URBAN LIVELIHOODS RECOVERY
Lessons from Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Developed in partnership with:
Acknowledgements

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACF  Action Contre la Faim
ASEC  Assemblée des Sections Communales
BRC  British Red Cross
CASEC  Conseil d’Administration de la Section Communale
CBO  Community-Based Organisation
CFW  Cash for Work
CMT  Community Mobilisation Team
CRS  Catholic Relief Services
D19  Delmas 19, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
DFID  UK Department for International Development
EDM  Entrepreneurs du Monde
HES  Household Economic Security
HNRC  Haitian National Red Cross
MAG  Market Analysis Guidance
MFI  Micro Finance Institution
MUSO  Mutual Solidarity Organisation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
RAM  Rapid Assessment for Markets
SLF  Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
ULP  British Red Cross Urban Learning Project
WASH  Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
EFSL  Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods
The earthquake that struck just south of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 12 January 2010 led to the loss of more than 220,000 lives, over 310,000 injuries and extensive damage to the city’s buildings and infrastructure. In June 2010, the British Red Cross (BRC) began to implement an integrated recovery programme in Port-au-Prince, including livelihoods, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene activities. The livelihoods component of the programme involved two main stages: 1) cash grants (three tranches of USD 250) to 4,000 families and vocational and business training and 2) the establishment, training and provision of loans to microfinance groups, as well as the provision of loans and training to small and medium-sized businesses to support their growth, and thus job creation.

This report focuses specifically on lessons learned from the implementation of the livelihoods component of the BRC urban recovery programme, from April 2010 to December 2013. It is a shortened version of a wider, internal study completed on the same topic, which focuses on issues relating to assessment, decision-making and management. As part of the British Red Cross Urban Learning Project, the purpose of the study was to gather evidence on specific challenges and opportunities in urban assessment, programme design and practical implementation, with a focus on urban livelihoods and economic recovery. The evidence and wider lessons from the study will be used to inform current and future programmes, technical guidelines, monitoring and evaluation tools and roster and delegate training across the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the coming years. For example, findings and lessons from the study have been integrated into the 2014 revision of the BRC Household Economic Security Guidelines.

The BRC urban recovery programme in Port-au-Prince was used as an entry point for understanding the specific challenges and opportunities of good practice in livelihoods recovery programming in urban areas. However, the study is not an evaluation, rather a learning study to influence operational practice and programme policy in future urban interventions. The study methodology included literature and document reviews; individual and group interviews (28 interviewees in total); an inter-agency workshop (nine participants in total); a field observation visit; and a debrief session with the programme management team.

Lessons for the British Red Cross and its partners

This report outlines six key learning points that should be taken into account when BRC staff and partners are conducting assessments for, designing and implementing future livelihoods recovery programmes in disaster-affected urban areas. These key learning points are summarised as follows.

1. Understanding needs: basic goods and services vs. livelihoods promotion in urban areas. Initial emergency livelihoods assessments must ascertain the basic goods and service needs of the affected urban community who generally rely on the market to meet their needs. However, a more detailed assessment, supported by co-ordination and information sharing with other agencies, needs to follow soon after in order to better understand the livelihoods recovery and promotion needs of the affected community. To deliver such high-quality assessments that are relevant to the urban area, effective recruitment and mobilisation of internal surge capacity are essential. Further, the utilisation of livelihoods frameworks (Sustainable Livelihoods Framework or the Household Economy Approach) and tools (for example, the Cash Learning Partnership urban toolkit, the Action Contre la Faim urban targeting guide and the Movement’s Market Assessment Guidance) that are adapted to the particularities of urban areas is vital.

2. Translating assessments into timely and relevant urban programmes. Timely and relevant programmes depend on timely assessments and the necessary skills and experience to translate assessment results into response options, programme design and, ultimately, a well implemented, managed and flexible programme. In urban areas, this is all the more important given the propensity for rapid change arising from population movements and fluctuations in markets driven by disaster impacts and aid inputs. While cash transfers can be vital in providing for immediate urban market needs post-disaster, a clear strategy on how they will contribute to livelihoods promotion, or another sector objective (for example, shelter, health or water and sanitation), needs to follow soon after. In addition, greater emphasis should be placed on internal human resource capacity not only to deliver high-quality assessments in urban areas, but to turn assessment results into timely and relevant urban programmes.
3. Selecting the right mode of operation/partnership for the urban environment. Different operational and partnership approaches have their own merits and drawbacks in relation to different urban areas, and there is no one-size-fits-all best practice approach. Instead, there are two particularly important issues to be considered in the pursuit of good practice, namely legitimacy and reaching the most vulnerable urban residents. For the BRC, partnerships with local National Societies may prove particularly useful in facilitating timely programme delivery and improved understanding of the operational environment. In addition, developing a strong relationship with government and municipal authorities, ensuring they are informed and involved in important decisions, is crucial.

4. Managing risk in urban cash programmes. Cash transfer programmes in urban areas present certain risks that need to be managed. Cities such as Port-au-Prince with higher levels of crime, violence and gangs present particular challenges. Selection criteria must be tightly defined, well communicated and beneficiaries verified, even if this is significantly time consuming. Beneficiary lists need to be carefully authorised and controlled to prevent manipulation. The involvement of government and local authorities can be important here, although this can present its own risks which need to be managed carefully.

5. Managing relations and communication with the affected community. Effectively managing the relationship with the affected community is important not only for timely programme delivery, but also for participation, accountability, feedback and security management. The voluntary network of the local National Society is of great value and should be used as a first option. Where this is not possible for reasons of capacity or access, the use of community mobilisers and a suite of face-to-face and technological tools is good practice. In addition, it is vital not to neglect the importance of softer, cultural and language skills amongst delegates in developing a robust chain of communication from senior management to the affected urban population.

6. Linking relief, recovery and development in urban areas. The challenges and opportunities of linking relief, recovery and development are not specific to urban areas. Nonetheless, they are a critical element of livelihoods recovery in any environment. Therefore it is essential to ensure that the necessary preconditions are put in place before engaging in recovery activities. In addition, effectively communicating the programme approach is vital to maintaining good relations with and accountability to the affected urban community.
1. Introduction

The earthquake that struck Haiti, just south of Port-au-Prince, on 12 January 2010, led to the loss of more than 220,000 lives, over 310,000 injuries (including more than 2,000 amputees) and extensive damage to the city’s buildings and infrastructure. The direct impacts of the earthquake were magnified by the chronic poverty and underdevelopment that plague Haiti and were further compounded by the subsequent cholera epidemic in October 2010.

As of April 2010, the British Red Cross (BRC) began to implement a recovery programme in Haiti. While immediate needs were overwhelming, it was clear that there would also be significant need for reconstruction, livelihood support and strengthening of basic services in a country beset by entrenched poverty, weak governance and insecurity. As part of the BRC Urban Learning Project (ULP), this study is a contribution to wider efforts to effectively learn lessons from the response and recovery operations that followed the earthquake, particularly as they relate to the challenges and opportunities of operating in such a challenging and high-risk urban area (Grünewald et al. 2010; Clermont et al. 2011).

The ULP aims to contribute to the continual improvement of the relevance, quality and impact of BRC and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (hereafter, Movement) programmes in urban areas through operational learning and innovation. The first year of the project (2012) constituted an inception phase, which involved the scoping of the project through the Learning from the City study, alongside a range of internal learning activities (see Kyazze et al. 2012 and Carpenter 2013).

In 2013, the ULP has gone further in building a primary evidence base by documenting BRC’s operational learning through in-depth, field-based case studies in Kathmandu, Nepal (see Grünewald and Carpenter 2014) and Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This study forms part of that process. In addition, the project has effectively developed the link between the collateral of operational learning and the BRC’s current and future programmes in urban areas, with plans for the evidence developed to inform technical and monitoring and evaluation approaches and tools, roster training and programmes. Further developing this organisational change and programme development focus is the priority for the ULP in 2014.

Study purpose

As part of the ULP, the purpose of the study is to gather evidence on specific challenges and opportunities in urban assessment, programme design and practical implementation, with a focus on urban livelihoods and economic recovery.

This report is a shorter version of the full study on lessons for the BRC and its partners emanating from the BRC’s livelihoods recovery intervention in Automeca camp and Delmas 19 (D19). The report outlines six key learning points that should be taken into account when BRC staff and partners are conducting assessments for, designing and implementing future livelihoods recovery programmes in disaster-affected urban areas.

British Red Cross urban recovery interventions in Port-au-Prince

D19 was an area of Port-au-Prince heavily affected by the 2010 earthquake and the majority of Automeca camp (60 per cent) residents came from D19. The BRC livelihood intervention began in Automeca camp, but in September 2010, due to a significant eviction of camp residents, the programme followed the affected community back to D19. Two sets of livelihoods activities have been implemented within the three phases of BRC’s Haiti recovery programme. In June 2010, a time-limited assessment of Automeca camp identified lack of income (as well as shelter) as one of the main problems facing the population in the camp, and previously in D19. This led to the design of a cash grants programme for livelihoods, as well as a proposal for the recapitalisation of credit. A total of USD 750 was provided to each family in three instalments (one unconditional and two conditional), as well as business planning and vocational training. The intervention, however, was complicated by the fact that the owner of the camp began evicting people during the assessment stage. In September 2010, following significant evictions from the camp, the programme shifted to an initial area within D19.

Overall, the BRC Haiti livelihoods recovery programme design has involved two stages:

1) Cash grants to the camp population of 4,000 families and vocational and business training: target area cash grants programme commenced in September 2010, reaching initially 947 beneficiaries and increasing to 1,028. The programme was rolled out to a larger, extended area (including zones 3 and 5) in D19 in June 2011, adding a further 2,982 beneficiaries, bringing the total for the cash grant programme up to 4,000 beneficiaries.

2) Microfinance and SME development: establishing Mutual
Solidarity Organisations (MuSOs) and strengthening their business management skills through training sessions, and facilitating access to loans and training (legislation and business management) for small and micro-businesses to support them to grow and take on additional workers.

The study draws learning from both stages of livelihoods activities.

Methodology

The study team included Bonaventure Sokpoh, Richener Noel and Isabelle Fortin, Groupe UrD, and Samuel Carpenter, BRC. The BRC 2010 Haiti Earthquake Recovery Programme was used as an entry point for understanding the specific challenges and opportunities of good practice in livelihoods economic recovery programming in urban areas. However, the study is not an evaluation, rather a learning study to influence operational practice and programme policy in future urban interventions.

The study methodology included: literature and document reviews (in-depth desk review of 35 programme documents and brief reviews of the urban economic context and cash and livelihoods lessons from other agencies operating in Port-au-Prince); individual and group interviews (with 28 individuals in all); an inter-agency workshop with nine organisations implementing cash and/or livelihoods programmes in Port-au-Prince; a half-day field observation visit in the target areas of D19; and a debrief session with the programme management team.

The information gathered was triangulated (document/literature review, interviews/workshop and observation) in order to arrive at the findings set out in section four. The findings of this study are essentially qualitative. Whenever feasible, the findings are illustrated by quantitative data from secondary literature. The importance given to a finding depends on the number and type of stakeholders who mention it.
2. Key lessons for the British Red Cross and its partners

As this study was conducted at a time when the majority of the activities under the livelihoods component of the BRC urban recovery programme were already completed, and BRC is not intending to continue to operate in Haiti after December 2014, there is a limited opportunity for BRC to use the results of this study within its Haiti programme. However, the study findings lead to six key learning points that should be taken into account when BRC staff and Movement partners are conducting assessments for designing and implementing future livelihoods recovery programmes in disaster-affected urban areas. These learning points should also be of use to other humanitarian and development agencies implementing livelihoods recovery programmes in disaster-affected urban areas.

Understanding needs: basic goods and services vs. livelihoods promotion in urban areas

In the first days after a disaster, addressing basic needs (such as food, water, sanitation, etc.) needs to take place very quickly. In such a situation, cash and voucher programmes can enable households to meet their basic goods and service needs without resorting to negative coping strategies. For cash interventions, understanding the needs of the affected population is crucial to adapt the amount and ensure targeting reaches the most vulnerable. Predetermining transfer values and number of households to be covered is not appropriate. Further, an analysis of the capacity of markets to respond to the injection of cash (including that provided by other agencies) is essential to avoiding inflation or shortages. The Rapid Assessment for Markets (RAM) is a useful tool here, having been developed specifically for the Movement. Such an analysis can then help you to decide whether it may in fact be better to provide supply- rather than demand-side support.

However, any such relief intervention should soon be followed by a more detailed recovery assessment in order to develop an understanding of the needs of the affected community in recovering and (re-)developing their income generating activities. Supporting the affected population to meet their basic needs for goods and services in urban markets is essential, but a more detailed understanding of their income generating activities, the markets in which they operate and potential trajectories of livelihoods development should be built through a livelihoods recovery assessment once initial relief transfers are up and running.

Initial assessment results also need to be quickly updated in urban areas given the dynamic nature of towns and cities relating to population mobility and market dynamics, which

Box 1: Livelihoods, mobility and rural-urban linkages

For the urban system to provide for the essential needs of its inhabitants it relies on the surrounding rural areas and their resources. Similarly, rural areas are dependent on urban markets. In the case of crisis, these rural-urban linkages can easily be broken, and specific efforts are needed to get them working again.

After the 2010 earthquake, a large proportion of Port-au-Prince’s population fled to the countryside. Once rural stocks (available food, even seeds) were depleted, many came back to the city to seek humanitarian assistance. Indeed, cash for work programmes in urban Port-au-Prince during the planting season seem to have led to rural-urban migration, undermining rural, and in turn national, food production (Harvey and Bailey 2011).

As the rural areas could not provide any more food, imported food (aid) was delivered. People got used to this food while local farmers lost their markets. In the long run, such a response impairs both urban food security and rural development. More assistance could have been provided in rural areas, rather than sucking people back into camps and slums (see Groupe URD 2011). Such considerations were included in BRC’s programme in the South Department, although more could have been done to systematically develop the links between this programme and the urban livelihoods recovery intervention in Port-au-Prince.

Similarly, a proper understanding of intra-urban mobility for labour is critical to effective response. Action Contre la Faim (ACF) worked with those in Martisan, which was not directly affected physically by the shock. However, their livelihoods were heavily affected as the areas in which they worked and the markets they supplied were disrupted.

For these reasons, humanitarian action in urban areas cannot simply rely on spatial or physical analysis, but must take a systems based approach, understanding the interdependencies and linkages which support lives and livelihoods in the city.
are particularly prone to fluctuation and volatility following a disaster shock and with the onset of resource flows that international emergency response brings with it. In addition, as rural to urban (migratory and market) linkages and remittances are important considerations in urban centres, it should be considered good practice to explore the influence of these factors in the target area. This can be done by examining financial capital using the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF). Co-ordination with other agencies (both humanitarian and financial) conducting livelihoods assessments and gathering data on the urban area can be vital here, particularly in a context where there is little pre-existing information on livelihoods profiles and markets.

To deliver high quality assessments that are relevant to the urban area, effective recruitment and mobilisation of internal surge capacity are essential. For BRC, this will involve a continued focus on enhancing urban knowledge and readiness within its Household Economic Security (HES) roster, enabling skilled personnel to be mobilised to respond and recovery operations rapidly with the flexibility to stay on to set-up management systems for programme delivery.

The importance of utilising livelihoods frameworks and tools that are appropriate to the urban area is also essential. Livelihoods frameworks such as the SLF or the Household Economy Approach (HEA), which informs the BRC HES guidelines (Hammond and Atkinson 2012), can help to develop a better understanding of both the basic needs and the livelihoods profiles of the affected population. In addition, various tools adapted to the urban context are now available and others are under development. Tools that are particularly useful are the CaLP Cash Transfer Programmes in Urban Emergencies Toolkit (Cross and Johnston 2011); the ACF – International guide to identification of vulnerable people in urban environments (Levron 2010); and the RAM and Market Analysis Guidance (MAG) developed by BRC, American Red Cross, the International Federation and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The challenge, however, is not simply the stockpiling of tools, but their effective utilisation. The response in Port-au-Prince show that more needs to be done in raising awareness of the tools and training of staff in their effective utilisation.

**Translating assessments into timely and relevant urban programmes**

The timeliness of the initial assessment and collaboration between different departments (Disaster Response and Recovery, and multilaterally with the Relief Emergency Response Units) at the early stage of the response to a disaster is essential. It is useful to have an initial assessment to design the urgent actions and then plan in-depth analysis to adapt the intervention. However, in Haiti, the initial assessment for recovery interventions should be completed as early as possible once relief activities are up and running.

Skills and experience are required not only to collect the data, but for the whole process of data and response options analysis, programme design and implementation and management. The timeliness of translation of the initial assessment into a programme of assistance is essential to ensuring the relevance of the intervention in a fast-changing, post-disaster urban environment. The local private sector can plan an important role in facilitating the shift to implementation by providing transfer mechanisms that are less expensive, transparent and secure (Creti 2010). The earlier these relationships can be formed the better – ideally they should be formed in the preparedness phase (Bailey 2014).

Activities that support the creation or revival of economic activities through SME development and micro grant activities for the affected population (not necessarily loans, rather grants, but with a strong training and business development component) can be implemented earlier on. Further, any grants provided beyond the immediate emergency phase need a clear objective, for example one relating to shelter, livelihoods promotion, WASH or health. Injecting liquidity can be important in the early stages post-disaster, but a more strategic approach needs to follow very shortly after. Table 1 opposite shows three different types of livelihood support measures and the indicated time after the shock in which each may be appropriate.
For BRC to be able to effectively respond to such needs in future urban programmes, a case could be made for the development of stronger skills in livelihoods recovery and programme management, beyond the current focus in the BRC on the development of skills and expertise in cash transfer programming (through membership of CaLP). Furthermore, programme management processes should allow for flexibility and adaptation of activities during the implementation of the intervention to ensure their continued relevance in an evolving context. This is particularly important given the propensity for rapid change in disaster-affected urban areas.

Table 1: Livelihoods recovery from a social protection perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of livelihoods support measure</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Relevant urban livelihoods recovery activities</th>
<th>Indicated time post-shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protective measures††</td>
<td>Guaranteeing relief from deprivation and the use of negative coping strategies</td>
<td>Food assistance, non-food items (NFIs) and unconditional cash transfers</td>
<td>Just after the shock and up to three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive measures</td>
<td>Averting deprivation and the use of negative coping strategies</td>
<td>Food assistance, NFIs, conditional cash transfers and vouchers to most vulnerable households or households at risk</td>
<td>During the first six months post-shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotional measures</td>
<td>Enhancing real incomes and capabilities</td>
<td>Conditional cash transfers, loans, business training and capability development</td>
<td>Started as early as possible (during the first six to nine months post-shock)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004).

Learning point 1

Initial emergency livelihoods assessments must ascertain the basic goods and service needs of the affected urban community who generally rely on the market to meet their needs. However, a more detailed assessment, supported by co-ordination and information sharing with other agencies, needs to follow soon after in order to better understand the livelihoods recovery and promotion needs of the affected community. To deliver such high quality assessments that are relevant to the urban area, effective recruitment and mobilisation of internal surge capacity is essential. Further, the utilisation of livelihoods frameworks (SLF or HEa) and tools (CaLP and aCF) that are adapted to the particularities of urban areas is vital.

Learning point 2

Timely and relevant programmes depend on timely assessments and the necessary skills and experience to translate assessment results into response options, programme design and, ultimately, a well implemented, managed and flexible programme. In urban areas, this is all the more important given the propensity for rapid change arising from population movements and fluctuations in markets driven by disaster impacts and aid inputs. While cash transfers can be vital in providing for immediate urban market needs post-disaster, a clear strategy on how they will contribute to livelihoods promotion, or another sector objective, needs to follow soon after. In addition, greater emphasis should be placed on internal human resource capacity not only to deliver high-quality assessments in urban areas, but to turn assessment results into timely and relevant urban programmes.

For BRC to be able to effectively respond to such needs in future urban programmes, a case could be made for the development of stronger skills in livelihoods recovery and programme management, beyond the current focus in the BRC on the development of skills and expertise in cash transfer programming (through membership of CaLP). Furthermore, programme management processes should allow for flexibility and adaptation of activities during the implementation of the intervention to ensure their continued relevance in an evolving context. This is particularly important given the propensity for rapid change in disaster-affected urban areas.

Selecting the right mode of operation/partnership for the urban environment

Different agencies used different approaches to identify the beneficiaries and to open up a relationship with them in relation to their livelihoods development. The following table, based on the findings of the inter-agency workshop, outlines the different approaches observed and some of their pros and cons.
The approach deemed most appropriate in discussions was partnering with local Community-Based Organisations (CbOs). However, different approaches have their own merits and drawbacks in relation to different urban areas, and there is no one-size-fits-all best practice approach.

Instead, there are two particularly important issues to be considered, namely: legitimacy and reaching the most vulnerable urban residents. Legitimacy of the representatives of the affected populations is always an important issue. But in metropolitan Port-au-Prince the issue was particularly complex. The choice of partner within the community is sensitive because the administrative authorities claim a role to play but the period of their mandate is over; the committees newly-created after the disaster don’t have real legitimacy to represent the affected population; and the CBO represents only their members, not necessarily the most vulnerable.

Before designing its mode of operation/partnership, in its original Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods (EFSL) assessment, Oxfam included a question within its focus group
discussions to ask communities to identify those organisations that best represented them and their needs. Results produced a total of over 60 CbOs. Oxfam followed a participatory approach to select the CbOs with whom it could build a partnership (Young et al. 2013). The BRC could have benefited from working with local partners earlier in its programme, which would have helped hasten the evolution of a stronger understanding of the context and operational environment. Partnership with the Haitian National Red Cross (HNRC) could perhaps have been used to greater effect here given that fewer challenges were experienced when working through HNRC in the rural areas of the South Department.

Strong knowledge of local political-economic structures and the importance or legitimacy given to each structure/organisation by the affected population is crucial in the process of designing a mode of operation/partnership that can facilitate timely programme delivery, while still reaching the most vulnerable. In addition, whatever the mode of operation or partnership chosen, a strong relationship with government and municipal authorities is crucial. They should be regularly informed and involved in the important decisions.

Managing risk in urban cash transfer programmes

Cash transfer programmes in urban areas present certain risks that need to be managed. Cities such as Port-au-Prince with higher levels of crime, violence and gangs present particular challenges. In the response phase, agencies noted that Cash for Work (CFW) programmes were often manipulated.

In urban areas selection criteria need to be tightly defined, well communicated and beneficiaries verified. Beneficiary lists must be carefully authorised and controlled to prevent manipulation. Useful guidance on fraud and corruption prevention in urban cash transfer programmes is available in the CaLP Urban Cash Transfer Programming Toolkit (Cross and Johnston 2011). Government authorities have an important role to play here and cannot be ignored in urban areas. While at the beginning of international agencies’ interventions in Haiti, government agencies were unfamiliar with cash and livelihood interventions in urban areas and could be nervous about their implications, some BRC staff also noted the usefulness of the mayor’s office in managing conflict, for example signing-off beneficiary lists for cash transfers and making sure recipients actually reside within the community. However, wider experience from other international agencies highlights that there are no guarantees that such involvement will not corrupt the process, for example through the addition of ‘ghost’ beneficiaries to lists.

In addition to avoiding fraud and corruption, distributions need to be conducted in a confidential way that will ensure protection of the affected population, including both at the point of distribution and demands on individuals being made linked to places on the beneficiary list. E-transfer mechanisms can be useful in this regard, although they should be set-up in advance, as a preparedness measure with National Society partners, to avoid delays to the implementation of the programme.

The delivery of unconditional cash transfers also creates expectations that need to be managed to ensure the sustainability of the programme, and in particular livelihoods promotion activities. This is part of developing an effective communication strategy with the affected community, outlining the planned phases of the

Learning point 3

Different operational and partnership approaches have their own merits and drawbacks in relation to different urban areas, and there is no one-size-fits-all best practice approach. Instead, there are two particularly important issues to be considered, namely: legitimacy and reaching the most vulnerable urban residents. For the BRC, partnerships with local National Societies may prove particularly useful in facilitating timely programme delivery and improved understanding of the operational environment. In addition, developing a strong relationship with government and municipal authorities, ensuring they are informed and involved in important decisions, is crucial.

Learning point 4

Cash transfer programmes in urban areas present certain risks that need to be managed. Cities such as Port-au-Prince with higher levels of crime, violence and gangs present particular challenges. Selection criteria must be tightly defined, well communicated and beneficiaries verified, even if this is significantly time consuming. Beneficiary lists must be carefully authorised and controlled to prevent manipulation. The involvement of government and local authorities is also important here, although this can also present risks which need to be managed carefully.
intervention and changes to the conditions on assistance provided that will occur over the course of the programme, as explored further in the next learning point.

Managing relations and communication with the affected community

The BRC’s experience in Haiti has shown the importance of maintaining good communication with the affected population to build confidence and trust, leading to a positive working relationship. One of the main difficulties experienced in moving from cash transfers to microeconomic initiatives was insufficient communication of the different phases of the livelihoods recovery programme and the beneficiary selection criteria. Since the establishment of the Community Mobilisation Team (CMT), the communication has substantially improved.

The CMT approach is good practice and innovative for BRC, who are used to working through the local National Society. But multiple channels of communication could have been used earlier to communicate the phased programme approach and the livelihoods programme beneficiary selection criteria. This would have helped to smooth the implementation of the programme, particularly when working with a complex and challenging urban community.

In establishing effective communication with the affected population in urban areas, the range of tools used by BRC in Port-au-Prince, from face-to-face meetings to community mobilisers to a call centre, all have an important added value. However, it is vital not to neglect the importance of softer, cultural skills amongst delegates, including social, cultural and gender analysis. Experience in Port-au-Prince highlights the importance of an effective understanding of the local culture, behaviour and codes of communication. Such skills are of great value, not only in terms of communication, but also in facilitating participation of and accountability to the affected community and in supporting security management.

In addition, the knowledge of the national languages is vital. Language skills are important for intra-programme communication, including both verbal and written.

Linking relief, recovery and development in urban areas

The challenges and opportunities of linking relief, recovery and development are not specific to urban areas and have been well reviewed elsewhere (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). Nonetheless, they are a critical element of livelihoods recovery in any environment and therefore must be prioritised.

The BRC’s experience in Haiti has highlighted some of the challenges in transitioning from cash transfers (seen as relief activities) to microeconomic initiatives (seen as recovery activities). Based on BRC’s experience in Port-au-Prince, the following elements are necessary to improve the link between the different types of activities:

> Early assessment of the needs for recovery activities
> Greater co-ordination between the Disaster Response and Recovery teams and, multilaterally, the ERUs and bilateral delegations to ensure the connection between the different types of activities
> In-depth analysis of the different aspects of the context (livelihood profiles, markets, stakeholders analysis, cultural aspects etc.)
> Designing a participatory approach

Learning point 5

Effectively managing the relationship with the affected community is important for not only for timely programme delivery, but also for participation, accountability and feedback and security management. The voluntary network of the local National Society is of great value and should be used as a first option. Where this is not possible for reasons of capacity or access, the use of community mobilisers and a suite of face-to-face and technological tools is good practice. In addition, it is vital not to neglect the importance of softer, cultural and language skills amongst delegates in developing a robust chain of communication from senior management to the affected urban population.

Learning point 6

The challenges and opportunities of linking relief, recovery and development are not specific to urban areas. Nonetheless, they are a critical element of livelihoods recovery in any environment and, therefore, it is essential to ensure that the necessary preconditions are put in place before engaging in recovery activities. In addition, effectively communicating the programme approach is vital to maintaining good relations with and accountability to the affected urban community.
that ensures good communication with the affected population and its representatives

- Balanced investment in the different types of activities and sufficient duration of the recovery activities to enable sustainable impact

- A thorough monitoring system and a level of flexibility within the programme in order to effectively monitor the results of the programme and to adapt the programme to the changing context

- Co-ordination with other organisations and involvement in lessons learned activities in the specific operational context.

3. Conclusion

This report has detailed six lessons stemming from the implementation of BRC’s urban livelihoods recovery programme following the 2010 Haiti earthquake. It is part of an on-going process of operational and organisational learning on humanitarian action in urban areas by the BRC and its partners in the Movement. It contributes to an evidence base being developed by the BRC, documenting operational learning through in-depth, field-based case studies. The study also develops the link between operational learning and current and future programmes in urban areas.

The evidence and wider lessons from this study will help to inform pilot programmes, technical guidelines, impact frameworks, monitoring and evaluation tools and roster and delegate training across the Movement in the coming years. This is essential if the Movement and wider humanitarian sector are to meet the challenge of improving humanitarian action in urban areas through organisational change and programme development that are truly evidence-based and rooted in operational experience and learning.
### Appendix 1: Selected British Red Cross programmes in urban areas: successes and challenges

#### Table 3: Individuals and groups interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Group</th>
<th>Position(s)</th>
<th>Team/Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British Red Cross</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melvin Tebbutt</td>
<td>Head of delegation</td>
<td>Senior management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy McCance</td>
<td>Programme co-ordination manager</td>
<td>Senior management team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jethro Sereme</td>
<td>Communication and security co-ordinator</td>
<td>Communication and security team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mor Golberger</td>
<td>Community mobilisation manager</td>
<td>Community mobilisation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group interview with two team members</td>
<td>Community mobilisers</td>
<td>Community mobilisation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Saint Louis</td>
<td>Microfinance manager</td>
<td>Livelihoods team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn Jules Mingot</td>
<td>SME manager</td>
<td>Livelihoods team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group interview with six team members, four microfinance – Noel Pierre Roussel, Godchild Regis, Alandre Ronald Jean Louis, Gerald Cassis and two SME – Daniel Baptiste and Uladimir Anglade</td>
<td>Microfinance trainer, SME officer, SME trainer and Livelihoods officer (HelpAge liaison)</td>
<td>Livelihoods team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Federation and PNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kris Flegg</td>
<td>Livelihoods delegate and former BRC Livelihoods programme manager</td>
<td>International Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizé Charles Saintfleur</td>
<td>Livelihoods programme manager</td>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MFIs</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionel Fleuristin</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>KNFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismène Paul</td>
<td>Head of training</td>
<td>KNFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carine Roenen</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Fonkoze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Louis Mykel</td>
<td>Programme manager, livelihoods</td>
<td>CRS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gustin Fredrique</td>
<td>Technical advisor</td>
<td>CRS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marie-Hermine De Montangon</td>
<td>Programme co-ordinator</td>
<td>EDM</td>
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<td>Hélène Mauduit</td>
<td>Programme manager</td>
<td>EDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cédric Piriou</td>
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<td>ACF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude Saint-Pierre</td>
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<td>Oxfam Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damien Berrendolf</td>
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<td>Oxfam GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Eugène</td>
<td>Livelihoods project officer</td>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marc-Darlème Accéus</td>
<td>Monitoring, evaluation and learning manager</td>
<td>Oxfam Quebec</td>
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</table>
Table 4: Participants in the inter-agency workshop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Gas Saint Louis</td>
<td>Microfinance manager</td>
<td>BRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jn Jules Mingot</td>
<td>SME manager</td>
<td>BRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jethro Sereme</td>
<td>Communication and security coordinator</td>
<td>BRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sainfleur Elizé Charles</td>
<td>Livelihoods programme manager</td>
<td>French Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélène Mauduit</td>
<td>Programme manager</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs du Monde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc-Darlème Accéus</td>
<td>Monitoring, evaluation and learning officer</td>
<td>Oxfam Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Mykel</td>
<td>Programme manager, Livelihoods</td>
<td>CRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismène Paul</td>
<td>Head of training</td>
<td>KNFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Grünewald, F. and Binder, A., with Georges, Y. (2010), *Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake* (Plaisians, Groupe URD).


Endnotes

1 At the time of the study, the Automeca camp no longer existed.

2 In addition BRC created a fund (blue box) that members can borrow from as well as an emergency fund.

3 See Appendix 1, Table 4.

4 See Appendix 1, Table 5 for participants.

5 As the interviews were confidential, quotations of sources do not include individual names, just the type of stakeholder.


7 This was assessed by Digicel, the mobile phone network provider, who tracked the movement of phones. For example, about 120,000 people went to the 19 communes in the South Department, although many of them rapidly returned to Port-au-Prince.

8 The RAM is intended to be used for an initial quick assessment of markets post-shock to inform response options analysis (with limited shelf life), while the MAG is intended to facilitate integration of market analysis into the different phases of the programme cycle from two weeks to one year post-shock.

9 Further tools and resources relevant to implementing urban livelihoods response and recovery programmes can be found in the HES Guidelines (see Hammond and Atkinson 2012) (currently being updated) and Appendix 2 of BRC’s Learning from the City study (see Kyazze et al. 2012). A further useful portal is the International Federation’s Livelihoods Resource Centre: livelihoodscentre.org/

10 For example, the Relief Emergency Response Unit deployed in Haiti by the American Red Cross.

11 Protective measures, especially unconditional cash, should be restricted to six months post-shock (only to prevent the use of negative coping strategies). The shift from preventive to protective and positive livelihoods interventions should start within the first six months post-shock.
REFUSING TO IGNORE PEOPLE IN CRISIS

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