

**EVALUATION OF THE JRCS AND IFRC RECOVERY AND  
REHABILITATION INTERVENTIONS AFTER THE GREAT EAST  
JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF 11 MARCH 2011**

**DRAFT Final Report**

***“It is people who support and help people”***

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	ii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	iii
MAP OF AFFECTED AREA .....	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	vi
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. THE EVALUATION .....	4
3. CONTEXT OF JRCS RESPONSE AND RECOVERY .....	8
4. ASSESSMENT AND FINDINGS .....	13
4.1. Efficiency and effectiveness.....	21
4.2. Impact.....	24
4.3. Accountability .....	30
4.4. Coordination .....	34
4.5. Relevance .....	39
4.6. Appropriateness of coverage .....	43
4.7. Standards and Principles .....	47
4.8. Preparedness .....	51
5. CONCLUSIONS .....	56
6. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	62
ANNEXES .....	71

## Acknowledgements

The GEJET<sup>1</sup> Evaluation Team was based at the Headquarters of the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) in Tokyo from early February to late March. During that period, members of the team interviewed JRCS staff extensively at all levels, as well as staff from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The Team undertook a number of visits to locations affected by the earthquake and tsunami and interviewed staff of the prefectures and municipalities within Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. Members of the Team also interviewed staff from the Government of Japan, international organisations and NGOs in Tokyo and Kobe.

The Team is indebted to all those persons in and outside the Red Cross Red Crescent who took the time to respond to their queries and helped in guiding the evaluation, including in government, international and national governmental and non-governmental organisations and other institutions. It expresses its sincere appreciation and thanks to the senior management and staff of JRCS at HQ and in Prefecture Chapters, to National Societies (NS) who participated in the interviews and in the on-line survey as well as to the IFRC Country Representative in Tokyo.

In commending the Japanese Red Cross and the International Federation for their initiative to evaluate the recovery programme, the Team acknowledges with gratitude the generous availability of all staff in cooperating in this evaluation, and is grateful for the excellent arrangements made for its schedule in Tokyo and in the prefectures and municipalities.

Last but not least, the Team expresses its profound appreciation to the individuals and communities in the affected areas who so readily shared their views, thoughts and feelings with them throughout their visits. The Team was impressed by the capacity of resilience, the understanding and patience of people who have suffered so deeply from the terrible disaster of March 2011. The Evaluation Team pays tribute and respect to all those individuals and communities who are at the heart of the enormous recovery effort currently underway.

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<sup>1</sup> GEJET (Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami) is not an official appellation; it is the acronym chosen by JRCS to refer to the disaster of 11 March 2011, in its triple dimension: earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident. In this report, it will mostly be referred to as “the disaster”.


## Acronyms and abbreviations

AED	Automatic External Defibrillator
AtB	Accountability to Beneficiaries
A/P	Asia Pacific
DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DM	Disaster Management
DMAT	Disaster Management Action Team
ECB Project	Emergency Capacity Building Project
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field assessment coordination team
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GAP	Government Accountability Project
GEJET	Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
HLM	High Level Mission
HQ	Headquarters
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDC	International Development Corporation
IDRL	International Disaster Response Laws
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IIPS	Institute for International Policy Studies
INES	International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRP	International Recovery Platform
JANIC	Japan NGO Centre for International Cooperation
JEN	Japan Emergency NGO
JPF	Japan Platform
JPY	Japanese yen
JRCS	Japanese Red Cross Society
JRI	The Japan Research Institute, Ltd.
JST	Japan Standard Time
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOFA	Ministry of foreign affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRP	Management Response Plan
NHK	Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPO	Non-profit Organisation
NS	National Society
NRBC	Nuclear Radiological and Biological Contamination
OCAC	IFRC Organisational Capacity Assessment Certificate
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PoA	Plan of action
PNS	Partner National Society (of the Red Cross Red Crescent)
PR	Public Relations
PSP	Psychosocial Programming
RAT	Rapid Assessment Team
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPHERE	The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UN/OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

## MAP OF AFFECTED AREA

Areas affected by the quake



## Executive Summary

The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) struck the North-East of Japan on 11 March 2011. The 9.0 tremor provoked a devastating tsunami that swept the Tohoku<sup>2</sup> coastal region causing a disaster of a magnitude that Japan had not experienced since the earthquake in Tokyo of 1923. As of March 2013, 15,881 people were confirmed killed and 2,668 were still missing or unaccounted for. Three reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were severely damaged, causing nuclear contamination that led to the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people. Two years after the disaster, some 298,000 people from the affected areas are still living in temporary accommodation.

Based on its mandated role in national disaster response, the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) immediately responded by dispatching medical teams to the area, in consultation with concerned central, prefectural and municipal authorities, local JRCS chapters and branches, other organisations and institutions as well as with donors. IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) specialists, as well as representatives from other National Societies (NS) arrived to provide support. While JRCS (nor the government) did not issue an international appeal, NS and other donors contributed a considerable amount of financial support in solidarity with Japan. In parallel, sizeable donations were collected from the Japanese public. In the first few weeks after the disaster, JRCS engaged in emergency relief assistance in the three most affected prefectures, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima, as well as in Chiba and Ibaraki. After two months, in May, in consultation with donor NS and with IFRC's support, JRCS decided to apply international funding to recovery action, in close association and with the support of local authorities in the prefectures and municipalities. This was an area that JRCS had no experience in, but given the needs in the communities and the availability of resources, a plan was drawn out to allocate funding to a diversity of projects in those 3 prefectures, as well as to displaced people who had relocated elsewhere in Japan.

Two years after the disaster, with 80 % of funds spent, an evaluation was carried out, commissioned by JRCS and IFRC, to provide the JRCS, IFRC, NS and other organisations that had contributed funds and expertise to the recovery programme with an independent, external assessment focused on recovery and rehabilitation interventions. A five-person Evaluation Team undertook this independent evaluation from February to April 2013. Its main conclusions are summarized as follows, covering the eight areas of enquiry that were adopted in the Terms of Reference.

**Efficiency and effectiveness:** Despite its absence of strategic focus, the recovery plan addressed genuine needs of the communities faced with the challenges of recovery. Given its weak structure and presence in the municipalities in terms of direct community support, JRCS' choice of implementing its programme of recovery activities through the prefectures and municipalities appeared to have been effective and efficient. Assistance was provided in a straightforward and timely fashion, and there were no bureaucratic delays in implementation. Communities received the support they needed and they received it fast enough, under the circumstances.

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<sup>2</sup> Tohoku: North eastern region of the mainland of Japan.



**Impact:** Noting the significant limitations in data and the way data was managed, the Evaluation Team felt that overall, the JRCS response to the disaster had a positive impact on beneficiaries, communities and many of the Red Cross Red Crescent members. JRCS' recovery interventions improved access to needed services and promoted healthy lifestyle activities for children and the elderly. The JRCS is now expanding its relief preparedness and response capacity; however the impact on recovery capacity thus far appears limited. The IFRC and many National Societies note how the Japan disaster has prompted them to address the question of how to deal with nuclear disasters and recovery in general.

**Accountability:** JRCS made significant efforts to be accountable to its international donors, but invested less in accountability to its public and beneficiaries; more could have been done to publicise what it was doing, for whom and how. International standards of beneficiary accountability were only partially met; the main accountability tool (Plan of Action) did not meet minimum standards, as it lacked clear strategy, criteria, objectives, targets, and a plan for M&E.

**Coordination:** The average rating for coordination by JRCS was mixed given the range of stakeholders involved. Overall there was strong coordination or consultation with prefecture and municipal government; there was limited collaboration with Red Cross Chapters and minimal coordination with NGOs and central government, although some attempts were made. JRCS was very accommodating with National Societies.

**Relevance:** The evaluation found that overall the JRCS recovery support was relevant. Interventions improved the availability of and access to key infrastructure and services. A broad range of support was provided across the three most affected prefectures while an attempt was made to provide support to victims regardless of where they relocated. Interventions were diverse, appropriately targeted to the communities' demographics and in line with local government priorities.

**Appropriateness of coverage:** The Evaluation Team found that recovery interventions were targeted appropriately in the three most affected prefectures, taking into account demographics and vulnerabilities. Coverage was good but poor information management prevented JRCS (and subsequently the Evaluation Team) from a sound assessment of coverage beyond the regional or prefecture level. This was likely to have limited JRCS in making informed decisions about which municipalities to support beyond those from which they received requests.

**Standards and principles:** It was felt overall that JRCS worked to uphold the Fundamental Principles throughout the recovery operation and tried to ensure that its assistance adhered to the Code of Conduct. Sphere was less well known and understood and there seems to be a similar lack of knowledge regarding the IFRC Gender policy. It was widely believed that standards in Japan would automatically exceed the minimum expected in internationally recognised instruments.

**Preparedness:** Despite the absence of preparedness for a "recovery" programme in the contingency plan, JRCS rapidly produced an *ad hoc* Plan of Action for recovery. JRCS was not prepared for nuclear disaster, but provided goods and services responding to the needs of local communities, and has just begun discussions on its potential role in addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear disaster. JRCS' latest contingency plan builds on the experiences of this disaster but has not yet embraced a "recovery" phase as its scope of intervention.

This report provides a series of 12 recommendations for JRCS and IFRC follow-up. In thanking all those who contributed to the evaluation, the Team congratulates the JRCS and the IFRC for this initiative that will contribute to the learning process in JRCS, the International Federation and National Societies.

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# 1. Introduction

## Background: the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011

The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) struck the North-East of Japan on 11 March 2011, provoking the most devastating natural disaster in Japan since the earthquake in Tokyo in 1923. The 9.0 tremor with its epicentre only 130 km off the coast of the Tohoku region shook Japan's Pacific coastline provoking a devastating tsunami that caused extensive damage to lives and properties along 700 km of coastline. Three reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were severely damaged by the force of the water, causing nuclear contamination that led to the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people in a 20 km radius exclusion zone as the plant was declared level 7 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)<sup>3</sup> (later that zone was extended to 30 km and even further out in some areas).

As a consequence of this triple disaster – earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident – 15,881 people were confirmed killed as of March 2013, 2,668 were still missing or unaccounted for and an estimated 313,000 people had been evacuated, scattered throughout Japan. Some 298,000 people from the affected areas are still living in temporary accommodation and are not expected to relocate in permanent housing for months or even years.

This devastating event came in a series of high-visibility disasters around the world in 2010-2011, many of which hit developing countries such as Haiti or Pakistan, but many others struck emerging economies and high-income countries, such as the severe flooding in Australia, Brazil, France, Germany and Thailand, the earthquakes in Chile, New Zealand and Turkey, the deadly tornados and storms in the USA<sup>4</sup>. Such large-scale disasters, with increased frequency related to climate change, have the same human consequences in high-income and in developing countries, and the chaos and suffering that they cause are comparable in all parts of the world, whether in affluent societies or in poor communities. However, the handling of such mega-emergencies and the tackling of complex problems caused by such significant events are different. While a large-scale disaster in a developing country almost automatically results in an international appeal for support, with a call from the victim's side to receive help, such a situation is managed differently in industrialised high-income countries, where the "giving" and "receiving" aid are perceived from different perspectives.

In spite of the unprecedented scale of the disaster, vital infrastructure such as roads and rail networks was operational only weeks after the earthquake and tsunami struck. International flights from Sendai Airport resumed by 27 March 2011 and international shipping routes were re-established by April. The majority of trade and transport routes

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<sup>3</sup> The INES Scale is a worldwide tool for communicating to the public in a consistent way the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events. Just like information on earthquakes or temperature would be difficult to understand without the Richter or Celsius scales, the INES Scale explains the significance of events from a range of activities, including industrial and medical use of radiation sources, operations at nuclear facilities and transport of radioactive material. Events are classified on the scale at seven levels: Levels 1–3 are called "incidents" and Levels 4–7 "accidents". The scale is designed so that the severity of an event is about ten times greater for each increase in level on the scale. Events without safety significance are called "deviations" and are classified Below Scale / Level 0. (From IAEA website: [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org))

<sup>4</sup> Only 9 percent of World's disasters occur in low income countries and account for 48% of disaster related death, which means 91 % occur in middle and high income countries and account for 52% of deaths (World Bank (@WorldBank) tweeted at 1:03 AM on Wed, Mar 13, 2013 Why invest in disaster preparedness & prevention? Infographic: <http://t.co/87HWMt5iHf> #tsunami#earthquake (<https://twitter.com/WorldBank/status/311507626351538176>)

were operational by September 2011, and essential public services were quickly restored. This included 165 of 184 hospitals (90%) affected by the disaster having resumed services, and classes started again at 1,876 of 2,325 schools (81%). Having restored essential infrastructure and services, progress is now also being made on longer-term infrastructure redevelopment initiatives including coastal facilities, following extensive planning and consultation with local stakeholders.<sup>5</sup>

### **Role of the Japanese Red Cross Society**

Within hours of the disaster, the Japanese Red Cross Society had dispatched 19 medical teams to affected areas and set up an operations centre. The JRCS network of 92 hospitals provided sites to receive patients and launch mobile health teams. Psychosocial support was provided by trained staff in evacuation centres; a family links website was established; relief supplies were dispatched.

JRCS' interventions were based on its mandated role in national disaster response, in consultation with concerned central, prefectural and municipal authorities, local JRCS branches, other organisations and institutions as well as with donors. Collaboration with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement started almost immediately and a number of International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) specialists arrived to provide support, at the request of JRCS; IFRC and other NS, invited by Japanese Red Cross, undertook an exploratory mission to the affected areas and IFRC sent a delegate to Tokyo. JRCS' interventions were publicised in regular information updates and through evolving plans of action and budgets that were shared with the Movement. In the first months after the earthquake and tsunami, efforts were naturally focused on immediate and urgent relief. Early in May, a Partnership Meeting was convened in Tokyo with Partner National Societies (PNS) where a Plan of Action was agreed. From then on, JRCS started working on recovery action, in close association and with the support of local authorities in the Prefectures and Municipalities. Recovery interventions were very different from what one would see in other countries after such disasters, conforming to the living standards of people in this industrialised, high-income country. In July 2011, the government adopted a Basic Policy on Reconstruction for the affected areas.

Within the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement as a whole, JRCS has a long and broad experience in responding to international disasters, with active exposure and experienced staff. In its domestic role, the National Society is engaged in relief through its hospitals, its 23 nursing schools and colleges, and with the provision of social services and blood distribution activities. Its organisational preparedness for domestic disaster response had, until the 2011 tsunami, largely been limited to the mandated role of national fundraising, emergency relief and provision of health services to victims in accordance with the Government of Japan's disaster preparedness provisions. It had not, in the past, dealt with the domestic consequences of disasters of the magnitude such as the one that struck on 11 March 2011. It did not, either, have any experience in recovery. The Secretariat of the IFRC Geneva, and its Zone and Regional Offices, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported the JRCS interventions with advice and expertise, when and as requested by JRCS. Both international organisations were present in Japan straight after the tsunami, and one IFRC delegate has represented the organisation in Japan since March 2011, essentially to assist with the post-disaster effort.

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<sup>5</sup> Source: Reconstruction Agency's 2nd anniversary report. <http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/2013/03/2nd-anniversary-report.html>

## **National and international solidarity**

Even before disaster struck, the Japanese Red Cross Society had taken the decision in its contingency plan not to issue an international appeal but to rely on its own capacity to respond. The Government of Japan acted in the same way, with no international call for support. However, it was to be expected that solidarity around the globe would rapidly drive donors to dispatch help to the Japanese people at that time of crisis. It was agreed between the Foreign Ministry and JRCS that any spontaneous or solicited cash contributions would be channelled to the Japanese Red Cross as for constitutional reasons, the Government of Japan is not allowed to be the recipient of cash donations. This was widely made known through the Japanese diplomatic missions around the world and expressions of support started flowing towards the Japanese Red Cross. At the same time, IFRC had opened a temporary account to receive any donations for Japan, which were transferred to JRCS (at no cost).

Thus, despite the absence of appeal, a hundred Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, DG ECHO and other organisations expressed solidarity with Japan and the affected population by sending funds totalling some US\$ 700 million. The Government of Kuwait contributed a further US\$ 500 million. At the same time, JRCS launched a broad, countrywide fundraising campaign for cash donations to which the Japanese public responded with incredible generosity, with almost US\$ 4 billion to JRCS. In resourcing terms, this became the largest Red Cross Red Crescent disaster intervention in a single country ever. The majority of funds raised by its partners were contributed to JRCS without or with little earmarking. Plans for relief and recovery interventions were presented and developed in coordination with donors, with the understanding and commitment by JRCS that adequate accountability mechanisms would be in place. The volume of funds received by JRCS was such that it was agreed, by May 2011, that funding would be used also for recovery activities, as the period of immediate relief drew to a close.

## 2. The evaluation

### Context of this evaluation

The risk of large-scale disasters with severe humanitarian consequences related to earthquakes, tsunamis and industrial accidents is very high in Japan. The situation that occurred with the triple GEJET disaster in 2011 could be repeated in other parts of the country, and preparedness is of utmost relevance. In that respect, JRCS is conscious of the importance of institutional learning and has already carried out a number of evaluations related to its handling of this disaster. By September 2011, recognising the need to assess its relief work that far, an independent evaluation was sponsored by the Japanese Red Cross, with Australian, New Zealand and Swedish Red Cross Societies to review what had been done and what could have been done differently or additionally. This resulted in a report (This evaluation was led by J. Talbot and referred to hereafter as 'Talbot 2012')<sup>6</sup> that made a series of recommendations to JRCS and to IFRC. In parallel, JRCS also arranged with the Tokyo-based Nihon so-ken (The Japan Research Institute Ltd, JRI) to have "Third Party Evaluations" carried out on its relief and recovery activities. This assessment activity is still on-going.

As a majority of the resources made available to JRCS had been spent or committed by early 2013, it was decided jointly by the JRCS and the IFRC to commission an independent evaluation to review the programme of recovery activities carried out after the disaster. Lessons learned from JRCS', IFRC's and other actors' response after the disaster would provide valuable input to the extensive experience and mechanisms already in place within and outside the Movement. The evaluation would also assist JRCS' and IFRC's learning process from reflecting on the validity of assumptions used in existing and draft International Federation policies and guidance for recovery and rehabilitation programming in the context of a disaster, in a high-income country.

As per the evaluation's terms of reference and the evaluators' inception report, the main purpose of this exercise is to provide the Japanese Red Cross Society, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other organisations that have contributed funds and expertise to this programme with an independent, external evaluation focused on recovery<sup>7</sup> and rehabilitation<sup>8</sup> interventions, covering the period from March 2011 to March 2013. During that time, JRCS has spent 80% of all funds received and a further 18% is committed towards construction of permanent structures, which will take a few more years to complete. This evaluation is not a substitute for project reporting and JRCS will continue to report as agreed with donors, and will provide final narrative and financial reports once all funds are spent. Since completion of all projects will take several years, JRCS and IFRC consider that undertaking an evaluation at the present time is essential to ensure due accountability and institutional learning for all stakeholders.

### Expected results

The evaluation of the first two years of the recovery interventions will result in two distinct but related outputs:

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<sup>6</sup> Preparing for and Responding to Large Scale Disasters in High Income Countries. Report Evaluation September 2011, published in February 2012

<sup>7</sup> Recovery in the context of disaster response is a process that results in people's lives returning to normal in a way that they will be more resilient to future disasters.

<sup>8</sup> Rehabilitation covers activities involving repair and rebuilding of assets, including transport services, utility supplies, public buildings and housing. This would also encompass reconstruction.



- **Lessons for the JRCS** for the future of its domestic interventions and its coordination and mobilisation mechanisms, and
- **Lessons for the IFRC and National Societies** for the mobilisation of international support for interventions after large-scale disasters, in particular but not exclusively in high-income countries.

To an extent, the evaluation will also serve as a reporting tool, as part of JRCS' commitment to accountability to the broad community of donors that spontaneously contributed to this programme. It will assess the interplay between JRCS organisational characteristics and external mandates that impact on its ability to strengthen its resilience and that of the communities it serves. It will assist JRCS in its reflection on how to strengthen the organisation's structure and systems at all levels in ways that enhance relevance and preparedness at community level. It will address how the projects implemented by JRCS have contributed to increased resilience in the affected communities, with a focus on impact, considering beneficiary perspectives, including the special needs of a population with a high proportion of elderly people with particular social, psychological and physical vulnerabilities.

Lessons learned from JRCS, the International Federation and other actors' recovery and rehabilitation response after the disaster will provide valuable and relevant input to the extensive experience and mechanisms already in place within and outside the Movement<sup>9</sup>, and will help the IFRC and National Societies to build their own capacity for future situations of such magnitude.

Another aspect that the Evaluation Team has touched upon, concerns the allocation of support costs directly related to the programme, in considering whether overhead costs charged to the programme were adequate and fairly absorbed by all concerned stakeholders. The review addresses the coverage of support costs of IFRC by JRCS, with consideration to how the annual budget allocations have adequately covered direct and indirect costs incurred by IFRC. It considers the question of coverage of IFRC costs in the context of a programme where no appeal has been made.

## Methodology

The Evaluation Team's methodology adhered to the IFRC Framework for Evaluations<sup>10</sup>, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilised.

The team gathered information/views, performed analysis and used a range of methods including secondary data review, key informant interviews, focus groups, an on-line survey with National Societies, field visits to the prefectures and municipalities affected by the disaster, and observation.

Technical and administrative support staff from the JRCS facilitated the Evaluation Team's work – e.g. translation, arrangements for field visits, interviews, collection of information, as and when required. JRCS and the IFRC Country Representative in Japan and in the Zone and Regional Offices provided support, including in-country guidance where appropriate.

<sup>9</sup> "The Road to Resilience, Bridging Relief and Development for a More Sustainable Future", June 2012

<sup>10</sup> "IFRC Framework for Evaluation" Planning and Evaluation Department (PED). IFRC Secretariat. February 2011

## Evaluation Team

The Team was composed of five independent consultants, with no operational involvement in the programme, all of whom have experience with the Red Cross Red Crescent through earlier links with National Societies and/or the IFRC: Mercedes Babé, Team Leader, and (in alphabetical order) John Horekens, Shunichi Kagami, Margaret Stansberry, and Naoko Tochibayashi.

The Team assembled in Tokyo on 4 February 2013 and worked together on location until 15 March 2013, then through remote contact until completion of the reporting phase. The Team's direct reporting line was to the Deputy Director General of the International Department of the JRCS and to the IFRC Country Representative.

## Constraints

The Team recognised the following constraints in designing and implementing the evaluation:

- Time: the Team had a reasonable amount of time and tried to match the areas of enquiry and evaluation design according to the time available. This was a mega-disaster, which meant the results were significant and complex. The Team did its best to account for the scope and scale of the triple disaster.
- Culture and language: the usual constraints of culture and language were addressed by having two Japanese professionals on the Team, each of who were known and respected by JRCS. One team member had significant international experience in a range of relief, conflict and recovery contexts while the other had significant, in-depth knowledge of the operation itself.  
Regardless, translation and interpretation took time and some points may have been missed by international team members but were generally noted by Japanese members of the Team. Staff, beneficiaries, municipality members were all very gracious and grateful for support provided by generous international donors. Many were able to give constructive feedback and thoughtful reflection. Occasionally critical comments on the Government as well as the JRCS were shared.
- Scope of areas of enquiry: JRCS and IFRC went through a participatory process to come up with the evaluation objectives and key questions. The scope was extensive. After considerable reflection, initial interviews and some data review, the Evaluation Team produced an inception report that largely kept the areas of enquiry intact (with some reorganization to reflect a more logical approach). The Team agreed that the scope was considerable but agreed to do what was possible to address each one.
- Evaluator bias: all evaluators have some bias in conducting evaluations. Being aware of biases allows evaluators to mitigate their impact. The Team had considerable international relief, recovery and development experience in a variety of settings, often with the Red Cross Red Crescent; this could have led to certain expectations as to the JRCS role in relief and community based recovery.
- Data: the Team was given access to considerable amounts of data. Much data however was in Japanese. While the Japanese members of the Team analysed and often transcribed key documents, much important data was missed because it was not available in English or was only partially transcribed.
- Evaluation capacity: each member of the Team had significant experience internationally and several in Japan. Areas of expertise included Red Cross Red Crescent leadership, social welfare, recovery, disaster management, risk reduction, psychosocial programming and communications to name just a few. However, only




one member was considered to be a professional evaluator having conducted, designed, managed or led over 60 evaluations in the past 15 years. The Team discussed methods, how to limit bias, ensure validity and other measures to ensure relevance of the work. Given these efforts combined with the diversity and seniority of the Team, the impact of evaluation capacity was limited.

### 3. Context of JRCS response and recovery

#### Preparedness and disaster management in Japan

The Government of Japan has a comprehensive disaster management system with the Cabinet Office (reporting to the Prime Minister) as its focal point, and a legal framework based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. Under the system, the disaster management responsibilities are decentralised: at the national level, the Basic Disaster Management Plan is prepared by the Central Disaster Management Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Minister of State for Disaster Management and all Cabinet Ministers as well as heads of the Designated Public Corporations including JRCS as board members. Based on this Basic Disaster Management Plan, a Disaster Management Operation Plan and a Local Disaster Management Plan are formulated at prefecture and municipality levels respectively. When large-scale disasters like this one occur, the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters is established under the Prime Minister's chairmanship, and that HQ is responsible for the implementation of the Basic Disaster Management Plan, coordinating the emergency operations at national level. At prefecture level, the governor is responsible for implementation and coordination of the disaster management operations, and at municipality level, mayors have primary responsibility to exercise those functions.

**Figure 1: Disaster Impact on People (Source: National Police Agency of Japan, March 2013 and National Reconstruction Agency, March 2013)**




In the case of this disaster, a Disaster Relief Act was applied to 10 prefectures (first 8 and later 10) that had at least one affected municipality on their territory. In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima, all municipalities were admitted as affected. Under this law, affected municipalities are entitled to receive relief goods and services including shelter, food, and clothing.

The Act on Support for Livelihood Recovery of Disaster Victims was applied to 7 prefectures including Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. Under this law, the affected municipalities are provided with medical services, housing, repair, daily necessities.

JRCS' mandate is defined within this legal framework and system of disaster management in Japan, and contingency plans have been developed for all expected future earthquake-related disasters.

There were 15 prefectures that had at least one affected individual (death, missing, house destruction) on their territory and were thus entitled to receive cash distribution. Distribution committees were hosted by JRCS and other agencies, and facilitated by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

**Figure 2: Housing Damage (Source: National Police Agency of Japan, March 2013)**



The government established the Reconstruction Agency in February 2012 to promote and coordinate reconstruction policies and measures by supporting reconstruction projects implemented by the local municipalities, through the Agency's field offices established in 5 prefectures affected by the disaster: Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima and Ibaraki. JRCS has been reporting regularly to the government on its recovery interventions, but there has been no substantial interaction to date with the government including that agency.

#### ***The evacuation situation***


*All prefectures urged evacuees residing on their soil to register; the registration is updated and reported to Reconstruction Agency every month. The Agency only announces the number of evacuees by prefecture to which the evacuees were evacuated and registered. The yearly statistical population survey conducted by Prefectures does not give specific data as to the number of evacuees.*

#### **JRCS response and interventions: relief and recovery**

On 11 March 2011 at 2:46 p.m. JST, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan with its epicentre 130 kilometres off its northeast Pacific coast and the epicentre area stretching for 450 km in length and 200 km in width. The earthquake was the 4<sup>th</sup> strongest in the world and the largest in Japan ever recorded. It generated a powerful tsunami, the height of the wave reaching up to 38 metres devastating the coastline in Tohoku, in the north eastern region of Japan's main island. As of March 2013, 15,881 people were


reported dead and 2,668 missing. 128,801 houses were reported completely destroyed and 269,659 partially destroyed. The earthquake and the tsunami were immediately followed by an accident at the Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima that lost its power, with three of its reactors severely damaged. A 20 km evacuation zone was established around the plant (later increased to 30 km or more), forcing the population to evacuate. Statistics as at March 2013 show that 313,000 people had to be evacuated either because of the loss of their houses caused by the earthquake and/or tsunami or as a consequence of the nuclear power plant accident.

*Map Current situation in Fukushima*  
*Source: Reconstruction Agency – March 2013*



As mandated under the Disaster Relief Act, JRCS immediately dispatched 19 medical teams to the affected prefectures, setting up its operations centre within the first five hours. Following the first group of medical teams, JRCS' network of 92 Red Cross hospitals immediately became operational in support of relief activities, deploying medical teams to the affected areas. A pre-established system of JRCS for the purpose of extending effective cooperation and support at times of disaster jointly to chapters in affected areas was activated. A number of Red Cross chapters were designated to support Iwate, some chapters to Miyagi and all provided support to Fukushima. Almost half of the 2,000 medical teams deployed by various agencies from across the country and beyond were from JRCS, each comprising a doctor, nurses, PSP trained staff and a coordinator.

### *Evacuees from most affected Prefectures*



According to the Disaster Relief Act, JRCS has an obligation to cooperate with national and prefectural government at times of disaster. During the relief operation for this disaster, JRCS set up aid stations, administered medical diagnosis, and provided psychosocial care. JRCS delivered blood products, collected donations and mobilised disaster volunteers, as provided by the agreement signed between the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the President of the JRCS. In addition, as a member of the Central Disaster Management Council headed by the Prime Minister, and in collaboration with other organisations, JRCS was responsible for a part of the country's overall disaster management.

A region where JRCS was particularly active was Ishinomaki, one of the most affected areas in Miyagi Prefecture where nearly 4,000 people lost their lives and where most medical facilities were washed away by the tsunami. This left Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital as the only place in the city able to provide medical attention. With a population of 220,000 in the region, Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital became the hub for all medical services. A Disaster Medical Coordinator managed the medical teams sent from universities, prefecture and municipalities, DMAT, Self Defence Forces, and through the Japanese Red Cross network.

IFRC was also quick in fielding a high-level support/liaison mission, comprised of members from sister National Societies led by the Head of the IFRC delegation in Beijing. This team made recommendations to assist and support the JRCS team. IFRC also provided assistance in the area of communications, on the basis of an agreement signed prior to the disaster.

Multiple teams operated throughout the affected areas although not all regions were coordinated in the same manner as in Ishinomaki. Within the first two months, Self-Defence Forces, NGOs, and emergency and/or medical teams from 23 countries had been fielded along with members of international organizations: FAO, IAEA, UN/OCHA and WFP (including the Japanese staff working abroad who were deployed to this emergency).

As international support started coming in to Japan, with a considerable volume of contributions, a discussion started as to how international donations should be received by Japan as a nation. As by law the government was not allowed to accept cash

donations, it was decided that JRCS would be the focal point for international funding. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Japan's Embassies and Missions around the world that all donations should be sent to JRCS. However, JRCS made a deliberate point, according to its contingency plan, not to accept contributions in kind, which were left in the hands of the government. This caused a huge volume of work for the Foreign Ministry for several months. JRCS did well to abide by its contingency plan.

JRCS was quick to begin its recovery activities as support from the international community through National Societies had gradually grown to US\$ 300 million, despite the fact that no appeal had been launched. A Recovery Task Force was set up in April 2011 to manage the projects that would use international funding. The Task Force comprised staff from various JRCS HQ departments, eventually growing to 20 members. It was created with a three-year mandate, and will operate until March 2014.

Following consultations with the prefecture authorities, requests were made to JRCS to provide electric appliances to the evacuees as a priority support measure. This was speedily accepted, and the distribution of six home appliances (refrigerator, washing machine, TV, rice cooker, microwave, and water thermos) started four weeks after the disaster. By the end of April, JRCS had a Plan of Action for recovery activities, which was presented during a PNS Meeting in Tokyo on 9 May 2011. The stated objectives for the recovery programme were to alleviate suffering, to help rebuild the lives of people affected and to strengthen JRCS' disaster response.

The focus for the recovery projects was concentrated on the three most affected prefectures: Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. This was a new area of activity for JRCS, and various methods were used to identify projects. JRCS' recovery task was to cover needs not fully accommodated by the central government. Needs assessments were not carried out by JRCS; projects were mostly identified by the prefectures and the municipalities and then submitted to JRCS for funding. As the criteria for the central government's support programme were strictly to restore the destroyed buildings and facilities in the way they stood prior to the tsunami, prefectures and municipalities could turn to JRCS funding that was more flexible in terms of outputs, and faster in terms of approval. JRCS funds therefore were highly appreciated by prefectures and municipalities to undertake recovery activities.

A second PNS Meeting was held in October 2011, by which time the volume of international contributions had increased to JPY 56.3 billion, or nearly double the amount since the earlier meeting. Most of the additional amount was allocated to further distribution of the six home appliances: the number of households receiving the appliances had grown from an estimated 70,000 to 133,183 (March 2013), due to an adjustment in criteria that allowed assistance to be given to evacuees wherever they had relocated, not only within the affected areas and provided they are living in temporary accommodation and "deemed" temporary housing.

By the end of the second year of the recovery period, the allocation of international funds by JRCS was almost complete. The Recovery Task Force at JRCS headquarters will nevertheless continue to be operational until the end of the scheduled period. Regarding results today, see tables with data in the section on "Impact" or check updated information in the JRCS web page ([www.jrc.or.jp/english](http://www.jrc.or.jp/english)).



## 4. Assessment and findings

JRCS did not have any previous experience in recovery, and engaged in recovery activities in the three most affected prefectures as a natural follow-up to its relief interventions; this was made possible given the availability of funding at its disposal. It was recognised however that there was no clear understanding in JRCS of what recovery implied.

For this main section of the Report and before entering into findings, the Evaluation Team shares IFRC definitions of recovery action to help the reader understand the scope of the concept of recovery. Following this, a summary of progress on the management response plan of the first evaluation is provided (2011, report issued February 2012, led by J. Talbot and referred to hereafter as 'Talbot 2012') and then a review of the findings of the donor National Society survey that helped provide a foundation for the recovery evaluation findings.

### Scope of recovery action

IFRC's guidelines for recovery programming give the following definitions <sup>11</sup>:

**Early recovery** is the process of people's lives returning to normal in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. It involves providing assistance to people in the earliest stages of disaster response in conjunction with the provision of relief, improving the effects of the relief and providing the basis for longer-term recovery. Early recovery enables people to participate more readily in longer-term recovery activities.

**Recovery**, in the context of disaster response, is a process that results in people's lives returning to normal in a way that they will be more resilient to future disasters. The extent to which people can recover after a disaster depends on the situation beforehand and how robust or resilient their resources are to withstand the effects of disaster. For some, recovery will be relatively quick, while for other it may take years.

**Recovery programming** builds on the affected people's immediate efforts to cope, recover and rebuild. It starts early, alongside relief, seeking to assist people at the peak of the crisis and continues into the mid-term to build greater resilience.

Recovery programming includes well-linked actions to protect and restore livelihoods, enhance food security and a wide range of other actions such as community and public health, temporary and longer-term shelter provision, protection and psychosocial support. These activities are undertaken in a way that reduces dependency, mitigates conflict and works towards meeting longer-term risk reduction objectives.

**Rehabilitation and reconstruction** are activities involving the repair and rebuilding of assets. Assets include physical infrastructure such as roads, transport services, utility supplies, public buildings, markets, and housing. These activities may involve minor repairs, infrastructure restoration or major rebuilding and may be undertaken by individuals (repairing their own properties) or by others such as contractors or locally trained artisans.

**Resilience** is the ability for individuals, communities, organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with and recover from the effects of adversity without compromising their long-term prospects.

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<sup>11</sup> Quoted from 'Summary of the IFRC Recovery programming guidance, 2012' ([www.ifrc.org](http://www.ifrc.org))

There are nine key strategic issues that need to be considered when developing or updating an operational strategy considering recovery:

1. Framing programming within the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
2. Ensuring the programme strengthens resilience
3. Building on systematic and on-going assessment and analysis
4. Ensuring integrated or multi-sectorial programming
5. Considering cross-cutting issues
6. Making use of innovative approaches such as cash transfers and market support programming
7. Building strong coordination both within and outside the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
8. Securing sufficient and realistic resources
9. Building on or contributing to the National Societies' own development.

As indicated above and as a follow up of the 2012 Evaluation on relief, the Team reviewed the progress of the Management Response Plan.

### **Management Response Plan of the 2012 Evaluation on relief**

Evaluations are often conducted to improve performance of an organisation. The IFRC Framework for Evaluation notes that Secretariat evaluations serve four key purposes – to improve our work and ultimately our mission to help those in need, to contribute to organizational learning, to uphold accountability and transparency and to promote and celebrate our work.<sup>12</sup>

One tool commonly used to help evaluations meet these aims is a management response plan (MRP). The MRP identifies if management accepts the findings of the evaluation and indicates how they will be addressed – either through the proposed recommendations or through other actions.

The relief evaluation, Talbot 2012, identified 20 recommendations for follow up either by JRCS, IFRC, National Societies or a combination of the three. One of the tasks of this Evaluation Team was to assess progress to date by those stakeholders on the 20 recommendations. In this process the Evaluation Team noted the following:

- IFRC does not have a focal point to overall manage the follow-up to the MRP (keeping in mind some actions are for the Zone, for Geneva and some are global in nature)
- JRCS does not have an overall focal point to manage the follow-up to the MRP; some actions are cross-cutting while many are targeted to specific departments (given the nature of the recommendation)
- The MRP does not indicate who is responsible for each recommendation – other than by generic organisation e.g. JRCS, IFRC; this further confounds follow-up and makes it difficult to hold people accountable.

A lack of organised and accountable follow-up to evaluations is a waste of resources; greater care should be taken to ensure money paid for evaluations is well spent.

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<sup>12</sup> IFRC, Planning & Evaluation Department - IFRC Framework for Evaluation. Geneva, February 2011: 2-3.



During the evaluation, the IFRC A/P Zone submitted an updated MRP for the recommendations it was responsible for. JRCS noted that the International Department compiled the initial response for JRCS but that it was not responsible to manage the process. Subsequently no one updated the MRP on behalf of the JRCS; however it was clear from various interviews that several components were being addressed. The Team also noted numerous discrepancies in the Japanese and English versions of the MRP, such that the intent of the management action changed. It was not clear who took decisions on behalf of the JRCS or which departments were responsible for follow-up. The Evaluation Team was not in a position to update the plan for JRCS, moreover it is not good practice to have external persons update such key documents as it further displaces ownership for learning.

### **Highlights of follow-up**

The relief evaluation recommended that JRCS update its contingency plan. JRCS continues to do this for the various scenarios it is likely to face. This recommendation was broken down into ten components, many of which the Disaster Management Division continues to follow. The Evaluation Team noted progress in many of the areas. However, gaps in follow-up included increased capacity for needs assessments, development of a recovery policy and a strategy for effective deployment of human resources.

PSP was another cross-cutting recommendation for JRCS. The nursing department is updating its approach to PSP at times of relief assistance, building on lessons learned using IFRC guidelines and tools; however the approach is still fairly medical (delivered through nurses with chapter staff and volunteers playing a support role). During this evaluation, the Head of the IFRC Reference Centre for PSP visited JRCS to support continued examination of its role in this area. Progress is being made to increase the understanding of PSP across departments and chapters, and such work should continue.

A third significant area for JRCS covers the mobilisation and management of volunteers. Although JRCS has some volunteers it is not a core component of its work. Numerous persons interviewed lamented that JRCS needed to go back to its roots as a volunteer organisation; that while they were proud of their strong workforce, more effort was needed to develop a volunteer system even though not all meaning of the concept of volunteer is fully enrooted in Japan. Some initial efforts have been taken regarding volunteer management but they remain at the strategy stage (e.g. ways to mobilise youth, ideas to engage corporate volunteers, instructions to chapter on how to work with the Council of Social Welfare at municipal and prefectural levels etc.). More effort in this area is needed across the organisation.

Regarding nuclear preparedness, JRCS is working on domestic guidelines for preparedness and response. Significant efforts have been made on a 'centre of excellence' or 'reference centre'. The Joho Centre (as it is called) is still in the planning stage and JRI is supporting this process. Plans are to be finalised late March; JRCS anticipates the launch of the centre in October 2013.

Nearly half of the recommendations were for IFRC. As noted, during this review period IFRC A/P Zone submitted an update MRP for those of relevance to it. The full, updated MRP can be found in the annexes. Some highlights of IFRC's progress to date include:

- IFRC has updated and disseminated recovery guidelines globally early in 2012
- In 2012 IFRC disseminated an updated version of the contingency planning guidelines along with a training package that had been piloted in a contingency planning training of trainers with five countries
- IFRC A/P Zone is planning pre-disaster meetings with 14 National Societies in 2013 in support of contingency planning for large-scale disasters. They reached 10 in 2012 and four of them have made this an annual event
- In May 2012 IFRC held a regional seminar convening 90 persons from National Societies, national disaster management authorities and customs authorities to exchange information and raise awareness which contributed to recommendation #2 of the MRP
- Also in support of recommendation #2, IFRC is supporting legislative reviews for IDRL with National Societies in 5 countries.

JRCS should formally update the MRP and indicate which departments and persons are to be responsible. Following this evaluation, the Team recommends that the outstanding items from the first evaluation be merged with the MRP from this recovery evaluation.

### **Survey of Donor National Societies**

To help round out the data collection for the evaluation and ensure comprehensive input into lessons learned for JRCS and the Federation as a whole, the evaluation conducted a survey of the donor National Societies to Japan's disaster.

**Survey purpose** - The survey was designed to:

- Assess the accountability measures used during the operation
- Assess the level of satisfaction with coordination mechanisms and identify options for future disasters when no appeal is issued
- Review preparedness measures taken by National Societies and assess recommendations for IFRC in future large-scale disasters
- Identify recommendations to further contribute to the preparedness of the IFRC secretariat and its members for future disasters.

### **Survey methodology**

- The survey targeted all 100 National Societies that donated to the 2011 disaster in Japan
- Two Societies could not be reached by email despite multiple attempts (D=98)
- To encourage broad participation, the survey was administered in English, French and Spanish
- The English survey was administered in survey monkey; the French and Spanish were done via hard copy form which was later entered into the on-line database

### **Participation and response rate**

Up to three persons per Society could respond to ensure the most relevant persons responded. 63 persons took the survey representing up to 50 National Societies. The overall response rate is 51% (50/98).

Of the 63 persons who took the survey, 53 completed it in full; ten persons left the survey before finishing. The 53 completed surveys originated from 47 National Societies. This results in a complete response rate of 48% (47/98). The analysis was conducted using only complete surveys (no partial responses were accepted).


## Key survey results and analysis

The full results and survey template can be found in annexes.


- The survey had a high response rate with 51% of donor Societies responding and 48% completing the survey in full
- 72% of those responding have worked ten years or more for the Red Cross Red Crescent; 47% support both the international as well as domestic work of their organisation, suggesting they know their organisation well
- Most respondents reported being familiar with the triple disaster in Japan as well as with JRCS' response
- 70% of donors were aware of the 2 page 'plan of action' while 30% reported not being aware of it
- Those who were aware of the plan reported being satisfied (57%) or very satisfied (24%) with it; only 16% were partially satisfied
- Overall donors were satisfied with the various ways in which JRCS managed their accountability to them
- A majority were also satisfied with the more traditional forms of communication and information sharing (information bulletins, operations updates and news stories) but were unaware or less aware of the use of social media e.g. Facebook, twitter and blogs
- Regarding coordination and accountability mechanisms, a majority noted that the current appeal system should be more flexible to account for no-appeal situations and should ensure that the full Movement response is captured regardless of the involvement of IFRC

The evaluation of the relief phase of the JRCS response identified several lessons for the membership to increase preparedness. The survey results noted that the majority of respondents are prepared or mostly prepared according to the recommendations (see chart below). The large percentage that 'mostly agree' with the statements suggest there is room for improvement.

How well prepared is your National Society for a very large disaster in your country? Indicate your strength of agreement with each of the statements below.



Respondents were well aware of resources and tools to support assessment and response but it was not likely that they would use them. However, that awareness is not well acknowledged in contingency plans; only 38% agreed that their contingency plan made provisions for accessing resources and support from within the Movement. Only 30% noted that it was likely that they would use such resources in the future (ERUs, FACT, RAT) while many only partly agreed or didn't know. (See chart below)



Regarding coordination, a majority of respondents (66%) would like the appeal system to be modified to accommodate situations where there is no request for resources; 24% felt a new instrument was needed. Many respondents noted that it was important for the membership to be inclusive and transparent about the needs and response; they also noted that when the National Society was able to meet the standards itself, it didn't necessarily need the IFRC to formulate or issue an appeal. Many respondents commented that the appeal system should be flexible but applied in a consistent manner even when IFRC was not involved. Perhaps there is a role for IFRC to play in ensuring that plans and appeals are comprehensive and consistent.

*"Appeals and reporting system is often too narrowly considered - generally only focusing on what the IFRC has done; it would be better to have 'Federation-wide' reports such as was used in the 2004 Tsunami and 2010 Haiti earthquake"*  
(Survey respondent)

Respondents were also asked about the policy base and practice to spend quickly. Numerous disasters, particularly high profile ones such as the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) or the Haiti earthquake (2010) have documented the perceived and often real pressure to spend money quickly. JRCS leadership also pressured its team to spend quickly in the light of past experience from other NS or from their own media or the public, and partly because of a perception that it was what donor National Societies expected of JRCS.

When asked, 53% of respondents noted that they did not have requirements on how quickly money should be spent following a disaster but 38% noted that they did.

When respondents were asked: “Do you think your public would allow a longer time frame for spending (say 3-5 years) to support large scale relief and recovery?” 57% said maybe for specific cases whereas 25% said no. Many noted that it would require clear and transparent communication on the needs and the response to avoid a negative impact on the National Society. Many noted that this was to be expected in large disasters and that it is also a function of the amount of resources received. At least one respondent pointed out that time was only one variable and that the context and type of disaster were important; highly developed countries may be able to recover faster but nuclear disasters may have a long-term impact and assistance may be required in the long term.

Finally, many respondents noted how Japan’s disaster profoundly affected them; for many it prompted them to re-assess their own preparedness for a large-scale disaster.

*Through the Japanese RC GEJET experience, our NS has been made aware of a serious ‘deficit’ regarding contingency, preparedness, decision-making structures, task forces, volunteer pools, and agreement with government in relation to our role in a major disaster of national proportions. A working group in my department was tasked with a review of those areas, and is expected to present practical proposals. In the meantime, again in view of the Japanese experience, our government has recognised our National Society’s coordinating role in relation to international coordination with the RC RC Movement. Our NS now keeps a roster of colleagues who could be called upon for specific duties in the case of such an emergency”. (NS respondent)*

## Areas of enquiry for this evaluation

JRCS did not have a contingency plan specifically tailored for a large-scale event in the Tohoku region. When disaster struck on 11 March 2011 the Society used its standby plan for Tokai, a sub-region of Chubu region that runs along the Pacific Ocean, on Honshu south of Tokyo. The Plan followed a standard format that JRCS has used and uses for other contingencies, and was the basis of its immediate response. That plan has since then been updated, in particular following the recommendations made in February 2012 after the first evaluation of the relief programme.

Upon engaging in activities related to the relief effort, a considerable undertaking in view of the level of devastation and the gruelling physical constraints, JRCS rapidly started putting in place a recovery programme. This decision to engage in recovery was against the general background of significant displacement and chaos. Approximately 387,000<sup>13</sup> people were living in evacuation centres within one week of the disaster, many of whom were suffering from trauma, anxiety and stress; the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was not yet stabilised, contributing to the volatility of the situation, with the national and prefecture local government providing only limited services and the municipal administration not fully functioning. There was clearly a need to move ahead in providing the affected communities with means that would allow them to return to a certain level of normalcy in their shattered lives.

The recovery period is considered to have started in May 2011 with the convening of the JRCS Recovery Task Force and the presentation of the JRCS Relief and Recovery Programme Plan of Action (PoA, see annex). This followed a gathering of a number of

<sup>13</sup> Japan National Police Agency as compiled by the Cabinet Office; accessed via the web at [www.cao.jr.jp](http://www.cao.jr.jp) during March 2013.



National Societies with the Japanese Red Cross at a Partnership Meeting for the GEJET (9 May 2011) that agreed on the broad plan for the use of the considerable resources made available to JRCS. The funding was of such a volume that it was decided that much of those resources should be allocated to recovery projects, as soon as feasibly possible.

Rather than a comprehensive descriptive plan, what was shared with donors was a list of projects, which was regularly updated by JRCS. The dual objectives of the recovery PoA were stated as:

- 1) To alleviate suffering, help rebuild the lives of people affected:
  - Improve current living conditions in evacuation centres
  - Support to move to temporary (prefabricated) housing
  - Rehabilitate social welfare services
  - Provide educational support for children
- 2) Strengthen JRCS disaster response:
  - Shelter, water, food, health/hygiene, communications

The plan was essentially broken down into a series of categories of activity (some of which were an extension of relief assistance), for an initial total amount of approx. JPY 58 billion (this was gradually increased to around 60 billion yen).

In conducting the evaluation of JRCS' recovery programme as outlined above, the Team focused particularly on 8 areas of enquiry, as follows:

1. Efficiency and effectiveness
2. Impact
3. Accountability
4. Coordination
5. Relevance
6. Appropriateness of coverage
7. Standards and principles
8. Preparedness

The areas of activity included:

- Distribution of emergency relief supplies
- Emergency medical services and PSP
- Regional health care support
- Assistance for nuclear power plant disaster victims
- Rehabilitation of health infrastructure
- Improving the living conditions of affected people in evacuation centres and temporary housing
- Social welfare support
- Children's education support

## 4.1. Efficiency and effectiveness

### Definition

The Evaluation Team considered the extent to which the JRCS Plan of Action achieved its objectives, with a specific focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of its recovery programme, with regard to operations and in terms of processes.

Points addressed by the Team included:

- Achievement of objectives adopted in the recovery and rehabilitation phase; meeting results; cost effectiveness and relevance of approaches to achieve results;
- Consideration of factors that helped to move the interventions forward effectively, and what factors had hindered progress; mechanisms or tools that helped promote good practice;
- Appropriateness of JRCS/IFRC structures for timely, efficient and effective delivery of recovery and rehabilitation interventions;
- Assessment of relief, recovery and rehabilitation experience to contribute to better organisation of volunteer work for JRCS in the future, including training, preparedness and mobilisation of volunteers;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of processes and systems to enable the response and the development of the recovery operation;
- Suitability of administrative and financial processes of the JRCS and IFRC, including human resources and procurement, to the type of emergency measures that were called for in this situation.

#### Definitions:

Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.

Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.

*Source: OECD DAC*

### Overall

Hasty as the plan's design may have been, it addressed genuine needs of the communities faced with the challenges of recovery. Given its weak structure and presence in the municipalities in terms of direct community support, JRCS' choice of implementing its programme of recovery activities through the prefectures and municipalities appears to have been effective and efficient. According to interviews with local government and beneficiaries, assistance was provided in a straightforward and timely fashion, and there were no bureaucratic delays or hassles of any sort. They received the support they needed and they received it fast enough, under the circumstances. However, a large number of people will have to remain in temporary accommodation for several more months and for some, several more years, either because of the need to prepare new, safer sites, or to wait for an approval to return to areas that are being decontaminated, in the case of Fukushima prefecture.

### Achievement of objectives

In all its simplicity, with its two-pronged objective of alleviating suffering and rebuilding lives, and of strengthening JRCS' disaster response capacity, the recovery Plan of

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Japan 2011 Tsunami. Evaluation of recovery action by JRCS/IFRC. April 2013

Action achieved its objectives of helping to bring communities back to normalcy after the disaster, preparing them for a better future, by providing people with the basics of a life standard that they had been accustomed to.

As highlighted in the preceding evaluation by JRI, the Team's interviews with municipalities and beneficiaries confirmed that the JRCS recovery interventions proved time efficient, cost effective and met the basic and immediate needs of the affected people. These interventions were implemented under the programme "Improving the living conditions of affected people in evacuation centres and transition shelters" as proposed in the Plan of Action.

Discussions with the municipalities revealed that working with JRCS HQ in Tokyo either directly or through the prefectures avoided delays and stringent and cumbersome approval rules from central government regarding reconstruction, and thus was efficient. The field representatives of JRCS HQ Task Force sent to Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima facilitated this direct communication with JRCS HQ. Chapters at times felt uninformed on the status of the programmes, or frustrated by the lack of communication within the HQ task force. JRCS, from the early phase of the intervention, could have utilised the HQ-led programmes as an opportunity for chapters to increase their interface with communities. Many of the people interviewed had only a very faint idea of what the Red Cross actually did even though they were regular contributors, and many were not expecting to receive the type of aid they did from JRCS. JRI's reports point out that the general public needs more communication from JRCS. It appears there is now a window of opportunity for JRCS to become more actively involved in community work.

JRI assessments noted that some projects could have been more efficient had greater attention been paid to project design, implementation schedules and coordination with the prefectures. This was particularly true for the home appliances, according to JRI. It was also noted that the vaccination programme may have been more effective had it been conducted earlier. Pneumonia cases were on the rise in Miyagi in March; Tohoku University reporting cases in a five-day period were 10 times above the average.<sup>14</sup> JRCS decided to support widespread inoculation amongst the elderly, aged 70 and older in all three prefectures, but these did not start until November 2011 and were concluded in March 2012.

Overall, JRCS' interventions were effective, using or collaborating with local authorities as implementation agents. In many areas, JRCS itself was absent from project execution, but that appeared not to affect the way projects were carried out, either positively or negatively.

The IFRC (and the international community at large, including the UN with UNDAC, and ECHO) did offer its services in the recovery process, but for a variety of reasons, JRCS did not avail itself of relief or recovery teams, relying on its own institutional practice and organisational structure and working through and with the local authorities. The efficiency of recovery delivery lies both in the open line set between JRCS and those authorities, and the speed of local authorities in assessing basic needs and transferring recovery assistance to the beneficiary communities without delay. Nevertheless, JRCS could have benefitted more from IFRC's broad knowledge and experience, and could have gained in its domestic work from the Federation's international experience. Under the circumstances, however, one has to recognise that JRCS' priority preoccupations were more on speedy delivery than on learning and strengthening its own operations.

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<sup>14</sup> UN OCHA. Japan Earthquake & Tsunami Situation Report No. 16. April 1, 2011: 4.



With regard to volunteers, JRCS recognises its very limited strength in the field of community support. Volunteers in the affected prefectures were fielded by other organisations, both national and local, or were individuals who volunteered their time out of solidarity for the victims. Although the Council of Social Welfare is mandated to coordinate volunteers from national to local community level, the Council was not prepared to work in a disaster situation. JRCS' volunteer structure will have to be reviewed for it to be of relevance in similar situations in the future, and the collaboration with the Council will have to be pursued.

As far as JRCS' internal management structure is concerned, the Evaluation Team heard from several sources that administrative and financial processes lack in effectiveness, particularly regarding speed of human resources mobilisation. However, this did not appear to be a problem in the context of this operation, since most of the transactions were simple transfers of funds for the purchase of goods or services, and the operation was supported by JRI. In fact, outsourcing of support services to JRI proved useful and contributed much to the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention.

With the international funds, and as per usual practice, JRCS carried out competitive bidding for most objects of expenditure. The process of competitive bidding can ensure transparency and should result in effective delivery of goods and services, if bid comparison and analysis are balanced on cost, schedule and quality. Some interviews made the Team feel that there were cases where JRCS should have rather ensured quality even if it meant spending a little more. In many organisations there is a practice of not accepting the lowest bid out of quality concerns. However, this was not what JRCS decision-makers did and this led to frustration amongst the Task Force at HQ and in the field.

It should be noted that the good cooperation between JRCS and the IFRC led rapidly to an arrangement whereby a Federation Country Representative could be based at JRCS HQ, assisting in no small way with administrative processes related to the cooperation between JRCS, the IFRC and other National Societies. However, should a broad framework agreement have been formulated between JRCS and the IFRC, much time could have been saved in avoiding the formulation of individual agreements with a variety of other National Societies, and would have helped efficiency of the whole operation by reducing the burden on the IFRC representative and JRCS's International Department.

## Key Findings

- Effectiveness of recovery actions did not suffer from overall weakness of plan
- Assessment of recovery needs by JRCS *per se* was not effective, relying only on requests submitted by prefectures
- Nevertheless, using prefectures and municipalities was an effective way to engage in recovery
- Delivery activities were well focused on beneficiaries' needs, and timely
- As much implementation was in the form of funds transfer through local government, recovery action was not hindered by JRCS administrative processes

## 4.2. Impact

A rigorous assessment of impact was not possible given the lack of detailed data, the limited amount of time that had passed and the fact the most persons interviewed believe that recovery was not yet fully underway. The management of data was problematic for several of the areas of enquiry. Approximately 43 municipalities across 8 prefectures were significantly impacted with the majority of municipalities located in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. However at the time of the evaluation, JRCS could not yet determine how many municipalities it had supported through the international donations.

### Definition of impact.

'Impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, environmental – on individuals, gender- and age-groups, communities and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household).' (OECD/DAC. 2006:56)

The Evaluation Team attempted to assess impact in the following ways:

- 1) Assessing impact on beneficiaries by examining beneficiary satisfaction, achievement of objectives and surmising the intended as well as unintended consequences; and assessing impact on communities by examining how increased access to services benefitted the population;
- 2) Assessing impact on JRCS by examining how much JRCS has changed, by its own accounts and by a review of plans, policies and procedures;
- 3) Assessing impact on IFRC and its membership by self-reported accounts of changes that had taken place and by a brief examination of changes in guidance and procedures said to be influenced by the disaster.

## Overall assessment

Noting the significant limitations in data and the way data was managed, the Evaluation Team felt that overall the JRCS response to the disaster had a positive impact on beneficiaries, communities and much of the membership. JRCS recovery interventions improved access to needed services and promoted healthy lifestyle activities for children and the elderly. The JRCS is expanding its relief preparedness and response capacity; however the impact on its recovery capacity thus far appears limited. The IFRC and much of the membership note how the Japan disaster has prompted them to address the question of how to deal with nuclear disasters and recovery in general.

## Discussion: impact on beneficiaries, communities, and the Red Cross

- 1) Impact on beneficiaries and communities

It is likely that JRCS support will have had an impact on the morbidity and even mortality of people given the scope and scale of services provided. In the sections below, the main results of support are reviewed.

JRCS support provided increase access to medical care; in some areas the hospital it supported was the only one available in the immediate vicinity. Several municipalities had lost their entire medical infrastructure, thus rendering this input crucial. Additionally, JRCS provided pneumococcal vaccines to 437,856 elderly persons over the age of 70 across the three most affected prefectures. People over 65 years old, the very young, and patients with lung or heart diseases are more susceptible to contract pneumonia. As noted earlier, in the first two weeks of the disaster there were reports of increasing cases of pneumonia. Pneumonia is a life-threatening disease and community-acquired pneumonia is common. Although vaccination coverage rates are unknown (national coverage rates for this vaccine were not available from the WHO website<sup>15</sup>) and the number of elderly who were forced to evacuate in each prefecture was not known (except that they were a majority), the fact that JRCS was able to support the vaccination of nearly half a million elderly surely prevented illnesses and saved lives.

### **Increased access to health care and health services**

- ✓ Ishinomaki hospital (renovation and bed/capacity increase); secondary medical care; temporary night time emergency medical centre – supporting catchment area of 200,867 people.
- ✓ Minamisanriku (temporary hospital) – supporting catchment area of 15,000 people until new hospital is built
- ✓ Minamisanriku/Shinzugawa: new, permanent hospital, catchment area 15,000 people
- ✓ Motoyoshi hospital in the city of Kesennuma, catchment area 84,785 people
- ✓ Onagawa: rehabilitation of community medical centre that includes a 100 bed elderly healthcare facility; catchment area of 7,962 people
- ✓ Pneumonia vaccinations for the elderly (437,856 vaccinated in three prefectures)
- ✓ Whole Body Counters (for level of nuclear contamination): 1 for Fukushima Red Cross Hospital with 7 more planned for 2013 for other municipalities;
- ✓ Food radiation control equipment in Fukushima and Miyagi: 109 units covering 68 locations were provided
- ✓ Mobile dental care in Miyagi prefecture targeting approximately 1,000 beneficiaries
- ✓ Psychosocial Services: held in all three prefectures and continuing in some; municipality coverage is difficult to determine but overall numbers seem to be low

With regard to support in Fukushima, JRCS provided 77 sets of food radiation detection equipment. With this support the local government was able to rapidly set up detection sites throughout the city. The central government eventually provided additional sets bringing the total to 137. This coverage allowed people to be assured that their food was safe. According to the city authorities, this quelled rumours and reinforced confidence in the government, which led to people being more receptive to subsequent messages and less influenced by rumours.

Nearly 50% of the recovery plan expenditure went towards the purchase of packages of six home appliances. This intervention raised much discussion within and outside JRCS. The JRI beneficiary survey found a very high level of satisfaction

### **Return to normalcy**

133,183 families in temporary housing and 'deemed' temporary housing received the six home appliance package consisting of a refrigerator, washing machine, rice cooker, television set, microwave and hot water kettle.

<sup>15</sup> [http://apps.who.int/immunization\\_monitoring/en/globalsummary/countryprofileresult.cfm?C=jpn](http://apps.who.int/immunization_monitoring/en/globalsummary/countryprofileresult.cfm?C=jpn)

(more than 90%) with the distribution of those items. The few direct beneficiaries the Team interviewed noted that these were considered as basic items to help people return to a normal life and that they were highly appreciated.

JRCS provided a “whole body counter” (a sophisticated machine that takes a picture of the whole body and can measure internal exposure to radiation) to the Red Cross hospital in Fukushima and has plans to provide 6 more throughout the prefecture. The local government has set a target of 292,240<sup>16</sup> persons to be measured (if they so choose). In 2012 the government was able to reach 37,181 persons, 6,204 of whom JRCS had measured or approximately 1/6 of the total. In January 2013 alone, JRCS reached around 4,000 persons, accounting for 10% of the total population. At the current rate, the government estimates that it will take three more years to reach its target. JRCS has plans to provide 6 more whole body counters. These machines cost between US\$ 600,000 (stationary machine) and US\$ one million (mobile machine). This might actually provide too much coverage; if people have significant concerns now they can travel to Fukushima city to the JRCS hospital, a private hospital or another public hospital to be checked. While to date JRCS has helped ease people’s minds through support of early detection and treatment and has supported the government in assessing the scope and scale of the problem, six additional counters may not prove an effective use of resources.

### **Increased access to services including those promoting a healthy lifestyle**

- ✓ Transportation (buses, social welfare vehicles, prefecture/municipality vehicles): 203 vehicles provided plus 18 buses serving 16 schools
- ✓ Smile Park: Fukushima – more than 16,000 children have participated to date (may be double-counting if children attended more than one session)
- ✓ Summer Camp: 3,451 children from all affected areas participated and 951 Red Cross volunteers, private sector stakeholders, teachers, nurses, clinical psychotherapists and travel agency staff and JRCS NHQ staff were mobilized to manage the camps
- ✓ Nordic walking: limited coverage but more planned in 2013; to date the project has involved 136 beneficiaries and 38 JRCS staff in 2 prefectures

### **Increased availability of housing and community infrastructure**

- ✓ Public Housing: Shinichi, Fukushima (550 homes); Soma, Fukushima (number not yet determined); Otsuchi, Iwate (approximately 60 homes or 1/8 of 480)
- ✓ Social Welfare Centre (2): Minamisanriku, Miyagi; Kesenuma, Miyagi
- ✓ Community Centres (2) : Otsuchi, Iwate; Kawauchi, Fukushima
- ✓ After-school centres: Ofunato, Iwate
- ✓ Nursery school/after-school centre: Yamada, Iwate
- ✓ Kindergarten and nursery School: Iwaki, Fukushima

International donations are providing support for the construction and rehabilitation of housing and public infrastructure. In Iwate, external funding supports the construction of public housing in one of the hardest hit municipalities. JRCS also supported the creation of new communities forced to relocate due to the impact of the radiation. Permanent housing contributed to the overall well-being of communities and

enabled families to stay together while parents could resume employment.

<sup>16</sup> Government of Japan, Fukushima City. February 2013.

In Iwate, the provision of after school care and nurseries has also enabled families with children to remain in the areas where they lived and resume a 'normal' life. Such support may also have prevented young families from leaving towns where the elderly are becoming the majority. However the scale is small and the level of coverage is unknown. Given that the elderly are a majority in the population, supporting the social welfare centres was important and is likely to impact their overall well-being due to improved services.

JRCS provided support that increased access to a range of services. Many of these were given at the request of local government, beneficiaries and through needs assessed by staff and volunteers. Transportation helped schools restart and helped residents to get to and from shops and work.

Support for transportation to local government and social welfare centres helped government to resume their provision of normal service, reaffirming the government's overall responsibility for the recovery. Other new services, i.e. summer camp, Smile Park and Nordic walking, are likely to have contributed to the psychological and physical well-being of adults and children alike many of whom were homebound for fear of radiation exposure.

As noted in the section on Accountability, through on-line surveys to approximately 600 persons administered by JRI, it appeared that more than 90% were satisfied or very satisfied with the services provided by JRCS.

## 2) Impact on JRCS

The impact of the disaster and the JRCS response in relief and recovery is not yet fully

### JRCS preparedness

- ✓ Reconstruction of Nursing School and emergency health training centre (Ishinomaki) serving 120 students
- ✓ Strengthening the disaster and emergency medical capacity of Inshinomaki RC hospital
- ✓ Construction and equipment of 432 community-based disaster preparedness warehouses
- ✓ Equipment and tools for future JRCS disaster response (tents, satellite phones, vehicles, ambulances)

assessed. This will take additional time, but in the meantime, JRCS has noted a number of perceived impacts. JRCS feels its preparedness and response capacity is improving at HQ, in chapters and in hospitals through new equipment, training and procedures; the disaster highlighted the need for satellite phones as the tsunami took out the telephone network for several days (JRCS did not have sufficient satellite phones on hand prior to the disaster).

JRCS is developing guidelines and additional capacity to deal with nuclear disasters; this was not a role that had been previously envisioned. The disaster highlighted the importance of strong public relations and communications. JRCS' Public Relations team realised its work was not effective when public misunderstandings arose and as it became apparent how poor its relationship with the media was. Since the disaster the annual budget of the Public Affairs department has tripled, seemingly in recognition of a need for improvement.

JRCS was able to learn and manage the IFRC financial management and reporting system to account for the international contributions, enabling the NS to manage the system more efficiently for potential future large-scale disasters if it finds a way to transfer these individual capacity improvements into institutional improvements.



Public awareness of JRCS may have grown. Most external stakeholders interviewed knew that JRCS was an organisation that worked overseas (for which it collected donations from the public); only a few people interviewed knew of JRCS' medical services. Even local government officials noted that they did not have much knowledge of JRCS or a close relationship with the Society.

This increased awareness may lead to increased contributions in the future (something that had been on the decline prior to the disaster) but it may also lead to increased expectations.

### 3) Impact on IFRC Secretariat and National Societies

The IFRC, particularly in the Asia Pacific Zone, regularly reflects on its disaster management policies and procedures, which are updated based on evolving experience. Japan's disaster provided an additional opportunity for review and updating but also highlighted the importance of being prepared for nuclear disasters; this has had a profound impact on the IFRC and much of its membership. While numerous consultative meetings have been held and many National Societies have begun to review their own preparedness in case of nuclear disaster, Japan's triple disaster prompted the membership to adopt the Resolution on the Enhancement of the National Societies to nuclear and radiological accidents, at the General Assembly in November 2011. This will have a significant and sustained impact, with Societies and the IFRC ensuring they are prepared to deal with such disasters in the future.

*The Japan Earthquake made us aware that we are absolutely not prepared in case of a major domestic disaster. We have now a working group that prepares contingency and response structures and responsibilities within our NS.*

*(Comments from a National Society member that donated to the Japan disaster February 2013)*

*"We knew about the relief teams but not in action.....prior to that we did not have a very close relationship with JRCS". (Prefecture official)*

The impact goes beyond the Secretariat and IFRC members; it has increased awareness with the government. The IFRC has also noted that this disaster prompted a review and update of its own surge planning and has led to follow-up throughout the Zone for Red Cross Red Crescent and external partners to prepare for large-scale disasters. Finally, JRCS's handling of the disaster, in particular in accepting international contributions from National Societies and support from IFRC, and accepting an international evaluation team, may have set a new standard in learning, transparency and accountability for the IFRC membership. The Federation secretariat and National Societies have a responsibility to ensure that standards are met, that the dignity of beneficiaries is protected and that the image of the Movement and its mission are promoted. This can only happen through openness, transparency and concerted efforts in learning.

### Key findings

- Increased access to healthcare (hospitals, clinics), health services (vaccinations, whole body counters, PSP, mobile dental services etc.), and actions promoting a healthy lifestyle (temporary and mobile gymnasiums, food radiation counters) are likely to have mitigated morbidity and even mortality amongst the population

- More than 130,000 households spread throughout Japan received support (home appliances) which is likely to have enabled beneficiaries to regain a sense of normalcy
- Increased public awareness of JRCS action may result in greater support and contributions in the future as well as increased expectations
- The nuclear disaster alerted the IFRC and much of the membership to increase preparedness and capacity to deal with this type of situation; the lessons learned will and already have assisted the IFRC and NS in updating their approach to recovery
- The openness of JRCS to the external, international evaluation may have set new standards in accountability and learning for other National Societies to follow in the future

### 4.3. Accountability

The Red Cross/Red Crescent has long recognised the importance of accountability. It figures prominently in the 1994 Code of Conduct; in particular principle 7: *'ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid'*; and principle 9: *'we hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources'* reiterate the importance of accountability to a variety of stakeholders.

#### Defining accountability:

ACCOUNTABILITY: Making sure the men, women and children affected really do have a say in planning, implementing and judging our response to their emergency.  
– ECB Project

ACCOUNTABILITY: The processes through which an organisation makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-making processes and activities. –GAP

ACCOUNTABILITY describes the way which organisations and projects involve different groups in making decisions, managing activities, and judging and challenging results. – SPHERE

Although clearly embodied in the Code of Conduct and many other internationally accepted charters such as SPHERE, greater effort is needed to ensure the work of global organisations, including Red Cross Red Crescent, meet those standards. A variety of reviews and evaluations in the past ten years have noted a need for improvement globally (The Listening Project - 2004, NGO Impact Initiative - 2006, Humanitarian Accountability Project standards – 2007) and it was also included in this evaluation's terms of reference.

#### Overall

JRCS made significant efforts to be accountable to its international donors, but could have done more to be accountable to its public donors and beneficiaries.

The evaluation examined accountability with the following groups of stakeholders:

- Donors – specifically National Societies and the general public
- JRCS staff and volunteers, and
- Beneficiaries

#### Discussion

JRCS was determined to be fully accountable for the international contributions received after the disaster: it held meetings early on with interested National Societies, facilitating their visits to disaster-stricken areas and holding two large meetings, one in May on the Recovery Plan of Action and one in October 2011 to discuss results to date and changes in the strategy. JRCS was initially supported by IFRC for the reporting work but in time hired a full-time reporting officer to ensure good communication on results. IFRC also provided support on financial reporting requirements and JRCS eventually reorganised personnel to run an extra financial system dedicated to handling the international funding. Regular programmatic updates and financial reports were sent to all international donors. This communication was complemented by the work of the Public Relations department that sent out updates on Facebook, Twitter and via the traditional channels such as press releases and news articles.



National Societies appreciated the information effort. Of the 47 that responded to the evaluation survey, more than 75% were 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with accountability tools such as the Plan of Action, operations updates and information bulletins.

It was known via media reports that JRCS had received significant international support: JRCS had received  $\frac{3}{4}$  of all international contributions<sup>17</sup>. Internal support was equally considerable, but accountability to public donors and beneficiaries was less forthcoming, although efforts were made. On 14 March 2011, the Government announced that all public donations (*gienkin*) should go to one of three designated public institutions; the majority went to JRCS (the equivalent of approximately US\$ 3.2 billion to JRCS and US\$ 400 million to NHK and Public Chest)<sup>18</sup>. While the central coordination committee, of which JRCS was a member, agreed in April to the overall criteria and allocations, it understandably took local government time to verify the allocations per those criteria. At that time municipalities were still physically devastated and had themselves lost personnel in the disaster.

The public's understanding was that the Japanese Red Cross was going to give out money directly and was delaying the process. JRCS reportedly was reluctant to communicate about something that was managed by the government. Over time, complaints flooded the JRCS donation hotline and it took considerable time and attention to deal with the situation.

While there was some communication on JRCS priorities and actions, the public complaints indicated that this was too limited. JRCS published newspaper ads, but only twice a year, and published in a monthly newsletter distributed to chapters, prefectures and municipalities, with a description of select recovery actions. Some press releases and updates were posted on the public website. While this was a positive effort, people interviewed for this evaluation noted that it was not frequent, nor comprehensive enough. As a public organisation JRCS could have taken advantage of the three months post disaster period to increase its visibility, a time when private commercials were not allowed to run and when public service announcements were made instead.

Many interviewees felt that more information was shared internationally in English than was shared locally and nationally in Japanese; interviewees said that even chapters were not informed of what JRCS was doing to support the recovery effort (beyond the Red Cross newsletter that did not report on the full recovery plan). It was noted that most public information items focused on how people could donate and not on how funds were being spent. Few direct beneficiaries were interviewed during the evaluation but they noted that they knew what JRCS was doing because the mayor kept them informed (through the progress of distribution of the six home appliances, for instance).

Four standards are now frequently promoted as minimum standards in beneficiary accountability for any service delivery provided by humanitarian organisations.<sup>19</sup>

- 1) Transparency: the provision of accessible and timely information to beneficiaries and the opening of structures, procedures and processes to their assessment;

<sup>17</sup> IDC Japan report released 7 March 2013 noted that Japan received JPY 163 billion; of this JPY 120 billion went to JRCS and 43 billion to 'others'. Comprehensive Review of Assistance from Overseas for the Great East Japan Earthquake, March 2013. (International Development Centre, Japan. In Japanese)

<sup>18</sup> As of January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2013 *gienkin* total income is JPY 364,400,000,000 according to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Welfare public website; JRCS received JPY 323,746,785,465 according to JRCS Organizational Development department

<sup>19</sup> For additional details on these and other accountability standards, see One World Trust: <http://oneworldtrust.org> and Humanitarian Accountability Project <http://www.hapinternational.org>

- 2) Participation: the process through which an organisation enables beneficiaries to play an active role in decision-making processes that affect them;
- 3) Monitoring & evaluation: the processes by which an organisation monitors and reviews its progress and results, with involvement from beneficiaries, and feeds learning back into the organisation on a regular basis; and
- 4) Complaints and response: processes by which beneficiaries can provide constructive feedback and the means by which the organisation regularly responds to that feedback.

Without being explicitly aware of any recent articulation of international standards, JRCS did fairly well in meeting them. Regarding transparency, some information on what JRCS was doing had been provided to the public; on participation, some municipal governments did consult with beneficiaries on needs and interests. Regarding monitoring and evaluation, JRCS hired JRI to conduct several evaluations including a public perception survey that included surveys of 600 persons in addition to some individual interviews and focus groups. However the timing was such that if the feedback had been negative, it is not clear that JRCS would have been able to significantly alter the service delivery. Finally, although JRCS did not actively put a complaints and response system in place, the donation hotline ended up being used in this way and JRCS staff worked to follow up on all calls.

Within six weeks of the disaster, despite the chaotic situation JRCS found itself in, it quickly developed a recovery Plan of Action. The plan remained largely intact for the following year and a half with additional projects being added as new ideas were formulated. In the end, the Plan of Action reads like a list of projects under 13 categories; that does not equate to a strategy or even a strategic compilation of programmes. After the first six months, JRI encouraged JRCS to stop, reflect and draw up a proper strategy based on its better understanding of the environment. The Task Force was not able to do so, as its members were too busy 'being chased by requests from the field'. In addition to the information listed in the Plan of Action (see annex), some objectives and targets can be found across several documents (primarily power point presentations created for the NS meetings) but these do not exist in one, coherent presentation.

## **Impact**

International Red Cross Red Crescent donors have generally indicated they were satisfied and will presumably actively support such displays of international solidarity in the future. This might not be true with the general public: JRCS' weak communication about *gienkin* and the use of international donations may have eroded some of the goodwill from the public.

## **Key findings**

- In accepting external contributions while taking the decision not to appeal, JRCS was determined to demonstrate full accountability
- JRCS made considerable efforts to be accountable to its international donors
- JRCS invested less in accountability to its public including its beneficiaries; more could have been done to publicise what it was doing, for whom and how

- International standards of beneficiary accountability (participation, transparency, M&E and complaints & response) were only partially met
- The main accountability tool (Plan of Action) did not meet minimum standards (lacking clear strategy, criteria, objectives, targets, and a plan for M&E)

## 4.4. Coordination

### Definition and purpose

Coordination is the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership.<sup>20</sup>

Coordination is a process through which actors involved in humanitarian response work together in a logical and concerted effort towards an agreed common end (namely to protect those affected, save lives and help resume normal activities), and in order to ensure maximum efficiency with the resources available.<sup>21</sup>

### Overall

The average rating for coordination by JRCS was mixed given the range of stakeholders involved. Overall there was strong coordination or consultation with prefecture and municipal government; there was limited collaboration with chapters and minimal coordination with central government and NGOs – although some attempts were made. JRCS was very accommodating with National Societies.

Coordination for all actors involved in the triple disaster was acknowledged as a significant challenge including the Central Government, the public sector, INGOs, NPOs and the Japanese Red Cross. The scale of the disaster, the scope of impact and the impact on municipal as well as prefecture government - all those factors contributed to overall poor coordination.

The Team looked at the following levels of coordination:

- 1) Within JRCS
- 2) Between JRCS and the Government
- 3) Between JRCS and NPOs/NGOs
- 4) Between JRCS and the local communities
- 5) Between JRCS and IFRC and National Societies
- 6) With other entities

### Discussion

#### 1) Within JRCS

- a) At the HQ level, coordination appeared to be generally good, given the overall chaotic situation. The Task Force was set up early and included a good diversity of members from around JRCS. New staff was hired to supplement the capacity of the Task Force and of the departments involved. However, information sharing, which is a significant part of coordination, was reported as having been

<sup>20</sup> Reindorp, N., & Wiles, P. Humanitarian Coordination. ODI, London. 2001: 5/ Minear, L., Chelliah, U., Crisp, J., Mackinlay, J. & Weiss, T. (1992) UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990–1992 (Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies: Providence, Rhode Island) Occasional Paper 13

<sup>21</sup> Source: Interagency Standing Committee quoted in, Handbook for coordination: Working together in international disaster response (updated March 2010).

poor. Line staff characterised communication between management and them as limited; staff recognised that they could have been more efficient if they had better understood how the hierarchy and the decision-making process functioned. Information sharing across departments and across lines of authority appeared to be weak. Although the work of the Task Force is gradually winding down, it still operates and monthly management meetings on recovery are still held with the President and senior management.

- b) HQ and Chapters: Some chapters reported receiving useful information from HQ but it was clear that they had a limited role in recovery. They did play a larger part in relief given their mandate. Three former JRCS international delegates were placed in the prefectures to manage a 'field task force' to support the recovery operation. It appears that responsibilities were structured to enable the chapters to continue their usual work while the delegates and HQ staff managed the recovery. The chapters took on a slightly larger role after the field task forces were dissolved between March and June 2012. From various interviews, it was clear that HQ worked directly with hospitals and prefectures, and that chapters had limited responsibilities throughout.

## 2) Between JRCS and government

- a) At central level JRCS has no relationship with key stakeholders in recovery largely because its mandate was limited to relief. The government's Reconstruction Agency was only established on 10 February 2012 (although reconstruction guidelines were issued in July 2011) by which time the JRCS recovery plan was well underway. JRCS management noted that they shared information on the Plan of Action, with recommendations for interventions by prefecture and municipality authorities, and frequently sent updated reports to the central government's Cabinet Office. According to JRCS, no feedback was received from the central government on the way it was spending the international funds. Although JRCS made an effort to link up, there was no coordination of strategies, priorities or resource allocations with central government. This is in part due to the decentralised nature of the Government of Japan, with prefectures playing an important role in the management of disaster relief and recovery. However, early on, JRCS did coordinate with the Foreign Ministry on the issue of receiving international donations.
- b) JRCS worked primarily through prefectures and municipalities. Rather than full coordination, this could be characterized as appropriate consultation. JRCS relied on prefectures to identify needs and priorities. Prefecture linked municipalities with JRCS HQ when the management of assistance went beyond prefecture capacity. Overall, coordination was good with local government, particularly in identifying and determining priority support needed. JRCS assumed that local government priorities were well aligned with beneficiaries' needs.

## 3) Between JRCS and INGOs/NPOs

JRCS had limited consultation and coordination with Japanese NGOs and NPOs. JRCS is a member of Japan Platform (JPF) and attended a few coordination meetings in Tokyo. HQ task force members did attend some NGO/NPO field coordination meetings but according to HQ staff, there was a feeling that they were discussing issues that were 'too small' for it to matter to JRCS.

JRCS criteria seemed to be focused on larger-scale interventions that could be conducted in all three of most affected prefectures in a way that was 'fair' (i.e. beneficiaries should be treated in the same way or receive the same support). Hence the work of NGOs with a narrower geographical focus was of little interest to JRCS HQ and coordination with NGOs thus never materialised.

By June 2011, JRCS using their international delegate pool placed a field staff in each of the three most affected prefectures, who led a 'field task force', in liaison with local government to help coordinate the international donations. One representative did attend numerous NGO coordination meetings in the field and frequently proposed that JRCS fund some of these organisations. The field staff noted that many NGOs had good community connections, were able to thoroughly assess needs and had good capacity to implement. However, JRCS HQ would not fund NGOs perhaps out of fear that funding one organisation would lead to criticisms of unfairness with the NGO sector as a whole. NGOs eventually sought funding elsewhere.

Local government officials noted that they did not coordinate with NGOs (particularly at the municipality level whereas prefectures eventually included NGOs in the prefectural task force, after much insistence by NGOs). At the municipal level, several officials noted that they assumed the NGOs coordinated amongst themselves. One international NGO interviewed described its coordination efforts with UNICEF and local NGOs but without JRCS participation. NGOs acknowledged the importance of coordination with local government; it remained difficult throughout for NGOs to get the attention of local government, which was not the case for JRCS. This gave the Red Cross a greater role in recovery.

#### **NPOs and NGOs in Japan**

**JANIC:** The Japan NGO Centre for International Cooperation (JANIC) is a non-profit, non-partisan networking NGO founded in 1987 by a group of NGO leaders who saw the need to better coordinate activities in Japanese society and facilitate communication with groups overseas. Currently it is comprised of 96 member organizations supporting operations in Japan around the world. ([www.JANIC.org](http://www.JANIC.org))

**Japan Platform (JPF)** is an international emergency humanitarian aid organisation that offers effective and prompt emergency aid, in response to the world situation, focusing on refugees and natural disasters. JPF conducts such aid in a tripartite cooperation way where NGOs, the business community, and the Government of Japan work in close cooperation as equal partners, making the most of the respective sectors' strengths and resources.

(<http://www.japanplatform.org>)

#### **JEN (Japan Emergency NGO)**

Is a organization that aims at restoring self-supporting livelihoods both economically and mentally for people stricken by conflicts and disasters. It has extensive international experience and became involved in the 2011 Japan disaster using its expertise from abroad. (<http://www.jen-npo.org>)

#### **4) Between JRCS and the Local Communities**

JRCS and communities: other than JRCS' initial response and the needs assessments undertaken by medical teams (particularly in Ishinomaki), JRCS seems to have had limited involvement at the community level. The Task Force (HQ and field delegates) carried out limited needs assessments in evacuation centres but this started late; staff noted that by the time they started, people had already begun to relocate to temporary housing or to return home. Beyond immediate relief, direct coordination with affected communities was reduced, except for field outreach conducted by some of the representatives. JRCS assumed it to be well managed by municipal government. In several municipalities, government staff and beneficiaries



qualified the consultation process undertaken by the government with communities as adequate (e.g. town hall meetings, mayoral meetings at community centre, surveys etc.).

## 5) Between JRCS and IFRC and National Societies

Coordination with IFRC and National Societies: by all accounts, JRCS worked well with the donor National Societies and accommodated their various information needs and requests. Although time consuming, JRCS hosted a high level mission and held several National Society meetings on planning for recovery, coordination and eventually on lessons learned. This was well appreciated by many National Societies as evidenced by the survey and several emails.

From various statements, JRCS appears to have valued the support provided by IFRC, particularly in communication. This was aided by the pre-agreement between IFRC and JRCS. The early acceptance of a country representative position was well appreciated by both JRCS and IFRC. There was frustration however, on the part of IFRC, as many in the secretariat felt that more support and assistance could have been provided had JRCS been more willing to accept, particularly in recovery planning and implementation. Support in monitoring and beneficiary communication might have also helped. There was a sense by some IFRC staff that the International Department at JRCS was aware of and open to additional support that IFRC could. However, offers of greater assistance were not made officially or formally by IFRC nor was anything formally declined by JRCS.

It is plausible that JRCS could also have been frustrated by IFRC and the membership as there was no constructive feedback on the recovery plan or implementation approach. At least one donor National Society noted that it did not feel feedback could be given to such a well-organised and respected National Society.

## 6) With other entities

The Evaluation Team looked at coordination matters in the context of domestic public donations or *gienkin*. While this evaluation is to assess only the use of international donations, it is relevant to examine this as NS donors were told (as is contained in the MoU that each donor signed with JRCS regarding how the international donations would be handled) that if JRCS could not find an adequate outlet for the international donations, funds would be disbursed through the *gienkin* system (as explained earlier in this report).

The central government noted that JRCS would be one of the three public organisations to receive public donations to support the victims of the disaster, which JRCS accepted. As no guidance was received from the government on the distribution of *gienkin*, JRCS called the central coordination committee that decided on a fair allocation of the resources collected across the affected provinces.

Although funding was shared between the three public corporations (a total of US\$ 3.8 billion had been collected), JRCS received the bulk and the public incorrectly understood that JRCS itself was responsible for distributing the resources. After setting the criteria, the prefectural government was responsible for the distribution. JRCS did not communicate well with the beneficiaries, which led to misunderstandings and frustration among the general public according to several persons who were interviewed.

## Impact of coordination

By working closely with the local government, JRCS was able to rapidly support the affected communities and help people resume a sense of normalcy; however, several opportunities to fund and work with other organizations that may have had a better understanding of the communities, were missed. Closer coordination with IFRC could have led to increased technical support.

## Key findings

- Coordination was a challenge for all actors given the size of the unprecedented disaster
- JRCS was highly collaborative with local government, only somewhat collaborative with chapters (they had a limited role), and minimally coordinated with NGOs/NPOs
- There was eventually good coordination with public institutions on *gienkin* but poor public communication; this led to misunderstandings and frustration amongst the public
- JRCS was very accommodating with donor National Societies but accepted only limited support from IFRC. Greater technical support from IFRC or even other National Societies could have improved the recovery operation

## 4.5. Relevance

The section following this examines appropriateness of coverage. As there is overlap between relevance and appropriateness, this section will examine the relevance of activities i.e. what was done and the next section on appropriateness will examine where things were done.

### Overall

Based on available data, the Evaluation Team found that overall the JRCS recovery support was relevant. Interventions improved the availability of and access to key infrastructure and services. A broad range of support was provided across the three most affected prefectures while an attempt was made to provide support to victims regardless of where they relocated. Interventions were diverse, appropriately targeted to the

*Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities, as well as with donor policy. (OECD DAC)*

communities' demographics and in line with local government priorities.

As per the evaluation's terms of reference and inception report, the Team examined the following areas under this heading:

- How needs were assessed and decisions taken on recovery projects;
- How complementary JRCS' strategy was to that of local authorities;
- How alternatives were considered;
- How recovery interventions supported communities in problem-solving, decision-making and even contributed to livelihoods.

It should be noted that a 2012 evaluation of JRCS by JRI <sup>22</sup> assessed all the major recovery projects of JRCS for which significant data was available. Projects were assessed against key criteria including efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, fairness and some criteria related to relevance. While it was not in the remit of the external evaluation to assess each programme area, the team did use JRI data supplemented by interviews, field visits and other secondary data review.

### Discussion

JRCS support was concentrated on the three most affected prefectures, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima out of the 8 to 15 that were designated by the government as 'affected'; this range is due to the fact that there were a variety of disaster acts and criteria met by different prefectures (Cabinet Office, 2012). Two other prefectures, Ibaraki and Chiba also experience significant destruction but although still significant, the scale was much lower when compared to the aforementioned three prefectures.

JRCS rightly noted the prominent role played by government in supporting the people to recover, and thus relied on local government for assessments and articulation of need. Furthermore, JRCS did not have the capacity at community level to assess recovery and arguably this was the government's responsibility. These assessments

<sup>22</sup> Summary Report: Third Party Evaluation of the Great East Japan Earthquake Recovery Task Force: 30 November 2012; in Japanese but a 64-page summary was translated into English for the team

were supplemented to some extent by JRCS' Task Force personnel in HQ and by three field staff. JRCS staff reported frustration at the needs assessment process because (1) they did not have experience in doing this, and (2) the goals and objectives of JRCS support were not clear. This led staff to ask local government for mere listings, rather than formulating a strategy. Asking local authorities what they wanted and responding to the most vocal could have led JRCS to miss genuine needs in affected municipalities.

	Type of damage					
Location	Personnel			Property Damage		
Prefecture	Killed	Missing	Evacuees	Total Collapse	Half Collapse	Partially Damaged
Miyagi	9,535	1,302	108,357	85,259	152,875	224,050
Iwate	4,673	1,151	40,304	18,369	6,547	13,556
Fukushima	1,606	211	97,072	21,141	72,714	166,015
Ibaraki	24	1	5,403	2,623	24,178	183,617
Chiba	21	2	3,993	801	10,088	53,039
Tochigi	4	0	3,101	261	2,111	72,876
Amori	3	1	1,149	308	701	1,006
Gunma	1	0	1,770	0	7	17,246

*Source of data: disaster impact data: National Police Agency of Japan: March 11, 2013. Abridged. Evacuee data from Government of Japan: Reconstruction Agency: Evacuee data is March 7, 2013.*

In some cases, municipalities conducted beneficiary surveys whereas others organised town hall meetings and met with community leaders to discuss their needs. Local government personnel were able to describe their assessment process in many municipalities and this was corroborated by the few beneficiary interviews that were conducted.

It is a good practice to work with and through government at all levels in disaster preparedness, response and recovery; this is an area that globally needs improvement. The evaluation team found that there was over-reliance on government, especially in the first 6 months but even beyond, for assessment and articulation of need. JRCS lacked an overall strategy and clear criteria for the selection of projects, programmes or interventions. Nor did JRCS assess funding needs of other organisations that might have provided a complement to the government's work. While JRCS did not need to replicate the role of the government, it should have verified their assessment processes (staff reported hearing of government assessment forms and summary reports but never saw any) and should have conducted additional, holistic analyses on needs, impact and coverage to further ensure the relevance of the proposed support. This may not have been done given the chaotic situation and the pressure to spend and quickly. *(See the following section on appropriateness of coverage for additional details)*

JRCS interventions were fully in line with local government plans. JRCS provided temporary medical infrastructure to increase access to medical services while central government took time to approve permanent health infrastructure projects. In many communities, all public health infrastructures were wiped out in the disaster; thus, providing access to health care was a priority.

The international donations also helped municipalities *'build back better'* as central government funding could only be used on infrastructure that was rebuilt *'exactly as before'*. Local government authorities explained that in many cases needs had changed because of the disaster or simply over time and it was no longer efficient or relevant to build back exactly as before (for example some hospitals needed fewer beds but would have benefitted from an additional ward to accommodate the elderly). JRCS was flexible and supported improvements in services as and where needed. This type of support was highly relevant and contributed to the resilience of communities through increased access to new and modified services in conformity with a changing situation.

It was not entirely clear to the team if and how alternative interventions were considered in this operation. Numerous staff in HQ noted that criteria for decision-making were not clear and information not shared appropriately. From numerous interviews it was clear that JRCS highly emphasized fairness in selecting recovery interventions. However, *'fairness'* was defined as *'the same for all'*. Given that needs and disaster impact were varied, more thought could have been given to equity rather than assuming equality, to ensure that recovery took into account the uniqueness of needs and capacities across prefectures.

Just prior to the disaster, JRI was assessing trends and reasons for declining membership fees and was asked to study the management capacity of JRCS in recovery. JRI helped with the financial management and analysis of the international contributions, and supported the implementation of beneficiary surveys and several internal evaluations or *'self-assessments'*. JRI noted that they were not aware if intervention alternatives were considered by JRCS. If interventions met the *'fairness criteria'*, they were approved otherwise they were not.

NGOs and NPOs also conducted their own assessments and proposed interventions albeit on a much smaller geographical scale (as community-based organisation with greater familiarity with local needs). Suggestions were brought forward to the Task Force, such as requests for power generators for households with handicapped children at a time of continuing power outages; such requests were declined seemingly because it was felt unfair to support NGOs in only one prefecture, or because such requests were about preparedness rather than recovery. Funding of NGOs/NPOs could have provided a good complement to local government requests.

Beneficiaries interviewed by the Team felt that the six home appliance support was relevant. JRI conducted public perception surveys (via the internet, N=600 – 3,000) and supplemented this with focus groups. Their surveys found that a majority of people were very satisfied or satisfied with the six home appliances. Some individuals noted that they did not have the money to replace the items on their own while others noted that given limited transportation, they could not have travelled to nearby towns to purchase those items. Some pointed out that JRCS was able to purchase the items more cheaply than them as JRCS bought in bulk and received a substantial discount. If home appliances hadn't been distributed, beneficiaries said cash would have been a good alternative. Transportation was also a need (*"...but we didn't expect you would give us cars"*). JRCS did provide transportation in the form of public buses for bus routes based on beneficiary needs; a number of cars were also provided to various public institutions.

While recovery interventions selected were relevant to the needs of beneficiaries and communities, they were not necessarily well aligned with the capacities of the Red Cross chapters. Some field staff worked to incorporate the chapters into the recovery work but noted that chapters were busy with their own work and that the recovery

activities were not necessarily a priority for them, particularly in the first year. Some chapter management mentioned that the recovery business was left to the field staff and task force members while some chapter personnel complained that they were not well informed of what these field staff roles and activities (noting the direct line of communication from the field staff to HQ task force members bypassing the chapter).

In many communities, field staff worked to find a role for the chapter that was relevant for their normal service delivery. In Miyagi, automatic external defibrillators (AED) equipment was provided in all community centres to support people living in pre-fabricated housing. The Miyagi Chapter organised training sessions for the residents on how to use the equipment. In many prefectures, chapter staff supported nursing staff in organising and mobilising psychosocial support activities. Chapter staff seemingly became more involved in the second year as the recovery activities transitioned. Fukushima Chapter is a good example: after the field staff's departure in March 2012, the chapter became more involved in planning and managing the recovery activities. For fiscal year 2013 Fukushima Chapter has a detailed plan of action covering psychosocial, community mobilisation, physical well-being and medical recovery support.

### **Key findings**

- Overall the recovery plan was relevant but not overly strategic; it was more a list of projects that grew over time without clear criteria or categorisation
- Many interventions were relevant, addressing needs of communities through the provision of increased access to infrastructure and services
- JRCS flexibility with partners increased relevance of projects, allowing communities to *'build back better'*
- JRCS interventions were in line with local government priorities
- There was over-reliance on local government for needs assessments
- Chapter competencies and ability to reach the community were too limited for many of the recovery interventions



## 4.6. Appropriateness of coverage

Appropriateness of coverage examines how well tailored the JRCS interventions were to local needs, how they increased ownership and accountability and how proportionate the assistance was to the needs. Evaluations of coverage often look at:

- Whether resources are adequate for the emergency (usually in comparison with other emergencies);
- Whether support was provided according to need at national or regional level and why or why not; and
- Who received support at the lowest local level, and why, broken down by demographics.

This section will focus on where JRCS implemented recovery whereas the previous section on Relevance, examined what was done.

### Overall

The Evaluation Team found that the recovery interventions targeted the three most affected prefectures and took into account the demographics and vulnerabilities in those prefectures. At least one intervention targeted support regardless of where the displaced had relocated (six home appliances). In this respect, coverage was good; however poor information management prevented JRCS (and subsequently the Evaluation Team) from a sound assessment of coverage beyond the regional or prefecture level. This is likely to have limited JRCS in making informed decisions about which municipalities to support beyond those from which they received requests.




Figure 3: Damage in Prefectures that experienced at least one tsunami-related death. Source: Government of Japan. National Police Agency and Reconstruction Agency. March 2013.

## Discussion

As repeatedly noted, needs assessment was understood to be a function of local government. However as central government was not coordinating overall inputs, JRCS should have assessed needs and coverage vis-à-vis each prefecture: JRCS could see the big picture whereas each prefecture could not. In this regard, JRCS could have made more efforts to ensure equitable and adequate coverage.

The more insistent or loudest requesters could also have influenced coverage. Some municipalities lost up to 50% of their staff. Many were supplemented by municipality staff from other parts of the country that may not have known those communities well. Such factors could have led to gaps in needs identification and in coverage. Furthermore, given the number of evacuees in Ibaraki and Chiba, it is not clear why support was not also prioritized for these prefectures. In the September 2012 Self-Evaluation, JRI also noted that rationale for the three was not clear and recommended JRCS to clearly document their reasoning in the interest of transparency and accountability.

Many of the projects were targeted to the elderly. They were the majority segment of the population in the affected municipalities. In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima efforts were made to support children as well. In Miyagi, local government reported being concerned about losing even more young families and further upsetting the balance of the population pyramid. Hence, interventions that encouraged a return to normalcy were prioritised, such as the re-opening of schools. JRCS supported school buses, nurseries, school equipment and temporary gymnasiums that helped schools resume and the communities regain a sense of normalcy.

The JRCS home appliance programme that was implemented in conjunction with prefectures, targeted support to displaced persons who were scattered throughout Japan. Initially this programme was designed for displaced people within Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima but the programme was expanded as a significant number of people moved beyond these prefectures. In the end the programme reached 133,183 households nearly doubling the initial target. Expanding the criteria ensured those living with host families were not discriminated against. While this was a huge logistical challenge it increased the coverage and ultimately was fairer. Several JRCS HQ staff and at least one prefecture mentioned receiving complaints from persons who did not meet the criteria. Fukushima Prefecture and chapter staff felt that the criteria were clear and fair as they followed strict government procedures. Neither the JRCS nor the local government were able to report the number of prefectures and municipalities that received this support; although the application form contained all such data, it was not analysed in this manner.

JRCS is providing support to local governments through the establishment of 432 community-based warehouses located throughout Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures. Although they experienced a lower level of destruction, Ibaraki and Chiba, having a similar disaster profile as their neighbours may also have benefitted from this preparedness support.

With no experience in recovery activities and operating in a very challenging environment for at least the first year, JRCS did not organise its recovery data in a systematic way. For example, JRI was only able to assess certain interventions given the lack of well-managed data for others; the evaluation team was unable to assess coverage down to the municipal level, as JRCS did not organise its data in that way. Subsequent to the Team's request, the Task Force indicated that it would be producing

this type of summary data before the close of the programme. While this will provide a good, final picture of results and coverage, the fact that information was not organised in this manner early on is likely to have meant decisions to ensure adequate coverage were not taken properly. While significant interventions clearly occurred in the hardest hit municipalities and cities, e.g. Inshinomaki, Otsuchi, Kenesuma etc. the coverage could have been increased had JRCS taken a more analytical approach to decision-making.

Finally, while interventions were well targeted in the three most affected prefectures, the timeframe and the type of interventions could have been modified in areas where there had been significant displacement. Persons are likely to remain in pre-fabricated housing for one to three years or more before they have a permanent home.

<b>Prefecture</b>	<b>Total Evacuees in Prefecture</b>
<b>Miyagi</b>	108,357
<b>Iwate</b>	40,304
<b>Fukushima</b>	97,072
<b>Ibaraki</b>	5,403
<b>Chiba</b>	3,993
<b>Tochigi</b>	3,101
<b>Amori</b>	1,149
<b>Gunma</b>	1,770

*Source: Government of Japan, National Reconstruction Agency, March 2013.*

In Fukushima, it could be ten years or more and people cannot expect to live in a 15 square metre container for that duration. In the interim, additional support is likely to be needed from JRCS. When permanent housing is available, people will be living next to 'new neighbours' and support in creating a new sense of community might be warranted. Although its actual community reach is limited, JRCS is well known and could use this awareness to better support households to become communities again in the future.

### **Impact of coverage**

Through concentrated support in the three most affected prefectures, JRCS made a difference in the lives of beneficiaries through increased access to services, infrastructure and care. Impact beyond the prefecture level cannot be assessed due to limitations in data. Using nearly 50% of the budget, JRCS support went well beyond these prefectures through the implementation of the home appliance programme.

### **Key findings**

- Recovery activities targeted the most affected prefectures
- The programme took account of demographics and vulnerabilities in the prefectures, with many projects targeted to the needs of elderly and children
- The programme delivered support to all who were displaced by the disaster regardless of where they relocated (home appliances)

- Greater efforts may be need in areas where 'community rebuilding' will take some time, particularly in Fukushima
- Coverage and fairness could have been improved if JRCS would have had a more comprehensive understanding of needs and gaps and better data management
- Preparedness support was limited to the three most affected prefectures.

## 4.7. Standards and principles

### Definition

The Red Cross Red Crescent has always been at the forefront of raising humanitarian standards in order to make the world a safer place for all.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is founded on an ideal: to alleviate human suffering whomever it affects and wherever and however it occurs. The seven Fundamental Principles are the basis for the Movement's action at all times. The Movement is constantly re-examining and refining the way in which it works to ensure that its actions are in the best interests of the people it seeks to serve.

The ethics of humanitarian action have been further articulated in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. The International Federation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and six other leading aid agencies developed the Code of Conduct in 1994. It represented a huge leap forward in setting standards for the conduct of disaster relief operations. It reasserts the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and independence and incorporates more recent development concepts such as the respect for culture, participation, sustainability, accountability and dignity in images.

Another such initiative is the Sphere project, launched in 1997 by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and a group of non-governmental organisations.

One of the main pillars of the Sphere project is the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. The Humanitarian Charter upholds the right of people affected by disaster to life with dignity and thus to assistance providing for their basic needs.

The IFRC recognises the importance of being accountable to the people it serves, its donors, members, staff, volunteers and other stakeholders. This commitment is reflected in the ninth principle of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief: "We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources."

### Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

This is done to strive towards a culture of transparent accountability to stakeholders, to achieve best practice standards in operational excellence and to uphold Federation-wide common standards. Through this commitment, IFRC and JRCS provided open reporting and transparent information to donors, making effective and efficient use of resources and creating systems for lessons learning, including through the assessments by the Japan Research Institute and the two external evaluations undertaken in 2011-12 and 2013.

## Overall

The evaluation found that JRCS worked to uphold the Fundamental Principles throughout the recovery operation and tried to ensure that its assistance adhered to the Code of Conduct. Sphere was less well known and understood and many interviewed assumed that Sphere was not relevant or that support would automatically exceed these minimum standards.

The Japanese Red Cross and IFRC's work is guided by Strategy 2020, which puts forward three strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disaster and crises.
2. Enable healthy and safe living.
3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of nonviolence and peace.

This section looks at the extent to which JRCS internal systems and processes upheld its commitment to established international standards and principles for humanitarian action, particularly the Fundamental Principles of the

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, and Code for Good Partnership.

## Discussion

The vision of the Japanese Red Cross, as a member of the IFRC, is to inspire, encourage, facilitate and promote at all times all forms of humanitarian activities, with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering, thereby contributing to the maintenance and promotion of human dignity and peace in the world.

From interviews and secondary data review it appears that JRCS applied the prevailing Standards and Principles on Disaster Relief, though not necessarily in a conscious or deliberate manner. Observations from people interviewed demonstrated an absence of knowledge about standards and principles, but showed a genuine awareness of their applicability, not because they were promoting or advocating them, but because of the high standards of practice in Japan.

The JRCS recovery Plan for Action was aligned with the Red Cross Red Crescent principles and, among others, highlighted the following points:

- Fairness to all affected areas, communities and people
- Support for the most vulnerable
- Alignment with municipal action plans
- Accountability to donors, Sister Societies and the public (media, etc.)

From the limited review it appeared that awareness of the major international standards and principles was higher in the JRCS International Department than in other divisions.



Regarding the application of Sphere standards it seemed that they were not applied because some assumed they were not relevant, as Japan's standards were known to be high. Staff seemed to misunderstand that Sphere can be used anywhere as long as it is contextualised to the environment in which it is applied. Furthermore Sphere includes many principles and standard ways of working that are useful regardless of the values attached to the minimum standards.

Gender equality is another integral part of the Red Cross Red Crescent's goal to promote respect for diversity and human dignity, and to reduce intolerance, discrimination and social exclusion. Addressing the causes and consequences of gender inequality is strongly linked to the organisation's humanitarian mandate, "to improve the lives of vulnerable people". The importance of this work is also outlined in the fundamental principle of impartiality. Out of the majority of interviews, there seemed to be limited awareness of the IFRC gender policy. Recovery interventions were not assessed according to gender needs but were not found to be inappropriate (age was more of a defining factor). The evaluation also found that JRCS were applying the psychosocial support guidelines in the training of nurses for future psychosocial programming.

#### **Good Practice Checklist for Gender and Diversity in Recovery**

- Conduct a full gender analysis, as an essential component of recovery needs assessment.
- Ensure that the team conducting the needs assessment is gender and diversity balanced.
- Consult with, and fully involve, women and men from all social and economic groupings in the affected communities when making decisions about the repair, design and location of new housing and community infrastructures, such as water and sanitation facilities and community halls.
- Encourage local participation in physical reconstruction, including the hiring of women and providing them with training in construction-related skills.
- Obtain accurate information on the different roles women and men play in contributing to the household's food security or income, whether as family members or heads of the household, and design livelihood recovery activities that meet the needs of both.
- Design housing, cash or food based assistance (home reconstruction, cash or food for work, cash grants), that provides opportunities for both vulnerable men and women and ensures that those without land title, such as squatters, unregistered migrants, and female heads of household, are not missed. Pay all persons fairly and equally for performing the work.
- Provide male and female health personnel to meet on-going health and rehabilitation needs, especially when cultural norms may not allow women to be examined by male physicians, and when women's mobility may be restricted.
- Ensure that recovery assistance continues to include items (condoms and midwifery kits), and information that meets men and women's reproductive health needs, including protection against HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.

*Source: Adapted from World Bank (2009).*

**The overall design** on Gender issues would need to take account of the following:

- Inclusion of gender-disaggregated data in the reporting systems,
- Setting recruitment quotas for female volunteers of 50 per cent in Community Disaster Management Committees, and 30 per cent in Community Disaster Response Teams,
- Holding basic first aid and disaster risk reduction trainings for both men and women, and other training courses for women based on self-identified needs and priorities,
- Taking gender differences in vulnerability into account when planning and implementing disaster mitigation measures,

- Providing livelihood-support measures according to the different needs of men and women,
- Involving local political and religious leaders as active volunteers when addressing issues of cultural and religious constraints to women's participation.

### Key findings

- There was no deliberate decision to apply international standards (e.g. Sphere) as it was largely presumed that national standards were sufficient (observance of local culture and customs)
- Internationally, there was trust that standards would be upheld in a high-income country like Japan
- There was limited awareness of international standards amongst staff interviewed, including gender issues
- In recognition of these gaps, psychosocial support guidelines have been adapted in new training undertaken by JRCS Nursing Department

Too much is at stake in this changing world. We have to work together for humanity else we risk allowing the formation of a humanitarian vacuum – a worst-case scenario where people in need cannot access assistance due to non-respect of humanitarian principles. This would be an unacceptable failure, particularly in light of the tremendous potential that we all have as individuals and organizations, and as partners.

*(Opening statement by the President of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Tadateru Konoé at the 31<sup>st</sup> International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 28 November to 1 December 2011)*

## 4.8. Preparedness

This section examines the extent to which JRCS was prepared for this type and scale of disaster and if JRCS made provisions for interventions in recovery. It also reviews the status of the new contingency plan, and how well JRCS and IFRC have followed-up on the management response plan (MRP) to the February 2012 evaluation report, including institutional follow-up on Red Cross Red Crescent preparedness for response to humanitarian needs arising from nuclear disasters. It also examines IFRC's preparedness mechanisms to react to JRCS' acceptance of international assistance, and to mobilise its technical support for JRCS recovery intervention.

### Overall

Despite the absence of preparedness for a specific recovery programme in the contingency plan, JRCS quickly produced an *ad hoc* Plan of Action for recovery, making the best use of the huge amount of unsolicited international donations.

JRCS has already initiated follow-up action to the management response plan from the February 2012 recommendations. JRCS' latest contingency plan builds on the experiences of this disaster and provides for some flexibility. However, it does not embrace a "recovery phase" as its scope of intervention. JRCS was not prepared for nuclear disaster, but provided goods and services responding to the needs of local communities, and has just begun discussions on its potential role in addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear disaster.

### Absence of mandate

Within the legal framework and system of disaster management in Japan, JRCS is not mandated to engage in the recovery phase of disaster, and thus its contingency plans developed in response to earthquake-related disasters do not cover plans for recovery interventions.

As a disaster in Tohoku was not among the expected earthquake-related disasters, JRCS had to base its response on its contingency plan for Tokai Earthquake that it had prepared in 2010. That contingency plan focused on emergency relief according to JRCS' mandated role, assuming a period of intervention of around 6 months and provided guidelines for dealing with possible international assistance to come. In the absence of plans for recovery interventions, JRCS produced an *ad hoc* recovery Plan of Action (PoA) to make the best use of the large amount of donations received from the international community. JRCS' programme based on the PoA responded to the acute needs of the affected population in their early recovery phase (the six home appliances), and over time JRCS shifted its interventions to more conventional Red Cross programmes such as PSP tailored to the affected community in temporary housing compounds.

The contingency plan for Tokyo Inland Earthquake issued in April 2011 is basically a copy of the Tokai contingency plan, in terms of the scope of intervention. The latest contingency plan for Tonankai and Tokai issued in August 2012 reflected on the lessons learnt in the Tohoku disaster and built on recommendations from the February 2012 evaluation of the emergency intervention, providing flexibility in disaster response

and maximising the use of Red Cross resources and networks. However, it has yet to include longer-term recovery as part of the plan.

### **Capacity-building for preparedness**

Building on its experience of this disaster, JRCS has taken several initiatives both at HQ and Chapter level in a variety of areas as shown in the following examples:

- Resumption of national scale volunteer training sponsored by JRCS HQ from 2012
- Co-sponsoring with the Council of Social Welfare the volunteer coordination symposium on issues related to international standards, needs assessment, etc. from 2012
- Founding in 2012 of ACT Research Institute in Ishinomaki Hospital to improve medical intervention in disaster through networking of hands-on players, which proved highly useful in Ishinomaki for this disaster
- Initiation of Study Group with other humanitarian NGOs and GOs on GEJET and International Humanitarian Assistance from 2012
- Compilation of guidelines for JRCS intervention in nuclear emergency, interim report within 2013, launching of Nuclear Disaster Information Centre in 2013
- The importance of communication is gradually recognised by JRCS at large, with an increase in budget and staffing for the public relations department
- JRCS HQ issued an official request in March 2013 to all the Chapters, urging them to strengthen their volunteer capacity by preparing them for large-scale disasters, including in recovery phase.

### **Key Findings**

- In the absence of a mandate and in view of limited capacity, JRCS was not prepared to engage in recovery
- Despite the management's response to the February 2012 evaluation and the flexibility of the new contingency plan, "recovery" is not yet well defined
- JRCS is improving its capacity to respond to humanitarian needs in large-scale disasters through the training of volunteers and staff, networking with external parties and research, to prepare for possible future intervention in recovery phase

#### **International support for domestic operations**

JRCS' basic policy regarding international assistance as defined in its contingency plan at the time of this disaster was as follows:

##### Acceptable assistance

1. Cash with no earmarking
2. RFL delegate from ICRC to address the needs of foreigners in the affected area
3. IFRC representative to ensure close coordination with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

4. Reporting delegate from IFRC as required
5. Information delegate from IFRC as required
6. No IFRC delegate if not coordinated by IFRC

Assistance that is not acceptable (noting that an appeal would not be launched)

1. FACT
2. In-kind donations

JRCS handled the incoming international assistance in accordance with its contingency plan, focused on relief only. IFRC had been building its capacity around recovery awareness and guidance, and was ready to mobilise resources not only for emergency relief but also for recovery. IFRC's A/P Zone was ready to provide extensive technical support. All the support provided by IFRC - including dispatch of HLM, provision of IFRC representative throughout the operation, provision of a communication delegate based on an advance agreement with JRCS - proved highly useful and was appreciated by JRCS. When the PNS gathered in May 2011 they (and IFRC) accepted JRCS' *ad hoc* plan of action for recovery as presented, against a background of time pressure, based on trust in JRCS' integrity and capacity. It should be noted too that it was as important for the international donors to give, than for JRCS to receive the donations.

IFRC and donor NS accepted JRCS' contingency plan as it was, including the fact that JRCS had decided not to launch an appeal, giving rise to several questions, such as accountability standards in handling unsolicited donations, IFRC cost recovery mechanism in supporting the NS, use of technical support from A/P Zone including recovery policy, guidance and tools available. IFRC and NS support to JRCS was processed through JRCS' International Department to its Domestic Disaster Operation. JRCS' policy on accepting international assistance in the latest contingency plan for Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake is more accommodating and flexible than the earlier contingency plans: accepting the possibility of receiving proposals for donations in cash, goods and human resources in such areas as safety of foreign residents, medical support, water and sanitation, livelihood support. The basic policy is as follows:

Support that JRCS accepts from the International Red Cross Red Crescent

1. Cash donations
2. ERU and others as per needs defined in the affected area
3. RFL delegate from ICRC to address needs of foreigners
4. IFRC Head of Delegation and other delegates as necessary to ensure close coordination with Red Cross Red Crescent Societies
5. Media and other IFRC delegates for reporting to International Red Cross Red Crescent
6. International Red Cross/Red Crescent experts specialised in nuclear, tsunami

and other disasters

7. High-level assessment mission dispatched under IFRC coordination

#### Support acceptable with conditions

Delegates from NS:

1. Minimum number of visitors
2. Technical personnel specialised in the equipment attached to specific NS
3. Advisors specialised in various activities to be carried out by HQ task force
4. Donations in-kind: on a case-by-case basis, coordinating with authorities as necessary

#### Mechanism for accepting International Red Cross Red Crescent support

1. Clear information to IFRC on acceptable/unacceptable support
2. In addition to HQ staff, staff with international experience, ERU experience, ERU registered from International Medical Stronghold Hospitals.
3. Call for language volunteer support.

### **Key Findings**

- IFRC and JRCS had an agreement in the area of communications that proved highly useful
- There was no clarity within IFRC as to the handling of a “no appeal” situation and its funding implications
- The domestic and international departments of JRCS HQ have different approaches that should be made more complementary to strengthen its preparedness

### **Public fundraising**

JRCS' mandated role includes fundraising for cash distribution for the victims of disasters (*gienkin*) as a designated public corporation. In this disaster, JRCS together with other two fundraisers, namely The Public Chest and NHK, had to host, with the support from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the central coordination committee for cash distribution, inviting representatives of the affected 15 prefectures. *Gienkin* was and still is a burden for JRCS in terms of its reputation in regard to the speed of distribution. Additionally, JRCS incurred an extra financial burden of US\$ 10 million to manage *gienkin* that was drawn from its own budget. Parties concerned foresee to review the issue of *gienkin* on the basis of a report currently being compiled by JRCS.



## Finding

- *Gienkin* was an extra burden to JRCS, and may have caused some damage to its reputation.

## Nuclear disaster

The Tohoku disaster was triple, with an earthquake, the resulting tsunami and the nuclear accident caused at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant hit by the tsunami. The Government of Japan, the prefectures, municipalities and communities were not prepared for a nuclear accident, neither was JRCS. JRCS had no policy, contingency plan or manual to help it address a nuclear accident. In order to assist JRCS relief teams in the Fukushima prefecture, ICRC immediately deployed an NRBC expert to work on a radiation protection regime for staff and volunteers working in the area. JRCS sent experts of nuclear medicine from Hiroshima and Nagasaki Red Cross Atomic Bomb Hospitals to the Fukushima Chapter to give advice. A Nuclear Disaster Preparedness Task Force was formed to manage and coordinate JRCS programmes in response to the disaster and for a potential future nuclear disaster.

In the areas of health promotion for the affected population, JRCS programmes included the provision of Whole Body Counters and Radiation Measuring Instrument for Food for Fukushima prefecture and municipalities, the construction of a temporary gymnasium and indoor playground for school children in Fukushima Prefecture, health check-up of evacuees outside Fukushima Prefecture, assessment of health needs for the evacuees in Iwaki city and PSP in the community. JRCS, in collaboration with Co-Op (a Japanese cooperative) is conducting nationwide Infant Safety Training for the general public. Most of these interventions will be concluding in 2013 except for the community based programmes mainly conducted by chapters and the programme with Co-Op.

As for preparedness for a future nuclear disaster, relief guidelines and a code of conduct are currently being prepared by JRCS, and the training of nuclear specialists with the help of Hiroshima University is underway. A nursing education programme is being updated to include relief in a nuclear disaster. JRCS HQ will be launching the Nuclear Disaster Information Centre in 2013, for dissemination and advocacy. Following the IFRC General Assembly resolution of November 2011, JRCS hosted a National Society Consultation Meeting on Nuclear Disaster Preparedness in Tokyo in May 2012, followed by the IFRC Governing Board Session in June 2012 which endorsed next steps and confirmed the progress made.

Two years after the nuclear accident, the trauma of the affected population, in particular of children, is coming to the surface. The need for psychosocial support to the communities is becoming more evident and crucial to community resilience. JRCS' Fukushima Chapter, in recognition of the long-term needs for psychosocial support for the affected population, is determined to continue its PSP programmes, which can be implemented by the chapter without financial support from HQ. With all these efforts underway, JRCS has just begun its discussions on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear disaster for community recovery.

## Key Findings

- JRCS, both at HQ and chapters, was not prepared for a nuclear disaster
- JRCS has just begun discussions on its role in nuclear disaster

## 5. Conclusions

The following conclusions are derived from the findings of the evaluation's eight areas of enquiry; they are intended to provoke a discussion on the validity and strength of findings before the formulation of recommendations. The findings are summarised in the table hereafter. They were presented to JRCS management in the concluding phase of this evaluation, on 12 March, and were agreed to in principle.

### Summary table of findings

#### Efficiency & Effectiveness

Effectiveness of recovery actions did not suffer from overall weakness of plan

Assessment of recovery needs by JRCS per se was not effective, relying only on requests submitted by prefectures

Nevertheless, using prefectures and municipalities was an effective way to engage in recovery

Delivery activities were well focused on beneficiaries' needs, and timely

As implementation was in the form of funds transfer through local government, recovery action was not hindered by JRCS administrative processes

#### Impact

Increased access to healthcare, health services and actions promoting a healthy lifestyle are likely to have mitigated morbidity and even mortality amongst the population

More than 130,000 households spread throughout Japan received support (home appliances) which is likely to have enabled beneficiaries to regain a sense of normalcy

Increased public awareness of JRCS action may result in greater support and contributions in the future as well as increased expectations

The nuclear disaster was a wake-up call for IFRC and much of the membership to increase preparedness and capacity to deal with this type of impact; the lessons learned will and already have assisted the IFRC and NS in updating their approach to recovery

The openness of JRCS to the external, international evaluation may have set new standards in accountability and learning for other National Societies to follow in the future

#### Accountability

In accepting external contributions while taking the decision not to appeal, JRCS was determined to demonstrate full accountability

JRCS made considerable efforts to be accountable to its international donors

JRCS invested less in accountability to its public including its beneficiaries; more could have been done to publicise what it was doing, for whom and how

International standards of beneficiary accountability (participation, transparency, M&E and complaints & response) were only partially met

The main accountability tool (Plan of Action) did not meet minimum standards (lacking clear strategy, criteria, objectives, targets, and a plan for M&E)

### **Coordination**

Coordination was a challenge for all actors given the unprecedented disaster

JRCS was highly collaborative with local government, only somewhat collaborative with Chapters (they had a limited role), and minimally coordinated with NGOs/NPOs

There was eventually good coordination with public institutions on *gienkin* but poor public communication; this led to misunderstandings and frustration amongst the public

JRCS was very accommodating with donor National Societies but accepted only limited support from IFRC. Greater technical support from IFRC or even other National Societies could have improved the recovery operation

### **Relevance**

Overall the recovery plan was relevant but not overly strategic but was a collection of projects

Many interventions were relevant, addressing needs of communities through the provision of increased access to infrastructure and services

JRCS flexibility with partners increased relevance of projects, allowing communities to 'build back better'

JRCS interventions were in line with local government priorities

There was an over-reliance on local government for needs assessment

Chapter competencies and ability to reach the community were too limited for many of the recovery interventions

### **Appropriateness of Coverage**

Recovery activities targeted the most affected prefectures

The programme took account of demographics and vulnerabilities in the prefectures, with many projects targeted to the needs of elderly and children

The programme delivered support to all who were displaced by the disaster regardless of where they relocated (home appliances)

Greater efforts may be needed in areas where 'community rebuilding' will take some time, particularly in Fukushima

Coverage and fairness could have been improved if JRCS would have had a more comprehensive understanding of needs and gaps

### **Standards & Principles**

There was no deliberate decision to apply international standards (e.g. Sphere) as it was largely presumed that national standards were sufficient (observance of local culture and customs)

Internationally, there was trust that standards would be upheld in a high-income country like Japan

There was limited awareness of international standards across JRCS, including gender issues

In recognition of these gaps, psychosocial support guidelines have been adapted in new training undertaken by JRCS Nursing Department

### **Preparedness**

In the absence of mandate and in view of limited capacity, JRCS was not prepared to engage in recovery

Despite the management's response to the February 2012 evaluation and the flexibility of the new contingency plan, "recovery" is not yet well defined

JRCS is improving its capacity to respond to humanitarian needs in mega-disasters through training of volunteers and staff, networking with external parties and research, to prepare for possible future intervention in recovery phase

IFRC and JRCS had an agreement in the area of communications that proved highly useful

IFRC was not clear enough in handling "no appeal" situation and its funding implications

The domestic and international departments of JRCS HQ have different approaches that should be made more complementary to strengthen its preparedness

JRCS, both at HQ and chapters, was not prepared for nuclear disaster.

JRCS has just begun discussions on their role in nuclear disaster.

## Discussion on conclusions

### Recovery Planning

The Evaluation Team undertook significant data collection over the course of its six weeks in Japan. The Team interviewed 115 persons across a variety of stakeholders as noted in the annexes and surveyed 53 persons representing 47 National Societies. Additionally the Team consulted a wide-range of documents in English and Japanese; several of those documents included evaluations undertaken by JRI and one by an external group of consultants (Talbot 2012). The JRI evaluations focusing on recovery, public image and beneficiary surveys provided useful input that supported the triangulation process. While there were inevitable gaps and limitations to data and analysis, the Team felt confident in its findings, concluding that:

- Overall, the response was efficient
- Considering the absence of a recovery mandate and the lack of a thorough plan, recovery activities were underway quickly
- The timeframe of the recovery plan of action was too short in view of
  - The time it takes for recovery to take hold
  - The limitations of JRCS
  - The long-term implications of the nuclear disaster, and
  - The sizeable financial resources JRCS had at its disposal.

Like JRCS, the government responded quickly to the disaster and victims were rapidly accommodated in temporary housing and key infrastructure was repaired with no delay. While doing things efficiently and effectively may be a characteristic of Japanese culture, in some way this may have been too fast. JRCS staff felt pressure to spend quickly: some of it was real, from the leadership, and some of it was perceived, from donor National Societies. The leadership noted that it wanted to avoid the difficult situation encountered by other National Societies that had been criticised by the media for a perceived slow response (e.g. Hurricane Katrina, Christchurch Earthquake).

The recovery response was partly influenced by JRCS' international experience. However this experience was too limited to allow JRCS to move forward in a comfortable and confident manner. The lack of mandate and experience combined with the pressure to spend fast resulted in JRCS acting without developing a detailed recovery strategy or plan. JRCS also overlooked a key lesson from past experience, that recovery takes time. Those factors led JRCS to provide support and services in a short time frame, having to spend some US\$ 700 million in three years' time. This may have caused JRCS to overlook the longer-term needs of displaced communities. One international NGO working in Japan received US\$ 70 million and with that 'large' sum of money developed a ten-year recovery plan. The agency is only now beginning to develop a more coherent strategy for Fukushima because it felt needs and potential so far had not been clear enough.

Given the disaster profile of the country, with a future large-scale disaster a high probability, JRCS has to profile and equip itself to better react to a future similar situation. A senior government official noted that external funding was "inevitable" for such high profile disasters. Because of this, JRCS should make plans for recovery as was recommended in the September 2011 relief evaluation (Talbot 2012). Furthermore, given the significant number of displaced and the length of time full recovery may take, its comprehensive recovery plan should draw on the capacity and experience of chapters, including the engagement of volunteers to support communities.

## **Preparedness**

The government and various partners, including JRCS are preparing for future disasters, with a variety of scenarios; one such scenario is the Nankai earthquake predicted at a magnitude of 9.0, resulting potentially in damages in the range of JPY 220 trillion<sup>23</sup> (not including costs related to potential damages of nuclear power plants).

The evaluation noted a range of findings linked to preparedness and programme quality. The earlier evaluation of the relief phase (Talbot 2012) found that neither IFRC nor JRCS were prepared to deal with a nuclear disaster; concrete recommendations were submitted. One year later, while several initiatives have been launched, it cannot be said that either IFRC or JRCS are yet prepared for such disasters, and both organisations need to maintain the momentum. That same evaluation also recommended that JRCS should plan for recovery (JRCS accepted the recommendation). A review of progress shows that this has not happened yet; according to some senior staff, the current recovery plan should first be complete to learn from this experience.

This evaluation concluded that JRCS was not prepared for recovery nor was it fully prepared for nuclear disaster. The Team concluded that the quality of JRCS' work, whether in the areas of relief, recovery, preparedness or development, could be greatly enhanced by undertaking a few steps (see recommendations hereafter).

## **Communications**

The review surmised that JRCS' external communications capacity was limited and that a close, trusting relationship with the media was lacking. This was corroborated by the JRI public image survey. One interviewee noted 'it is ironic that JRCS is well known but not well understood'. JRCS does not appear to have profiled itself with its public; to ensure the alignment of its mission and expectations, it should clearly determine its role and communicate accordingly.

## **Community reach**

The review found that JRCS had limited capacity at the community level (also evidenced in Talbot 2012 in relation to its ability to mobilise and manage volunteers). Although the Council of Social Welfare at prefecture and municipality level is in charge of volunteers, and JRCS is only mandated to cover certain functions in relief, given its nationwide coverage (47 chapters and more than 66,000 employees), opportunities exist to increase the National Society's relevance and effectiveness with a well-functioning volunteer system, whether at times of disaster or not. Clarifying JRCS' role in community-based activities, reinvigorating its volunteer base along with the Council of Social Welfare, and reaching out to NGOs/NPOs to complement respective roles and prepare for future disasters are areas that JRCS should investigate and invest in.

Although this was not assessed comprehensively, the evaluation found limited awareness and understanding of some principles (e.g. gender; Sphere). JRCS' quality of work could be improved through endorsing key principles in both disaster response and everyday work.

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<sup>23</sup> Kyodo. "JPY 220 trillion hit seen from Nankai quake." The Japan Times, March 19, 2013



## Synergies

Although not part of the evaluation's Terms of Reference, the Team noted a functional divide between the domestic and international departments. This is common to several large National Societies and in some respect is natural given the differing clients of domestic and international departments.

The evaluation found that many international programming and good practice lessons were applied in the recovery programme e.g. working with government and ensuring interventions were aligned or complementary to government actions, planning early for recovery, being open to external evaluations and posting results publically. Some were not e.g. taking time to plan and re-plan based on needs assessment and analysis, considering all facets of being accountable to beneficiaries, and taking account of local capacities in relief and recovery, including local community organisations. The Evaluation Team concluded that better practice could be reached if there were a stronger operational relationship between the domestic and international departments.

## International support through IFRC

The IFRC, from its HQ in Geneva as well as through its A/P Zone Office and Regional Office in Beijing, has developed a considerable wealth of experience in relief and recovery, which can be tailored to the needs of very different situations. Through its global reach-out capacity and dense network, the International Federation (secretariat and Member Societies) is in a position to provide any of its members with valuable support to prepare for crisis, to respond to emergencies, and to plan for recovery.

The evaluation concluded that:

- IFRC had more technical capacity than was utilized in the Japan 2011 disaster; this was due both because of JRCS' reluctance to accept greater support and because of the divide between international and domestic departments;
- IFRC has a role to play in ensuring the global application of agreed policies, principles and standards. This role appears to be unevenly applied between developed and developing countries;
- The IFRC technical support in PMER was poor, contributing to limited planning and analysis that impacted the quality of reporting;
- IFRC made significant progress in following up on the relief evaluation (Talbot 2012) but there is a lack of overall ownership of the management response plan.
- The Asia Pacific Zone does not undertake thematic or meta evaluations of its work, with evaluation responses focused on individual events;
- In large National Societies, IFRC appears to prioritize support to international departments rather than those who are responsible for domestic service delivery.

**In conclusion**, assuming the validity of the Team's findings, there are a number of actions that JRCS should take to further improve its preparedness for future disasters and enhance the quality of its engagement with communities in both relief and recovery. The IFRC for its part should also consider some actions that would give it greater relevance to its membership.

## 6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are put forth as a direct result of the evaluation's findings. They are addressed both to JRCS and IFRC, with an expectation that both the National Society and the International Federation will gain from their mutual experience in driving their implementation.

### 1. Recovery: a strategic choice

- Recovery is an integral part of the process that helps individuals in communities to rebuild their lives shattered by disaster, and as such should be part of the Red Cross' extended mandate.
- As recommended in the first evaluation, JRCS should take a formal policy decision to include recovery as an area of operations. Recovery should be clearly defined on the basis of the guidelines developed by the IFRC. It should be managed and integrated in the organisational structure in the same manner as other activities, such as disaster response and relief.
- The spectrum of activities falling under recovery has to be defined, and should include needs assessment, planning and programming, and monitoring. Tools should be developed, including training, to prepare staff for the tasks related to the Society's recovery responsibility.
- IFRC should provide JRCS with the appropriate support in developing recovery in its institutional portfolio. This should include sharing material concerning recovery, and supporting the adaptation of such material to the Japanese context. It should also include learning and training, for example through workshops and staff exchanges with Federation and other National Societies.
- IFRC should develop an arrangement whereby it can provide immediate, pre-planned support to JRCS in the event of another large-scale disaster (stand-by arrangements)

### 2. Raise the profile of JRCS

- As a result of the high visibility gained by JRCS in Japan, the National Society should devote time and resources to develop its image as an innovative, forward-looking, relevant and effective organisation. The profile of the National Society should be revamped as an organisation closer to the community.
- JRCS should identify its major strengths and communicate them clearly to the Japanese public, with senior management engaging fully in the new profiling of the National Society.
- Bridges should be built between JRCS and the media, at national and prefecture level, as well as with other entities that have to become part of JRCS' network of supporters, in the private and public sector. An assessment of potential partners should be conducted as soon as possible, building on the Society's current visibility.
- JRCS should continue to build the in-house capacity of its public relations team to proactively manage the image of the JRCS

### 3. Accountability to beneficiaries

- Being accountable to those we support has long been a principle of Red Cross Red Crescent work and is strongly embodied in the Code of Conduct. Action

should be taken by JRCS in four areas, to adhere more closely to accountability principles:

- a. Transparency
  - b. Participation
  - c. Monitoring and evaluation
  - d. Complaints and response
- Internationally accepted standards (see Sphere, the Listening Project, Humanitarian Accountability Project, etc.) are not consistently understood or applied in Red Cross Red Crescent projects or programmes. IFRC should develop a short (30-45 minute) on-line course on the Learning Platform, on minimum standards: what they are, who they are for, how they can be applied, lessons learned for the membership. This could include articulation on how select tools in the secretariat (beneficiary communications programme) can help but also why 'bencoms' tools alone are not enough.
  - JRCS should work to increase organisational awareness and application of minimum standards in beneficiary accountability. Accountability to beneficiaries (AtB) should apply to JRCS service delivery both in domestic and international operations.
  - Steps for JRCS to do this could include the following (and should be developed and implemented over the next two years):
    - a. Develop a short guidance document on accountability to beneficiaries and what forms it could take in JRCS relief and 'peace-time' programming (3 page summary and 10 slide powerpoint); JRCS should not wait for IFRC to develop the on-line training
    - b. Consider partnering with JPF, JANIC and JEN to develop national guidelines
    - c. Each Director-General should be given an orientation in AtB and should hold a one-hour orientation meeting with his or her team
    - d. Designated staff from domestic relief, international and public relations should work together to develop a short 'menu of activities' to help operationalize each of the four areas in line with JRCS capacity and service delivery
    - e. The menu of activities should be included in staff orientation, disaster relief and other SOPs; international delegates should also be briefed on AtB and how to support NS in ensuring they are applied
    - f. Designated staff should provide training to all Chapters using the orientation material and the menu of activities; the Nursing Department may want to further contextualise the material for their line of work and provide orientation to teams across the network
    - g. The Disaster Relief Department should ensure that reviews on progress and quality of AtB work are included in their post-action reviews
    - h. Chapters should review progress in meeting standards on an annual basis
    - i. Public Relations Department should review the impact of PR tools on HQ, chapters and hospitals in meeting the standards, on an annual basis

#### **4. Partnerships**

To support preparedness, response and community outreach, JRCS should engage into partnership with key stakeholders in the private and public sectors. This could include key corporate partners building on current agreements, NGOs/NPOs and government agencies such as Social Welfare departments at prefecture and municipal levels. Many local government agencies reported not being aware of JRCS' role in disaster or 'peacetime' opening opportunities to raise awareness.

- 1) If not already available, JRCS should create succinct, formal materials on the organisation's mission, mandate and strategic direction. This should include an articulation of what local government can expect in times of disaster as well as in 'peacetime'.
- 2) Chapters, using these materials, should provide an orientation to counterparts in prefectures and municipalities
- 3) Awareness raising should be conducted with key corporate players and NGOs; chapters should undertake this with key stakeholders in their region, while HQ should undertake this with national actors
- 4) After identifying its key corporate and public stakeholders, JRCS should enter into a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with them, agreeing on their respective activation in the coming years

## **5. Role in community and volunteers**

The Evaluation Team found that JRCS had limited outreach capacity and chapter activities were, in general, limited to first aid, fundraising and disaster preparedness/response (although it was noted there is variation across the 47 chapters). This limited chapters' involvement in community-based recovery activities despite staff enthusiasm. JRCS needs to better profile itself, determining its role as a community-based organisation, ensuring that the role of volunteers is commensurate with the community focus. Suggested steps are:

- 1) JRCS could better respond to the changing needs of Japanese society by being involved in daily life of vulnerable people, e.g. by providing support services through community based volunteers. This will help to
  - a. Promote, guarantee and recognise the full exercise of human rights and International Humanitarian Law as key to social inclusion, as well as contributing to non-violent culture and peace
  - b. Develop intervention strategies in the social setting (family and community) to prevent and/or alleviate the factors responsible for discrimination, stigmatisation and social exclusion
- 2) Promote greater volunteer participation in all activities of the organization, foster greater identification with its aims and objectives and provide training that allows volunteers both to perform their activities and to grow personally
- 3) Learning from this disaster's experience, develop a more rational approach to needs assessment (keeping JRCS capacities, interests, choices and resources in mind) that would allow volunteers to respond to a broad spectrum of basic complementary social welfare needs
- 4) Explore opportunities for Red Cross youth and specialised corporate volunteers
- 5) Develop a strategy for community services and engagement of volunteers at community level to respond to assessed needs
- 6) JRCS HQ should support Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Chapters to identify and share with other chapters their experiences and lessons in community-based services and in working through volunteers
- 7) IFRC should provide JRCS with information on peer support from other NS with experience in this type of services and promote the cooperation among Sister Societies
- 8) IFRC should support JRCS with the adaptation of material for services and training of volunteers in this field.

## 6. Formulate a recovery plan for the next 3 – 5 years

The evaluation concluded that JRCS had done well in supporting people and communities in the recovery from the triple disaster of March 2011. While much has been done to date, hundreds of communities will remain in temporary housing as the government works to reclaim and prepare land for new neighbourhoods (in the case of Iwate and Miyagi) or decontaminate entire cities and towns (in the case of parts of Fukushima). As of March 2013, 313,000 people remained in temporary housing, mostly in small, 15 square meter prefabricated housing and some in temporary rentals or with family and friends.

These artificial, temporary communities face serious challenges. The elderly are isolated as they no longer live near neighbours they have known for most of their lives; many people are unemployed and idle; in some cases, families are split as one parent has remained behind or moved on to find work while the other cares for the children. Many people are not settled and many continue to move in the hope of finding employment or a better location.

Construction of new neighbourhoods will take one to three years more; decontaminating areas of Fukushima will take five to ten years, according to current government projections. Some towns may not become habitable again and inhabitants might have to permanently relocate elsewhere assuming the government can identify land.

Support for those temporary communities is likely to be needed for the next several years, as new housing becomes available and new communities form. With its remaining resources, JRCS should consider the role it can play in that context, through its chapters and branches. In particular, JRCS should address the role of PSP and other community-based support that can help build the resilience of such communities and prepare them for future disasters. Some suggested steps are:

- 1) Summarise and analyse all the results to date of the 2011-2013 recovery Plan of Action. The analysis should include a review of results by all municipalities supported by intervention area (the current information system cannot produce this easily); final results should be shared with key stakeholders including the public and international donors
- 2) With local government and community leaders, review temporary communities including location, numbers and how they are currently being supported (by Social Welfare and other NPOs/NGOs)
- 3) Reconsider current recovery project requests in light of the analysis of results to date (some areas may have already received significant support or others may have gaps) and of revised objectives (see below). With remaining resources, JRCS should adjust anticipated results to evolving needs (e.g. purchasing US\$ 600,000 Whole Body Counters for local government vs. community-mobilisation activities targeting communities in temporary housing)
- 4) In cooperation with chapters, prefectures, key municipalities and community members, determine the role that JRCS can play in providing community-based support in temporary communities as they transition into permanent ones. Ideas could include psychosocial programming, psychological first aid, promotion of volunteerism to support community-identified projects, first aid training, disaster preparedness, social welfare support to the elderly, local and international fundraising, Red Cross Youth/Junior Red Cross training, working alongside other NGOs/NPOs to support community mobilisation and community development etc.



- 5) Draw up a draft plan that clearly states the revised goal of such a recovery plan, with 2 or 3 main objectives, expected results, key strategies and actions to achieve those results, timeframe and budget. The plan should be activated and updated by the chapters in Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi and the results summarised in a modified overall plan. Plans should be linked to the on-going work of the JRCS hospitals and should clearly build on disaster preparedness

Technical support could be provided by JRI and IFRC. This process could help to include recovery in JRCS' contingency plans.

## **7. Principles**

While JRCS did apply the Fundamental Principles and other major standards regarding disaster relief in responding to the disaster, opportunities exist to increase awareness and ensure that staff know and enact key principles and standards in their daily work.

- 1) JRCS should review how key principles and standards such as the Fundamental Principles, Gender policy, Principles and Rules in Disaster Relief and Sphere are currently incorporated in mandatory training and orientations for all departments
- 2) HR should devise a strategy to ensure this awareness is widespread and maintained (i.e. not a one-off workshop but rather a procedure that is part of the hiring, orientation, rotation and performance review processes); the strategy should include raising and maintaining awareness amongst volunteers
- 3) IFRC should support JRCS in organising a workshop on the Principles and Rules of Disaster Relief between domestic and international departments, and with the broader participation and involvement of JRCS chapters help to promote key standards and principles
- 4) IFRC should support JRCS in accessing core reference and training materials on principles and values in action
- 5) Specific focus should be given to the IFRC Gender Policy and related guidance and tools to help creating wider awareness in the National Society; this should include gender sensitive approaches to disaster management (noted by the World Bank as a significant gap for most organisations responding to Japan's triple disaster)
- 6) Awareness raising should include Strategy 2020 and what that means for JRCS

## **8. Humanitarian preparedness for nuclear accident**

This was noted in the MRP of the first evaluation. Efforts in this area must continue for the International Federation as a whole, including National Societies along with JRCS:

- 1) In the process of compiling relief guidelines and code of conduct, consult with IFRC and share the products (guidelines and code) with the Movement partners through workshops to be coordinated by IFRC
- 2) IFRC, jointly with ICRC, should formulate guidance for the Movement to address the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear disaster
- 3) IFRC, as and when required by JRCS, should contribute to the Nuclear Information Centre to be launched in 2013
- 4) JRCS, with the support of IFRC, should organise an international workshop targeting nurses and volunteers on long-term community based PSP, for NS to develop programmes that fit in the social and cultural context



- 5) IFRC should look into ways to support the Sr. Officer for Nuclear Preparedness beyond the initial year (through support from JRCS); there is a concern that one year is insufficient to build capacity and interest in this area; the organisation should undertake efforts to ensure funding for such a position for at least three years and not burden the incumbent with that responsibility

#### **9. Develop a common mechanism for 'no-appeal' situations**

The question of costs to cover IFRC's interventions in this disaster raised the issue of programme recovery in the context of a "no appeal" situation, as it was this case.

Several National Societies that responded to the survey noted that when the National Society is able to respond to the relief and recovery operations and meet the standards by itself, it doesn't necessarily need the IFRC to formulate or issue an appeal. Many respondents commented that the appeal system should be flexible and applied in a consistent manner even when and if IFRC was not involved. In any case there is a role for IFRC to play in ensuring preparedness plans of NS that plans and appeals are comprehensive and consistent.

- 1) In consultation with National Societies, IFRC should develop a mechanism to handle recovery costs in such situations, where the NS decides not to launch an appeal but where IFRC is called upon to provide support. Such a mechanism should be based on existing arrangements that could be used on a case-by-case basis with the appropriate adjustments required for specific cases. The following criteria is suggested:
  - Overhead cost charged by IFRC secretariat and expressed by percentage should be well-balanced with, the volume of the operation and according to, the level of need for IFRC secretariat services regarding coordination and technical support
  - New IFRC instrument should provide options which both giving and receiving National Societies mutually agree to choose
  - Receiving National Societies should take the initiative to minimize overlapping and duplication of intervention programs and services to support programs, so that the interventions will reach the beneficiaries effectively and efficiently both in cost and time
- 2) JRCS and A/P IFRC's Zone Office could take an initiative in launching such a review process that could result in a proposal to be considered by IFRC globally.

#### **10. Alignment of synergies between domestic and international departments**

IFRC should initiate regular international learning workshops for NS domestic disaster management teams, so that NS domestic specialists and technical staff mutually benefit from the experience of other NS, in particular in the area of "relief to recovery", noting that IFRC's strength is in its international network of national RC resources, not only in its network of international departments of NS

#### **11. Develop the learning strategy of IFRC and ensure follow up on key evaluation events**

As part of the evaluation terms of reference the Team reviewed progress on the management response plan from the evaluation of the relief phase of the Great East Japan Earthquake (Talbot 2012). While several persons contributed to the relief evaluation management response and several issues were followed upon both at JRCS

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Japan 2011 Tsunami. Evaluation of recovery action by JRCS/IFRC. April 2013

and IFRC, it was clear that there was no single focal point in either organisation, making it difficult to identify persons who were actively managing the follow up. Follow-up on evaluation work is a common challenge in many international organisations; across the secretariat and IFRC's membership, hundreds of evaluations are conducted annually, many of which are not followed up in a coherent or pragmatic manner.

While it is important to follow up on individual evaluation results, by themselves they do not often lead to organisational learning and change. A more coherent and purposeful approach is needed. At a minimum, assessments of the quality of IFRC evaluations followed by regional and global meta reviews by theme and time period would lead to a more structured approach to learning. While the Secretariat has made some strides in recent years in organisational learning, the focus has remained on individual, on-line training through the global learning platform. Many who have been able to access the materials praise it highly. It is useful but not sufficient.

To prevent *ad hoc* learning, avoid major learning gaps and ensure that the Red Cross' role in mega-disasters lead to Federation-wide improvements, a more structured approach to learning is recommended. The Learning and Knowledge Management Division in IFRC Geneva should lead such an exercise, underlining that the strategy is for the Federation as a whole and not only the secretariat. This report does not recommend concrete steps to take as the secretariat is in a better position to select the appropriate mechanisms and methods with the membership. However, some minimum components and characteristics of a learning strategy should include:

- 1) A vision on Federation-wide learning
- 2) The identification of critical elements that include ways to enable both planned and emergent learning
- 3) The provision of resources to ensure that the secretariat has appropriate internal expertise
- 4) The appropriate use of information management and communication technologies
- 5) The creation of a learning agenda with a few topics for initial focus
- 6) The development and approval of an organisational policy on learning
- 7) The establishment of links between the learning agenda and the individual performance review system
- 8) Simplicity
- 9) The development of mechanisms to encourage critical thinking and learning from mistakes as well as from success
- 10) The development of mechanisms linking practice, policy and advocacy

Related to the learning strategy, both IFRC and JRCS should ensure coherent follow-up on the current evaluations (2012-2013). The evaluation team recommends that:

#### **JRI Self-Assessment Evaluation Recommendations – September 2012**

1. Consider setting up operational guidelines and creating forms to encourage documentation and record-keeping
2. Better communication with stakeholders regarding project activities and the use of financial resources
3. Prepare a report summarizing the three years of Recovery Task Force activities
4. Formulate a basic plan indicating the way JRCS recovery support should operate in preparation for future disasters
5. Establish a JRCS Recovery Task Force promotional framework and set up guidelines in preparation for future disasters

- a) JRCS identify a focal point for managing the overall follow-up to the MRPs
- b) The MRPs include designated departments and persons responsible for each recommendation to ensure accountability
- c) JRCS follow-up on the JRI evaluations; the 2012 self-assessment produced five recommendations that would further enhance JRCS capacity in preparedness and programme management; they are noted in the text box. While there is some overlap with the recommendations above, they are worth noting for emphasis
- d) IFRC formally assigns a focal point to oversee IFRC management of the MRPs.

## 12. Undertake the OCAC process

One strategy that will help JRCS address many of the recommendations from this evaluation is the IFRC Organisational Capacity Assessment Certification (OCAC). The OCAC is a tool that enables National Societies to assess their own capacity and performance to help determine the best approaches for self-development and ensure

OCAC starts with the adoption of a set of five compound organisational capacity-dimensions that are essential for the successful functioning of any National Society. These are: *the capacity to exist, the capacity to organise oneself, the capacity to relate to others and to mobilise resources, the capacity to perform, and the capacity to adapt and to grow.*

they are a well-functioning organisation, providing relevant services for its public and target populations.

The overall OCAC process combines an initial self-assessment followed by a focused corrective development effort to address the identified weaknesses (phase one), with a peer review cum corrective development effort (phase two) for those who succeed in passing the initial self-assessment before proposing successful candidates for acknowledgement ("certification") by the Board.

IFRC should support JRCS to undertake this process. This may require having a peer National Society brief JRCS leadership on the benefits and challenges of the process. JRCS should commit to undertake the process thereby setting a good example of how even well-functioning organisations can improve to better contribute to the goals of strategy 2020.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	WHO IT IS FOR
1) Recovery: a strategic choice	JRCS IFRC and NS
2) Raise the profile of JRCS	JRCS
3) Accountability to beneficiaries	IFRC JRCS
4) Engage in formal partnerships with other organizations to increase preparedness for recovery and improve the community reach of JRCS	JRCS
5) Expand the role of volunteers and include more community-based activities	JRCS IFRC
6) Develop an updated recovery plan for the next 3-5 years	JRCS IFRC
7) Increase knowledge and awareness of key principles in both domestic and international work	JRCS IFRC
8) Humanitarian preparedness for nuclear accidents	IFRC JRCS
9) Develop a common mechanism for 'no-appeal' situations	IFRC JRCS and NS
10) Alignment of synergies between domestic and international departments	JRCS IFRC
11) Develop the learning strategy of IFRC and ensure follow up on key evaluation events	IFRC JRCS for MRP
12) Undertake the OCAC process	JRCS IFRC

## ANNEXES

- Bibliography
- JRCS Relief and Recovery Plan of Action – (initial & updated)
- Follow up to Management Response Table
- Results from Survey of National Societies
- Survey template
- List of people met
- TOR Evaluation
- Inception Report