanisms are there to ensure sustainability of capacity gains after the programme ends?</p>	10,10, 8, 9
Content of CB activities	<p>How has the programme addressed coordination and communication between scales?</p> <p>Has the activity addressed the capacity needs of highly vulnerable groups?</p> <p>How has the programme addressed the gendered dimensions of vulnerability and capacity?</p>	12, 13, 13

Effectiveness	Has the CB activity been considered effective in addressing its capacity building objectives?	
	Has this been sufficient to raise functional capacity, and what lessons can be learned in this respect?	14, 14,
	What lessons can be learned about how effectively the activity integrated CD across scales of DRM?	
	What lessons can be learned about how effectively the activity fostered interaction and coordination between actors?	15, 15,
	What lessons can be learned about how effectively capacity to address long-term changes in risk has been raised?	
	What lessons can be learned about how effectively capacity to reduce vulnerability has been raised?	
	Whose capacity has been raised?	16, 16, 16,
	Is the capacity gain sustained/likely to be sustained?	
	How closely has the activity addressed pre-existing capacity needs?	
	What worked well, and why in the programme?	
What did not work well, and why?	17, 18, 19, 19,	
What were the enabling factors?	19, 19	
What were the barriers/limitations?		

<p>Capacity (general)</p>	<p>How has existing capacity in DRM been achieved? How important has the activity been in this?</p> <p>What factors would you say are key in ensuring the success of capacity building for DRM?</p> <p><i>Provide each participant with the matrix of principles for rating exercise with explanation of what each means and the rating categories</i></p> <p>How would you rate the importance of the following 'principles' in enabling effective CB?</p>	<p>20, 21, 21</p>
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## B.5 Final Workshop

*Introduce the project & consent procedure*

*Present and discuss initial findings*

*Ask questions based on the list below (possibly in breakout groups)*

*Undertake M&E exercise*

Module	Question guide	Links to RQ
Context	<p>What other social, economic or political changes are important for understanding current DRM?</p> <p>How does the quality of overall governance in the country affect the work of DRM organizations?</p> <p>What is the extent of civil society and citizen engagement in DRM?</p> <p>How do wider social and political issues impinge on DRM?</p>	2, 3, 3, 3
Capacity (general)	<p>What level of capacity in DRM exists and what are the main shortfalls?</p> <p>Has capacity changed recently?</p> <p>How has existing capacity been achieved? How important has the activity been in this?</p> <p>What factors would you say are key in ensuring the success of capacity building for DRM?</p> <p><u>Which of the following 'principles' do you think is most important and why?</u> <u>(provide list of principles with explanation of what each means)</u></p>	20, 20, 20, 21, 21