

# Evaluation

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## **Preparing for and Responding to Large Scale Disasters in High Income Countries**

**Report  
Findings and Lessons Learned from the Japanese Red Cross Society's  
Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami**

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**Comparisons with Experiences in other Countries**

**\*\***

**Recommendations**

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

DMAT	Disaster Medical Action Team
DP	Disaster Preparedness
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
GEJET	Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
GoJ	Government of Japan
JPY	Japanese Yen (see below for conversion to USD rate)
SDF	Self Defence Force
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPHERE	Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
USAR	Urban Search And Rescue
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
Watsan	Water and sanitation

## Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Acronyms and Abbreviations

AP Zone	Asia Pacific Zone Office (IFRC)
DMU	Disaster Management Unit, Asia and Pacific Zone Office
FACT	Field Assessment Coordination Team (IFRC activated)
EARD	East Asia Regional Delegation (IFRC)
HLLM	High Level Support/Liaison Mission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
JRCS	Japanese Red Cross Society
Movement	Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, IFRC and member national societies)
PSS	Psychological Support Programme
RCRC	Red Cross Red Crescent
RFL	Restoring Family Links


Exchange rate on 22 November 2011 - to nearest round figure. Conversion by Oanda Currency Converter.

JPY 100 = USD 1.30

or

USD 1 = JPY 77

### Map of Affected Tohoku Region



- Date: 2011/ March 11 14:46 at epicentre
- Epicentre: 130km from Sanriku coast (450km long and 200km wide.)
- Magnitude: 9.0
- Depth: 24Km
- Aftershocks (as of June 6)
  - M7.0 and over 5 times
  - M6.0 and over 82 times
  - M5.0 and over 502 times

## Executive Summary

Over recent years, increasing numbers of people are being affected by the disasters in high income countries. The continued growth in population, increasing urbanisation and the changing and more violent weather patterns associated with climate change all contribute to this trend. Many high income countries are finding they have a more vulnerable population as the demography changes and elderly people become an increasing percentage of their population.

No country can fully protect itself against the forces of nature. The magnitude 9 earthquake off the coast of Japan on 11 March 2011 highlighted this by precipitating a catastrophic tsunami, devastating communities along a 700 km coastline in the north east of Honshu Island and striking the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant creating danger and widespread alarm as efforts were made to contain the damage.

With the considerable resources at its disposal, the authorities and people of Japan responded immediately to rescue and assist the survivors. Even so, nearly 20,000 people have been either killed or remain missing. The road ahead for the tens of thousands of people still displaced remains challenging.

The Japanese Red Cross Society was at the forefront of the emergency response, sending 46 medical teams into the affected areas within the first 24 hours and distributing relief supplies from the large disaster stocks held. The Red Cross hospital in Ishinomaki was the only health facility left standing after the city of 170,000 people was devastated. Japanese Red Cross Society was there to give life saving support during those first critical first days. But the work went on as the emergency phase passed and the devastated communities turned their attention to recovery. With up to 400,000 evacuees at one stage, support for the displaced in evacuation centres and later in temporary and prefabricated housing became the focus of Red Cross care and support. Faced with many anxieties as they face an uncertain future, Japanese Red Cross Society will be there to give vital assistance over the period ahead as they restore their shattered lives.

The plight of the survivors of this triple incident disaster led to spontaneous offers of help from around the Red Cross and Red Crescent world. During the first six months, some 74 national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies had donated funds to the Japanese Red Cross Society totalling the equivalent of USD 690 million.

Recognising that there are important lessons to learn from such a large disaster response operation, the Japanese Red Cross Society proposed that it jointly with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies arrange an evaluation of the operation. The aim was both to support the process of the National Society's review of its own organisational response and to assess management of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent support for the operation. The evaluation was tasked to make findings and recommendations after reviewing the experience of other national societies in high income countries which had recently responded to large scale disasters in their own countries.

"High income countries" is a World Bank definition and is helpful in generally describing countries with relatively greater wealth, well developed infrastructure and effective organisation and systems but there are significant differences in the profile of countries in this classification. These differences highlight the need for caution in making assumptions that the experience in one country will be the same as another in the same group of countries. Nevertheless, there are significant points of common learning that are important to share.

Based on the findings, 20 recommendations (pages 53-55) are made, both to the Japanese Red Cross Society and other components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

In summary, these recommendations address:

- the need to nurture and maintain close liaison with the authorities, DMAT Japan (Disaster Medical Action Team) and NGOs before disaster strikes so that close liaison can be sustained when large scale disasters strike and place organisations under stress
- the importance of contingency planning to enable national societies to scale up and identify in advance the additional resources and assistance required from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
- the need to build capacity in making assessments and having appropriate tools, based on best practice, available for use in high income countries
- the need for the development of a strategy for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in responding to nuclear accidents
- the need for ongoing work to take advantage of evolving technology and social media in designing more effective services for restoring family links and tracing in large scale disasters
- the need to sustain long term support for psychosocial activities after a large scale disaster and to recognise and plan with other national societies to address the special needs of foreigners in the affected country
- the need to have a strong trained Red Cross/Red Crescent volunteer base, systems to manage them and the means to appropriately handle new recruits during the disaster
- the need for national societies to develop and have in place up to date disaster recovery policies
- the need for national societies, in the emergency phases of large scale disasters, to draw on the experience of their staff members and volunteers who have experience in large scale disasters and familiarity with best practice in applying international humanitarian policies and standards, such as Sphere (these people are sometimes in a part of the organisation not directly charged with implementing the domestic relief programme)
- the need for national societies to have capacity and competence to communicate via the internet and social media
- the need to develop an efficient and effective operational framework for channelling spontaneous donations in times of large scale disasters and when no appeal for assistance has been made
- the need for the International Federation to assess the adequacy of the present system for recovering direct and indirect costs when no appeals are launched and to determine a new formula if needed, and
- the need for national societies to plan for the placement of an IFRC representative within their national societies when coordination of multiple partner national societies is needed and, if required, the placement of technical delegates embedded within the national societies and working according to the host national societies' standard operating procedures.

This report endeavours to support the ongoing process within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to learn from experience and use lessons to improve policies, procedures and systems so it might better address the needs of the growing number of people affected every year by disaster.



# Introduction

## Context for the evaluation

In the light of the unprecedented scale of the relief and recovery operation precipitated by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET), the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) decided that the first six months of the operation be evaluated in order to learn lessons and to improve the mechanisms for managing large scale disaster response in high income countries.

Climate change, sea level rise, increasing urbanisation and environment degradation are some of the factors influencing the increase in large scale disasters around the world. There have been several recent large scale disasters in high income countries, including Hurricane Katrina which hit New Orleans and southern states of USA, in 2005, the floods in Queensland, Australia, in 2011 and the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, in the same year.

Sharing learning from these large operations in countries with well-developed infrastructure and services can be mutually beneficial and contribute to building improved collective responses.

The aim is to use the GEJET experience to provide the opportunity to review the operation and to make findings and recommendations, taking account of the experiences in other countries. In this way the evaluation seeks to contribute to the on-going process of improving policies and systems for the optimisation of access to and the use of resources for the benefit of the increasing number of people affected by large scale disasters in high income countries.

## “High Income Countries” and features that affect vulnerability

The World Bank uses a definition of a high income economy to describe those countries with a gross national income per capita of USD 12,276 in 2010. There are 70 countries that fall into this category. Other organisations, including the United Nations, use different definitions to describe developed or advanced economies. While none fully satisfies the definition needed, IFRC has chosen the World Bank definition for the purpose of this evaluation.

Though the definition is useful in classifying those countries with high per capita income and a high correlation to well-developed infrastructure and services, it needs to be borne in mind that the definition does not take account of the different vulnerabilities that exist in these populations.

**Income disparities.** The Gini Coefficient indicates income disparities that are relevant for identifying some aspects of vulnerability. In the United States, for example, the most affluent fifth of the population had more after-tax household income than the other four fifths of the population together, while the lowest one fifth received only about 5% of the total after tax household income in 2007<sup>1</sup>.

**High risk areas.** It is common in high income countries for the many disadvantaged and marginalised socio-economic groups to live in the most “at risk” areas. Others live there to pursue economic activities. For example, fishing communities will often live in vulnerable coastal areas. In these respects, there are similarities with other countries around the world.

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<sup>1</sup> International Herald Tribune, 27 October, 2011.

**Demographic trends.** As found in the case of the GEJET operation, the demographic make-up of populations can vary significantly in different parts of the country. Japan has a hyper aging society with 22.7% of the national population in 2010 over the age of 65 years<sup>2</sup>. The earthquake and tsunami hit coastal communities had an even higher percentage of elderly people over the age of 65 years (27.8% in Iwate, 25.8% in Miyagi and 23.8% in Fukushima Prefectures<sup>3</sup>), higher unemployment than the national average and a less than average ratio of professional people, such as doctors, to the wider population. Many professional and young people had already, prior to the disaster, moved to other areas where greater opportunities existed. In these same coastal communities, projections show that the aging rate may increase from 26% in 2005 to 42% by 2040 and that the total population will decrease by 45% over the same period<sup>4</sup>. The vulnerability of the population will thus clearly increase further with time.

The demographic changes associated with an aging population are a feature of most high income countries and the need to provide tailor-made assistance to the vulnerable elderly people has been recognised in other large scale disasters as needing special attention.

These demographic factors increased the vulnerability of a population to disaster and serve as a reminder that measures to reduce disaster risk and respond in times of disaster need to take account of the specific vulnerabilities of the different populations around a country. It would be wrong to be misled by the term “high income countries” without understanding it within the context of socio-economic disparities, including the nature of vulnerabilities existing in different geographical areas.

**Employment.** When considering the post disaster recovery phase, research shows that economic recovery and employment can be strongly impacted by a major disaster event in the medium and long term. In New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, 246,000 people (45% of the total population) left the city within one week of the disaster. Even so, the unemployment rate went from 5% to 15% after one month as work places closed and some staff were laid off. Five years later, the city had regained about 75% of its pre-disaster population and unemployment stabilised around 8%<sup>5</sup>. Historical evidence points to the fact that many areas rebound after disasters if they were enjoying growth before the disaster. In relatively depressed New Orleans, to promote recovery and employment opportunities, the government provided an economic stimulus package. Similar challenges will face the recovery in the Tohoku<sup>6</sup> region and there may well be parallels between New Orleans and Tohoku after the shorter term post disaster recovery construction period is over insofar as there will be a reduced number of people looking for work, matched to some extent, by fewer employment opportunities.

**Social and economic support.** High income countries will generally be able to provide financial benefits for those who face financial adversity as a result of disaster. The GoJ provided condolence grants to families who lost members, interest free loans for those who lost homes and for those who reconstructed their house, an unemployment allowance for those who lost jobs and support for the affected farmers and fishermen. Benefits of this type are common in most high income countries.

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<sup>2</sup> Data is drawn from *2010 population Census*, 16 April, 2011, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> Naoki Hayashi, Susumu Saito *Future Population Estimates in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima – Reconstruction of Compact Town-*. Socio , Economic Research Center Discussion Paper, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, <http://criepi.denken.or.jp/en/serc/index.html>

<sup>5</sup> Shu En Bi, *Labour Market Trend in Tohoku(Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima) – Suggestion from Hurricane Katrina* - , Business Labor Trend June 2011, The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training

<sup>6</sup> Tohoku is the description of the north most region of the island of Honshu. It comprises the prefectures shown on the map, page v. The country is divided into six such regions

High income countries will generally be able to afford a better range of benefits than developing countries but some of those affected may still face serious financial disadvantage.

**Infrastructure and technology.** The GEJET relief operation demonstrated that even where there is highly developed infrastructure and technology, these cannot be relied upon in a large scale disaster. Roads and railway tracks were damaged and destroyed and access to some isolated coastal communities possible only by helicopter in the first days after the earthquake and tsunami. There was severe lack of fuel and electricity was interrupted for several weeks. Telephone lines were broken and cell phone towers destroyed, cutting lifelines and communications and creating major problems for the identification of emergency and relief needs and organising the logistics necessary to meet them in a timely way.

**Capacity of local authorities.** While local authorities are generally well developed and responsive in providing services in high income countries, their capacities can be severely impaired by a large scale disaster. In the three worst affected prefectures in Tohoku, municipal offices, which are responsible for coordinating immediate disaster response, were often badly damaged and key staff members were amongst the fatalities, rendering some municipalities dysfunctional for an extended period.

**Risks of industrial accidents.** The existence of nuclear power plants is often a feature of high income countries. As shown in the GEJET disaster, the risk of a nuclear accident cannot be eliminated or managed with confidence even with all the knowledge and high technological advances available in high income countries. Other industrial accidents are also a common risk in high income countries.

**Availability of resources.** Among the characteristics of high income countries that may be advantageous are the resources that can be made available domestically at short notice. In the case of GEJET, the private corporate sector located and supplied, through its own logistical systems, enormous quantities of food and non-food relief items. Perishable goods were even delivered on a daily basis to many municipalities. Unaffected prefectures, municipalities and private persons also contributed. Almost all of the immediate food and non-food needs were met in this way.

In common with most high income countries, uniformed services can usually be quickly mobilised and bring important logistical capacity. At the peak of the GEJET operation, many trained personnel were made available. In one day, the Self Defence Force (SDF) mobilized 107,000 people. The Coast Guard placed 349 vessels and crafts plus 46 patrol airplanes and helicopters at the disposal of the operation. There were 12,800 Police and over 6,000 Fire and Disaster Management Agency personnel deployed. In addition, the US Armed Forces based in Japan played an important role, especially making available their considerable logistical capacity.

As the recovery and reconstruction began, the availability of heavy machinery, construction material and technical and other resources has resulted in huge amounts of debris and waste being removed and 49,000 temporary prefabricated houses and important facilities constructed. The ability to achieve this in such a short time frame is a function of the stage of development of the country. High income countries have the capacity for quicker physical recovery.

**Disaster management plans.** There is normally well developed preparedness in high income countries based on government disaster management plans. These, however, may not always be adequate if not designed to meet particularly large scale disasters, as was the case in Japan with GEJET.

**Culture and language.** The GEJET highlights a unique national difference related to the influence of culture and language in making appropriate international assistance responses. The use of foreign personnel in this context was of an extremely limited and prescribed nature. WFP addressed the issue by providing a significant logistics capacity to the GoJ by deploying all the Japanese staff available in its global structure. This is reported to have

worked well<sup>7</sup>. By way of contrast, due to the cultural and language barriers and the understanding of Japanese social systems, the deployment of foreign teams and expatriate personnel was less fruitful.

On the other hand, where there are few such differences between countries, close cooperation and exchange of personnel can enhance the resources available. This has been well demonstrated within the Red Cross in the cooperative relationship and exchange of personnel between the New Zealand Red Cross and Australian Red Cross in responding to the Christchurch earthquake and the Queensland floods.

**RCRC capacity.** Most high income countries have a relatively strong and well-functioning national Red Cross or Red Crescent society, very often with a clear mandate under the authorities' disaster management plans. This provides for the front line Red Cross Red Crescent) RCRC capacity in the disaster affected country and is also a valuable vehicle for channelling any Movement related assistance to those affected.

All in all, while it is helpful to use the concept of "high income countries" to describe some common characteristics, it would be wrong to draw too many general conclusions. While lessons can be learned, each country must plan and respond to large scale disasters after analysing and considering its own unique context.

## "Large scale disasters"

The definition of a "large scale disaster" is also not capable of precise definition in that there may be a combination of different factors at play. In Japan, the GEJET affected people in 15 prefectures, three of which were seriously affected. There were three disasters at the same time, the earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear accident, adding to the complexity. The nature of the GEJET clearly defines it as a large scale disaster.

The numbers of people affected relative to the total population, the geographic spread and isolation of the affected communities, the degree and cost of damage to infrastructure and the ability of the authorities and other organisations to meet the emergency and ongoing needs of the affected people all contribute to the determination of the scale of the disaster. A large scale disaster in a small country may not be described as such in a large country where more resources exist to address the needs.

For the purposes of this report, we have adopted a definition of a large scale disaster which takes account of these variables.

## Purpose and Scope of Review

The overall purpose of the joint IFRC/JRCS commissioned GEJET evaluation is to assess the first six months of the operation particularly in relation to the Movement resourced activities and the process of managing international assistance. Findings are to be made and lessons learned which, after taking account of experience in other high income countries, are to lead to the development of recommendations for improved planning and response to large scale disasters in high income countries.

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<sup>7</sup> Japan-US-South Korea Civil Military Disaster Preparedness Workshop, September 27-29, 2011 organised by Peace Winds America and hosted by US Embassy, Japan.

## Methodology

The methodology adopted included a review of files held in Japan, documented materials and wide consultation with key stakeholders. The report draws upon interviews and discussions held with JRCS staff, Miyagi and Iwate JRCS Chapter staff, Prefecture and Municipal Chapter officers, the IFRC Representative in Japan, East Asia Regional Office, Zonal Office, Geneva secretariat members and representatives of national societies in high income countries which recently experienced large scale disasters. As well, meetings were held with other organisations. A full list of interviewees is attached as Annex 3.

Further, a survey was conducted among all 74 partner national societies through the internet based *SurveyMonkey* tool.

The initial information and materials for the documentation review were gathered by the IFRC Representative from the Zone Office, the Beijing East Asia Regional Office and from JRCS sources. JRCS provided additional source information, such as all the reports from the Headquarters Disaster Response Task Force meetings.

The evaluation criteria laid down in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation<sup>8</sup>, namely, Fundamental Principles/Code of Conduct/Strategy 2020, relevance and appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, coverage, impact, coherence and sustainability and connectedness guided the review process.

The evaluation framework facilitated the gathering and organisation of information, which focused on the key questions in the TOR<sup>9</sup>.

Movement and IFRC policy documents were used as reference. These included The Fundamental Principles, The Code of Good Partnership; Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief, Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response and The Sphere Humanitarian Charter.

## Composition of Team

A team of three people was selected to undertake the tsunami operation review. They were:

### ***Jerry Talbot***

Jerry Talbot, former Secretary General of the New Zealand Red Cross. Over 20 years in senior IFRC leadership roles in the Pacific, Asia and Africa and the international secretariat working with the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies in support of organisational development, community programming and disaster relief and recovery activities. Wide experience within the Red Cross and Red Crescent in coordinating and building partnerships to support developing and/or disaster affected national societies. In depth knowledge of the Movement's and IFRC's policies and procedures.

### ***Chris Staines***

Chris Staines is based in the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone office as a Senior Officer in the Tsunami Unit with duties focussed on Quality and Accountability, particularly in relation to lessons learned related activities. He was

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<sup>8</sup> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Framework for Evaluations*. Geneva, 2011.. <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/performance-and-accountability/monitoring-and-evaluation/>

<sup>9</sup> Attached as Annex 1.

previously General Manager of the Australian Red Cross Indian Ocean Tsunami Operation for four years. Prior to this role he worked in the domestic operations of Australian Red Cross for six years, engaged in senior roles across a wide portfolio of corporate, disaster management, communications, resource mobilization and organisational development responsibilities.

### ***Mika Wada***

Mika Wada is a coordinator of the Japan International Cooperation Center(JICE). The main mission of JICE is to implement international cooperation activities entrusted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), government ministries and municipal bodies, and other public and private organisations.

## **Constraints**

The plan to have a JRCS designated representative on the evaluation team could not be realized. The absence of a Japanese evaluator was felt by the team, especially given the cultural and language divide. JRCS staff worked hard to support the team in bridging this gap, including in providing a fulltime coordinator to work with the team, undertake research and provide translation services when needed.

Furthermore, a person originally appointed to be a member of the team had to withdraw for reasons of ill health. This required late changes to the work plan and delays in the original deadlines set.

After further consultation and review, it was found that the beneficiary satisfaction survey specified in the terms of reference would be impractical because most of the beneficiaries had moved from evacuation centres to temporary housing and it was felt inappropriate to contact them individually. Further, a separate evaluation being undertaken by JRCS had conducted a beneficiary satisfaction survey and comprehensive stakeholder interviews.


The evaluation team did, however, obtain feedback from other stakeholders, e.g. municipal officers, who attested to the importance attached by beneficiaries to the largest recovery project, the supply of six electrical items to all evacuees.

## Background

### Situation<sup>10</sup>

On 11 March 2011 at 2.46 pm local time (05:46 UTC), the north east of the island of Honshu, Japan, was struck by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, depth 24 km, with the epicentre 120 km off its coast. The earthquake generated a tsunami, the first waves of which reached coastal communities within 30 minutes. The tsunami also hit the nuclear reactor plant at Fukushima causing a serious accident of a scale not experienced since the event at Chernobyl in 1986. Seven prefectures were hit by the tsunami along 700 km of coastline, with the most severe damage in three prefectures: Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. In all, 15 prefectures were hit by the earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear accident.

Of these three linked disasters, the tsunami caused the fatalities and together with the nuclear accident, all the evacuees. Confirmed as dead and missing were 19,946 people and 5,929 were injured. Of the deaths, 92.5% were caused by drowning in the cold winter waters. The communities hit had above national average aging populations and those over 60 years of age were particularly vulnerable. As the pie chart below shows, over 65% of the fatalities were those over the age of 60 years.



Source: National Police Agency

It has been estimated that nearly 400,000 people were evacuated, including those displaced from the 30 km zone around the damaged nuclear reactor plants in Fukushima-Daiichi.

Over 114,000 houses were completely destroyed and close to 700,000 damaged. Public and industrial infrastructure suffered massive destruction. By end of March, 200,000 people still remained without electricity and over 650,000 households had no water. Cold winter conditions exacerbated the adverse situation of those displaced and those without basic utilities.

Within the first two weeks following the GEJET, the local authorities distributed large amounts of food, water and daily necessities, fuel, medical supplies, much of which was donated by the local population which had been less affected by the disaster and also in an unprecedented expression of solidarity by people in other parts of Japan. Private people, commercial companies and officials from neighbouring municipalities and prefectures rushed to provide support. The Self-Defence Force, Fire Service, Coast Guard and Police from across the country were mobilised to assist, along with 500 nuclear disaster response teams. More than 2,000 medical teams, including

<sup>10</sup> Refer RRCS 6 Month Report for more detail.

818 from the JRCS, were sent to the affected areas. The US and South Korean military also immediately responded by sending ships, planes and personnel. From around the world, countries and organisations spontaneously offered search and rescue and relief assistance.

The GoJ did not request a large amount of support from UN agencies, however, a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team supported the GoJ with information management, the deployment of USAR teams and international offers of assistance. Some specialist agencies contributed support, including World Food Programme (WFP) with logistics capacity, and International Organization for Migration (IOM) with a repatriation programme for foreign nationals made homeless by the tsunami<sup>11</sup>.

The World Bank initially assessed the costs of rebuilding to be approximately USD 235 billion, equivalent to between 2.5% and 4% of the country's economic output in 2010. At the end of March, 2011, the GoJ stated that the losses from the disaster could total USD 305 billion.

## JRCS – Relief Response<sup>12</sup>

JRCS hospitals started to dispatch medical teams from different parts of the country on news of the disaster being received. Within 24 hours of the disaster, 46 medical teams were mobilised. Some 818 teams had been deployed and treated almost 81,000 people during the first six months<sup>13</sup>. The teams provided medical care at evacuation centres, including to those who were evacuated from the zone around the nuclear plant in Fukushima. Radiation medical specialists were sent to Fukushima to assist with health information in the area. A total of 15 specialised psychosocial support programme teams were deployed, assisting almost 14,000 people who suffered bereavements and trauma from the multiple disasters.

In the city of Ishinomaki, the JRCS hospital was the only third tier medical facility left standing and functional, placing huge demands upon it and its staff as it met most of the first, second and third tier medical needs of the surrounding population of 230,000 people.

As part of their mandate to address relief needs, JRCS immediately released and distributed relief stocks held to supplement the items made available by the municipal authorities. JRCS distributed 30,970 relief kits, 132,500 blankets and other various relief items to evacuees.

JRCS volunteers were also mobilised and provided the equivalent of over 72,000 days of work in social and emergency service activities such as providing mobile kitchens distributing food and non-food items, assisting with clean-up activities and helping people reach evacuation centres as well as fundraising.

JRCS invited IFRC to send a High Level Support/Liaison Mission (HLLM) comprising seven national society representatives, led by the IFRC Head of the East Asia Regional Delegation (EARD), to visit Japan to provide timely, high level coordination support and advice to the JRCS on how best to utilise the capacity of the IFRC. This team visited 15-19 March and besides its advice to JRCS, it helped establish a well coordinated approach among the partner national societies, IFRC and JRCS.

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<sup>11</sup> Each of the WFP and IOM support activities were partly funded by grants from the American Red Cross.

<sup>12</sup> See Annex 4 for information about Japanese Red Cross Society

<sup>13</sup> By the end of seven months, 842 medical teams had been deployed and they had treated 87,860 people.



JRCS did not make an international appeal through IFRC for assistance from member national societies but, supported by the IFRC, JRCS has received or had hard pledges for JPY 53 billion (USD 688 million) from 77 sister national societies and further USD 520 million from the government of Kuwait. The GoJ encouraged other governments and civil societies to provide their monetary support towards the disaster through their national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The European Union contributed JPY 1.1 billion (EUR 10 million) to the JRCS through ECHO and IFRC.

With the help of ICRC, a Restoring Family Links programme was established and about 5,000 people were registered. ICRC also contributed technical back up and advice from its Nuclear, Radiation, Biological and Chemical (NRBC) specialised staff. As well, they offered support, which was not utilised, in the areas of water and sanitation and identification of dead bodies.

In its role as a principal fundraising organisation in time of disaster, JRCS collected more than JPY 284 billion (USD 3.7 billion) from the population in Japan and overseas. These funds are placed in the hands of the Central Grant Disbursement Committee made up of government officials from national and prefecture level, JRCS representatives, media representatives and individuals appointed for their expertise and standing in society. The funds are distributed according to national and prefecture set criteria through municipal distribution committees. More than 80% of these funds had been disbursed to beneficiaries by the end of August.

## JRCS – Recovery Activities

A month after the disaster the JRCS moved into early recovery.

A meeting of participating national societies was held on 9 May 2011 to discuss and agree a Relief and Recovery Plan that would be largely funded by the RCRC national societies and organisations. This plan further evolved over June, July and August 2011 as additional funding became available, the budget amounting to JPY 52.933 billion (or USD 688 million). The 9 September Plan and Budget<sup>14</sup> includes:

- a temporary night-time emergency medical centre and temporary hospitals for secondary medical care
- improvement to living conditions for those in evacuee centres and transitional shelters, including water and sanitation facilities
- shuttle bus services for displaced people so they can reach shops and other facilities
- six items of basic electrical equipment (washing machine, refrigerator, TV, rice cooker, microwave oven and hot water dispenser) for those settled in prefabricated or other temporary housing
- summer amenity goods, especially for the elderly in evacuation centres, including cooling pads, coolers, paper fans and insect repellents
- Red Cross safety classes to assist children to better understand how to protect against heat stroke
- temporary showers in a number of locations
- support for the social welfare for elderly and children's education, such as medical/nursing beds for the elderly
- vehicles for social welfare
- replenishment of items for school clinics
- computers for high schools in Fukushima
- care givers for the elderly, and
- capacity building for JRCS disaster management

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<sup>14</sup> See Annex 5

At the end of October/beginning of November 2011, JRCS organised a monitoring visit for partners to review progress with the implementation of the recovery plan.

## Disaster Management in Japan

With a long history of coping with disasters, the GoJ has a disaster management system and a legal framework that addresses the several disaster phases from prevention to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Clear roles are defined for national and local governments and relevant stakeholders in the public and private sector.

The Cabinet Office is the focal point, supporting the Central Disaster Management Council, chaired by the Prime Minister. This body determines policies, plans and promotes disaster countermeasures. The Basic Disaster Management Plan consists of various plans for each type of disaster where countermeasures are described for different stakeholders according to the disaster phases of prevention and preparedness, emergency response, recovery and rehabilitation. When large scale disasters occur, the disaster response mechanism provides for the establishment of an Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to coordinate the emergency operations of each ministry and to collect information. (In the case of a “major”, as opposed to an “extreme” disaster, a similar headquarters is established under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister of State for Disaster Management,) The disaster management responsibilities are highly decentralised. While the Cabinet Office is responsible for establishing the national policy, the prefecture has the responsibility within its area to use the national policy as the basis for its plan and to support municipalities to plan and respond to disasters. At prefecture level, the governor has primary responsibility for the exercise of these functions. The municipal level is responsible for its local area plan and to be responsible for responding and coordinating others when disasters strike. The design of the disaster management structure requires the JRCS to coordinate and cooperate with the prefecture and municipality when disasters occur.

However, the municipalities have to take account of the availability of funds in implementing disaster response activities. In the case of GEJET, the costs in many municipalities where people have had to be relocated and housed were huge. The municipalities have therefore been heavily dependent on GoJ providing substantial funding from national budgets before being able to commit expenditure. Where there has been mass relocation of people, the GoJ is covering 94% of the costs<sup>15</sup>, with the municipalities having responsibility for the balance. Even so, under the circumstances, the municipalities are faced with a major challenge to find the 6% funding required.

JRCS is a member of the Central Disaster Management Council. It has a basic commitment defined by the Japanese Red Cross Law of 1952 to provide prescribed disaster response services under its so-called “mandate”. It has responsibility to provide medical relief, emergency blood supplies, storage and distribution of relief goods and to undertake fundraising for cash distribution to be made through local government. JRCS expenditure for the medical relief response, with the exception of staff salaries, is covered by the GoJ. Otherwise, expenditure for emergency response interventions are met from JRCS’ own funds. The funds raised from the public are exclusively used for cash distribution.

JRCS has the discretion to assist with other needs and following the GEJET, JRCS volunteers gathered information, provided first aid and hot meals, supported tracing services, helped with transportation and

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<sup>15</sup> Japan Research Institute documentation submitted to evaluation team.

distribution of relief goods and care for evacuees in shelters. JRCS also actively sought to identify the most vulnerable and to provide support to them during the early recovery and recovery phase.

## Findings

### 1. Relations with Government and Other Organisations

The decentralised disaster management structure in Japan determines that JRCS cooperates and coordinates its disaster response with the affected municipalities. As communications with many of the municipalities was cut during the first days and as some of the offices had been rendered dysfunctional by the tsunami, the normal relationship with local government was often impossible to establish. Fortunately, the JRCS Chapters have a close working relationship with the prefecture offices and coordination was able to be provided at this level. As well, JRCS has facilities, particularly hospitals which can play a vital role both in coordinating health activities and in providing a “forward” operations base for disaster response. The best example of this was the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, where a senior doctor was assigned health coordination authority by the prefecture and where the Chapter could ask for operational support for staff working at evacuation centres.

Over 50 laws govern disaster management in Japan and there is a large and complex disaster management organisation based in the Cabinet Office. While there were sectoral meetings organised at a central level after GEJET building close liaison with the large national government bureaucracy proved to be challenging for JRCS. It is understood that the Cabinet Office has already instituted a review of the operational performance and that this has been an internal process, at least to date.

In the Cabinet Office, there was a small team of no more than 10 people assigned to coordinate domestic and international organisations. This team was soon overwhelmed and Japan Platform (a foundation for supporting Japanese Official Development Aid, by promoting coordination between NGOs, the GoJ and the business community) offered to provide a liaison point for the national NGO sector, setting up offices in the worst affected prefectures, keeping the Cabinet Office informed. As one of the larger members of Japan Platform, JRCS played a supportive role.

The scale and complexity of the disaster, the resources required and the pressure placed on the GoJ’s disaster management structure has given rise to the reflection that JRCS should consider proposing a new framework of cooperation between the GoJ and the nongovernmental sector. The legal base defining the relationship between GoJ and JRCS in times of disaster is established in the Japanese Red Cross Law of 1952. Some of those interviewed within JRCS felt there was a need to review the relationship in the light of experience and develop the means to a closer relationship with the GoJ, including the Cabinet Office at Central level; so that there could be improved coordination in responding to disasters. Similarly, several interviewees felt that experience had demonstrated the value of developing a closer working relationship with the NGO community.

#### **Other countries**

American Red Cross enjoys a close working relationship with its government and has clearly mandated roles and responsibilities (see section on Contingency Planning). Though much easier to nurture in smaller administrations, the Red Cross societies in Australia and New Zealand also have close working relations with government disaster management authorities. In Australia, for example, the Queensland Division has memoranda of understanding with a number of local government authorities, the Department of Communities and the Queensland Police Service. The auxiliary relationship between governments and their national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies provides the foundation for clarity about respective roles and responsibilities.

## Recommendations

1. That JRCS take a lead to develop a framework for cooperation with the appropriate government authorities at central and local levels, NGOs and other relevant organisations to better share information, understand each others' plans and foster coordination of activities in the future.
2. That national societies continuously nurture a close working relationship with the disaster management authorities at all levels to enable effective and efficient liaison when large scale disasters strike and decision-making bodies come under heavy pressure.

## 2. Contingency Planning

Large scale disasters in high income countries have often recently tested the adequacy of disaster management planning. Most of these disasters were completely unexpected, having been considered as unlikely to occur, at least on the scale experienced. This is true for the four country events which the evaluation team has reviewed.

### Assessing Risk

In an Interim Report of a Technical Investigation Committee of the GoJ's Central Disaster Management Council<sup>16</sup> it is noted that the characteristics of events that gave rise to the GEJET had not been previously experienced and, thus, were not envisaged in making hazard assumptions prior to the earthquake. Even though there are records of large earthquakes in the past, because of the difficulties in reproducing a complete picture including their intensities and tsunami height, they had not been built into the assumptions underlying the modelling for disaster management measures. Even so, historical records show, for example, the maximum wave height reached by a tsunami in 1896 was 38 metres and in 1933 another tsunami generated a maximum wave height of 29 metres<sup>17</sup>. As a result of the shortcomings in making the hazard assumptions, the risk of a mega disaster of the devastating proportions that struck the Tohoku area on 11 March 2011 was tragically underestimated.

Nevertheless, in the light of the risk of a large tsunami occurring in the future, certain areas were deemed to be unsuitable for housing and prefecture funds were established for relocating people. Fishing communities wanted to live close to the coast for the sake of their livelihoods and land use plans did not restrict houses being built in, what proved to be, unsafe areas. Ten metre high embankments built by the authorities, combined with well practised responses to early warning systems and designated tsunami evacuation sites, many of which were inundated on 11 March 2011, in all probability gave reassurance and an unwarranted sense of security.

The disaster response plans of the authorities were based on the likelihood of having to deal with the consequences of an earthquake: There was less comprehensive preparation for tsunamis with only some authorities having plans in place or, sometimes, under preparation. At Ishinomaki, the evaluation team was told that the Red Cross Hospital had only a manual for an earthquake disaster – similar comments were received from several JRCS and local authority officials interviewed.

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<sup>16</sup> Committee for Technical Investigation on Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis Based on the Lessons Learned from the “2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake”, Central Disaster Management Council, *Report of the Committee*, 28 September, 2011.

<sup>17</sup> National Geophysical Data Center / World Data Center (NGDC/WDC) Global Historical Tsunami Database, Boulder, CO, USA. (Available at [http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu\\_db.shtml](http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu_db.shtml))

The emphasis on earthquake risk may have been influenced by the considerable work done following the Great Hanshin- Awaji Earthquake (Kobe) in 1996, after which lessons were learned and the disaster management plans of the authorities and JRCS were enhanced. Even so, JRCS recognises that some further work could have been done and would have been of additional benefit when the GEJET disaster occurred.

### **Planning**

According to the Japan Times<sup>18</sup>, in 2006, an assessment had been made to calculate the probability of a devastating tsunami hitting the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This was placed at a 10% chance within the 50 year estimated life of the plant. The newspaper stated that no action was taken by the public utility company responsible, nor was the result of the assessment made known for reasons of not wanting to spark concern of residents living near the plant. While this assessment has been challenged by the utility operator for being based on an experimental probability assessment analysis, it does point to the difficulties that arise in assessing risk in a transparent way and giving trustworthy information to the public.

The magnitude of damage, with the complexities created by the triple disaster, resulted in a situation for which adequate plans did not exist. To some extent this will always be true for large disasters of this scale and complexity.

The GoJ's Cabinet Office has undertaken a review of the operational performance, signalling its determination to learn and strengthen systems. Even before the disaster struck, the GoJ had established a Reconstruction Council, recognising the importance of moving from disaster prevention to disaster mitigation. In particular, emphasis is shifting from focus on physical infrastructural measures towards building even better awareness in the community around what to do when disasters strike and the warning systems are activated. Having more resilient communities will certainly help mitigate the impact of large scale disasters which, by their nature, are difficult to anticipate and prepare for with appropriate plans.

While it may not be realistic to “plan for the unimaginable” as suggested by one UN official, the evaluation team understands that the risk of future large scale disasters occurring is being placed higher on the agenda of those responsible for disaster management in Japan.

### **International Disaster Response Law (IDRL)**

While there is a strong commitment to the concept of IDRL in JRCS, with over 50 laws regulating disaster management in Japan, the use of the IDRL guidelines as a means to changing the law to facilitate and regulate offers of international assistance in times of disaster will be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, IDRL guidelines are seen as a helpful way forward in addressing practical issues. The Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed in an ASEAN Conference that regulatory barriers be abolished to facilitate disaster assistance between countries. It was also suggested by JRCS that the guidelines could provide the basis for reaching an agreement about sharing of international resources in dealing with a major nuclear accident.

IDRL does represent an important disaster management tool and is useful in building preparedness for large scale disasters and contingency planning.

### **Other Countries**

In the United States, following Katrina, there were several major analyses of the disaster response by US Congress, government sponsored task forces and public policy committees. American Red Cross contributed to many of these initiatives. The result is a very structured disaster response system of defined duties, responsibilities and performance expectations. Much of this has been codified in new law, similar to that in

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<sup>18</sup> The Japan Times, 20 October 2011, reported that there was an internal assessment carried out by the company that owns and operates the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, namely the Tokyo Electric Power Company.

Japan. The American Red Cross is written into this as the principal nongovernmental disaster response organisation with its own mandate and participates in national, state and local government disaster management planning and exercises. It also has a seat on the government's emergency management council.

The National Disaster Response Framework in USA includes engagement with the private sector and neighbouring countries. As part of the Framework a section addresses the International Assistance System including managing offers of international assistance<sup>19</sup>. The example from USA illustrates well an inclusive process where the national society has been included in the analysis and consultation and has assumed clear roles and responsibilities under the new Framework.

In New Zealand, the Red Cross has also been involved in analysing the Christchurch experience, leading to a number of changes including the development of a new registration form and a new negotiated memorandum of understanding with the Police.

Unexpected events might well include damage to a national society's headquarters and operational capacity, especially in those countries where headquarters are sited in areas of high risk, for example Tokyo in Japan and Wellington in New Zealand. This needs to be considered and arrangements put in place for managing the activities of the national society from an alternative location, with back up staff and facilities.

## Recommendations

3. That JRCS develop a contingency plan for large scale disasters after considering the following issues:
  - the relationship with GoJ in implementing the disaster management plan (see recommendation 1)
  - a strategy to scale up and meet abnormally large needs in the case of mega disasters and/or when two or more chapters are seriously affected (see section 4)
  - the possible role of JRCS health institutions, such as hospitals, in providing a forward disaster management coordination centre in large scale disasters
  - the need for capacity in making assessments, including in situations where municipalities are rendered dysfunctional (see recommendation 5)
  - JRCS role and responsibility in case of large scale industrial accidents (see recommendation 8)
  - the need for a JRCS recovery policy (see recommendation 14)
  - a strategy for the most effective deployment of human resources within the Society, including those with practical experience and expertise in overseas large scale disasters and those familiar with Movement policies and standards (see recommendation 18)
  - the need to strengthen the corps of JRCS trained volunteers to give added outreach to the communities and provide surge capacity to deliver emergency relief services (see recommendation 13)
  - the basis on which additional resources (e.g. funds, international tools, supplies and personnel) may be mobilized from within the Movement (see section 5), and
  - stronger coordination with the government, NGOs, the private sector and other organisations (see recommendation 1).
  
4. That national societies undertake adequate contingency planning for large scale disasters, including arrangements to access resources and assistance from within the Movement, to respond to events which, while highly unlikely, may have catastrophic effects in their country.

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<sup>19</sup> Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of State, *International Assistance System: Concept of Operation*. October 1, 2010

### 3. Assessment

Given the large scale and complexity of the GEJET disaster, it took 10 to 14 days to get a reasonably clear picture of the overall situation and the main needs. Even in the period up to June, some municipalities were struggling to identify clearly the priority needs of their communities.

The decentralised disaster management system compounded the challenges faced as municipalities are first and foremost responsible for assessing and responding to disasters. Some of the municipalities were severely damaged and fatalities included key municipal officers, rendering some of the administrations dysfunctional. The prefectures, under the responsibility of the Governor, had the wider responsibility for the cities and municipalities in their areas but they still depended on receiving information from the affected municipalities and this was difficult to obtain through normal government channels. The rescue and emergency services were able to assist in filling the information gap but with 15 prefectures affected, getting a clear picture of the situation nationally and then defining the priority needs took time and presented the GoJ with a difficulty to match resources being offered, especially from international donors, to the needs in the country.

Under the disaster management structure, JRCS depends upon information from the municipalities as a basis for making its response. The fact that so many municipalities were overwhelmed by this large scale disaster and sometimes rendered dysfunctional hindered planning for the emergency response. The Police and Fire and Disaster Management Agency have a responsibility to support municipalities in assessing needs, but these agencies faced their own challenges in meeting competing priorities. Adding to the complications faced at the municipal level was the flow of uncoordinated relief supplies donated spontaneously by other local authorities and well wishers.

JRCS did have the advantage of having Chapters with well established close working relationships with their respective prefectures, providing timely access to the information when it did become available and conveying this to the national headquarters where the Task Force met daily under the leadership of the President. The role for JRCS headquarters was to gather the most reliable information available from external and internal sources.

Though not tasked to undertake assessment, the HLLM visit within the first 10 days of the disaster did bring to the attention of JRCS a number of issues identified by this partner group.

However, at municipal level, JRCS organisation was weak. JRCS disaster management volunteers did set up volunteer centres in several municipalities and headquarters did assign volunteers to Miyagi and Iwate Chapters and to support NGOs such as through the Tono Magokoro Net in Iwate Prefecture. Nevertheless, the JRCS outreach to the affected communities and the ability to conduct assessments of needs in the emergency phase was limited.

As the relief operation started and Red Cross personnel were deployed, information gathering and assessment were important for identifying the most vulnerable and targeting of assistance. The need for skills and knowledge of assessment methodologies was important at this stage. JRCS had trained one member of each medical team to assess the situation and needs in the area where the team was deployed. This information was to be relayed back to JRCS to assist operational planning. During the GEJET operation, it was found that the person charged with this responsibility within the medical team was often preoccupied with other medical duties and the system did not work effectively.

There was one excellent example of an assessment conducted by the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital. Charged with the coordination of the deployment of all medical teams from JRCS and other agencies at the 330 evacuation centres throughout the Ishinomaki area, survey forms were developed and over a one month period information was gathered on medical and non medical conditions, including water and sanitation. These formed



the basis for planning and implementing ongoing action in the field. The survey material yielded critical information on needs and public health trends and is now the subject of further study by a university to ascertain its possible further application.

Given the important role played by JRCS medical teams following a disaster and the experience at Ishinomaki Hospital, the development of an assessment survey template for use in collecting health related information could be a valuable tool for the future.

There was limited exchange of information between NGOs and other organisations involved in the GEJET operation. This would seem to be a missed opportunity and there needs to be a better framework for coordinating and cooperating with other agencies at national and prefecture level.

### **Other countries**

The common experience of national societies in high income countries affected by large scale disasters is that the government agencies make the initial assessment, identify the beneficiaries in need of priority assistance and determine an overall operational plan in line with the predetermined disaster management plan. For the national societies in such situations, the government assessment is the basis for launching activities and for planning early relief interventions, but this needs to be complemented and analysed in view of the totality of information available in order to identify gaps where intervention may be essential and within the capacity of each national society.

In New Zealand, following the Canterbury and Christchurch Earthquake, the initial relief response was directed towards meeting the priorities that were immediately known on an ad hoc basis, without any systematic needs assessment<sup>20</sup>. No effective needs assessment framework had been identified that would inform clear response plans<sup>21</sup>. New Zealand Red Cross soon became involved in assessment, in particular suburbs that were badly affected. Teams of volunteers conducted extensive “door knocks” to check on households and identify vulnerable people. Their findings were then used to target on-going assistance to those most in need.

### **Recommendations**

5. That JRCS build capacity within its domestic disaster response personnel to conduct assessments on the basis of IFRC developed methodologies in order to better target assistance and reach the most vulnerable. Trained assessment teams should be available to be deployed at short notice to help municipality authorities assess the needs of their communities, especially in areas where JRCS can deliver services. JRCS should also review its volunteer base at municipal level and consider more systematic training and organisation for disaster intervention.
6. That IFRC develop tools for post disaster needs assessment in high income countries and systematically share best practice.

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<sup>20</sup> Elizabeth McNaughton, Sally Paynter, John Dyer, *Review of New Zealand Red Cross Response to the Canterbury Earthquake, the Pike River Mine Explosion and the Christchurch Earthquake*. July 2011.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

## 4. Scaling Up

JRCS had well prepared plans to meet its obligations under the GoJ's national disaster management plan and it implemented these very effectively. Two hours after the tsunami a team of 6 headquarters staff were deployed to Miyagi Chapter to assess the situation and support relief efforts. By the end of the first day, JRCS had 46 medical teams in the field. The Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital immediately organised the reception of hundreds of survivors, many suffering from hypothermia, taking a huge responsibility for medical care as the only remaining medical institution in the whole city. JRCS volunteers were assisting those directly affected with meals and soup from mobile kitchens. A national fundraising campaign was launched to assist the municipalities to bring cash assistance to the affected population.

Having thus met its mandatory emergency relief obligations, JRCS hesitated to go beyond these standing commitments. A number of reasons have been given for this. There was a concern to not overextend the JRCS organisation, given the very considerable ongoing responsibilities associated with running the hospitals, nursing colleges and blood centres. The lack of an early clear assessment of the situation by the GoJ and the absence of any meetings at a national level to discuss a coordinated approach towards meeting the known and emerging needs and agreeing further allocation of responsibilities resulted in some uncertainty. Aggravating this, many of the worst affected municipalities were struggling to establish and convey their priorities for assistance. The humanitarian consequences and extent of the destruction of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors and the ensuing radioactive contamination were also difficult to assess and led to widespread fear and uncertainty. The combined effect of the earthquake, the nuclear catastrophe and the massive destruction by the tsunami along 700 km of coastline made it nearly impossible to identify where scaling up relief should be prioritised. The amount of funding that would eventually be made available to JRCS from sister national societies was also unknown at the initial stages, though substantial amounts were very soon donated.

There were indeed immediate outstanding needs that could have been met by JRCS. The HLLM was not tasked to conduct an assessment, but it did identify some of these, such as extending services to evacuees beyond the evacuation centres, assisting with the provision of water and sanitation at many of the evacuation centres and some possible early recovery activities.

As a catastrophe of this scale had been unforeseen, there had been insufficient contingency planning for dealing with such a complex and widespread disaster. One person observed to the evaluation team that the approach seemed to be that "we can only do what we planned for". Contingency planning for a mega disaster including the possibility of taking new responsibilities by engaging existing resources and capacity from the RCRC Movement might have enabled JRCS to scale up its activities further during the emergency phase. Certainly, the level of spontaneous funding from international donors that was available meant that there would have been no financial constraints if there were priority needs to be met.

JRCS also has a pool of staff and delegates with long and solid experience of large scale disaster interventions worldwide and would have benefitted by drawing more on this expertise in the scale up process and planning.

JRCS might consider whether the network of hospitals and other health institutions have a possible broader role as focal points for managing relief operations. They provide a physical base with important facilities and infrastructure, as was demonstrated by Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital. As well, the possibility of setting up a JRCS coordination centre at a strategic location in the Tohoku region could have made it easier to access municipalities and negotiate the recovery programme. The possible advantages of decentralising some operational functions to the field could be explored.

Though a window of opportunity may have been missed as this early stage in the operation, JRCS quickly moved forward with planning a major early recovery and recovery programme with the funds made available from the international community.

### **Other countries**

An important factor that influences the ability to scale up is the availability of additional resources to generate surge capacity. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, American Red Cross requested IFRC to recruit logistics specialists. Within 24 hours of receiving the request, 64 experienced foreign Red Cross logistics delegates were recruited to work with the American Red Cross. While lessons were learned from this experience regarding how it might have been better managed, this experience highlights the fact that human and material resources can be quickly mobilized from within the Movement and deployed when requested. The challenge is to identify where capacities may need strengthening and plan for such needs to be met before the disaster strikes. Good examples of this working well are the agreement put in place before Hurricane Katrina that deployed a Canadian Red Cross media specialist to support American Red Cross. A similar arrangement saw the rapid deployment of IFRC communications delegates to support JRCS.

### **Recommendation**

See Recommendation 3.

## **5. IFRC Tools**

IFRC has developed a number of tools to help strengthen its collective disaster response capacities by mobilizing the resources available with its member national societies.

Field assessment and coordination teams (FACT) are teams of experienced Red Cross and Red Crescent disaster managers on standby and trained to support in times of major disasters. In the case of GEJET, no such team was requested by JRCS as it assumed this would be unnecessary with the assessment process coordinated by the GoJ providing the information needed. Instead, JRCS invited the HLLM to provide timely, high level coordination support and advice to the JRCS on how best to use the capacity of the IFRC to help respond to the humanitarian crises resulting from the earthquake and tsunami.

The IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund can also be called upon to provide advance funding to launch relief operations. JRCS did not need to make use of this facility, as would be the case for most national societies in high income countries.

Emergency response units (ERUs) comprising trained teams of specialist volunteers and pre-packed sets of standardized equipment ready for immediate use were offered to JRCS. After some deliberation, it was decided that these would not be of additional benefit to JRCS. In particular, it had been suggested that a water and sanitation ERU could have been useful, given the water and sanitation needs in evacuation centres and around hospital locations.

Within IFRC, ERUs are seen as a particularly useful tool to provide specialised capacity in a range of sectors during the emergency response phase. JRCS gives strong support to the international project and has its own medical ERU for deployment overseas and has developed a dERU (domestic ERU) to provide additional medical equipment and supplies for teams deployed during local disasters. The evaluation team, therefore, consulted

with JRCS personnel at headquarters and field level to assess the suitability of ERUs from other national societies for deployment in times of large scale disaster in a high income country.

Most of those interviewed felt it was important that the ERU model was sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the special needs in the affected country. In particular, it was felt that the quick delivery of equipment and supplies for water and sanitation would have been useful in the GEJET operation. There was also the possibility that a field hospital unit could have added capacity, though expatriate medical personnel could not have treated patients in Japan without proper registration and accreditation. In the logistics area, material such as Rubb halls, may or would have been beneficial. In most cases, specialist staff could be accessed within Japan to use the equipment and material. The major hesitation was about the difficulty of accommodating expatriate personnel who could not communicate in Japanese.

This response indicates that there may be some misunderstanding about the model and the flexibility that does exist to modify the tool. For example, the German Red Cross provided a field hospital for Chinese Red Cross to staff and operate following the Sichuan Earthquake, keeping only one German specialist on site to maintain and keep the hardware functional.

### **Recommendation**

7. That IFRC assure the flexibility of the ERU model and make national societies aware of this so that ERUs can be more expeditiously made available and integrated into existing national society structures and systems in high income countries.

## **6. Nuclear Accident**

The nuclear accident caused when the tsunami hit the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant added a third and highly complex dimension to the GEJET operation. Though the accident was due to external forces, the preparedness measures proved inadequate in a number of respects. While the medical system reportedly functioned adequately, the lack of information caused frustration among those working in the affected area, created anxiety among the local population and misinformation and rumour generated panic buying and concern throughout Japan, especially in Tokyo. A large number of non-Japanese residents even left the country. Some of the nearly 80 000 people evacuated from the 30 km zone around the nuclear plant suffered discriminatory behaviour with verbal abuse and other forms of harassment. Since it may take a long time till they may move back to their homes, their situation differs significantly from those who lived in other tsunami affected areas and their need for humanitarian support will be different. Now they are included in the cash distribution coming from the Grants Disbursement Committee and recovery programmes of JRCS.

### **Safety of staff and volunteers.**

In the absence of the dissemination of reliable information about the risks of exposure to low level radiation, emergency services requested to transport hospital patients refused to enter within 30 kms of the nuclear power plant. JRCS medical teams also withdrew as concerns grew about the safety of working in the area.

JRCS had experts in nuclear medicine at its Atomic Bomb Hospitals in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and deployed them to Fukushima to provide advice. As well, ICRC deployed a Nuclear Radiation Biological Chemical (NRBC) expert to work with JRCS on an effective radiation protection regime for staff and volunteers working in the area. No activity was allowed within 30 kms of the power plant. Permissible radiation levels were set and arrangements were made to brief the staff prior to any deployment. One hundred sets of protective clothing, masks and goggles

were made available and ICRC also provided dosimeters to Movement delegates to allow monitoring of the accumulated dose of radiation levels during each mission. After a few months it was found that radiation levels outside the evacuation zone remained below the safety threshold value of one millisievert per year.

### **Public information**

The lack of information and a poor level of understanding among the public raised many concerns for their health and safety. Some distrust of the official information existed, aggravated by contradictory opinions among scientists and the uncertainty caused by the difficulties in stabilizing the damaged reactors. Most of the 54 nuclear reactors in Japan and some in other countries were closed down for review of their security systems. JRCS arranged a public lecture in an attempt to allay some of the fears felt by the people living in the area.

### **Health and care**

JRCS has recently launched a project in partnership with the Fukushima Prefecture Medical Association to plan follow up activities for the next 10 – 20 years. The main activities will include the collection of data from people evacuated from the area surrounding the power plant through general health checks, including blood and thyroid tests. A number of these people have relocated to other prefectures around the country, presenting an added challenge in monitoring their health over an extended period.

PSS activities are also foreseen for an extended period.

### **Future approach**

While the detrimental effects of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster were less extensive than in Chernobyl in 1986, much has been learned from the earlier accident when some 10,000 Red Cross workers were involved in an operation resettling people from Chernobyl and when staff and volunteers of the Soviet Red Cross assisted the public health services. On-going support to people affected has been maintained by the Ukraine, Belarus and Russian Federation Red Cross Societies, supported by IFRC and partner national societies. The Chernobyl nuclear accident highlighted the fact that the disaster can have regional consequences with many European countries affected by the radiation cloud.

Drawing on these lessons, JRCS remains committed to focus on its mandate in times of disaster. In providing relief to the affected population, Red Cross workers and volunteers need to be armed with knowledge about how to protect themselves and need up to date and accurate information of the affected area for their safety. Elements of nuclear disaster need to be built into the JRCS disaster response plan with clear definitions of the role and responsibility of the different parties. JRCS also prioritises the importance of making the local population aware of the situation and disseminating information to relieve anxiety and prevent discrimination.

Given the global threat of nuclear accidents<sup>22</sup> and the RCRC experience to date, JRCS has taken the lead in supporting a decision to convene an international RCRC forum for the sharing of experiences and identification of priority activities for national societies in preparing for and responding to nuclear accidents.

It has also been suggested by JRCS that a major nuclear disaster carries with it the need for an international response to address it and to deal with the risk to neighbouring countries. In this respect, International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) could provide and an important legal base for governments to best prepare for receipt of international assistance.

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<sup>22</sup> In January 2010 there 38 states operated or planned to operate more than 570 nuclear power units. Source: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, *World Nuclear Power Plants*”

## Recommendations

8. That the RCRC Movement continue to partner JRCS both in giving assistance to the affected population after the Fukushima Daiichi power plant nuclear accident and in contributing to the development of a strategy (ideally expanded to an approach that includes all NRBC industrial accidents) to address the humanitarian consequences of such disaster events.
9. That a strategy for the Movement be developed to elaborate domestic and international roles in dealing with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear accidents, drawing on the extensive experiences of humanitarian interventions after the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accidents.

## 7. Registration and Inquiry

To assist people anxious about news of their loved ones following the GEJET, ICRC offered assistance to JRCS to establish a website where people from Japan and abroad could register to inform their family and friends that they were safe and provide their current contact details, while those looking for people could check the list for information. They could also register the names of missing family members and friends, encouraging them to get in touch<sup>23</sup>. This Restoring Family Links (RFL) service is well established as part of the ICRC's ongoing work for the registration of people separated by conflict or disaster. National societies have a basic role to provide tracing services and to assist with registration and inquiry services following a disaster.

With the difficulty of communicating and providing transport to the affected areas, it took several days for JRCS headquarters to establish the RFL service. With communications systems down in the days immediately after the disaster, efforts were made to collect information through manual means such as providing registration forms to JRCS medical teams travelling to the field and, in early April, a RFL team was deployed to Miyagi Prefecture.

As the number of people missing in Japan grew and it became evident that many foreigners were living in the affected areas, Chinese, Korean, Portuguese and Spanish were added to the Japanese and English language website. Ultimately, 5,963 entries of missing persons were registered on the website made up of 1,185 Japanese and 4,178 foreigners.

When communications systems were restored by NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegram), several agencies began to set up their own websites. NTT Docomo provides a Disaster Message Board Service in the event of any major disaster and this enabled those living or staying in the affected area to use their Docomo mobile phones or smartphones to post status information so that other people worldwide could check on their safety through the internet. KDDI Corporation, another mobile phone provider, created its own message provider and Google launched its Persons Finder website. There were a number of other initiatives including Google establishing a password protected website in conjunction with the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital. Over 30,000 people are reported to have registered on these other websites. The JRCS' RFL service did not, therefore, meet the needs of most of the people searching for missing family and friends. A number of lessons were learned from this experience. The RFL website proved to be much less user-friendly than the non-Red Cross web based sites for those trying to locate family members and friends. The ICRC RFL system has been primarily designed to

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<sup>23</sup> <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/japan-news-2011-03-13.htm>

meet requirements in conflict related situations. The system therefore was designed for registration and more detailed information was required than necessary for linking those who had become separated by the disaster.

Acknowledging the need for a more flexible system, JRCS are commencing a consultation process with the four JRCS Chapters in the most populated centres of Japan to elaborate a more appropriate programme. At the same time ICRC and JRCS are aware that there must be capacity to respond to the requirements of a recent enactment placing responsibility on JRCS, in case of armed attack, to provide a RFL service for foreigners.

JRCS proposes to convene a meeting with ICRC and interested parties, especially those who provided services following GEJET, to establish a coordinated approach and to develop guidelines. JRCS recognises that a disaster in a highly populated area will likely involve a large number of foreign tourists and this will call for the flexibility to use different languages, a feature of RFL. JRCS also raises the possibility that a global approach to websites such as Google might be useful.

### **Other countries**

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, over one million households were forced to evacuate within days of the disaster, many people losing contact with family members and loved ones in the process. FEMA<sup>24</sup> asked American Red Cross to establish a service to help people locate those who became missing. Working in cooperation with ICRC, the Katrina Family Links website was established 4 days after the disaster. Two weeks later, American Red Cross shifted to the Family Linking Website designed in partnership with Microsoft to consolidate the data from the many sites that emerged and to make more information available. Relatively simple "I'm alive" or "I'm looking for" messages could be registered. This was complemented by a 24/7 toll-free phone service through which the same messages could be registered. American Red Cross deployed Family Linking field teams in some of the disaster areas to help those displaced make direct contact with family members. The teams, consisting of people from American Red Cross, ICRC, British Red Cross and the Netherlands Red Cross, distributed hundreds of pre-paid cell phones to enable people to make free calls to loved ones or register their whereabouts. Emergency welfare requests were also handled to enable people with life threatening conditions, such as being insulin dependent or requiring kidney dialysis, to be reached and assisted.

In New Zealand following the Christchurch Earthquake, the National Society played an important role in handling registrations and inquiries on the Public Registration and Inquiry Registration Database for Emergencies (PRIDE) and managing the National Inquiry Centre – a centre set up in cooperation with the Police and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. New Zealand Red Cross also established a call centre to handle and process thousands of calls. New Zealand Red Cross volunteers recorded over 50,000 registrations on the PRIDE database using a Google based application. The Australian Red Cross sent three specialist tracing officers to support the New Zealand Red Cross and the Police with inquiries for missing persons, 832 cases being resolved.

In reviewing the process, it has been recognized that the Civil Defence PRIDE registration form did not produce all the information required by different authorised parties or to address missing person inquiries. Based on the experience of the Christchurch Earthquake, work is now being done by Red Cross to develop a more comprehensive registration form to meet the needs of various authorised agencies. The call centres were established to deal with missing person inquiries and there was some initial confusion about whether the purpose was for registration, missing persons or establishing family links. This highlights the need for defining clearly what is to be provided by a registration and inquiry service and to have standard operational procedures with trained people in place to provide this service when needed.

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<sup>24</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency

In summary, the Movement has a strong tradition in providing tracing and family reunion activities. Especially in high income countries, new technology and the capacity for instant global communications puts new demands on the Movement to streamline systems and maintain efficient services. Cooperation needs to be reached with other agencies able to provide similar services and this should extend to agreements on guidelines, minimum standards, roles and responsibilities and the authorized sharing of information. Global websites, such as Microsoft and Google, have the technology to add significant value in bringing data together and providing ready access to internet users. Whilst detailed registration will be required for many purposes, Red Cross can make available call centres, websites and facilities for more immediate linking of family and friends.

### Recommendation

10. That the Movement continuously reviews and updates its restoring family links and tracing services to take advantage of evolving technology and the social media.

## 8. Psychosocial Support Programme

The Psychosocial Support (PSS) Programme has played a prominent role in JRCS disaster response since 1995 when it was introduced following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. There is a clear and natural fit between PSS and JRCS's mandated responsibility to provide medical relief.

The IFRC Reference Centre for Psychosocial Support defines psychosocial support as:

*“An approach to victims of violence or natural disasters to foster resilience of both communities and individuals. It aims at easing resumption of normalcy and to prevent pathological consequences of potentially traumatic situations”.*<sup>25</sup>

The Centre also notes “the term ‘psychosocial’ refers to the close relationship between the individual and the collective aspects of any social entity. They mutually influence each other.”<sup>26</sup>

JRCS has invested in developing its PSS resources over many years and is able to boast an impressive capacity of:

- 380 accredited trainers (mostly nurses);
- 9,154 medical relief personnel (from JRCS hospitals); and
- 3,396 trained volunteers.

JRCS provided PSS support to almost 14,000 people affected by the GEJET by the end of the six month period through the intervention of 586 medical team members. Some of these personnel worked as members of 15 specialised PSS teams, including at the PSS Centre established at the Ishinomaki Hospital for grieving families. The number could have been greater had the trained volunteers been deployed and programme delivery not been mainly reliant on medical relief personnel - principally nurses from the JRCS hospitals. The following were reasons why volunteers were not mobilized:

<sup>25</sup> The Reference Centre for Psychosocial Support <http://PSS.drk.dk/sw38265.asp>

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.



- concerns as to JRCS being able to provide a safe working environment
- logistics challenges, e.g. transport and accommodation, and
- lack of awareness and knowledge within Chapters of the PSS Programme and its capacity.

PSS is by its nature complicated, given that trauma is an individual experience and that each individual's reaction to trauma is different. Other factors identified as complicating programme implementation in this specific disaster include:

- difficulties in reaching people that were not residing in evacuation centres
- the unusually high number of elderly people amongst the survivors called for special programming
- the reluctance of some prospective clients to accept support – in part a reflection of the prevailing local culture
- the complexity of this disaster – the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident
- many of the first responders, emergency services and municipal staff, were also victims of the disaster
- the sheer scale of the disaster - the number of individuals and communities affected, and
- the uncertain and potential long term consequences of the nuclear accident.

Although Japan has a relatively homogenous population when compared with other high income countries, e.g. Australia and Sweden, there are significant populations of non-native Japanese speaking people resident in the affected communities, e.g. people from Philippines, China and Korea. Opportunities to provide support specific to the needs of these communities and in the native language of the clients were suggested – similar to the intervention that JRCS made in New Zealand after the Christchurch Earthquake when it deployed a team of PSS specialists to support Japanese families and friends of nationals killed or injured.

Discussed after the GEJET operation was the potential engagement of sister national societies to help design and implement such programmes. This did not materialize.

Experience from other large scale disasters indicates that affected individuals and communities may require ongoing support for a decade or longer. For example, following the 'Estonia' ferry disaster of 1994, PSS support is still being provided more than 15 years after the disaster by Swedish Red Cross. As the situation of those people displaced as a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident remains unclear it can be expected that some form of PSS programming will need to be sustained for at least a decade.

It is well established that emergency service personnel and others "in the front line" suffer trauma in major disasters. In the municipality of Otsuchi, Iwate Prefecture, over 25% of the municipal officials had lost their lives in the tsunami and others had suffered bereavements and trauma leading to loss of their capacity. Yet, the municipality still had to function and meet the enormous relief needs, including finding accommodation for 6,000 evacuees at the peak, and then to start the clean up and begin to plan for the recovery of the town. While these officials depended upon the GoJ health services to give support, psychosocial support had not been accessed six months after the disaster. There may well have been a role for JRCS to address these needs as well as those of the evacuees.

Strategies to transition programme implementation to trained volunteers recruited from within the affected communities, supported by local psychiatrists and psychologists have been developed. This approach was suggested to be most appropriate as:

- it can be scaled to the potentially large number of people requiring support
- it can be replicated in numerous communities across Japan, addressing the fact that many people have and will continue to relocate from the affected communities

- it is relatively cost effective, considering that sustainability through the potentially extended period of programming is critical, and
- this approach also builds a disaster preparedness capacity in the event of future disaster.

The evaluation team found that there is a clear need for current and ongoing PSS support to individuals and communities affected by the disaster. Potential clients include survivors, residents, people displaced by the Fukushima nuclear accident, emergency services personnel and the staff of municipal and prefecture authorities, focusing on specific needs of vulnerable groups, e.g. the elderly, isolated communities, children and non-native Japanese speaking individuals.

## Recommendations

11. That JRCS undertake investigations to establish needs and the feasibility of providing long-term, volunteer delivered PSS programming in support of individuals and communities affected by the GEJET as part of the recovery programme.
12. That national societies both plan to send and to receive trained PSS personnel to support their expatriate communities when large scale disasters strike, given the presence of many different nationalities in most high income countries. The deployment of such personnel must depend upon usual travel protocols being respected including the agreement of the host national society.

## 9. Volunteers

The six months operations report records that JRCS volunteers provided 72,305 cumulative days of work in a variety of activities from 11 March up to end August 2011. In close cooperation with local initiatives and public services, these volunteers were involved in the following social and emergency service activities:

- mobile kitchen (hot meal/soup distribution)
- distribution of food and non-food items
- fundraising related activities to assist earthquake and tsunami survivors
- directing affected persons to the evacuation centres
- management and support to volunteer centres
- assisting home owners and communities clean mud away from their property, and
- assisting affected Red Cross branches

While JRCS began volunteer activities in the nursing sector as far back as 1887, volunteering as part of disaster response was not a strong activity in Japanese society until after the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake when renewed interest was registered within JRCS and Japanese NGOs. At the end of 2010, there were over 2 million registered volunteers in the JRCS of which 1,986,000 were classified as community volunteers and over 48,000 classified as registered disaster relief volunteers. The *Review of Activities 2011* recorded that the rapid social change in Japan over recent years has led to a diversification of needs and a weakening of community values. There are challenges to fill needs in areas such as child care, nursing care, disaster prevention and environmental protection.

Within JRCS, challenges for the 3,000 volunteer corps include disparities in activities across corps and an aging membership. Efforts are being made to strengthen training systems and to develop leadership skills.

Though JRCS volunteers undoubtedly played an important role in meeting some of the community based needs immediately after the GEJET disaster, the evaluation team recognised that the volunteer numbers in Miyagi and Iwate, at least, were not sufficient or highly enough trained to play a significant role in providing outreach to the affected communities. For example, in Iwate Chapter, the Secretary General sought to complement his small staff numbers by calling on volunteers from the Fire and Disaster Management Department<sup>27</sup> since there was no established JRCS volunteer base.

JRCS identified 4,000 volunteers as having participated in "hands on" activities during the operation. Most were not disaster management trained and most were not present at the early stage of disaster. Other volunteers were in support activities like fundraising and kitchen services. It was further noted by the Chapter Secretaries General in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures that they lacked staff to undertake volunteer management when there were many competing priorities at the outset of the disaster.

An independent analysis finds that, compared to the number of volunteers available through other organisations, JRCS had a very small percentage of those deployed to assist in the operation. From March to June, JRCS had 2005 volunteers contributing to the operation compared to 498,500 volunteers under the coordination of the Japan National Council of Social Welfare<sup>28</sup>.

Efforts during the relief period to recruit JRCS volunteers from other parts of the country via the internet were largely unsuccessful for various reasons, including uncertainty about requirements. In some cases, Chapters were not aware of the resource available, for example, over 3,000 trained PSS volunteers.

As time went on, the Society was increasingly able to recruit new volunteers, particularly to train and sustain the PSS activities and this will clearly be important for the future as it is expected that these services will be needed for an extended period. It was also suggested that the presence of youth volunteers in Fukushima Prefecture might afford the opportunity, with training, to deploy them in creating awareness about the effects of the nuclear accident.

Overall, it was found that the pool of trained disaster response volunteers available in the worst affected prefectures was limited at the critical time when additional capacity was needed during the emergency disaster response phase. Systems and procedures did not always work well with mobilization from other prefectures via internet largely ineffective and volunteers trained in PSS not being called upon. Nevertheless, some volunteers were deployed to good effect according to their skills in support of overstretched staff and to carry out activities in the affected areas. The targeted recruitment of younger people would extend and diversify the opportunities for trained volunteer.

### **Other Countries**

Experience around the world has continually born out the importance of Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers in meeting the needs arising in times of disaster. In American Red Cross, volunteers make up 97% of the Red

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<sup>27</sup>The Fire and Disaster Management Agency is the central body seen by the public as being the principal foci for volunteers in disaster management. Fire and Disaster Management Departments are present in many cities and municipalities in Japan, comprising both professional and volunteer members. Besides fire services, the Agency and local authorities' departments are also responsible for disaster risk reduction and response. In this regard, this service plays a role that national societies may partly fill in other countries.

<sup>28</sup> Information provided by the Japan Research Institute Limited

Cross workers. A large number of these volunteers were mobilised and played a substantial role in supporting the many evacuees who fled the destruction of Hurricane Katrina. Further, recruitment systems were in place to accept and orientate 60,000 new volunteers who came forward to offer their services to the American Red Cross.

Australian Red Cross mobilized 1,400 workers, most of whom were trained volunteers, to assist in the Queensland Floods. The national society has a pool of approximately 10,000 emergency service volunteers to draw upon. They were used to manage evacuation centres, emergency shelters, assist in recovery centres and deployed as outreach teams to affected communities. Red Cross also embedded teams in a number of the worst affected communities to work with them in longer term recovery.

IFRC has a memorandum of understanding with Lions International which resulted in an important initiative being taken by New Zealand Red Cross in accessing 100 volunteers from Lions clubs in Christchurch during the Christchurch Earthquake relief and recovery operation. This is an example of the leverage that may be available to access volunteers in countries where Lions clubs exist and where there is a need to supplement existing Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteer resources..

### **Recommendation**

13. That JRCS strengthen and diversify its trained volunteer base and have effective systems in place for their efficient mobilization and deployment. As well, effective systems should be developed to manage a surge in the recruitment of new volunteers in times of disaster.

## **10. Recovery Programming**

JRCS did not have a recovery policy or plan to guide it in addressing the longer term needs to restore the population's livelihoods after the disaster. The Society has vast experience in relief response but has not previously been involved domestically in assisting people beyond the relief phase, except through the cash distribution system. However, in the case of the GEJET on-going needs were clearly considerable for the approximately 200,000 people who were being temporarily relocated for up to two years (and maybe longer) until resettlement of whole communities can be planned and implemented. As well, those displaced as a result of the nuclear accident could require medical monitoring and support for a much longer period, it being suggested this might be 10 – 20 years, and many of these people are relocating to other prefectures, making follow up measures more complex.

Many of the people evacuated as a result of the tsunami and the nuclear accident have increased vulnerability on account of a high percentage being elderly and many others having lost their livelihoods. Furthermore, many of the professional people able to find work elsewhere in Japan have moved away from the Tohoku region negatively impacting on accessibility to services and potentially reducing community resilience.

### **JRCS recovery plan**

On 1 May, the JRCS established the GEJET Recovery Task Force to manage their extensive recovery support. Reporting to the task force, a GEJET Recovery Programme Unit was formed to manage the programme. Headed by a senior manager from the International Department with wide RCRC experience, the rest of the unit of approximately 20 staff were drawn from many other headquarters' departments.

The task force focuses attention on recovery needs in the three most affected prefectures, namely, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. With funds available from the international partners, a plan and budget for JPY 30 billion (USD 389 million) to cover relief and recovery needs was developed and presented at the partner national societies meeting on 9 May 2011. This plan and budget had been expanded to almost JPY 53 billion (US 690 million) by 9 September. (Further funds are also expected, perhaps realising a further USD 470 million, but the largest part of these from a single donor will be distributed directly to projects identified by the authorities at municipal and prefecture level.)

The recovery plan was developed following consultations with the prefecture and municipal authorities, as well as the central authorities. The decentralised disaster management structure of government and the challenges to obtain a coordinated approach with the fragmentation of bodies considerably complicated the planning process. While JRCS had no recovery policy or strategic plan to follow, some general criteria were applied. These included the requirement to support “life”, “health” and the “dignity” of all survivors, to be fair to all affected areas, communities and people; to support the most vulnerable people; to get alignment with municipal plans; and to meet standards of accountability to partner national societies and the public. In particular, there were several aims:

- improve the living conditions of affected people in evacuation centers and transition shelters
- social welfare support for elderly
- education support
- medical support, including a vaccination campaign and health monitoring support for those affected by the nuclear accident
- rehabilitation of medical infrastructure and associated capacity building activities, and
- disaster management capacity building of JRCS

A summary of the Relief and Recovery Plan and Budget is attached as Annex 5. Over half the budget (JPY 28 billion or USD 364 million) is being applied to the purchase of six electrical appliances for those evacuated from their homes. All 49,000 prefabricated houses were equipped with a package of a refrigerator, television, water heater, washing machine, rice cooker and microwave. Sets were also distributed to those evacuees housed in apartments and those able to return to their repaired homes. This project has been a huge logistical challenge and successfully met needs in a very timely way. By end of September, 110,000 sets of electrical equipment had been delivered and installed and a new target to reach 128,000 established.

With the destruction of many social welfare institutions that had housed the disabled elderly, there was a need to assist these particularly vulnerable people. By July, the planned 572 medical nursing beds had been provided and JRCS went on to meet further needs with some 673 units delivered by mid August. Vehicles are being provided for social welfare institutions and municipalities so that the isolation of these people can be partly overcome.

These and other planned activities are well advanced six months after the disaster. The need to replace temporary or permanent health infrastructure is understandably taking more time.

In the time available, the evaluation team was unable to evaluate this programme in the field. While impossible to obtain feedback from a representative group of beneficiaries, municipal and prefecture officers plus JRCS Chapter staff were able to inform us that the JRCS programme was well appreciated by beneficiaries and those responsible for their care. The evaluation team is aware that the JRCS’s separately commissioned evaluation was tasked to address beneficiary satisfaction.

In Ishinomaki, the 206 bed Municipal Hospital was destroyed. Since the Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital became the medical centre for the whole city and the Director was appointed by the prefecture to take

responsibility for the whole health region of the city and surrounding area (about 330,000 people), it was natural that the medical needs of the area were quickly identified and addressed to JRCS. As a consequence, JRCS have agreed to undertake a number of projects to rebuild and/or provide temporary medical facilities in this heavily affected part of the tsunami affected population. Visits were made by JRCS staff to municipalities in Iwate and Fukushima Prefectures to ascertain whether JRCS could meet similar needs. No requests were made. Notwithstanding, without the pre-existing relationship with JRCS that existed in Ishinomaki, these municipalities may have missed opportunities to get the same support from JRCS if consideration and acceptance of projects depended solely on a request being made. The provision of medical facilities may have been too much influenced by JRCS' major role in the medical and health sector in Ishinomaki with the result that equitable support to the wider disaster affected population could have been compromised.

In summary, the evaluation team found the JRCS Relief and Recovery Programme allocated resources to meet needs mostly identified through consultation with different levels of the authorities. It is not possible to assess whether any gaps exist or might have been met in the absence of a comprehensive assessment but this would have been practically difficult to achieve in a timely way given the decentralised nature of the authorities, limited JRCS presence in all the affected areas and the fact that many displaced people relocated to other parts of Japan.

### **Recovery policy**

Good recovery programming requires planning and is based on principles such as the need for community consultation and building the capacity and resilience of the target population. Relocation of families and communities introduces even greater complexity into the process. Planning tools and skills need to be developed to assist the JRCS to drive and implement recovery activities in the future. The increasing risk of more large scale disasters with growing urban populations and the added unpredictability arising with climate change, coupled with the existing threat from a seismically active area, makes for a greater likelihood for the need for JRCS involvement in recovery activities. As well, a disaster arising from a nuclear accident always remains a risk. Another large scale disaster is also likely to generate expressions of international solidarity. This signifies the need for JRCS to develop a recovery policy and a plan to heighten its preparedness to address a variety of natural and technological disasters.

### **Other countries**

In national societies in other high income countries, large scale disasters are frequently followed by the mobilization of significant resources creating opportunities for addressing recovery needs for those affected. Recent experience has shown that additional resources can be made available through international partner national societies, complementing domestic income generation activities. This has opened the way for national societies to become more involved after immediate relief needs have been met.

Following the Christchurch Earthquake, New Zealand Red Cross saw the longer term needs of people that would have to be relocated and worked to establish a "Recovery Framework" to guide it in a coherent approach to providing on-going support. This is an example of what can be done to enhance the RCRC capacity to continue to support disaster affected populations in helping them to restore their lives after disasters strike.

### **Recommendations**

14. That JRCS develops a national recovery policy and a plan to build relevant capacity as part of its disaster management strategy.

15. That national societies in high income countries adopt disaster recovery policies, taking account of their unique national context, the disaster risks present and drawing on the work being undertaken by IFRC in developing an IFRC recovery policy.

## 11. Managing offers of assistance without an appeal

### Background

Large scale disasters can give rise to huge and spontaneous expressions of sympathy and support, manifested in offers of assistance of all kinds (personnel, relief goods and funds). When such disasters hit high income countries, the humanitarian instinct to assist can be further heightened by a wish to express solidarity to countries that have historically been substantial donors in their own right. This was overwhelmingly the case following the GEJET.

### JRCS approach to offers of international assistance

JRCS quickly communicated to IFRC the decision not to launch an international appeal<sup>29</sup>. Aware of the enormous interest to help, JRCS did express a willingness to accept funds contributed voluntarily but only by or through national societies. It did not wish to receive funds direct from individual or corporate donors in other countries as this might have been regarded as in contravention of the IFRC policy restricting public fundraising activities in the countries of other member national societies. As well, it advised it was only able to accept non earmarked funds and did not have a need for personnel or relief supplies from partner national societies.

Along with the strong motivation to express solidarity with the people of Japan and JRCS, the trust held by donors in the integrity of JRCS and its capacity to deliver services in response to the GEJET resulted in extremely low requests for ear-marking of donations, the few exceptions relating to the need to satisfy back donors.

As part of being transparent and accountable, JRCS took the decision, which was communicated to partner national societies, that any final surplus funding after meeting the costs of JRCS recovery programming will be channelled into the cash distribution scheme handled by the National Disbursement Committee.

Later, JRCS did accept offers of goods, such as blankets, on a selective basis. However, the quality did not meet the specifications required in Japan, highlighting the need to assure appropriate logistics procedures are in place to manage an effective supply pipeline.

To provide some of the accountability requirements come to be expected by donor national societies when IFRC appeals are launched, JRCS prepared a standard form agreement for accepting the donations from national societies which provided the basis on which transfers and use of funds would be managed, the accounting and audit requirements, reporting, monitoring and evaluation.<sup>30</sup> This was available to those donor national societies which wished to have a written agreement. Reassurance was also given to partners through information about the intended distribution of funding, a partnership meeting, a partner monitoring visit and individual partner visits.

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<sup>29</sup> This was initially misunderstood by IFRC which advised national societies that JRCS was not accepting donations of funds. This was subsequently corrected.

<sup>30</sup> Standard agreement can be found at Annex 6.

As the full scale of the disaster unfolded and the amount of international funding became known, JRCS decided to extend its early recovery and recovery efforts beyond its traditional relief activities. The planning and implementation of activities was done in close coordination with the local authorities and organisations providing similar support. This became the principal avenue for channelling internationally funded assistance to those affected.

### **Government approach to offers of international assistance**

JRCS's initial position regarding offers of international assistance was based on the approach adopted by the GoJ during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. There had been no indication that this would change for the GEJET and JRCS followed the position it assumed the GoJ would maintain.

The GoJ position, however, changed. While it made no international appeal for assistance, it did agree that offers of help be accepted, advising its embassies and diplomatic missions overseas to direct any offers of monetary assistance to the JRCS, giving added impetus to the flow of funds to Red Cross. The GoJ then went a step further in accepting offers of personnel and goods on a selective basis. It set up a mechanism to match offers made to the needs of the authorities and did not involve JRCS or the NGOs as part of this coordination framework. The GoJ's approach had not been as inclusive as JRCS had come to expect.

### **Implications for IFRC**

Faced with the enormous pressure from national societies to contribute funds but without the appeal mechanism to handle these in a more conventional way, the IFRC secretariat decided to establish a separate bank account to accept "solidarity" contributions for the JRCS. The notion behind this was to keep the funds outside the IFRC financial system and to simply use it as a "flow-through" to JRCS with no accountability accepted by IFRC except to assure all funds, plus interest earned, be passed to JRCS. Member national societies were informed by the secretariat about the basis for accepting and handling funds.

An IFRC appeal triggers an accountability mechanism in the handling of the funds, including the need for pledge management notes, documentation of plans of action and budgets, regular narrative and financial reporting. As well, the application of PSSR<sup>31</sup> provides the funding for IFRC indirect costs, including at Zone and delegation level.

The absence of an appeal from JRCS meant that the costs for funding the IFRC support to JRCS were covered under the PSSR provision for providing "supplementary services". The service fee under this provision is to cover the full cost of providing these services, that is, the direct costs of providing the service as well as the indirect costs as a contribution to the core infrastructure supporting the provision of the service.

JRCS agreed to release funding from the internationally sourced funds to cover budgeted costs expected by the IFRC and the East Asia Regional Office, Beijing, and the Zone Office in Kuala Lumpur developed a budget to cover direct costs associated with the provision of specialist delegates and the PSSR rate was applied to cover indirect costs. As the PSSR indirect cost recovery mechanism was applied only to the IFRC's direct costs and not to the overall budgeted operational expenditure, the contribution to maintaining the IFRC structures in Geneva and the field is considered to be underestimated.

Further, some of the costs, such as those associated with maintaining an IFRC Representative in Tokyo and the costs of this evaluation are being met fully by partner national societies. If an IFRC appeal had been launched, these costs would normally form part of the total operational budget and attracted PSSR recovery.

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<sup>31</sup> PSSR – Programme and Services Support Recovery is a charge on restricted funds expended by the IFRC to cover indirect costs associated with the activities.



The contribution towards the recovery of IFRC's direct and indirect costs is therefore understated when compared to the situation when an appeal is launched. This raises some question about the present IFRC funding architecture and the need to sustain capacity both to support national societies facing large scale disasters when no appeals are made and to meet ongoing obligations to other member national societies.

### **Compliance with Movement policies**

JRCS and IFRC observed the spirit of the Movement by providing a framework for the expressions of solidarity to be channelled in an appropriate and standard way. Information was communicated about what was not needed, namely, personnel, supplies and ear-marked funding. Setting this framework was important to avoid the burden of dealing with uncoordinated and controlled donations and enabled the flow of appropriate assistance within an organisation deeply committed to the principle of bringing humanitarian aid to those affected by disasters wherever they may occur in the world.

In accordance with the Code of Good Partnership, the different mandates of the Movement were respected, including the role of the JRCS in its own country. Partner national societies had the opportunity to actively participate in coordination and communication mechanisms at different levels. The Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief provide that certain accountability requirements be met in the case of an appeal being issued. JRCS integrated many of these provisions into the standard agreement to be signed with those national societies that made voluntary contributions.

Going against the advice of JRCS and the policies of the Movement, three national societies unilaterally sent representatives, causing extra work and embarrassment to the JRCS.

### **Other national societies**

Recent large scale disasters in high income countries, including Hurricane Katrina, Queensland Floods and Christchurch Earthquake, also saw the national societies concerned in receipt of significant funding from sister national societies without any formal international appeal having been launched.

A national society expressed the view that a domestic appeal for funds provides a good accountability platform for the receipt of international donations. In the case of two close neighbours, Australia and New Zealand, assistance went beyond financial donations with both societies transferring specialist staff who were able to support operations on the other side of the Tasman Sea. In the case of the Christchurch Earthquake in New Zealand, for example, Australian Red Cross was able to provide much needed expertise in Tracing and PSS. American Red Cross was also able to draw on expertise from Canadian Red Cross when Hurricane Katrina struck, underlining the value of mutual agreements and understanding in assisting neighbours in large scale disasters.

### **Appeal or no appeal**

The Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief stipulate that any request for assistance from a disaster stricken country will be directed to the IFRC which, when conditions call for it, shall launch an international appeal to national societies. National societies in high income countries are unlikely to appeal for international assistance for several reasons including the fact that domestic donors will generally provide generous support. USD 2.1 billion was donated to the American Red Cross in the case of Hurricane Katrina and approx USD 60 million was donated to New Zealand Red Cross in the case of the Christchurch Earthquake. However, in the case of JRCS the huge sums raised within Japan were not available to JRCS because of the standing arrangement that funds are being raised on behalf of the municipalities for them to meet the needs of those affected.

While the international donors' wish to assist and to express solidarity will be influenced by the nature of the disaster, experience shows that large scale disasters will attract support from within the Movement irrespective of an appeal.

Some argue that there should always be an appeal when international assistance is provided as it provides the accountability framework that other member national societies accept. Some argue that the concept of an "appeal" is outmoded and point to the IFRC's shift from launching annual national society development programme "appeals" to a presentation to potential partners of plans and budgets. For some, the word "appeal" has a negative connotation.

The existing dichotomy between an appeal and "no appeal" situation is a reality that can risk being divisive if not carefully managed. For this reason and that of accountability, there needs to be a framework established to regulate the proper coordination and control of "no appeal" situations.

The recovery of indirect costs, long studied by the IFRC and some partner national societies, is the issue of defining the "value chain" existing between the donor and the beneficiary to equitably recover overhead costs. The conclusion of this process is that it is impractical to have a uniform approach when national societies have different financial architecture; they operate in different competitive market places and where the laws of the countries are different e.g. the requirements for tax deductible donations. There is no evident solution or practical way to harmonise cost recovery within the wider membership of IFRC.

For the IFRC, the launching of an appeal activates the PSSR charge necessary to cover the indirect costs associated with its expenditure on related activities. Where there is no appeal but services are provided by IFRC, there needs to be sufficient cost recovery for the secretariat to be sustained and its capacity to provide services to all its members not to be compromised.

In summary, experience shows that large scale disasters in high income countries may generate offers of substantial support from within the RCRC Movement. It is also unlikely that an appeal for international assistance will be made to the IFRC. Under these circumstances and to ensure optimal use of resources, the operating society should clearly communicate the needs that can be met by international assistance and the procedure for channelling these resources in an effective way. Such a framework for receipt of international assistance might include:

- nature of acceptable unsolicited donations (funds, goods, personnel, ERUs, etc)
- requirement that any donations must be channelled via the donor national society for purposes of coordination and to avoid the risk of being seen to be fundraising in the country of another national society
- protocols for managing relationships with organisations that use their global network for fundraising
- accountability measures such as communications and reporting, financial and audit reports, monitoring visits and partnership meetings to share evolving plans, etc.
- services sought from IFRC and ICRC and their role
- services being made available by partner national societies as part of mutual agreements, and
- measures to recover costs from the resources made available through this channel.

## Recommendations

16. That IFRC consult with partners to consider and develop a coherent operational framework for national societies in high income countries to use when accepting spontaneous donations from partner national societies. This should regulate ways in which assistance can be efficiently and effectively channelled via the Red Cross Red Crescent to reach the beneficiaries and specify the responsibilities of the operating national society in accounting for the use of these resources. The development of this operational framework must take account of existing policies and procedures and may result in the need for amendments to and/or new policies.
17. That IFRC undertake a study on the adequacy of the secretariat's direct and indirect cost recovery during GEJET and determine a new formula for such "no appeal" situations, if needed.

## 12. Making best use of personnel with experience of large scale disasters

The complexities of managing such a large scale and complex disaster created enormous challenges, all the more so since the nuclear accident introduced huge uncertainties as to operational conditions. The lack of information and needs assessment data further complicated the decision making and it took some days before the full picture of the scale of the devastation fully emerged. No domestic disaster of this scale had confronted the Japanese since the Second World War.

On the first day of the disaster, the JRCS President formed a Disaster Relief Response Task Force to immediately mobilise relief efforts and to provide the coordination and allocation of tasks across the Society. This task force met on a daily basis and involved all the relevant senior staff. JRCS leadership placed a priority on responding in a way that would not risk or compromise the on-going normal functional capacity of the JRCS needed to sustain, for example, the many health institutions and blood services throughout the country. This understandable concern is likely to have reinforced existing organisational structures and constrained the types of organisational decisions that might otherwise have been made.

The establishment of task forces at a senior management level for relief response and recovery was important for the coordination necessary for taking the key ongoing operational decisions. A GEJET Recovery Response Unit, led by a senior and experienced officer, was formed at the beginning of May to implement the programme. These organisational structures widened the skill base for the operation but there could have been further efforts to better access the large scale disaster skills and knowledge available within JRCS.

In the emergency phase, there was a missed opportunity. Many JRCS staff and volunteers have "hands on" experience in working in large scale overseas disasters. Within the JRCS headquarters, many staff in the International Department, plus former JRCS delegates and members of JRCS ERUs, had not only experience working in large scale disasters but they also had familiarity with IFRC policies, procedures, resources and services and how to readily access them if needed. Areas where international experience could have brought added value included knowledge of SPHERE standards, assessment methodology, access to tools such as ERUs and the development of recovery strategies.

Given that the disaster was of an unprecedented scale for most people in the organisation and given that no disaster management plans existed to guide such a large scale response, it could have been of benefit to draw more on the experience of those who had dealt with such large scale disasters in the field and while working in senior positions with the IFRC structure. One of the senior members of the International Department, for

example, had the highly relevant experience and knowledge to establish the Disaster Management Unit in the IFRC's AP Zone Office.

As well, there are others within JRCS who have a wide experience and rich knowledge of domestic disaster relief response but, given the JRCS human resource rotation policy, were assigned to other responsibilities in the organisation. Unlike the International Department where the rotation policy is more relaxed to allow for specialisation, the Disaster Relief Division has frequent turnover of staff which in turn adversely impacts the building of capacity.

In the evaluation team's opinion, there is a danger that the JRCS departments responsible for domestic relief and international relations are too much separated and operating as silos in the headquarters structure. It is difficult to change the way of working and the culture of any organisation when it is placed under the type of stress generated by the GEJET. To better utilise the breadth of experience in JRCS in the critical first days and weeks of large scale domestic disasters needs to be built into contingency planning.

Since disaster response in Japan is first and foremost the responsibility of the prefecture and municipalities, the JRCS Chapters play a critical role in the relationship with the authorities. They should be familiar with assessment methodology, with the resources that are available within the Movement and aware of the international policies and standards. This knowledge would place them in a stronger position to inform the authorities about possible resources available and advocate observance of international standards, such as SPHERE.

### **Experience at JICA**

In another domain, it was interesting that JICA also felt that its considerable experience in responding to large scale disasters was hardly utilised. Two staff members were deployed to Miyagi Prefecture to assist with recovery planning but other JICA staff or volunteers were not otherwise deployed or their experience called upon. Even if JICA's mandate does not include domestic disasters, under the extraordinary circumstances of what amounted to a national emergency, there could have been more flexibility in finding a more active role to support the operation within GoJ or other circles. This serves to underline the fact that access to relevant resources must be planned if optimal use is to be made of them, especially when the disaster situation is overwhelming and unprecedented and organisations come under stress.

### **Other Countries**

JRCS's organisational separation of functions into domestic and international areas is often found in other large national societies. Some of those interviewed in partner national societies shared the view that, while the role of the staff assigned to work in international departments remains important in times of large scale disasters, the knowledge and experience available can be overlooked or under-utilised. A further observation made was the notion that the section of the national society responsible for domestic relief should include staff who have had experience of dealing with large scale disasters. Better organisational links could be established for a more integrated approach.

A further observation is that disaster response mechanisms in high income countries are relatively weak when it comes to such areas as undertaking assessment and the application of standards set in internationally adopted policies, such as SPHERE. Mechanisms for community participation in relief and recovery planning may also not be strong. Best practice may, in fact, be experienced in less developed countries where agencies are conditioned to apply accepted international norms in the initial response, planning and implementation of relief and recovery programming.

Acknowledging that the context will differ among high income countries, where appropriate, consideration should be given to how best to advocate for the establishment of minimum standards in humanitarian responses (e.g. Sphere standards).

### **Recommendation**

18. That national societies in high income countries consider how best to organise access to relevant experience and knowledge about international disaster management best practice available within their national societies and plan to deploy their human resources accordingly in the emergency phase of domestic large scale disasters.

## **13. Building Good Partnerships**

Since there was no formal multilateral appeal for assistance through the IFRC, it was of special importance that bilateral partners and services offered by the IFRC and ICRC were handled in a coherent and coordinated manner. With expressions of goodwill and the early indication of spontaneous contributions from Red Cross and Red Crescent partners, JRCS was faced with the need to build the foundations for good partnerships. The Head of the EARD therefore arrived in Japan on the day after the disaster to coordinate and lead the support to JRCS. An IFRC Representative was in the beginning of April assigned to JRCS to take over his role on the ground. This position remains after the six month period with widened terms of reference and has been important in coordinating IFRC support and meeting special donor needs, such as complying with partner national societies' and ECHO's conditions and reporting requirements.

The Movement's Code of Good Partnership<sup>32</sup> establishes the basic expectations and minimum standards of behaviour for working together. Partners are expected to comply with Movement resolutions and policies and be open and transparent in matters such as defining strategies, financial and human resources management, communications and service delivery. Good partnership is based also on accountability towards beneficiaries, affected populations, the public and donors and mutual respect for diversity in values and organisational cultures.

### **Accessing Support from the Movement**

Aware of the challenges faced in responding to the humanitarian needs resulting from the disaster and interest expressed in supporting the National Society's work, JRCS built the foundations for establishing good partnership. During the first days following the disaster, it invited the HLLM comprising seven national society representatives, led by the IFRC Head of EARD, to visit Japan with the purpose:

'To provide timely, high level coordination support and advice to the JRCS on how best to utilise the capacity of the IFRC to help respond to the humanitarian crises resulting from the earthquake and tsunami.'

From 15 to 19 March the HLLM visited Tokyo and undertook a short field visit. A report with 17 recommendations for the consideration of JRCS was presented on 22 March to help guide the development of a Plan of Action (PoA). The updated 9 September 2011 version of the PoA (funded by contributions from partner national societies)<sup>33</sup> demonstrates the acceptance and subsequent programming of a number of these recommendations. Key informant interviews reveal that the work of the HLLM was well regarded and has been an important input to

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<sup>32</sup> [www.rcstandcom.info/pdfs.../15\\_CoD09\\_14\\_1\\_CfGP\\_EN.pdf](http://www.rcstandcom.info/pdfs.../15_CoD09_14_1_CfGP_EN.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> Programme and Budget at 9<sup>th</sup> September can be found at Annex 5.

the still evolving PoA. The changing context, particularly the emergence of new beneficiary needs and other actors, has guided decisions about programme development.

At the outset, ICRC also made a number of offers of support. Offers to assist in establishing a web based RFL programme and deployment of specialist staff to work with JRCS experts in addressing the threats created by the nuclear accident were accepted.

These measures were introduced in the first days following the triple disaster and created a platform for nurturing trust and transparency amongst the members of the Movement as the relief and recovery programming evolved.

### **Communications and Media**

Even as JRCS focussed on mobilizing domestic resources, consideration was given to a recognized gap in its capacity to deal with international, non Japanese-language media. A contingency plan had been established in 2009 for technical support to be provided through the IFRC's AP Zone office. Implemented immediately, the AP Zone communications manager arrived in Tokyo on 12<sup>th</sup> March with the EARD communications delegate arriving the following day. From March till June, seven experienced IFRC communications delegates, most seconded by partners, worked continuously in JRCS headquarters. Liaising closely with staff from the JRCS Planning & Public Relations office, a steady flow of information on the response activities of JRCS was provided. Delegates and staff travelled together to obtain first hand reports and video material on the situation in tsunami affected areas. These were made available to partner national societies directly and via the JRCS and IFRC websites.

JRCS and the IFRC delegates conducted hundreds of media interviews for domestic and international media services. IFRC also provided support to key JRCS spokespersons, assisting with the preparation of speeches, presentations, media releases and with preparations for television and radio interviews. With material produced in this way, and through frequent field trips facilitated by JRCS, spokespersons for partner national societies could respond well to the demand for information from their own domestic audiences via television, radio, newspaper, and on-line websites. Fundraising campaigns were thus greatly facilitated.

Media monitoring undertaken by Meltwater News reports that JRCS' earthquake/tsunami operation was mentioned nearly 59,000 times between the disaster and the end of May, providing evidence of both the media and public interest in the disaster and the success in profiling the work of JRCS.

New media technology and channels demonstrated their worth and gave clear evidence to the commitment to sharing information, expressing solidarity, accountability and mobilizing resources. JRCS established a dedicated website<sup>34</sup> and together with IFRC extensively used social networks (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr), reaching millions of people globally.<sup>35</sup> These contacts included:

- through Twitter in the first four days after the disaster more than 1,000 tweets disseminated information to more than 2,000,000 people.
- on Flickr, the photoset for Japan, comprised of pictures from the IFRC, JRCS and Reuters, surpassed 1,000,000 views on the two-week anniversary of the disaster.

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.jrc.or.jp/eq-japan2011/index.html>

<sup>35</sup> Japan Earthquake & Tsunami: Social Media Outreach March 11 – 25, 2011

- promotions within the Facebook environment including an official “Global Disaster Relief” page with 534,000 fans.
- Goodwill Ambassador Jet Li’s official page with 5,068,000 fans.

Reviews of the communication operations were conducted by JRCS and IFRC at the three month and six month marks to assess progress and identify adjustments that may be necessary to the strategy. The opportunity was also taken to begin planning for future initiatives – e.g. 1 year anniversary communications strategy.

Though laudable results were achieved by the JRCS public relations team, it feels there is a need to continue to strengthen capacity in website and social media skills. It also feels that resources are needed in order for the Public Relations Office to be more proactive and timely in communicating with the public, both through domestic and foreign media.

### **Reporting**

Comprehensive Information Bulletins were issued on 11, 12, 15 and 22 March by IFRC when public interest was at its height. Regular on-going reporting was maintained by JRCS, with assistance from IFRC, through the issue of Operations Updates in April, two in May, and one in each of the months of June and August with a six-month progress report issued in September. Technical support for this was provided by IFRC.

JRCS had to search for and recruit a skilled and bilingual person to assume the demanding role for production of narrative reports in English for a global audience and to communicate on a regular basis with sister national societies concerning the details of donations. Previously, this capacity had not been required in JRCS – rather, as the donor, JRCS looked to other national societies to provide this service as part of the management and accountability requirements when making donations to others.

The provision of this critical reporting function during the time of large scale disaster needs to be built into contingency planning for such events.

### **Working with Partners**

On 9 May 2011, JRCS hosted a Partnership Meeting attended by 62 representatives from 18 national societies, JRCS, IFRC, ICRC embassies, the European Union and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The agenda covered a variety of topical issues:

- apprising participants of the consequences of the disaster
- providing a status report on the JRCS response activities to date
- outlining plans for further relief and recovery programmes
- leading discussions on cooperation and coordination issues, and
- facilitating an open forum for discussion and inputs from participants.

Eleven conclusions were reached at the meeting and these became part of the planning frame for the JRCS and the partners could identify the link between their contributions and the agreed PoA.

With a clear focus on demonstrating accountability and transparency and recognizing the confidence and trust placed in it by sister national societies, JRCS has met with and consulted numerous delegations visiting Japan since the disaster, including Red Cross representatives from the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia and Red Crescent representatives from Qatar, Malaysia and Pakistan.

After the six month period of this evaluation, JRCS hosted a monitoring visit for Movement partners from 31 October to 2 November 2011 during which progress to date was reviewed with representatives from 11 national societies, the European Union, ICRC and IFRC.

A short, on-line survey of partner national societies was conducted as part of this evaluation. The responses to the 'Partnership' question of the survey revealed very high levels of satisfaction amongst respondents – with 92% indicating a positive response to the question:

*"In the absence of an IFRC Appeal do the current arrangements provide your national society the opportunity to 'partner' with JRCS in a satisfactory way?"<sup>36</sup>*

The evaluation team concluded that JRCS has been transparent in the way it has worked with partner national societies, ICRC and IFRC. This openness to accept support:

- was judicious and considered – e.g. in accepting resources (financial, technical and human resources) based on the mandate and responsibilities of JRCS
- was appropriately sensitive to the political, social and cultural context in which the disaster occurred
- assisted sister national societies to respond to the requirements of their domestic audiences and governments
- demonstrated appropriate standards of accountability and transparency, and
- was led by JRCS.

The overwhelming majority of national societies supported JRCS in accordance with Movement standards and guidelines. The unilateral actions of a small number of national societies were an unwanted distraction.

Good partnership within the Movement is based on an open and transparent relationship with partners. Consulting and engaging partners from the start in understanding the context and nature of the disaster, affirming plans and budgets for partner support and subsequent monitoring all contribute to the building of mutual trust and respect. High quality communications and reporting also contributed to building a relationship with partners that optimised the access to the resources of the Movement in addressing the needs of those affected by the disaster.

### **External Partnerships**

JRCS has also engaged with a range of external organisations since the disaster. For example, on 10 June 2011 JRCS hosted a meeting led by the Japan Platform and attended by representatives from 14 NGOs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JRCS. The meeting provided a forum for sharing updates on operational activities in Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures.

During the period, JRCS hosted visits by senior representatives of overseas governments and organisations, including ECHO, British Columbia (Canada), Canadian Coast Guard, Ireland, Ty Warner, Swiss Solidarity and Caritas Switzerland.

### **Some partnership challenges**

A small number of national societies acted unilaterally during the operation which caused some embarrassment.

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<sup>36</sup> Please see Annex 7 – NS Survey Results and Analysis



The uncomfortable reality is that there is a long history of such actions being taken in major disaster operations – despite the existence of numerous agreements, codes, frameworks and mechanisms that have been ratified and agreed at the highest levels of the IFRC<sup>37</sup> and which explicitly disallow such actions.

### **Other countries**

JRCS's engagement with Movement partners has been more extensive than in other high income countries that the evaluation team has studied. In that regard, it has been a good model for building confidence and trust among partners.

Nevertheless, prior mutual agreements have also worked well between sister national societies in other countries. For example, a Canadian Red Cross media specialist was deployed to American Red Cross to boost capacity after Hurricane Katrina emphasising once again the importance of contingency planning.

The fact that a domestic appeal was launched by some of the national societies in the other countries reviewed helped to provide a plan and context for international donors and represented a good tool for accountability. In the case of Japan, no formal appeal was launched and funds donated by the public were exclusively used for cash distributions to beneficiaries by the authorities in the affected municipalities.

Partnership meetings have not been commonly held in other countries, though New Zealand Red Cross plans to hold such an event early in 2012. The conduct of evaluations of large scale disaster operations has been more common with American Red Cross, New Zealand Red Cross as well as JRCS conducting these as part of the drive for accountability and the learning of lessons.

### **Recommendation**

19. That national societies, including JRCS, prioritise the importance of having and building capacity and competence in communicating critical post disaster information via the internet and social media.

## **14. IFRC Coordination and Support**

From the beginning of the disaster, the AP Zone office took the lead in coordinating between PNS and IFRC Secretariat offices in Geneva, the EARD office and the JRCS. The AP Zone office coordinated the deployment of the HLLM which was led by the Head of EARD. The Head of EARD also managed the IFRC delegates in Japan. Since IFRC had no delegate with JRCS based in Japan prior to the disaster, the IFRC Secretariat Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for disaster response and early recovery in Asia Pacific provides for the nomination of a representative to act on its behalf within the country team (made up of representation from a national society and the IFRC Secretariat). In line with the SOP the AP Zone management determined that the Head of EARD would act in this capacity and be responsible for ongoing liaison with JRCS while the AP Zone office continued to lead the overall coordination. This arrangement was in place until a dedicated Liaison Officer was appointed at the end of March, reporting to the Head of EARD.

The SOP of IFRC is that the Zone office takes the lead when there is a large disaster in a country. In the case of GEJET the arrangements established by the Zone reflected the context of the operation, i.e. JRCS was fully in

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<sup>37</sup> Refer to the Principles and Rules for Disaster Relief art 20.1 Also the Seville Agreement and Amendment and the Code of Good Partnership establish the basis for proper working relationships.

charge of the operation, there was no IFRC Appeal, all internationally raised funds except the ECHO funding were channelled directly to JRCS and the IFRC role was advisory and supportive to the national society.

The resources available within the AP Zone office were also deployed from the outset, including the Head of the Disaster Management Unit and specialist delegates such as the communications manager. Further specialists were deployed from IFRC Geneva (senior logisticians) or seconded from partner national societies (reporting delegates and communications delegates), complemented and supported by staff and delegates from EARD, including communications and finance expertise.

At the request of JRCS, the IFRC Representative was appointed and a more permanent coordination and support role was established in country. The IFRC Representative is embedded within JRCS to advise on overall strategic planning with regards to the earthquake and tsunami operation. The objectives of the position include leading all international staff supporting JRCS in coordination, planning, monitoring, evaluating and reporting. Profiling and representing the IFRC in relations with external partners and organisations is also a defined role.

The IFRC Representative is situated within the International Department of JRCS. For practical purposes, this works well as the staff members in this department speak English, unlike in many parts of the organisation. His access to bodies such as the GEJET Recovery Task Force is limited on account of the language divide, though he does enjoy access, as required, to individuals throughout the Society. Those interviewed valued the role played by the Representative including the coordination of the range of activities involved with partners, helping JRCS to meet IFRC standards in reporting and arranging the external evaluation. Though the JRCS International Department contains officers highly experienced in working with IFRC, the pressures of their daily work allowed limited time for dealing with the wider issues of strategic planning and Movement cooperation. The IFRC Representative position was valued in adding a capacity to reinforce work in areas such as these.

In summary, the coordination model adopted by IFRC in the GEJET operation has been effective and appropriate to the needs of partners, including JRCS. The role has been one of support and liaison, facilitating the exchange of information and resources. On-going engagement between JRCS and national societies, ICRC and IFRC has been important. The reporting line to the relevant regional delegation (EARD) has been efficient and effective, building on an already existing relationship between the IFRC and JRCS, and backed by appropriate skilled staff in the regional delegation. The support provided and the cooperation between the different levels of IFRC and between IFRC and JRCS has been satisfactory and mutually appreciated.

### **Other countries**

Early in the Hurricane Katrina operation, American Red Cross asked the IFRC for logistic specialists to strengthen its capacity. A total of 64 delegates were deployed in response to this request. Experienced delegates have worked in countries where they have taken lead roles in implementing IFRC or ICRC logistics procedures according to well established SOPs. In the case of Katrina, American Red Cross wanted people who could adapt to work within its existing logistics structure and use its procedures. The role was not to take the lead, as would have been the case in Haiti for example, but to support and work with American Red Cross colleagues. Though American Red Cross took steps to integrate these international delegates, including assigning liaison personnel, the role of working within an existing national society structure was not well understood by many of the international recruits.

In hindsight, it was realised that more explicit briefing and orientation to the roles expected could have helped but it was not the right time to design this when the operational response was still evolving and had not stabilised.

American Red Cross regard this matter as an important preparedness issue both for well developed national societies planning for large scale disasters and for the IFRC in managing recruitment in support of these national societies.

Though the IFRC also assigned a Movement coordinator delegate to support American Red Cross in working with Movement partners, this assignment was made too late and the role was not sufficiently well defined for work with a national society with wide knowledge of the Movement.

## **Recommendation**

20. That national societies and IFRC plan for the placement of an IFRC representative and technical delegates, as needed, in times of large scale disasters in high income countries when there is widespread Movement support. The placement of an IFRC representative is for coordination and experienced technical delegates with substantive consultative skills should be made available as needed and integrated into the host national society structure. The delegates assigned need to respect and work with colleagues according to the host national society's established standard operating procedures.

## 15. Accountability

### **JRCS Disaster Management Mandate Responsibilities**

The JRCS responsibilities under the national disaster management plan are clear and well understood: provision of medical services, provision of relief supplies and to fundraise in Japan for cash distribution. JRCS met these responsibilities by providing effective and efficient medical services with sustained presence in the affected areas. Approximately one third of all medical personnel deployed in the first month after the disaster were deployed by JRCS. By August, 818 teams had provided treatment to almost 80,000 people. JRCS distributed relief supplies including more than 132,000 blankets, 13,500 sleeping kits and 30,000 emergency kits. JRCS has raised more than USD 3.8 billion from the public on behalf of the municipalities for distribution to those affected.

Prefecture and municipal stakeholders acknowledged the valuable contribution made by JRCS in the areas of medical and relief supplies. JRCS' good coordination with other medical team providers and the authorities was emphasised as an important aspect.

### **Reporting**

JRCS accessed technical support from IFRC in support of the design and establishment of the financial, operational and performance reporting framework for this operation - several reporting delegates were made available to JRCS and a finance delegate facilitated harmonized financial reporting. There has also been on-going technical support from EARD and AP Zone on planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER). A dedicated position within the International Department of JRCS to coordinate these tasks was established. More than 83% of respondents to the partner national society survey of this evaluation confirm the adequacy of the reporting framework for this operation.

## **Recovery support policies**

JRCS established a set of six guiding principles for its Fundamental Policy of Recovery Support, effectively establishing an accountability framework for the recovery programme. This policy establishes the following criteria:

- effective utilisation of international support
- support “lives”, “health” and “dignity” of survivors
- reach a broad area and as many people as possible
- support the most vulnerable (i.e. the elderly, those who require nursing care and the affected children)
- cooperate with central government, prefectures and municipalities on mid-and long-term recovery plan
- secure accountability and transparency of the programme in Japan and abroad.

The policy has guided programme design activities and is reflected in the recovery programme and budget. Performance monitoring and evaluation is undertaken at both the headquarters and field levels and regular reports are presented on performance achieved.

## **Beneficiaries**

In recent operations responding to mega-disasters, e.g. the Haiti Earthquake and Pakistan Floods, the Red Cross and Red Crescent programmes have included a beneficiary communications intervention. Initiatives such as radio programming and sms messaging have proven to be very successful and efficient in reaching communities and individuals, providing them with vital information and connecting them to the RCRC operation<sup>38</sup>. These programmes also provide opportunities to build accountability measures, e.g. feedback mechanisms that assist in building two way communications between beneficiaries and the Red Cross.

Though municipalities take the lead in coordinating support for the beneficiaries, JRCS could have established greater rapport with their clients if such mechanisms had been used. As municipality authorities are now working at the community level to gather feedback on initial recovery and reconstruction plans, a window of opportunity exists for JRCS to review its links to beneficiaries and to strengthen its accountability to them.

JRCS has commissioned a comprehensive review by consultants with focus on technical aspects of its response activities. That review will provide an independent assessment of performance achieved, identify issues requiring attention/rectification, and lessons learned. The review addressed accountability issues relating to programme implementation and includes a beneficiary satisfaction survey.

## **Risk Management**

The usual JRCS planning process includes an approach referred to as ‘POCD’ - plan, organise, check, do. Risk management is taken into account as part of the planning process.

JRCS clearly appreciated that although a formal appeal had not been launched, there were a range of accountability expectations that were placed upon it by accepting support from sister national societies.

While not in the brief of the evaluation team, JRCS’ public fundraising for cash distribution became the subject of some adverse media coverage. A lack of understanding of the mechanism by the media gave rise to criticism that the JRCS was slow in distributing the funds to those affected by the disaster. JRCS is authorized to fundraise at the request of the municipalities for people affected by disaster. The arrangement is that a GoJ appointed National Disbursement Committee, made up of various individuals of standing, national and prefecture officials, the media and a representative from JRCS, determines the criteria for distribution. The funds are

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<sup>38</sup> *Beneficiary Communication Evaluation – Haiti Earthquake Operation 2011*. IFRC, July 2011.

channelled from this Committee via the prefectures to the municipalities for distribution by them. The accountability for the funds so far raised from more than two million donors is therefore not technically resting with JRCS once the funds are transferred to the authorities. However, since JRCS is the recipient of close to 75% of the total funds donated by the public in Japan, there is an issue of accountability to media and the general public involving considerable reputational risk, also for JRCS' partner national societies and IFRC.

JRCS risk management has focussed on presenting and clarifying this situation since the disaster. Despite this concerted effort, two criticisms of JRCS persist in the media and the public: perceptions of a 'slow' distribution of cash to the beneficiaries and wrongful allegations that JRCS is deducting an 'administration fee' from the donations.

The former adverse criticism has given rise to a discussion within JRCS about the current arrangement and the problems it presents for Red Cross in being accountable to the domestic donors. Several factors give rise to new and high expectations from the public regarding the timely distribution of their donations. Technology used by the media is able to bring very quick and often real time images and stories of disasters to the public. Social media allow individuals to share and voice their opinions directly in real time through electronic media. These factors give rise to expectations that the distribution of funds can be as efficient and fast.

As for the misinformation about JRCS levying an 'administration fee', strenuous efforts have been made to correct this. It is acknowledged that, at the outset, a more proactive public information campaign about the nature of the fundraising programme could have obviated the need to address both of these unfounded criticisms, underlying the importance of having the capacity in place to protect the reputation of JRCS.

In other respects, JRCS met the public relations challenges of such a large operation by providing good quality information and communications to reassure donors that funds were being used in an appropriate and timely way. JRCS responded openly to unprecedented levels of interest from domestic and foreign media and provided spokespersons to speak to the media. Media conferences were organised, advertising in the media undertaken and many press releases made. JRCS also established a framework of net-based, easily accessible, regular reporting on progress, financial and other issues of interest to supporters and other stakeholders

## **Recommendation**

See recommendation 16.

## Recommendations

Recommendations are numbered according to their order in the text of the report.

### **For attention Japanese Red Cross Society**

1. That JRCS take a lead to develop a framework for cooperation with the appropriate government authorities at central and local levels, NGOs and other relevant organisations to better share information, understand each others' plans and foster coordination of activities in the future.
  
3. That JRCS develop a contingency plan for large scale disasters after considering the following issues:
  - the relationship with GoJ in implementing the disaster management plan (see recommendation 1)
  - a strategy to scale up and meet abnormally large needs in the case of mega disasters and/or when two or more chapters are seriously affected (see section 4)
  - the possible role of JRCS health institutions, such as hospitals, in providing a forward disaster management coordination centre in large scale disasters
  - the need for capacity in making assessments, including in situations where municipalities are rendered dysfunctional (see recommendation 5)
  - JRCS role and responsibility in case of large scale industrial accidents (see recommendation 8)
  - the need for a JRCS recovery policy (see recommendation 14)
  - a strategy for the most effective deployment of human resources within the Society, including those with practical experience and expertise in overseas large scale disasters and those familiar with Movement policies and standards (see recommendation 18)
  - the need to strengthen the corps of JRCS trained volunteers to give added outreach to the communities and provide surge capacity to deliver emergency relief services (see recommendation 13)
  - the basis on which additional resources (e.g. funds, international tools, supplies and personnel) may be mobilized from within the Movement (see section 5), and
  - stronger coordination with the government, NGOs, the private sector and other organisations (see recommendation 1).
  
5. That JRCS build capacity within its domestic disaster response personnel to conduct assessments on the basis of IFRC developed methodologies in order to better target assistance and reach the most vulnerable. Trained assessment teams should be available to be deployed at short notice to help municipality authorities assess the needs of their communities, especially in areas where JRCS can deliver services. JRCS should also review its volunteer base at municipal level and consider more systematic training and organisation for disaster intervention.
  
11. That JRCS undertake investigations to establish needs and the feasibility of providing long-term, volunteer delivered PSS programming in support of individuals and communities affected by the GEJET as part of the recovery programme.
  
13. That JRCS strengthen and diversify its trained volunteer base and have effective systems in place for their efficient mobilization and deployment. As well, effective systems should be developed to manage a surge in the recruitment of new volunteers in times of disaster.

14. That JRCS develops a national recovery policy and a plan to build relevant capacity as part of its disaster management strategy.
19. *That national societies, including JRCS, prioritise the importance of having and building capacity and competence in communicating critical post disaster information via the internet and social media.*<sup>39</sup>

#### **For attention National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**

2. That national societies continuously nurture a close working relationship with the disaster management authorities at all levels to enable effective and efficient liaison when large scale disasters strike and decision-making bodies come under heavy pressure.
4. That national societies undertake adequate contingency planning for large scale disasters, including arrangements to access resources and assistance from within the Movement, to respond to events which, while highly unlikely, may have catastrophic effects in their country.
12. That national societies both plan to send and to receive trained PSS personnel to support their expatriate communities when large scale disasters strike, given the presence of many different nationalities in most high income countries. The deployment of such personnel must depend upon usual travel protocols being respected including the agreement of the host national society.
15. That national societies in high income countries adopt disaster recovery policies, taking account of their unique national context, the disaster risks present and drawing on the work being undertaken by IFRC in developing an IFRC recovery policy.
18. That national societies in high income countries consider how best to organise access to relevant experience and knowledge about international disaster management best practice available within their national societies and plan to deploy their human resources accordingly in the emergency phase of domestic large scale disasters.
19. That national societies, including JRCS, prioritise the importance of having and building capacity and competence in communicating critical post disaster information via the internet and social media.
20. That national societies and IFRC plan for the placement of an IFRC representative and technical delegates, as needed, in times of large scale disasters in high income countries when there is widespread Movement support. The placement of an IFRC representative is for coordination and experienced technical delegates with substantive consultative skills should be made available as needed and integrated into the host national society structure. The delegates assigned need to respect and work with colleagues according to the host national society's established standard operating procedures.

#### **For attention International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**

6. That IFRC develop tools for post disaster needs assessment in high income countries and systematically share best practice.

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<sup>39</sup> Recommendations in italics are also under another heading.

7. That IFRC assure the flexibility of the ERU model and make national societies aware of this so that ERUs can be more expeditiously made available and integrated into existing national society structures and systems in high income countries.
16. That IFRC consult with partners to consider and develop a coherent operational framework for national societies in high income countries to use when accepting spontaneous donations from partner national societies. This should regulate ways in which assistance can be efficiently and effectively channelled via the Red Cross Red Crescent to reach the beneficiaries and specify the responsibilities of the operating national society in accounting for the use of these resources. The development of this operational framework must take account of existing policies and procedures and may result in the need for amendments to and/or new policies.
17. That IFRC undertake a study on the adequacy of the secretariat's direct and indirect cost recovery during GEJET and determine a new formula for such "no appeal" situations, if needed.
20. *That national societies and IFRC plan for the placement of an IFRC representative and technical delegates, as needed, in times of large scale disasters in high income countries when there is widespread Movement support. The placement of an IFRC representative is for coordination and experienced technical delegates with substantive consultative skills should be made available as needed and integrated into the host national society structure. The delegates assigned need to respect and work with colleagues according to the host national society's established standard operating procedures.*

#### **For attention RCRC Movement**

8. That the RCRC Movement continue to partner JRCS both in giving assistance to the affected population after the Fukushima Daiichi power plant nuclear accident and in contributing to the development of a strategy (ideally expanded to an approach that includes all NRBC industrial accidents) to address the humanitarian consequences of such disaster events.
9. That a strategy for the Movement be developed to elaborate domestic and international roles in dealing with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear accidents, drawing on the extensive experiences of humanitarian interventions after the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accidents.
10. That the Movement continuously reviews and updates its restoring family links and tracing services to take advantage of evolving technology and the social media.



**Terms of Reference for the Evaluation**  
**of the JRCS and the IFRC Response to the Great East**  
**Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 Mar 2011**

## 1. Summary

- 1.1 **Purpose:** This evaluation will assess the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS)/IFRC response to the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, so as to develop a more effective domestic intervention mechanism based on lessons learnt from this, as well as how international support can be better mobilized and coordinated.
- 1.2 **Commissioners:** This evaluation is being jointly commissioned by the JRCS and the IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office. In country guidance to the process will be provided by the JRCS and the IFRC representative in Tokyo, who will act as the focal point for the evaluation team in situ for the in-country process and field work. Both JRCS and AP Zone Office will be responsible for approving the various outputs of the process.
- 1.3 **Audience:** The evaluation is intended for the leadership and staff of the JRCS and IFRC (including the IFRC secretariat and concerned PNSs).
- 1.4 **Duration of consultancy:** approximately 31 days
- 1.5 **Estimated dates of consultancy:** Within September - October, 2011
- 1.6 **Location of consultancy:** Japan, Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, and Geneva

## 2. Background

- 2.1. The East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on 11 March 2011 was the most devastating natural disaster in Japan since the earthquake in Tokyo in 1923. The 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent 38 meter high tsunami lead to extensive damage to lives and properties - a death toll of 15,687 with 4757 missing, and evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people - requiring huge humanitarian response.
- 2.2. The JRCS has a long and wide experience in responding to international disasters within the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement (The Movement). In its domestic role the National Society is engaged through its 92 hospitals, 23 nursing schools and colleges, social service provision and its blood service activities. Its organisational preparedness for domestic disaster response has hitherto largely been limited to fundraising for cash distribution, and also emergency relief and health to disaster

victims.

- 2.3. Partner National Societies, the IFRC Secretariat and its regional offices, ICRC and a number of external actors have and continue to support the JRCS intervention with large sums of funding raised in their own countries and also with expertise.
- 2.4. In support of the massive intervention by JRCS, more than 50 sister National Societies raised around 400 million CHF from the general public in solidarity with the affected population. The contributions from the public in Japan have contributed over 2.6 billion CHF for cash grant distribution.
- 2.5. The majority of funds raised by partners have been contributed without earmarking. The trust and confidence in JRCS builds on its accountability in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability, coverage, coordination and coherence. An important aspect of the rationale for this evaluation shall therefore be to provide increased accountability both to donors and beneficiaries.

In recent years, large scale disasters events have occurred in a number of high-income countries and the National Societies within these countries have received or been offered funds and/or expertise to support their own humanitarian action. One conclusion from a partnership meeting held in Tokyo on 9 May was that there is an urgent need for IFRC-wide guidelines defining systematic and effective ways in how support can be offered and received by the affected National Society to better using the collective resources. Lessons learnt from the IFRC's and other actors' response to the 2011 disaster in Japan will provide valuable and relevant input towards such guidelines, building on the extensive experience and mechanisms already available within and outside the Movement.

- 2.6. The evaluation will cover the six-month period from 11 March 2011 till 10 September 2011 and be undertaken during the months of September and October 2011 with a duration of about 30 days.

### **3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope**

- 3.1. The risk for future large-scale disasters with severe humanitarian consequences related to earthquakes and industrial accidents is very high in Japan. JRCS recognises this and intends to carry out a thorough evaluation process of its response to this Earthquake and Tsunami response during the first six months, reviewing both what was done, what was not done and what could have been done. JRCS' intention is to develop a more effective domestic intervention mechanism based on lessons learnt from this and earlier domestic disaster interventions.
- 3.2. The purpose of the evaluation is to contribute to the development of:
  - more effective future interventions by the IFRC in large scale disasters in high income countries.

- consistent and applicable policies, guidelines, procedures and techniques for JRCS and the Federation valid for the context of Japan and other operation context with similar characteristics
- improved contingency planning of JRCS
- optimized IFRC and JRCS mobilization of new and existing collective resources
- accountability for operational effectiveness to stakeholders

JRCS intends to present the report as an input to a planned workshop during the IFRC General Assembly in November on the issue of improved collective response to large natural disasters in high income countries.

### 3.3. The objectives of the evaluation are:

- To ascertain output, outcome, impact and assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the range of disaster response interventions and actions undertaken by JRCS, partner NSs, the IFRC Secretariat and its regional offices, ICRC and external actors;
- To provide findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to future policy issues, management systems, operational actions etc.
- The evaluation report will describe the social, political, economic and demographic context within which the operation took place, and its influence on the outcome and impact of the disaster response action taken.
- The evaluation report will provide a description of the policy context relevant to the intervention, both JRCS's own and the RC/RC Movement policy documents, objectives and strategies.
- The evaluation report will describe JRCS and the Movements institutional context, organisational arrangements established for implementation, and stakeholder involvement relevant to the operation, so that their influence can be identified and assessed. This will include organisational and management structures and collective resources and mechanisms for disaster response
- The evaluation report will describe, discuss and assess the intervention logic in relation to JRCS mandate, contingency planning, the disaster context, institutional and organisational capacity and review potential gaps and potential opportunities missed.
- JRCS and the IFRC secretariat will generate list of follow-up actions based on recommendations of the evaluation report, and disseminate to the concerned for follow-up.

### 3.4. The Scope of the evaluation are as follows:

- The evaluation will cover all the response activities related to international support from the Movement partners from 11 Mar up to 11 Sept 2011.
- The scope of the evaluation will be defined by issues covered and planned by JRCS (Annex 1: JRCS Plans of Action) and proposed by the High Level mission invited by JRCS at the initial stage (Annex 2: High Level Mission report), as well as other planned or possible modes of intervention identified by the evaluation team during the evaluation.
- The JRCS management and institutional structures in terms of staff and volunteers at HQ and prefecture levels utilised or available for the intervention should be

reviewed and analysed. This would in particular refer to planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting, finance management, communications, management information systems and internal audit.

- IFRC secretariat and Partner National Societies support to JRCS in terms of compliance with and use of Federation policies and guidelines such as the Code for Good Partnership, and Principles and Rules for Disaster Relief, technical expertise, financial contributions, terms of agreements and Memoranda of Understanding, communication, etc will be reviewed and analysed in the evaluation
- The cash distribution programme as implemented by Japanese authorities with funding from JRCS and other organisations will not be part of the evaluation.

#### 4. Evaluation Objectives and Key Questions

Key objectives and questions to be answered in this evaluation are listed below though non-exhaustive. In addressing these objectives and questions, particular emphasis should be placed on the JRCS and IFRC internal strategies, policies, guidelines, systems and processes at all levels – not only the service delivery at the field level, but the related levels that affect this both nationally and internationally, with the IFRC zone office, and at the IFRC headquarters in Geneva, as well as with participating National Societies.

- 1. Efficiency & effectiveness:** to what extent have internal processes, systems, and mechanisms affected timely and cost-effect service delivery. Guiding questions include but are not limited to those below:
  - a. To what extent has the Operation achieved the proposed objectives of the relief/recovery phase?
  - b. How timely and relevant were the different plans, appeals, and management reports?
  - c. Could the operation have adopted more cost effective alternative strategies or approaches to achieve the same results?
  - d. Was the use of global tools - RDRT, FACT, ERUs etc being considered and utilized, and what were the rationale for the decision?
  - e. What NS/IFRC mechanisms and tools were used to promote good practice (e.g. Sphere, emergency assessment tools, Plan of Action template etc)?
  - f. What were the factors that helped to move the Operation effectively forward, and what factors hindered progress?
  - g. Was the JRCS/IFRC operational structure well geared to deliver timely, efficient and effective disaster response?
  - h. What changes in capacity, capability, understanding and learning have occurred within the JRCS as a result of the operation so far? Are these appropriate?
- 2. Impact**
  - a. How did the support provided to the targeted communities impact on their well-being?

- b. What were the positive and negative consequences/changes in the communities as a result of the support provided?
- 3. Accountability to beneficiaries**
- a. Is there a beneficiary feedback mechanism, and is it effective?
- 4. Communication and resource mobilization strategy**
- a. How effective and efficient were the systems to mobilize resources – financial, human resources, communications/media, logistics etc.?
  - b. How was the impact of the external communication and resource mobilization strategy of the JRCS and the IFRC to the funding and operation?
  - c. How does the operation/reporting mode impact to the accountability to international donors via movement partners?
- 5. Coordination:** to what extent the JRCS response was managed in a cohesive and effective manner, including communication, collaboration, and coordination among key stakeholders:
- a. How timely and effective was the coordination mechanism and processes among Movement partners at all levels and how has it impacted to the overall effectiveness of the operation?
  - b. How timely and effectively has the JRCS/IFRC externally communicated and collaborated in its response with external actors, particularly the Government and the international and national humanitarian community?
- 6. Relevant and appropriate coverage:** to what extent have internal systems and processes ensured that population groups are included in or excluded from the operation, and the differential impact on these groups.
- a. How has the assessment finding linked through to response and planning?
  - b. How have JRCS/IFRC internal systems and processes affected whether services have been delivered in an equitable manner, proportionate to need?
  - c. To what extent, were the strategies employed to meet the needs and priorities identified by the targeted communities, tailored to the local context? Note: This should consider how well the intervention took into account the economic, social, political and environmental context, thus contributing to ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness.
  - d. Were the operation's strategies and priorities in line or complement those of the authorities? If not, why?
  - e. To what extent did the intervention support the targeted communities' own problem-solving and decision-making to address local needs?
  - f. Were there gaps that the JRCS/IFRC should have expanded its services to cover more in sectors/people among the affected communities?
  - g. To what extent did activities planned and carried out during the relief phase take into account the longer term recovery aspects? Cite examples where this was done.

- 7. International Standards & Principles:** to what extent has JRCS internal systems and processes upheld the JRCS commitment and compliance to established international standards and principles for humanitarian action, especially the (1) Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the (2) Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, and (3) SPHERE.

## **5. Evaluation Methodology & Process**

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluations, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

The **evaluation team**, which will be responsible for gathering information/views, performing analysis, and drafting the evaluation report, will comprise the following:

- (i) a team leader, who will be an independent professional with several years of experience in humanitarian programme evaluation;
- (ii) a senior level manager not in any way directly related to this operation at any point of time (e.g. a representative from other NS)
- (iii) a technical representative from the IFRC secretariat.
- (iv) a senior level manager from the JRCS with international experience but not in any way directly related to this operation at any point of time

On top of that, technical/administrative support persons from the JRCS and IFRC would be appointed for facilitating the Evaluation Team's work in the process – e.g. arranging field visits, interviews, collection of information, as and when required.

The external evaluator will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience to the evaluation, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on their professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. The internal evaluators will provide IFRC background and experience to assist the external evaluator in the assessment process, and to best interact with the various RCRC actors involved in the operation and this person should have sound knowledge and understanding of IFRC disaster response. It is expected that this three person team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed assessment of the emergency operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

*The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the evaluation team and IFRC*, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. **Desktop review** of operation background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including concerned prior evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such exist surveys from IFRC participants in the operation.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites.
3. **Key informant interviews.**
4. **Focus group discussions**, as time and capacity allow.

The evaluation team will be recruited by end of Aug 2011. The review will be undertaken in Sept-Oct 2011, and finalized no later than 31 Oct 2011. The initial findings from the field mission will be shared in early Oct. The consultancy period will be for a maximum of 31 working days for team leader.

The schedule will be confirmed during the inception period. A draft outline is provided below:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>No. of working Days</b>
Aug 2011	Hiring of consultants/ Contracts signed	
Sept– Week 1	1. Desktop study: review intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation. 2. Development of detailed inception report, or data collection/analysis plan and schedule, draft methodology, and data collection tools.	4
Sept- Week 2	Mission Briefings in Kuala Lumpur and Beijing, Tokyo, Focus Group Discussions and/or key informant interviews	5
Sept - week 3-4	Interview key stakeholders in Japan Field visits to target communities – surveys, FGDs, key informant interviews	8
Sept - week 4	Debriefing in Tokyo, Beijing and Kuala Lumpur	4
Early Oct	Provide first draft report by Evaluation Team	5
Mid Oct	Feedback on draft report by JRCS & IFRC (5 days) Provide second draft of the report	2
End Oct	Feedback on draft report by JRCS & IFRC (5 days) Consolidation of Final Report	3
<b>Total Working Days for Consultant</b>		<b>31</b>

The review process will be followed to ensure stakeholder input while maintaining the integrity and independence of the evaluation report according to the following lines.

- **Inaccuracy.** Inaccuracies are factual, supported with undisputable evidence, and therefore should be corrected in the evaluation report itself.
- **Clarifications.** A clarification is additional, explanatory information to what the evaluators provided in the report. It is the evaluators' decision whether to revise their report according to a clarification; if not, the evaluation management response team can decide whether to include the clarification in their management response.
- **Difference of opinion.** A difference of opinion does not pertain to the findings (which are factual), but to the conclusions and/or recommendations. These may be expressed to the evaluators during the review process. It is the evaluators' decision whether to revise their report according to a difference of opinion; if not, the evaluation management response team can decide whether to include the clarification in their management response.

**The evaluation will also ensure the relevance of the evaluation results as follows:**

- The evaluation findings must be relevant to the object being evaluated and the purpose of the evaluation. The results shall follow clearly from the evaluation questions and analysis of data, showing a clear line of evidence to support the conclusions. Any discrepancies between the planned and actual implementation of the object being evaluated must be explained.
- The evaluation will be conducted and the results made available in a timely manner in relation to the purpose of the evaluation. Un-envisaged changes to timeframe and budget shall be explained in the report as well as any discrepancies between planned and actual implementation and products of the evaluation.
- Recommendations and lessons learned shall be relevant, targeted to the intended users and actionable within the responsibilities of the users. Recommendations will be actionable proposals and lessons learned will be generalizations of conclusions applicable for wider use.
- Concerned management will ensure the systematic dissemination, storage and management of the output from the evaluation to ensure easy accessibility and to maximise the benefits of the evaluation's findings.

## **6. Evaluation Deliverables**

**Inception Report** – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the evaluation and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. Specifically, the following should be considered and included in the inception report:



- Stipulating the evaluation method and process used and discuss validity and reliability. It will acknowledge any constraints encountered and their impact on the evaluation, including their impact on the independence of the evaluation. It will describe the methods and techniques used for data and information collection and processing. The choices will be justified and limitations and shortcomings explained.
- Methods for assessment of results will be specified. Attribution and contributing/confounding factors will be addressed. If indicators are used as a basis for results assessment these should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound).
- Relevant stakeholders will be involved in the evaluation process to identify issues and provide input for the evaluation. Both staff and volunteers of JRCS, partners and beneficiaries will be consulted. The evaluation report will indicate the stakeholders consulted, the criteria for their selection and describe stakeholders' participation. The methods and reasons for selection of particular stakeholders will be described.
- The evaluation report will explain the selection of any sample. Limitations regarding the representativeness of the evaluation sample will be identified. An important part of the evaluation shall be based on input from beneficiaries, preferably sampled through a survey based on data collected directly from beneficiaries.
- Evaluation criteria will be clearly stated and address efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, sustainability, coverage, coordination and coherence. If a particular criterion is not applied, this will be explained in the evaluation report, as are any additional criteria applied.
- The evaluation questions asked, as well as any revisions to the original questions, will be documented in the report for readers to be able to assess whether the evaluation team has sufficiently assessed them.

**Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels** – The team will report its preliminary findings to the

- (i) IFRC in-country team and JRCS; and
- (ii) East Asia Regional office and AP zone office

It will take on board any pertinent comments or corrections.

**First Draft report** – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field.

**Second Draft report** – incorporating comments on the first draft.

**Final report** – The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background

of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed, and any other relevant materials. The final evaluation report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from JRCS/IFRC.

The report content will encompass the following requirements:

- The evaluation report will answer all the questions and information needs detailed in the scope of the evaluation. Where this is not possible, reasons and explanations will be provided.
- The analysis will be structured with a logical flow. Data and information will be presented, analysed and interpreted systematically. Findings and conclusions will be clearly identified and flow logically from the analysis of the data and information. Underlying assumptions are made explicit and taken into account.
- The evaluation report will distinguish clearly between findings, conclusions and recommendations. The evaluation will present conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned separately and with a clear logical distinction between them. Conclusions will be substantiated by findings and analysis. Recommendations and lessons learned will follow logically from the conclusions.
- The evaluation report will contain an executive summary. The summary will provide an overview of the report, highlighting the main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned.
- The evaluation report will describe the sources of information used (documentation, respondents, literature etc.) in sufficient detail, so that the adequacy of the information can be assessed. Complete lists of interviewees and documents consulted will be included, to the extent that this does not conflict with the privacy and confidentiality of participants. The evaluation will cross-validate and critically assess the information sources used and the validity of the data, ensuring reliability and accuracy by using a variety of methods and sources of information.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the JRCS and IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his or her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

## **7. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards**

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and

accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation<sup>40</sup>.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation. The evaluation process will be characterized by sensitivity to gender, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders and undertaken with integrity and honesty. The rights and welfare of the participants in the evaluation will be protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants will be protected when requested.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders. The evaluators will be independent from the policy, operations and management functions of the commissioning institutions, implementers and beneficiaries. Possible conflicts of interest will be addressed openly and honestly. The evaluation team will work freely and without interference. It is assured of cooperation and access to all relevant information. The evaluation report will indicate any obstruction which may have impacted on the process of evaluation.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate. Stakeholders will be given the opportunity to comment on findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned. The evaluation report will reflect these comments and acknowledge any substantive disagreements. In disputes about facts that can be verified, the evaluators will investigate and change the draft where necessary. In the case of opinion or interpretation, stakeholders' comments will be reproduced verbatim in an annex, to the extent that this does not conflict with the rights of the participants.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: [www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp)

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<sup>40</sup> <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf>.

## 9. Qualifications

Selection of the external evaluation consultant will be based on the following qualifications:

1. Demonstrable experience in leading evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to large scale complex disaster relief and recovery operations, with specific experience in evaluation preferred;
2. Knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations and proven ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
3. Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions, make recommendations and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
4. Ability to manage relations with representatives from national societies, government, donors, and the community, including good diplomacy, consensus building, and interpersonal skills.
5. Experience in qualitative data collection and data analysis techniques, especially in emergency operations;
6. Knowledge and experience working with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement preferred;
7. Demonstrated capacity to work both independently and as part of a team;
8. Excellent English writing and presentation skills in English, with relevant writing samples of similar evaluation reports.
9. Good knowledge of Japan preferred but not required.
10. Minimum qualification of a PhD in relevant field of study, or a Master with equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience.
11. Immediate availability for the period indicated.

## 9. Application Procedures

Interested candidates should submit their application material by \_\_\_\_\_ 2011 to the following email: [enkas.chau@ifrc.org](mailto:enkas.chau@ifrc.org). Application material is non-returnable, and we thank you in advance for understanding that only short-listed candidates will be contacted for the next step in the application process.

Application materials should include:

1. **Curricula Vitae (CV)**
2. **Cover letter** clearly summarizing your experience as it pertains to this evaluation, your daily rate, and three professional references.
3. At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in this TOR.

## Annex 2: Timetable (2011-2012)

23 – 26 Sept	Jerry Talbot starts briefing, reviewing files and documentation and planning for the work of the evaluation team. First draft of Inception Report prepared for review by JRCS and East Asia Regional Office.
27 – 29 Sept	Chris Staines joins the team. Work continues with desk review and redrafting of Inception Report. Attended final session of Peace Winds (NGO) lessons learned workshop hosted by US embassy.
29 Sept - 2 Oct	Frank Joerres joins team and desk review continues. Field trip planning finalised with JRCS staff. Inception Report agreed with JRCS and finalised.
3- 4 Oct	Allocation of tasks and plan for the team's work finalised. Interviews with JRCS staff begin.
5 Oct	Travel to Morioka, Iwate Prefecture. Meetings with JRCS Chapter and Prefecture officials.
6 Oct	Travel along tsunami affected coast. Meetings with municipal officials in Yamada and Otsuchi and with Coordinator of volunteer group based in Tono. Internet based <i>SurveyMonkey</i> launched addressed to 74 partner national societies for feedback and comment.
7 Oct	Meetings with Prefecture officials and JRCS Chapter in Sendai, Myagi Prefecture. Visit and briefing at JRCS Hospital, Ishinomaki. Visit to evacuation centre. Return to Tokyo.
8-19	Meetings with JRCS leadership and staff, ICRC, selected partner national societies in high income countries and other stakeholders.
20 Oct	Team departs Japan
24 Oct	Chris Staines conducts interviews in KL Zone Office
25 & 26 Oct	Chris Staines interviews in Beijing East Asia Regional Office
27- 30 Oct	Jerry Talbot and Chris Staines in Japan produce first draft report for review by JRCS and feedback.
31 Oct	Discussion of preliminary findings with partner national societies visiting Japan for monitoring visit for their feedback Second draft report prepared
22 Nov	Draft report submitted to JRCS and IFRC
30 Nov	Preliminary findings shared with national societies at a workshop in Geneva during the International Conference JRCS translate document into Japanese for further comment and feedback
30 Dec	JRCS comments received
11 Jan	Final Report submitted

**Annex 3: List of Interviewees**  
**JRCS HQ Key Informant Interviews**

Tadateru Konoe	President
Yoshiharu Otsuka	Vice President
Osamu Tasaka	Director General, International Department
Naoki Kokawa	Deputy Director General, International Department
Otohiko Hori	Deputy Director General, International Department
Masanao Mori	Director, International Relief Division, International Department
Yukiya Saito	Director, Development Cooperation Division, International Department
Hiroko Kusakabe	Deputy Director, GEJET Recovery Task Force
Atsuhiko Hata	Deputy Director General, Planning and Public Relations Office
Ryuta Okamoto	Deputy Director General, Planning and Public Relations Office
Sayaka Matsumoto	Planning and Public Relations Office
Toshiharu Makishima	General Director, International Medical Relief Department, JRCS Medical Center (Tokyo)
Hideki Katsumura	Director General, General Affairs Department
Shuichi Nishijima	Deputy Director General, General Affairs Department
Izumi Misawa	Director General, the GEJET Recovery Task Force
Satoshi Sugai	Director, GEJET Recovery Task Force
Fumito Yamada	Executive Director General, Operations Sector
Tsunesaburo Ando	Senior Technical Advisor, Operations Sector
Naofumi Kimura	Director General, Disaster Management and Social Welfare Department
Kikuko Urata	Director General, Nursing Department
Tomoko Higashi	Director, Nursing Department
Shinichi Osada	Director General, Planning and Public Relations Office
Ryouichi Hattori	Director General, Organisational Development Department
Chisato Matsuno	Director, Organisational Development Department

### **JRCS Chapter Key Informant Interviews**

Kiyoaki Hatakeda	Secretary General of JRCS Iwate Chapter
Ryuichi Suzuki	Secretary General of JRCS Miyagi Chapter
Nemu Abe	Staff, GEJET Recovery Task Force in Iwate
Mari Morimoto	Staff, GEJET Recovery Task Force in Miyagi

### **ICRC Key Informant Interviews**

Yoshinobu Nagamine	Head of Office, International Committee of the Red Cross
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### **IFRC Geneva Key Informant Interviews**

Matthias Schmale	Under Secretary General, Programme Services, IFRC
Andrew Rizk	Head of Finance Department

### **IFRC AP Zone Office Key Informant Interviews**

Jagan Chapagain	Director, Asia Pacific Zone
Umadevi Selvarajah	Zone Finance Manager, Asia Pacific
Kathryn Clarkson	Water and Sanitation Coordinator
Jim Catampongan	Deputy Health Coordinator
Jeremy Francis	Regional Logistics Coordinator, Asia Pacific
Michael Annear	Head of Disaster Management Unit
Patrick Fuller	Communication Manager, Asia Pacific
Alan Bradbury	Head of Resource Mobilisation and PMER

### **IFRC EARD Key Informant Interviews**

Martin Faller	Head of East Asia Regional Delegation
Qinghui Gu	Regional DM Delegate
Nicole Lafleur	Regional Programme Coordinator
Amgaa Oyungerel	Regional Health Delegate
Haijuan Yu	Regional Finance and Admin Manager
Francis Markus	Regional Communication Delegate
Bjorn Eder	IFRC Representative in Japan

### External Stakeholders Key Informant Interviews

Shuzo Koshino	Extraordinary Councillor, General Affairs Division, Iwate Prefecture
Seiichi Satodate	Director, Health and Welfare Section, Yamada Town Office
Tsuguhiro Sawaki	Deputy Director, Health and Welfare Section, Yamada Town Office
Sakunori Tabata	Chief, Recovery Promotion Section, Yamada Town Office
Yoshiyuki Sasaki	Chief, Recovery Promotion Section, Yamada Town Office
Kouzo Hirano	Director, General Affairs Division, Otsuchi Town Office
Ryouichi Usuzawa	Director, Volunteers Network “Tono Magokoro Net”
Nobuyuki Sato	Director, Crisis Measures Division, Miyagi Prefecture
Yoshio Onodera	Director of Crisis Management, Miyagi Prefecture
Satoru Ishibashi	Director, Emergency and Critical Care Centre, Ishinomaki RC Hospital
Masaru Kameyama	Chief, Emergency Section, Ishinomaki RC Hospital
Kae Yanagisawa	Director General, Japan Disaster Relief Team, JICA
Hitoshi Otomo	Japan Disaster Relief Team, JICA
Tsukasa Katsube	Japan Disaster Relief Team, JICA
Masatoshi Suzuki	Research Director, the Japan Research Institute, Limited
Gaku Funada	Manager, the Japan Research Institute, Limited
Setsuko Kawahara	Director, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (till Sept 2011)

### Partner National Societies Key Informant Interviews and/or Information Provided

Donna McSkimming	Head of International Programmes, Australian Red Cross
Andrew McKee	Manager, International Operations and Emergencies, New Zealand Red Cross
Eunhee Cho	Head, International Humanitarian Law Institute (IHL Institute), Korean Red Cross. (Formerly, Deputy Head, International Relations.)
Armond Mascelli	Vice President, Disaster Operations, American Red Cross
Tracy Reines	Director, International Response, American Red Cross



#### **Annex 4: Information about the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS)<sup>41</sup>**

The Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) was established in 1887 and Her Majesty the Empress is the Honorary President of the society whereas other members of the Imperial Family act as Honorary Vice-Presidents. The society has more than 11.7 million individual members and 170.000 corporate members.

Currently 451 staff works at the JRCS National Headquarters (NHQ) in Tokyo while 694 paid staff, excluding medical and blood services staff, work within the 47 JRCS chapters in each of the prefectures of the country. Below the chapter level are branches formed in association with government administrative units at the city, ward, town and village levels.

The Japanese Red Cross Volunteer Corps, which provides the power for the Society's humanitarian activities at the grass-root level, is one of the oldest and largest groups of volunteers in Japan. The regulation of the Japanese Red Cross Volunteer Corps stipulates the mission the Corps as Disaster Relief and Dissemination of the Red Cross Principles. The latest statistic shows that registered Red Cross volunteers number over 2 million.

##### *JRCS Disaster response capacity*

The JRCS has a well-organized disaster response regime, with 488 response teams throughout the country with 6,844 medical relief personnel registered as standard. Each team consist of six personnel; doctor, a head nurse, two nurses and two administrators.

The domestic disaster relief activities of the JRCS are as follows;

- a. Medical relief and psychological care
- b. Storage and distribution of relief goods
- c. Provision of blood products
- d. Collection and distribution of voluntary donation.

The JRC has a specific role under the Government's response plan coordinated by the social welfare association within the overall national disaster management architecture. This role is to provide immediate non-food relief items and health services in the initial stages of a disaster event. The JRC plays no role in the assessment process.

##### *JRCS medical services*

Red Cross hospitals are designated as "public medical institutions" by the 1951 Medical Law and they assume responsibility as part of the Government's medical policy. Today, the JRCS runs 92 Red Cross Hospitals, including one maternity hospital and two hospitals specialising in the treatment of atomic bomb survivors and other patients as well as six clinics and six Geriatric Health Service Centres. Number of staff, including medical and non-medical, working at Red Cross hospital is 50,555 throughout the country.

In addition, the Japanese Red Cross operates 26 nursing schools and colleges across the country and number of staff working at those facilities is 576.

The NHQ itself directly manages the Medical Centre in Tokyo, the Plasma Fractionation Centre, the Centre of NAT (Nucleic Acid Amplification Test) and Quarantine and the school for Midwifery. All other Red Cross institutions in various fields fall within the jurisdiction of the chapters in their respective prefectures.

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<sup>41</sup> Extract from High Level Support/Liaison Mission Report, 15 – 19 March 2011, Annex 1. (Amended)

The JRCS, in cooperation with the National Government and local authorities, carries out a nation-wide voluntary and non-remunerated blood donation movement to ensure a continuous supply of blood products that are essential for medical treatment. Therefore, the society itself operates 212 blood centres and blood donation centres with 5.843 medical and non-medical staff.

The JRCS has 59.042 staff working nation-wide.

The activities of the NHQ and branches are mainly financed by the membership fees and contributions; medical services are covered in part by medical fees paid by patients but mostly by the National Health Insurance Programme; blood services from the proceeds from blood and blood-product sales; and social welfare services from care of benefit incomes.

## Annex 5: Recovery Operation Program and Budget

	Program	Project	Budget (Yen)		Project status	Remarks
1	Distribution of emergency relief supplies	Purchase and replenishment of relief supplies	0.34	billion	-Procurement ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Purchase and replenishment of blankets, sets of items for a comfortable sleep, sets of emergency goods, daily goods, partitions, clothes, foods, etc. -Transportation, warehouse at branch level, other activities by chapters
2	Emergency medical services and PSP	Deployment of medical teams	0.1	billion	-Process ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Costs for deploying RC special medical teams including special PSP activities which will not be compensated by the Government
3	Community Health Care	Vaccination for pneumonia, etc.	4.6	billion	-Negotiation with prefectures ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Cover the costs of pneumonia vaccination for elderly people in the affected cities in Miyagi and Iwate prefs.
4	Assistance for nuclear power plant accident victims	Procurement & setup of medical equipment to gauge radiation levels	1	billion	-Equipment specification being discussed. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Introduce mobile whole body counter & thyroid gland monitor in Fukushima RC Hospital
5	Rehabilitation of health infrastructure	Construction of the temporary night-time emergency medical center (Ishinomaki, Miyagi)	0.15	billion	-Plan has been approved. -Will be completed by the end of Nov. 2011	-Support for reconstructing primary and secondary medical care systems in Ishinomaki City
		Construction of temporary hospital as a secondary medical care (Ishinomaki, Miyagi)	0.6	billion	-Negotiation with Miyagi prefecture ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	
		Strengthening disaster/emergency medical capacity of Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital Establishment of training center for disaster medical care	4.37	billion	-In planning process. -Will be completed in 2013	-Strengthening disaster response medical system of the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital as tertiary medical care system -Secure Red Cross nurses specialized for disaster medical-care(including construction of JRCS nursing school)
		Construction of temporary hospital (Motoyoshi cho, Miyagi)	0.15	billion	-Negotiation with Belgian Embassy on going.	-Possibly funded by Belgian Embassy
		Construction of temporary hospital (Minami Sanrikucho, Miyagi)	0.6	billion	-Negotiation with Miyagi prefecture ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Support for reconstructing primary and secondary medical care systems
		Construction of permanent hospital (Onagawacho, Miyagi)	2.24	billion	-Plan has been approved. -Will be completed by March, 2012	-Funded by Swiss RC/Swiss Solidarity Fund
6	Improving the living conditions of affected people in evacuation centers and transition shelters	Installation of appliance at large-scale evacuation centers	0.088	billion	-Completed.	-Household appliances, etc
		Provision of household items at meeting/consultation space in prefab temporary houses	0.492	billion	-Procurement ongoing. -Will be completed by the end of 2011	-Tables, chairs, TVs, etc.
		Distribution of winter amenity items	0.1	billion	-Completed.	-Wet sweat towels, insecticides, other cooling items
		Distribution of summer amenity items, insecticide, etc.	0.117	billion	-Completed.	-Wet sweat towels, insecticides, other cooling items
		Community service, PS'	0.028	billion	-Projects ongoing.	-Run community buses between temporary houses and cities
		Distribution of electronic household appliances sets	28	billion	-Distribution ongoing. 87,000 sets being distributed by the end of August. Target No. is now 130,000. -Will be completed by the end of 2011.	-Refrigerator, washing machine, TV, rice cooker, microwave and water thermos for 130,000 affected households
		Construction of temporary meeting/community spaces	0.1	billion	-2 places in Fukushima Pref.	-Funded by German RC/German Embassy

7	Support to social welfare for the elderly	Distribution of medical/nursing beds	0.17	billion	-Procurement ongoing. 673 beds being distributed by mid August. 498 beds are in the pipeline. -Will be completed by October 2011	Special Elderly Nursing Homes, Geriatric Health Service Centers, etc
		Procurement of vehicle for social welfare institutions and municipalities	0.4	billion	-Vehicle specifications being finalized. -Will be completed by March 2012.	-Provision of means of transport for elderly/disabled people
		Care workers deployment	0.005	billion	-Completed.	-Support for the elderly by nursing-care teams
8	Support to child education	Support to disaster orphans	0.1	billion	-In procurement process.	-provision of kitchen equipment, kitchen materials
		Provision of items for school kitchen centers	0.13	billion	-In procurement process.	-provision of kitchen equipment, kitchen materials
		Construction of temporary gymnasiums, playing spaces	0.66	billion	-Completing.	-One completed, and one in planning
		Provision of School Buses	0.155	billion	-In procurement process	-Initially rented, later procured.
		Provision of school items	0.041	billion	-AED, PCs, Hand lights, etc.	-Invitation for summer camp funded by Canadian RC
9	Livelihood Support	Provision of fishing boats	0.035	billion	-In planning process	-Proposed and funded by German RC/German Embassy
10	Capacity building of JRCS	Strengthening DM capacity of the JRCS HQs, chapters and facilities	2	billion	-Equipment specification been discussed. -Will be completed by March 2012.	-Provision of JRCS mobile disaster response fleet equipped with telecommunication unit, water purification and storage facility, mobile shower block, mobile kitchen
11	New projects to be identified at later stage	-	1.085	billion	-Project identification will take place in the end of 2011.	
12	Others	Support for RC Branch activities and Volunteer Centers	0.037	billion	-Projects ongoing	-Proposed and carried out by the RC Branch
13	Project identification ongoing	Reconstruction of hospitals, schools, permanent houses, etc.	4.6	billion	-Negotiation with Taiwan counterparts and project identification ongoing.	-Funded by Taiwan RC Organization
14	Project management costs for JRCS and IFRC (communications, finance, reporting and others)	Personnel, external audit, etc	0.5		-Will be completed by March 2014.	-Including support from IFRC, such as communications, reporting, etc.
<b>Total</b>			<b>52.993</b>	<b>billion</b>		

As of 9 September, 2011

## **AGREEMENT**

### **CONCERNING**

## **THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE RELIEF AND RECOVERY PROGRAMME**

### **1. PREAMBLE**

- 1.1. This Agreement is made between the [PNS] (hereinafter referred as xPNS) and the Japanese Red Cross Society (hereinafter referred as JRCS), hereinafter referred as “Parties”, with respect to support for and implementation of the Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme for the population affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake which struck Japan on March 11, 2011.
- 1.2. The Parties recall that the Fundamental Principles and Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the decisions of the General Assembly of the Federation and resolutions of the International Conference will be applicable in all circumstances.

### **2. JRCS EMERGENCY RELIEF, EARLY RECOVERY, AND RECOVERY PROGRAMME**

- 2.1. The JRCS, as an auxiliary to the government, has been rendering emergency services to the affected population as per the mandate defined in the National Disaster Response Plan, as well as the JRCS contingency plan for the earthquake disaster in hand.
- 2.2. Whereas the magnitude of disaster and subsequent effect of the disaster on the affected population are overwhelmingly great, and whereas the external support from the Movement partners shown as solidarity to JRCS is extraordinarily large, the JRCS decided to extend its early recovery and recovery efforts beyond its traditional relief activities.
- 2.3. In planning and implementing activities, JRCS closely coordinates with local governments, i.e. affected prefectures and municipalities, as well as other institutions and groups providing similar support.

### **3. TRANSFER AND USE OF FUNDS**

- 3.1. The xPNS agrees to transfer to JRCS [fund amount] for the purpose of supporting JRCS Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme in Japan (the “Funds”).
- 3.2. The JRCS will use the Funds exclusively for the purpose of JRCS Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
- 3.3. Any amount remaining from the Funds that have not been expended by the JRCS for JRCS Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme upon termination of this Agreement will either be returned to the xPNS or will be decided on its use by the Parties.
- 3.4. JRCS may propose to allocate a part of the funds for cash grants to the affected population through the Cash Grants Disbursement scheme managed by an independent committee to which JRCS is a member. In such case, JRCS will consult the approval of xPNS in writing.
- 3.5. The Funds shall be paid out in full by the xPNS upon execution of this Agreement.

### **4. INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT**

- 4.1. This Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Movement Principles. In case of any interpretive conflict that arises between the Movement Principles and the Governing Law applicable to this Agreement under Article 10 of this Agreement, that interpretive inconsistency shall be resolved in favour of the Movement Principles.
- 4.2. Should this Agreement be translated, in the event of a discrepancy in the interpretation of its meaning, the English version shall prevail.

### **5. TERM**

- 5.1. This Agreement is in effect from the signing of both parties until the completion of JRCS’s xxx year relief and recovery programme, i.e. until March 10, 201x.

### **6. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITS**

- 6.1. The JRCS will manage funds as per JRCS financial system and regulations.

6.2. The JRCS shall conduct an external audit for the funds received from Movement partners collectively, on an annual basis ending at the end of fiscal year, i.e. 31<sup>st</sup> March, as per international standards pertaining to the implementation of the JRCS Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme.

## 7. **REPORTING**

7.1. The JRCS shall provide narrative progress reports and financial reports on the funds received from Movement partners collectively as per the following frequency:

- The first progress report by the end of August 2011, covering from 11 March 2011 to 31 July 2011.
- The second progress report by 31 January 2012, covering from 11 March 2011 to 31 December 2011.
- Quarterly reports every three months afterwards until the completion of the programme.

7.2. Annual reports will be submitted separately from 2011 until the completion of the programme.

7.3. The JRCS shall provide a final narrative report and a financial report within 90 days upon completion of the JRCS Emergency Relief, Early Recovery, and Recovery Programme.

## 8. **MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

8.1. The JRCS will closely monitor the progress of the implementation of the Programme.

8.2. The JRCS will invite interested PNSs for a joint monitoring at an agreed frequency.

8.3. The JRCS shall permit the xPNS, with reasonable notice, to visit and access all locations where JRCS is utilizing Movement partners' funds or other resources pursuant to this Agreement.

8.4. The JRCS with support of the IFRC shall conduct evaluation on the program, as well as lesson learnt exercise with interested PNSs.

## 9. **DISPUTES**

9.1. The Parties shall endeavour to settle any dispute that arises as a result of any claim or controversy evolving from this Agreement by negotiation. Any dispute, disagreement or issue of any kind arising out of this Agreement, that cannot be resolved through negotiations within 30 days of a written request for negotiations delivered by either Party to the other (the “Notification”), shall be resolved through mediation. Such mediation shall be facilitated by a neutral third party that is to be determined by both Parties..

## 10. **GOVERNING LAW**

10.1. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of Japan, to the exclusion of its conflict of laws rules.

## 11. **FORCE MAJEURE**

11.1. For the purposes of this Agreement, Force Majeure shall mean any circumstances beyond the reasonable control of either Party to this Agreement. Neither Party shall be liable to the other for delay in performing or failure to perform its obligations if the delay arises from Force Majeure.

## 12. **AMENDMENTS**

12.1. Any amendments to this agreement shall be made in writing with the consent of the Partners.

## 13. **TERMINATION**

13.1. Either Party may terminate this agreement in whole or in part;

- i. In case of a serious violation by the other party which is not rectified within XX working days after it has been drawn to the other Party’s attention in writing, or;
- ii. Where a condition has arisen that impedes that party from successfully fulfilling its responsibilities under this Agreement, by providing the other party with 60 days written notice of its intention to terminate this Agreement.

## 14. **CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION**



14.1. In the event of any termination of this Agreement, the JRCS shall forthwith return to the xPNS the remaining amount of Funds and property entrusted to it which have not been expended or utilized in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

In witness whereof, the undersigned being duly authorized have signed this Agreement.

On behalf of [Name of Society]

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**Name**

**Title**

**Date**

On behalf of the Japanese Red Cross Society

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**Motoharu Yoshida**

**Executive Director General Affairs Section**

**Date**

## Annex 7: Partner National Society Survey Results and Analysis

### Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

#### National Society Survey Results and Analysis

##### Background:

A ten question, on-line survey was prepared to gather feedback from the 74 National Societies that contributed financially to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.

13 NS responded to the survey giving a response rate of 18%. The feedback received indicates that respondents:

- Appreciate and value what JRCS has achieved and appreciate their efforts in responding to the needs of sister NS
- Are overwhelmingly satisfied with the partnership, coordination, accountability, communication, coordination and monitoring and evaluation arrangements established.
- Note that although a formal 'appeal' was not launched this did not prevent NS from supporting Japanese Red Cross – explanations included the 'confidence' and 'trust' that NS have in Japanese Red Cross. It was also noted that this is an unusual situation that may not be applicable in other operations.
- Generally appreciated the extra reporting arrangements that JRCS have been established to accommodate the requirements of sister NS although one NS reported that accountability mechanisms would not have met the requirements of their back donors.
- Identified the need for the majority of cash grants to be distributed before the first anniversary.
- Identified the following lessons already learned:
  - the distribution of cash grants in a high income country require a long term approach and support systems.
  - the need to focus on contingency plans in the domestic context – particularly exploring partnerships with neighbour NS in the event of mega disasters.
  - The profile of the NS was elevated due to its role in responding to the humanitarian needs by mobilizing resources for the people of Japan - due to respect for the people of Japan.

The questions and responses received are detailed below:

**1. In the absence of an IFRC Appeal do the current arrangements provide your NS the opportunity to 'partner' with JRCS in a satisfactory way?**

	Response Percent	Response Count

Yes	92%	12
No	8%	1

**2. Have the High Level Liaison Mission and IFRC Country Representative role contributed to your NS's partnership with JRCS?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	75%	9
No	25%	3

**3. Please describe any factors that you believe adversely impacted on your working relationship with JRCS. Responses summarised above.**

**4. Do the accountability mechanisms in place (e.g. financial, operational and performance reporting, etc) meet your requirements and those of any back donors, if appropriate?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	83%	10
No	17%	2

**5. Have the communications/information arrangements to date met your requirements?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	83%	10
No	17%	2

**6. Have the IFRC coordination arrangements for this operation been satisfactory and appropriate?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	92%	11
No	8%	1

**7. Do the current monitoring and evaluation arrangements in place satisfactorily take account of your needs?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	83%	10
No	17%	2

**8. Are there any emerging or future risks that you have identified and would like to share? Possible areas to consider might include: - reputation risks; - coordination arrangements; - resource mobilization (including direct online donations).**

Responses summarised above.

**9. Are there any lessons from your NS experience in this operation that you would like to share? Possible areas to consider might include: - coordination arrangements; - resource mobilization (including direct online donations).**

Responses summarised above.

**10. Are there any further comments you wish to make to the evaluation team?**

Responses summarised above.

Further detailed information is available on request.

17 November 2011.

## Annex 8: Reference Documents

### Reference Documents for Samoa Tsunami Review Team

#### **IFRC Documents**

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Framework for Evaluations*. Geneva, 2011.  
<http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/performance-and-accountability/monitoring-and-evaluation/>

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<http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/>

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#### **JRCS Documents**

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[http://www.jrc.or.jp/vcms\\_lf/110906\\_AugustReport\\_kokusai.pdf](http://www.jrc.or.jp/vcms_lf/110906_AugustReport_kokusai.pdf)

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#### **Other RCRC Documents**

American Red Cross, *The Face of Recovery: The American Red Cross Response to Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina Wilma*. 2007

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## Other Reports and Documents

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, *Disaster Management in Japan*. <http://www.bousai.go.jp>

Centre of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, *Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update, Wednesday, March 30, 2011*. <http://www.coe-dmha.org/Research/.../Japan/Japan03302011.pdf>

Committee for Technical Investigation on Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis Based on the Lessons Learned from the “2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake”, Central Disaster Management Council, *Report of the Committee*, 28 September, 2011.

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of State, *International Assistance System: Concept of Operation*. October 1, 2010

Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, Japan, *2010 Population Census* April 16, 2011

Socio Economic Research Center, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, *Future Population Estimates in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima – Reconstruction of Compact Town*.  
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