BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A MULTI-HAZARD HUMANITARIAN APPROACH

Red Cross Red Crescent Partners’ Africa consultation report
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For further information, contact Malika Noisette (mnoisette@redcross.nl)
Barriers and opportunities for a multi-hazard humanitarian approach
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Picture on this page: Kilembe hospital (Uganda) swept away by floods. A Uganda Red Cross staff testing drone for needs assessment, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Picture on front page: Madagascar, January 2021. Volunteers from the local branch of the National Society in Atsinanana region are raising awareness on mitigation measures to be taken by the community before the tropical storm Eloise touches Madagascar soil.
Introduction

Most countries in the Africa region are regularly facing simultaneous or cascading disasters such as floods, desert locust invasion, communal violence and conflicts, drought, food insecurity, cholera, Ebola and other epidemics, leading to compounding and exacerbated impact on affected communities. The Covid-19 pandemic has added up to those hazards and presented an operational challenge for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Aware of the tendencies to work in silo through a non-comprehensive approach of humanitarian needs, the push to work in a multi-hazard approach has intensified.

The following report aims to provide major insights and recommendations for the implementation of a multi-hazard humanitarian approach drawing from the different experiences of staff members of the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement working in Africa. This report is the result of a consultation process of 35 staff members, including branch and HQ NS staff, PNSs and IFRC representatives, from various departments, carried out between September and October of 2020. This consultation followed a preliminary survey carried out in August 2020 and was initiated by the “multi-hazard approach” sub-group of the ADMAG (Africa Disaster Management Advisory Group). For more information on the participants’ interviews and the methodology, please take a look at Annex 1.

The consultation had a threefold purpose:

I. Understand to what extent the National Societies are willing to implement such a multi-hazard approach when facing compounding disasters

II. Identify what the National Societies need to implement such an approach (if the will exists)

III. Identify learning opportunities and establish concrete recommendations for the ADMAG to support the National Societies in the implementation of a multi-hazard response approach

Upon finalising the interview stage, the analysis of the findings focused on mainstreaming the responses per each relevant sector: Hazards, risks and needs analysis; Response planning; Resources Mobilisation; Coordination; Support services (finance, logistics, HR and planning, monitoring, evaluation, learning and reporting). After drafting a summary of the interviews, a driver’s analysis together with a SWOT analysis informed the recommendations set as main part of the report.
Part I - What are the main barriers and opportunities for the implementation of a multi-hazard humanitarian approach in Africa?

The below drivers’ analysis graph (p.4) was compiled by gathering all inputs provided by the respondents of the interviews.

1. Findings from the drivers’ analysis

All participants shared a similar concern regarding the fact that most RCRC led emergency responses in Africa are not properly addressing the needs of communities, hit by several disasters with compounding effects. This seems to be largely due to the lack of capacities of National Societies to monitor and plan for compounding risks, which also comes from a lack of strategic investment from their partners to allocate the required resources to build those capacities. Once the disasters happen, fragmented approach and disparate planning are mainly caused by uncoordinated and non-flexible funding mechanisms which lead us to design responses based on disasters cycle only - when and where they are happening - and not enough based on needs of the affected communities. Moreover, the lack of good coordination mechanisms at country level leads most partners to impose a narrow and silo approach in terms of response design.

It also came out that, to improve its response to compounding disasters, the Movement should initiate a shift of focus in its planning process: all interventions (preparedness and response) should be driven by people’s needs (as well as the NS’s role and capacities), which would widen our scope to include the compounding effects of simultaneous and/or cascading disasters, rather than responding to a single disaster at a time. In other words, we should move away from a disaster approach and ad hoc decision making towards a needs and evidence-based approach and a more consistent and systematic decisions making process before and during emergencies.

Additionally, we observe a disconnect between (i) donors’ high expectations of having humanitarian actors ready to respond efficiently and anticipate risks and (ii) the means provided to develop the required capacities to ensure such anticipated and effective response, as well as the type of funds provided to activate preparedness actions and implement adequate emergency response mechanisms.

Using the Preparedness for Effective Response (PER) approach is seen as the best way to bring all partners together on a common multi-hazard approach and planning process, to allocate their contributions to a coherent and evolutive response plan. Adopting this approach would ensure that coordination is done systematically throughout planning and operations as a standard way of working (vs. working together on a specific intervention or a specific project only).
**Successive disasters, sometimes one being the consequence of another one, causing exacerbating effects on vulnerable communities**

**Communities impacted by several disasters**

- Lack of Institutional capacities (incl. HR) and expertise to monitor and anticipate the compounding impact of several disasters
- Lack of time devoted to anticipate hazards, monitor forecasts & plan accordingly
- Tendency to have a "business-as-usual attitude", lack of efforts to invest in improved disaster management practices
- Lack of institutional support to invest in building this approach ahead of emergencies (NS strengthening funds when NS motivation is there)
- Lack of understanding/knowledge on how to plan response to compounding impact of several disasters (and no concrete example of a multi-hazard response plan to learn from)
- Lack of proper coordination mechanisms among partners in planning ahead of emergencies
- Lack of core costs

**Action/reaction response mode:** Constantly responding to disasters, always unprepared. NGOs caught up in cycle of emergencies constantly coming up, one after the other

- Needs assessment done by using historical knowledge on the impact of such disaster, rather than based on robust needs assessment among the affected population
- Uncoordinated funding request from the partners to their back donors, with different types of requirements, focus, etc.
- Lack of proper coordination mechanisms among partners at country level concerning the response and funding approach to complex emergencies
- Donor funds are hazard specific, restricted to the thing of a specific hazard, sector focused and sometimes restricted to specific geographical areas, positioned at global level only
- Strategic choice goes towards several DREFs/EAs because it will cover more core costs
- No synergy/ flexibility possible between IFRC emergency funding mechanisms (eg: DREFs are hazard-specific and can't be used to respond to an additional disaster when it happens
- Lack of locally available and unmarked response funds to respond according to the evolving compounding needs

**Response planning not based on robust needs analysis**

**Response planning driven by donors' interest/focus**

**Lack of flexible funding to support multi-hazard response plans**

**Single hazard response plans**

Communities' needs are not well understood and not addressed adequately
Overall, the entire panel of respondents was of the opinion that the Movement should adjust its way of working to move away from this rigid and silo disaster management approach towards a more flexible and dynamic way to deal with addressing compounding risks from anticipation to response. The motivation is undoubtatable, and this is corroborated by the number of initiatives which have started to that effect throughout the continent. As much as no robust capacities have been built and no systematic ways of dealing with multiple disasters have been developed, the following examples shared during this consultation demonstrate the fact that several National Societies are already trying to change through great opportunities that we can learn from:

**Kenya** RC has a multi-disaster response plan for COVID-19, Floods and Desert locust invasion.

**Burundi** RC has integrated the disaster management approach to their strategic plan, aiming to mainstream the response team, the community committees of disaster risk reduction and early warning approaches. They also validated a government multi-hazard contingency plan for 2020-21, which integrates aspects of the national strategy elaborated two years ago.

**Uganda** RC started to develop and implement combined response plans addressing concurrently the impact of floods and epidemics. Supported by the IFRC and their Partners National Societies, URCS has adopted the PER approach and started implementing their PER work plan which aims to strengthen URCS’s capacities to respond to several disasters simultaneously in the most efficient way.

**Mozambique** RC developed a multi-hazard contingency plan.

**Madagascar** RC initiated a planning process including cyclone and COVID-19.

The **CP3** (Community Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness1) program implemented in 7 African countries has been designed to adopt a multi-hazard preparedness approach from the start, arguing that epidemics are another hazard NSs need to prepare for, with the same staff/volunteers and systems and require close coordination between the Health and DM teams.

**ICRC** emergency funding model (with local prepositioning through annual plans)

National Society Investment Alliance (NSIA).

Good country coordination mechanisms, conducive for a multi-hazard humanitarian approach, to inspire us:

• **Sudan** COVID-19 response
• **Zambia** multi-hazard response led by government 2020
• Movement coordination platforms in several countries in **East Africa** (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan) chaired by the National Societies
• OIA framework in **DRC** for the response to the Ebola outbreak

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1 For more information on CP3:  https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/community-epidemic-pandemic-preparedness/
2. Recommendations for the implementation of a multi-hazard response approach in Africa²

Strategic investments

- Promote strategic decision from National Societies and its partners to invest time to develop this approach in suitable contexts
- Encourage long term support to National Societies to provide the required institutional support to develop the approach, the Preparedness for Effective Response being the best way to channel and coordinate such support
- Increase National Societies Development efforts to ensure availability of long-term staff for ongoing multi-hazard risk analysis and response planning
- Opt more often for Cash Based Intervention in response plans since it is often a good way to support communities affected by several disasters
- Sustain minimum capacities and activities of the NS out of emergencies since it forms the basis of their response capacities and ensures staff continuity. This will eventually lead to a better positioning of the NS within the national humanitarian coordination mechanisms and to a more adequate decision making process in time of crisis.

² The following list of recommendations was extracted from the interviews’ analysis (drivers’ analysis above and SWOT analysis available in the Annex 2.)
**Analysis and planning**

- Clarify what the approach consists in, acknowledging previous concepts and avoiding over theorisation
- Create awareness among National Societies (including to National Societies senior management) and their partners on the multi-hazard approach and its benefits, on the importance of planning emergency work based on people’s needs (in addition to NS’s role and capacities) rather than based on disaster cycles
- Provide technical support on how to implement the approach (from multi-hazard monitoring & anticipation to multi-hazard response planning and resources mobilisation)
- Reinforce National Societies’ capacities to be adequate for multi-hazard monitoring & anticipation, multitask analysis
- Adapt our assessment tools to be able to assess the compounding impacts of several disasters; ensure that the Assessment Coordination Cells also follow the multi-hazard approach
- Review and adapt Emergency Plan of Action and Emergency Appeals format to cater for compounding disasters
- Adapt our contingency plans to support proper multi-hazard response planning & flexible planning
- Revisit and clarify the linkages among preparedness, anticipatory, response and recovery aspects of the work of an NS. Encourage a programmatic holistic vision on how to collectively achieve common goals rather than project focussed and disconnected efforts on all the domains
- Train more multi-skilled National Disaster Response Teams (so they can implement a higher variety of interventions)

**Resources mobilisation**

- Support National Societies in developing a checklist of minimum requirements to be met before they accept emergency funds from donors/partners. This will help them make sound decision when proposed funds from a donor who do not prioritise the National Societies’ Plan of Action and that don’t accommodate multi-hazard approach
- Propose a mix of long-term and short-term options for suitable funding mechanisms\(^3\). Long-term options are related to donors ‘engagement, while short-term options are within our own systems, such as:
  - Positioning emergency funds at country level to be used for preparedness and response when needed, detached from any specific hazards (see ICRC model)
  - Dedicating 20% of all projects funds towards flexible funding for emergency preparedness & response (when an alert is issued)

\(^3\) For inspiration, see Flexible funding for humanitarian response and COVID-19, March 2020, IASC.
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✓ Utilise donors’ emergency funds to contribute to one National Society’s national response plan only (as opposed to requesting specific plans for each donor’s contribution)
✓ Foster a culture of preparedness in all programming to “promote thinking before rather than during a disaster”
✓ Review IFRC emergency funding mechanisms to allow more flexibility and make them suitable for multi-hazard’s response. Turn Emergency Appeals and Emergency Plans of Action into more flexible tools oriented towards short, mid and longer term dynamic emergency responses rather than hazard specific disaster response. Adapt accordingly the budgeting, funding, planning and reporting architecture and procedures (ex: consider the addition of COVID-19 response in DREFs as a long-term option to include several responses in one DREF and allow reallocation of unspent resources to another disaster response instead of imposing the return of the funds while new and different needs have appeared).
✓ Review examples of funding mechanisms within and outside the Movement to learn on potential adaptation of our tools, and/or on potential ways to utilise IFRC tools for multi-hazard response.

Kenya, Kisumu County, May 2020. Jessica Nekesa (left) receives a pack of hand sanitizers donated by the EABL from a KRCS aid worker at Manyatta informal settlement, as part of the response to the COVID-19 crisis across the country. Photo: John Bundi / Kenya Red Cross Society.
Coordination

• Engage with donors as a Movement whenever possible, to avoid scattering of funding which contributes to an uncoordinated approach (with poor communication & coordination among RCRC partners) and a multitude of isolated incomplete single hazard response plans. Encourage and support the design of one national response plan led by the Host NS with multiple contributions from various partners.
• Adopt strong coordination mechanisms at country level (not only between partners but also between departments). Work more often in consortium and ensure that the National Societies are in the driver’s seat. Make use of the opportunity we have to gather such a variety of expertise within the Movement, turn it into a strength by valuing synergies between various types of resources.
• Use the PER approach to ensure good coordination of resources in multi-hazard emergencies preparedness and response (PER being the best way to have all partners work under one common umbrella)
  • Implement more systematically SMCC

Operations support

• Advocate for early and flexible humanitarian funding, and share a common message towards donors (common positioning on endorsing multi-hazard response approach, requesting suitable funding mechanisms and possibly joint planning where relevant)  
  *NB: Flexible funding alone are not enough if the capacities of the National Societies to implement a multi-hazard risk monitoring and response planning approach to utilise those funds adequately is not reinforced. Donors might be able to give more flexible funds if there are robust planning, monitoring and reporting systems in place which they trust.*
  
  • Wherever possible allow more agility and flexibility of our financial procedures, coding system, reporting and pledge managements to match the dynamic of multi-hazards response approach
  • Multi-hazard approach might necessitate larger budgets (although it should also lead to managing only one consolidated budget vs. several smaller-size budgets). We therefore need to get better at designing and managing bigger budgets.
  • Multi-hazard approach should lead support services to start doing proper planning of their activities (e.g. bi-annual financial and logistical planning related to operations based on risks and scenario analysis)
  • Support National Societies in implementing digital-based M&E systems to monitor and evaluate multi-hazard preparedness and response
  • If partners agree to work on a common plan led by the National Societies (see Coordination point 1 above), it would simplify the work of the support services who could combine procurement, finances management, and M&E work.
Part II - Summary of the participants’ feedback

The below sections provide further details on the constraints which prevent National Societies from understanding and adequately addressing the compounding effects of multiple disasters in their response planning, and on what is needed from all Movement actors to implement the required shift, as gathered during the consultation process.

Summary

When faced with the concept of multi-hazard approach, participants identified with the proposal of mainstreaming programming through the lens of multiple hazards and their interaction. Their support to the approach is founded on an operational dilemma: the contexts they work in are confronted by several hazards (concurrent and/or sequential) which, however, are responded through “stand-alone” projects and/or silo approaches. While this situation is not out of the ordinary to the participants, they agreed that COVID-19 has prompted a major call for changing the traditional single-hazard approach of operational responses. There is a need to better channel limited resources to increase impact as a Movement.

While participants find the multi-hazard approach as an appealing solution, they also warned that this approach is not new and faced difficulties for its implementation due to:
• **Single-hazard oriented funding mechanisms and donors’ stance:** Funding mechanisms relied by National Societies (such as DREF, including the FbA by the DREF) are single-hazard, and do not provide a platform for multi-hazard proposals. Similarly, many donors tend to focus on specific beneficiaries and sectors, which lead to the creation of silos. Lack of flexibility was raised as a main challenge.

• **An emphasis on reactiveness rather than preparedness:** Prompted by consecutive and overlaying hazards, participants admitted that there is an endless cycle of jumping from one response to the other, dedicating less time to forecasting or taking a holistic view to the response. Additionally, reactive approaches are further prompted by external pressure to respond to the beneficiaries in the most immediate manner.

• **Internal resource capacity to adopt the approach:** Participants noted down challenges related to the current resource capacity and expertise of National Societies. Implementing the multi-hazard approach would require mainstreaming expertise which might or might not be available, and which would be confronted with chronological and repetitive incoming hazards from different geographic areas.

• **Overall doubts as to how to put this into practice through projects proposals and operations:** Discussions on the approach date back to years ago and have been materialised into harmonised concrete guidelines and/or recommendations but it has not been turned into a harmonised way of working together in support of common goals, with the NSs in the driving seats. This leads us to a lack of common understanding and joined prioritisation on how to improve our response and to have better impact on the ground. Participants embraced the idea of the benefits behind the multi-hazard approach but remained cautious as to how this could be implemented given current capacities and differential needs per context.
As a result, they encouraged stronger technical support as well as further clarity on the terminology: acknowledging previous concepts and avoiding making it too theoretical and academics.

Aware of the increasing challenges posed by compounding risks, the participants stressed that National Societies are willing to further implement a multi-hazard humanitarian approach.

“There is a recurrent cycle of emergencies. Unfortunately, it seems that we are always unprepared. No one is taking any action to recurrent multiple hazards. We should not look at disasters individually. We should have holistic approaches. Often, they are consequences of each other.”

1. **Hazards, Risks and Needs analysis**

1.1. **Where do we stand in multi-hazard risk monitoring and analysis?**

Most participants mentioned that multi-hazard risk monitoring, analysis (and therefore planning) are not taking place to the extent of its potential. While there is some level of joined risk analysis taking place, it is still very basic. There is no deep analysis of the interactions between disasters as it is happening more on an *ad hoc* basis rather than through regular multi-hazard risk monitoring systems. There are some exceptions though where this approach is already being implemented: in Uganda, multi-hazard
risk analysis is slowly taking place for both long term DRR program and multi-disaster response. But it is not yet robust and institutionalised. It remains ad-hoc and project-based.

However, new opportunities are arising, some of which are driven by donors in the context of COVID-19, like in Madagascar where humanitarian actors are discussing how to deal with food insecurity crisis, COVID-19, and cyclone preparedness. This is a good opportunity to explore the possibility to put in place a multi-risk approach. It is still a fairly new approach (yet a few NSs have already been working on it due to their context) which requires much increased coordination across various sectors. Additional considerations are also being included in the PER mechanisms to cater for multi-hazard approach and a higher variety of contexts implementation.

1.2. What constraints prevent us from developing multi-hazard risk analysis?

- Lack of knowledge on how to do it
- Complexity of the approach: “It is much more complicated than single hazard risk analysis. Also from an M&E perspective” mentioned a respondent.
- Lack of institutional capacity (especially trained staff) partly due to lack of prioritization of the investment in preparedness and of ownership building on what is already available within the system
- Changing habits: National Societies tend to do business as usual and not to invest enough in systemic improvement. They are mostly used to carry out single hazard risk analysis, prioritise the main disaster and develop a response strategy around it.
- Lack of proper planning: National Societies generally on reactive mode, moving from one emergency to the next and lack experience in complex scenario planning.
- Restricted funding: response resources are hazard specific and National Societies have to plan based on what the resources are meant for.
- Lack of dedication to the approach from National Societies and from their partners: hazard analysis is often done on an ad-hoc basis according to how partners work and their approach which results in superficial analysis.

1.3. What kind of support is needed to implement multi-risk analysis and monitoring?

All respondents from National Societies mentioned that they need technical support on how to carry out multi-hazard risk analysis in the form of training of staff, management on multi-risks analysis and providing the required resources (including relevant assessment tools) to implement the change:

“Sometimes we might do a multi-risk analysis without knowing but we mainly need technical support to accompany us in this process which is key in our context”.

Partners also pointed out that improved coordination is critical to have a unified way of doing risk analysis in order to inform our response to multiple disasters. Many partners mentioned that African National Societies need capacity strengthening with regards to the multi-hazard risk analysis and dynamic mapping; we need to train and
equip NS staff in order to do so. It was also mentioned that we need firm and long-term engagement from PNSs and from the IFRC. It was recommended that the IFRC plays a key role in emphasizing the concept of multi-hazard approach and support National Societies capacity building. A respondent suggested that risk watch systems should be better used, and that National Societies should be supported in using it. As for now, it is mainly used at IFRC level and it could be passed on to National Societies.

2. **Response planning**

2.1. **Where do we stand in terms of response planning?**

According to the feedback gathered, the vast majority of National Societies plan their responses for specific hazards in silo. Only a few examples of multi-hazard response planning were given by the respondents, like Kenya Red Cross who is implementing a multi-hazard response project (COVID-19, Floods, Desert Locust invasion) with the support from British Red Cross. More is taking place at global level with the recent efforts from IFRC (NS preparedness and health teams), GDPC, Canadian and Netherlands RC participation to improve the Contingency planning and Business continuity planning tools with a multi-hazard angle, but much efforts are still needed to make those tools and initiatives known on the ground and used in synergy.
2.2. What constraints prevent the NS from developing multi-hazard response planning?

One of the main constraints mentioned is that too often partners supporting National Societies chose to work in silo, around their own area of expertise and funding. This is sometimes led by donors’ restrictions on how to use their response funds which prevents National Societies from implementing a multi-hazard approach: “It is also due to the fact that resources are hazard specific and National Societies have to plan based on what the resources are meant for” as mentioned by one of the respondents. Another key point mentioned is the lack of time and resources dedicated to anticipation and response planning due to the lack of financial investment and long term strategic investments by PNSs. A respondent highlighted the lack of core resources: many National Societies largely depend on funds from Emergency Appeals and DREF, hence some prefer to submit several separate appeals for each disaster since it will cover more of their core costs than only one complex emergency appeal.

2.3. What kind of support is needed to implement multi-hazard response planning?

- **Technical support**
  The need for technical support, including support from technical experts, to train NS staff on how to plan for multi-disasters was largely mentioned by respondents. The main support should be given in risk and impact assessment as well as flexible planning. One respondent also mentioned the need to train “multi-skilled” National Disaster Response Teams in several response domains so that they are not specialized in only one or two types of responses. This could be made possible by the wider use of the newly developed NRT Common Standard\(^4\) guide and the harmonised training package piloted end of 2020.

- **Flexible funding**
  Some respondents pointed out that flexible funds are needed to support flexible planning, more systematic use of mechanisms such as the crisis modifier. Additionally, plans which are not associated to resources or donor commitment do not live on. In order to develop such multi-hazard response plans the National Societies need to have guarantee for funding at the end, otherwise they cannot invest time in the planning process. In addition to the funding perspective, it was also reported that DREF and Emergency Appeals are too hazard specific and should be adapted to cater for joined response to multiple disasters.

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\(^4\)https://ifrcoresharepoint.com/f/s/IFRCSHaring/EtkKpZSmdNDvju1EalD_0l8mxZubO1fv58__Uj5vvlLcg?e=OEtEeo
• **Partners’ coordination**
When partners coordinate and collaborate well, discuss and put their resources on the table to find out which one can quickly be used - provided there is a kind of crisis modifier - it allows the National Societies to act much more rapidly, based on the evolution of the situation (often a disaster on top of another one) and to use the resources in a more flexible manner so as to respond to the impact of several disasters simultaneously.

• **Putting people’s needs first**
We have a culture of community-based assistance and we should extend this people centred approach to scenario planning as well. We should look at risks from a needs-based perspective to inform the response planning and not with a disaster cycle angle which is too theoretical and takes us away from the reality of the situation on the ground, as faced by the communities hit by subsequent disasters. Those needs should of course always been put into perspective with the capacities of the NS to address them. This also requires to have a good understanding of the NS real operational capacities.

*Burundi Red Cross radio programme provides Ebola messages to communities close to the border with DRC.*
3. **Resources mobilisation**

3.1. **Current constraints in getting flexible funds to support multi-hazard response.**

One common constraint to support multi-hazard response identified by participants is the contrast between donors’ behaviour / policies and National Societies’ current fundraising capacity. Donors’ interests and political agendas of their governments shape the angle of the funds. However, in a context full of competing internal and external priorities, donors can fall into a narrow and selective fundraising approach. With an increasing competition and major calls for accountability, donors’ requirements and standards are heightening, calling for major preparedness without necessarily providing the flexibility and early financial support for National Societies to respond in such manner and connect the various funding options.

In cases where donors provide major flexibility and innovative fundraising approaches, the current capacities of National Societies to adapt and respond to them can be limited. Their current capacities can limit their appeal to donors and their responsiveness to come up with a plan that suits their proposed standards. Not only does the elaboration of response plans to access funds takes time, but lack of preparedness and forecasting further undermine the process. As a result, National Societies are confronted by the need to access financial support to further improve its preparedness and the lack of expertise to quickly create a response plan before the hazard elapses.

“Donors are always asking why we are always responding and not preparing. Answer: Preparedness requires money, are they willing to fund it?” mentioned a National Society staff.

While the interaction between donors and organisations frame greatly the fundraising constraints for a multi-hazard approach, it is important to understand the constraints posed by the complexities of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. The issue of understanding each other’s mandates faces major difficulties due to the lack of coordination and communication when it is time to plan for a response and its respective fundraising. Participants stated that Movement partners do not always “talk to each other” and end up pitching towards donors separately, which ends up in individual non-coordinated responses. No multi-hazard response approach can be based on such an uncoordinated way of working.
3.2 Recommendations on what should be done to access suitable types of funds for multi-hazard approach

Respondents proposed to actively focus on behaviour shift and donors’ buy-in. The proposal addressed two sides: the means and the content of the message. On one side, they proposed to engage with donors as a Movement to avoid scattering of funding. Some participants proposed to further leverage the current buy-in enjoyed by PNSs with their respective governments so that they act as a bridge to lobby with them. On another side, sharing a common message would be important. This would involve an institutionalisation of multi-hazard approach across the Movement components together with a strategy to navigate political connotations and donors’ interests through wisely selected wording and labelling. Funding should be available at the preparedness phase rather than at the response phase - as traditionally done. Providing early funding would address the financial resources and capacities required for a multi-hazard approach response. This could be done through the more systematic application of forecast-based financing approach and major shifts in flexibility by donors.
Respondents acknowledged that such harmonisation implies a long-term process and not an immediate solution. Therefore, different short- and medium-term strategies were proposed to accompany and strengthen the journey towards multi-hazard fundraising:

- Funds to be made available per country (rather than per type of disaster) which could be further extended per incoming hazard and included into an overall country plan
- PNSs’ role in changing the percentage of earmarked funding offered to National Societies, leaving at least a 20% of funding flexible towards operations.
- Possibility for National Societies to create combined plans which are later supported by each donor or Movement partner through specific and selected contributions, centralised in one unique country plan.

Interviews also pointed out that the tools currently in use should be adjusted to this shift. Within the IFRC system, few synergies can be created when faced by different hazards. For instance, funding allocated for COVID-19 cannot be used to respond to an incoming flood, even though such an event changes the priorities of response of the National Society. Yet, given the wide scope of the COVID response - complementarities between the COVID appeal and new disasters could be considered. In the views of most participants, the current system and mindset were not designed to focus or think about multi-hazard. Appeals come with earmarking and conditions which restrict any action outside the scope of the appeal.

One tool under scrutiny by participants was the DREF, which some called for the review of its guidelines given its strict nature. Some pointed out that the current request for including COVID-19 as a component of future DREFs might be changing the single-hazard nature of the DREF; however, they were unsure if this change could be sustained in the long run. Participants called for more flexibility to reallocate resources instead of returning the funds when not used on the given disaster (especially when a bigger disaster comes and require more attention).

Some respondents considered that the issue was not about the tools themselves but their application. In other words, they asserted that the tools had a potential towards a multi-hazard approach depending on how they’re adjusted to the situation which requires out-of-the-box thinking. Understanding the time delay involved in the approval of a DREF, some National Societies are drafting an EPoA before an emergency to be prepared in advance and adapt he template according to the particularities of the emergency. For instance: “There was an Emergency Appeal for 5 countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda) and each one was initial funding of CHF 50,000 for seed money. They were able to use that funding to specifically do risk analysis. DREF also allows to access initial funding to do risk analysis in an anticipatory DREF. But most National Societies have not been trying to address this aspect out of the DREF.”
3.3. **Support needed in accessing funds for multi-hazard response approach**

Both PNSs and IFRC called for further support on domestic resource mobilisation through National Society Development. Not only does this involve strengthening financial capacities but also investing on capacity building on the drafting of quality and effective response plans. To further adapt to multi-hazard response, this would involve strengthening skills related to risk and evidence-based analysis, response strategies, and requests to donors.

NSD has also been mentioned by National Societies who call for major focus on organisational development and capacity development support. While capacity building is the general response provided by participants, one respondent emphasized on the need for training an internal focal point who will carry on the knowledge sharing as well as take responsibility to further take the enhancement of capacities and “stand in front of donors and participate in meetings to speak up for the National Society”.

### 4. Coordination

**4.1. Concrete examples of conducive coordination mechanisms**

Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) was mentioned as a concrete example of conducive coordination mechanism. Adopting Consortium-like approaches inside the Movement is also a solution and this also leads the Movement to harmonise response approaches. A few successful examples of good coordination mechanisms were mentioned:

- Sudan during the COVID-19 response for which the NS, PNSs, IFRC and ICRC (in part) organised the response jointly with an efficient division of tasks and responsibilities.
- The response to 2014 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines led by the Philippines Red Cross had a common response plan for all Movement Partners.
- The EVD response in DRC and the “One International Appeal” which saw an unprecedented synergy at Movement level as the DRC Red Cross didn’t have the technical leadership, ICRC did not have the programmatic expertise and IFRC did not have the infrastructure.

Using the Preparedness for Effective Response mechanisms\(^5\) as an entry-door for increased coordination and multi-hazard planning would be a good step forward: different partners join up in the PER exercise, assess the needs to capacity-strengthening or reinforcement and draw a common NS preparedness strengthening plan.

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\(^5\) [https://go.ifrc.org/preparedness#global-summary](https://go.ifrc.org/preparedness#global-summary)
4.2. **What are the main barriers to conducive coordination mechanisms?**

A few respondents mentioned time as a barrier to conducive coordination mechanisms as field staff are focused on their own agenda and goals and do not necessarily have time to devote to coordination mechanisms. They also mentioned that PNSs are sometimes competing for funding which can be detrimental to good coordination.

It was pointed out that coordination platforms and forums should be reinforced. At the moment we have a few but some of them are more sector-based (e.g. FSL Cluster, WASH cluster etc.) so not conducive to a cross-sectoral approach. Moreover, National Societies do not always participate in the cluster meetings or in other forums available meaning that National Societies’ participation can also be an issue.

4.3. **Recommendations on how to implement conducive coordination mechanisms for the implementation of multi-hazard response approach**

The main recommendation is to work even more with National Societies and put them at the forefront of those initiatives. Planning and designing of initiatives should be done jointly with the National Societies. Coordination with all Movements Partners involves commitment at the strategic, planning and operational /implementation level. Some respondents recommended to use PER approach as a conducive coordination tool as it’s a good starting point for joint multi-hazard planning. Indeed the PER approach encompasses the mechanisms as a foundational aspect and guiding principles to guide a way of working and partnering for preparedness for response capacity. It was also mentioned that all Movement Partners should adopt an open attitude towards coordination and joint planning. This has improved recently.

According to some interviewees, the key will be to ensure a shared consensus on the fact that multi-hazard approach is important and from there get commitments from partners on their participation. Assigning roles and responsibilities will also ensure accountability and success. Having clear objectives, outcomes and output as well as indicators to measure progress and will ensure success.

It was also emphasized that for the multi-hazard approach to work, long-term engagement at every level (IFRC, PNSs, ICRC and National Societies) would be needed - engagement which should not be person-dependent as turn-over is very high, especially in field postings, but at institutional level.

Increased Movement coordination leverage each partner’s expertise and mandate. Only when this happens can the National Societies receive optimal support.
5. Support Services

5.1. Impact of a multi-hazard approach on support services.

Most National Societies foresee a need to strengthen support services for them to be able to implement a multi-hazard approach. Some partners stressed that we should listen to the National Societies and be realistic in meeting their needs for reinforcement. Areas which should be strengthened:

- **Procurement:** Having overlap of all hazards would help to know what items would be needed. Standby agreements could be negotiated, potentially at a better price.
- **Finance/budgeting:** Ensure good projections in advance and a cost-modelling system that uses information from past responses to predict costs. This way we would have integrated budgets that are done quickly and efficiently (*Kimetrica* was given as an example which allows people to make quick decisions).

5.2. Support needed for support services in regard to the multi-hazard response approach

Some respondents stressed that it was important to plan for resources to be pre-positioned in order to not start from scratch every time an emergency happens. That would require partners to adopt financial and logistical planning: when planning for multi-hazard, we could factor in the material support needed. For example, having a central location where all items are prepositioned, and implementing tools to mobilise these assets quickly. This should be a system accessible to all PNSs: prepositioning should be automated and linked with each level of response.

Other respondents mentioned the need to review the profiles we are employing and aiming for more candidates who are multi-functional (vs. highly specialised).

It was suggested to reinforce our M&E by moving to fully digital data collection which would simplify reporting. National Societies should be encouraged to move to a digital system with trained staff to support this shift.

Several National Societies expressed the need for support in terms of capacity-building in different areas (PMER, financial planning, supply procedures etc.) in order to meet the challenges linked to multi-hazard planning.
Annex 1 - Review of participants and supporting organisations

A first round of consultation was carried out in August 2020 to gauge the level of interest of RCRC Movement partners in discussing the opportunity to develop more systematically multi-hazard response approach and to pre-identify colleagues who were available to dedicate one hour to respond to a more detailed survey.

From this first round, 31 persons responded they were willing to take part of the second round of consultation. We contacted all of them, not all of them replied but some respondents advised us to contact one or more of their colleagues to get additional input, which we did. At the end of this process, 35 respondents participated in this detailed survey. Here is a breakdown of the organisations and departments represented in the above analysis:

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List of interviewed National Societies: American, Belgium, British, Burundi, Canadian, CAR, Danish, Ethiopia, French, Ghana, Malawi, Netherlands, Somalia, Swedish, Uganda, Zambia

List of contexts analysed/mentioned: Burundi, CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, IOI (Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros), Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Eastern and Western Africa from a cluster perspective.

The following partners supported the preparatory work and the conduction of the interviews: British RC, ICRC, IFRC Africa Office, Netherlands RC, Swedish RC. The interviews, data analysis and report writing were facilitated by Malika Noisette (Netherlands Red Cross/ Independent Consultant) with contributions from Sheila Chemjor (Netherlands Red Cross), Marie Cleret (British Red Cross) and Lucia Pantigoso Vargas (Independent Consultant). The questionnaires for the first and second rounds of consultations are available on demand (contact Malika Noisette, mnoisette@redcross.nl).
Annex 2 - SWOT Analysis

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<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
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| • The auxiliary role of the RCRC movement to the government constitutes an added value for the National society to openly engage and implement the multiple-hazard approach to better respond to increasing hazards and incoming requests from beneficiaries, authorities and donors.  
• The diversity within the Movement partners provides an opportunity to channel resources to increase collective impact.  
• Multi-hazard approach was perceived as means of cost effectiveness, reduction of duplications and cross-cutting across sectors. | • Single-hazard oriented funding mechanisms relied by National Societies (such as DREF) do not provide a platform for multi-hazard proposals. Similarly, most donors tend to focus on particular sectors, which leads to the development of silos response plans.  
• Lack of flexibility among the donors creates a challenge to respond to multiple disasters (crisis within a crisis).  
• Limited internal resources and expertise of National Societies to implement a multi hazard approach which requires mainstreaming expertise that might or might not be existing. |

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<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
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| • Covid-19 has prompted a major call for changing the traditional single-hazard approach of operational responses, with some donors slowly pushing for this agenda.  
• Regional platforms could be a source to implement multi-hazard response. Enhanced coordination among partners can enable rapid responses with a more efficient use of resources.  
• Growing culture of business community of forecasting can be brought into the scenario planning of multi-hazard response.  
• Learn from other Movement (ICRC) or donor’s funding mechanism as a way to improve IFRC’s. | • External pressure to respond to delimited hazards as well as lack of support for multi-hazard by governments or donors  
• Monitoring and planning influenced by self-interest of partners and restricted/inflexible funding.  
• Lack of core resources available impacts the planning and response strategies of National Societies.  
• Geographic location influenced by each Movement actor limits their buy-in in coordination efforts for Multi-Hazard.  
• Funding landscape promotes competition that may undermine coordination of efforts and resources. |