



‘Resilience’

An Objective in Humanitarian Aid?

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACF	Action Against Hunger
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
RREAD	Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
V2R	Vulnerability to Resilience

Glossary of Terms

Adaptive Capacity¹: The potential or capability of a system to adapt to climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)²: The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR)³: Independent review into how the UK responds to humanitarian emergencies, commissioned by the Secretary of State for International Development and led by Lord Paddy Ashdown. The review considers how the UK should best respond to humanitarian emergencies overseas, and the role the UK should play in the international humanitarian system.

Humanity⁴: The basic, shared human impulse to seek to prevent the loss of human life and dignity. This principle is also understood as an 'imperative' to act.

Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015⁵: Plan adopted by 168 UN member states in 2005, developed collaboratively by

¹ Definition from the IPCC Working Group (McCarthy 2001, 839)

² Heavily drawing on the UNISDR Definition (<http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>)

³ Heavily drawing on Ashdown, 2011, 1

⁴ Derived from IFRC and ICRC, 1994; Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003; UNOCHA, 2012; and MSF 2012.

⁵ UNISDR Definition (<http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa>)

governments, international agencies, disaster experts and many others to reduce disaster risk and to ensure a common system of coordination. The HFA outlines five priorities for action, and offers guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. Its goal is to substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015 by building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. The HFA was adopted by 168 Member States of the United Nations in 2005 at the World Disaster Reduction Conference.

Impartiality⁶: Principle that relief should be given based on need and not an individual or group's affiliations, or other policy objectives.

Independence⁷: Principle of autonomy in humanitarian action and the avoidance of being instrumentalised for non-humanitarian, domestic or foreign policy objectives.

Neutrality⁸: Principle of neither facilitating hostilities nor using relief to promote 'a particular political or religious standpoint'⁹.

Resilience: Definitions of resilience vary depending on the specific field in which it is used. In this report, a fusion of three different, comprehensive definitions focusing on emergencies will be used as working definition.¹⁰

⁶ Derived from IFRC and ICRC, 1994; Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003; UNOCHA, 2012; and MSF 2012.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ IFRC and ICRC, 1994.

¹⁰ Drawing on these three definitions: Practical Action (Upton & Ibrahim, 2012, 10) and Twigg (2009, 8), with an addition of ODI (Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 2). By doing so, our definition encompasses the spectrum of resilience through including the different areas of focus that we came across. The weakness is that it gives the impression of consensus, however, there are myriad definitions that differ in terms of threshold (maintenance, minimal functioning (e.g. UNISDR, 2005), progressive

Resilience of a particular system (household, community) includes:

- Capacity to anticipate and prepare for a shock or stress
- Capacity to absorb, accommodate stress or destructive forces through resistance or adaptation
- Capacity to manage, or maintain certain basic functions and structures, during disastrous events
- Capacity to recover or 'bounce back' after a shock or stress (in a timely and efficient manner)

Vulnerability¹¹: The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard.

track (e.g. Manyena, 2006), characteristics, measurement and proposed starting points for resilience-building.

¹¹ Ibid.

Executive Summary

In the UK, resilience began its sharp rise to prominence within the humanitarian and development aid sphere in 2011, following the publication of the *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review* (HERR). Thereafter, DFID has put great emphasis on incorporating resilience into project sectors – the increase in resilience projects in DFID’s project database illustrates this trend. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have been quick to integrate the term into all areas, including in-country projects, job descriptions and research.

This report aims to evaluate whether ‘resilience’ is a new and valid objective for humanitarian aid. Alternatively, is it simply a reframing of old concepts around a new term? Or is resilience just a ‘buzzword’ soon to fall out of fashion? Can resilience be compatible with the humanitarian field, where immediate and potentially short-term involvement is considered ideal? These questions are expounded in five sections.

First, the roots of the term resilience are explored. In the 1970s, resilience emerged as a concept within the academic discourse of ecology. Since then it has crossed over into numerous fields. This transition is primarily attributable to its usefulness in describing systemic changes provoked by phenomena such as climate change and urbanisation. As is debated in academic literature, resilience derives both strengths and weaknesses from its broad applicability. It allows for a common vocabulary across wide-ranging fields, but prevents a common, broadly endorsed definition from emerging. Although resilience is increasingly being mentioned in the UK context

of humanitarian aid, research either rebutting or supporting its inclusion as an objective could not be detected.

This is followed with an examination of how resilience has been taken up by governmental organisations, think tanks and INGOs in the UK context. The governmental development agency DFID enthusiastically supports the uptake of the term, making great efforts to formulate novel policies, programmes and mechanisms to proliferate it in the UK aid environment. The large multi-mandate INGOs have been quick to adjust to reflect this desire for resilience, and have adopted resilience into their statements, project mandates and job descriptions. Therefore, resilience is more than just a buzzword. However, there is little evidence to suggest these resilience-focused projects fundamentally differ from earlier projects.

A cash-in-hand contingency fund case study from CARE in the Horn of Africa is then examined. Firstly, due to a dearth of methods to measure and evaluate resilience, it is challenging to analyse the extent to which a project described as resilience-building differs from earlier disaster risk reduction projects. Further, though the project is categorised as ‘humanitarian’, it seems to be more compatible with the goals and time frame of development aid. Hence, the case study implies that although humanitarian projects (especially in the context of chronic emergencies) are being described as building resilience, there is no compelling evidence to date that this is true. However, if actors managed to agree on a measurement for resilience, development aid and resilience-building objectives could be compatible in practice.

Reflecting on the current resilience discourse and practice, the next section analyses the impact of resilience-oriented approaches on core humanitarian principles: independence in operational design and fieldcraft, neutrality, impartiality and humanity. It also includes a note on solidarity. Resilience approaches currently discussed among UK aid actors in fact diminish the ability to leverage the four, core humanitarian principles to deliver effective assistance, as commonly happens in attempts to design 'developmental relief'. This analysis finds that aiming to build resilience through humanitarian relief would pose challenges to humanitarian actors' credibility and access that exclude it as valid humanitarian objective.

In conclusion, this report finds that there is a growing body of policy papers and organisational responses to DFID's push to incorporate resilience work within humanitarian action. Even though resilience can be seen as a sophistication of older concepts, it does not add a new dimension in practice. However, there is a dearth of research on how resilience plays out in the humanitarian context. The report finds that resilience may be seen as positive if the actor engages in both humanitarian and development work. By contrast, if the actor believes humanitarian aid best kept wholly apart from development aid, resilience would seem a developmental threat.

Finally, the report looks at the next steps which could be addressed in the context of the discourse on resilience in the UK aid sector. The report proposes the following topics requiring further research:

- A robust evaluation of the effectiveness of using humanitarian funding streams and capacities to promote resilience is needed.
- Motivations for the proliferation of resilience as a concept in the context of humanitarian aid must be scrutinised.
- Concept of negative resilience should be further explored.
- Why is resilience being pushed in the absence of hard evidence of the benefit? The motivations behind this must be analysed.
- Humanitarian aid actors must be aware that integrating resilience may push them too far towards development. This could restrict their ability and independence to negotiate access to zones of need.

1. Introduction

At the request of the UK Secretary of State for International Development, an independent assessment of the British government's recent humanitarian assistance to emergencies in Haiti and Pakistan was completed in March 2011, published as the *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review* (HERR)¹². The review mapped out seven threads to a new approach that would improve the efficacy of British humanitarian assistance. Resilience was included among them.¹³

The British government issued a formal response to the HERR, in which the Secretary announced 'a new core commitment to build resilience in all country programmes'¹⁴. A resilience approach paper accompanied the announcement. Thereafter, DFID made resilience a central component of its aid work and committed funds to resilience programmes in a range of countries.¹⁵ Accordingly, DFID is funding many INGOs' resilience initiatives, accompanied by research consortia and collaborative efforts to promote a coherent understanding of resilience in practice.¹⁶ On the basis of these efforts, resilience has become the subject of great interest among UK aid actors dealing with disasters. But is it just a new 'buzzword'?

Innovation, even rhetorical, is an essential bulwark against donor fatigue—a challenge for DFID as much as for INGOs. The concept of resilience-building serves this purpose: it has been portrayed as 'progressive'¹⁷, 'evolutionary'¹⁸ or 'sophisticating'¹⁹, cost-effective²⁰ and a flexible, 'silo'-busting approach to budget management²¹. Yet like many innovative concepts in the aid sector, resilience has acquired numerous meanings. The same term may just as easily validate differing, perhaps contradictory actions, as it may standardise practice or build consensus. Such words 'produce an easy consensus as long as they remain abstract notions or undefined goals or principles'²², and do not necessarily reflect needs on the ground.

However, given the extent to which actors are engaging in the resilience discourse, it is worth reflecting on the potential impact of a resilience-oriented approach on humanitarian ground operations. What is the current narrative on resilience? What does it look like in practice? Is a resilience-oriented approach consistent with humanitarian principles? And is it a valid objective for humanitarian aid?

¹² Ashdown, 2011

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ DFID, 2011c, 4

¹⁵ Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011.

¹⁶ See Appendices B, D and E

¹⁷ Pantuliano and Pavanello, 2009

¹⁸ Save the Children employee, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁹ Gordon, interview with authors, 2012

²⁰ Cf. 'value for money' (Ashdown, 2011)

²¹ DFID, 2011b, 16

²² DuBois, 2007

2. Research Methodology

2.1. Data Collection

The selection of relevant academic articles was sourced primarily from aid-focused journals and grey literature that was publicly available before mid-February 2012. The selection of organisations for review was based on their use of ‘resilience’ in online statements, published reports, PowerPoint presentations and conference notes, as well as through personal interviews. Amount of funding received from DFID also played into the decision of which INGOs to include in the analysis. A detailed table of searches can be found in the appendix. The case study was selected from a review of publicly available project documents and independent research. The criteria for the selection included: that the intervention was described as humanitarian, with a budget that included funds earmarked for humanitarian purposes; that it referred to a resilience-based framework; that it was conducted by one of the relevant UK-based humanitarian INGOs; that the project had reached completion, and had had some form of evaluation. Finally, the humanitarian principles that were selected appear in at least three of four sources.

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Code of Conduct, signed by 492 NGOs worldwide (by July 2011)²³

²³ ICRC & IFRC, 2011

- Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship, endorsed by 17 humanitarian donors, including the top ten donors in 2009²⁴
- UNOCHA guidelines, endorsed by the UN General Assembly, the ‘essential’ principles for the UN humanitarian agencies²⁵
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Charter²⁶

2.2. Limitations

There are limitations to desk research through online sources, as organisational websites will primarily reflect the INGOs’ fund-raising and marketing strategies. However, this can also be conceived of as an opportunity to assess whether resilience is being used simply for those purposes, or whether there is more programmatic substance to the term. It has also been difficult to locate precise details on funding for programmes and projects (e.g. total budget, line items, and donors). Secondly, as resilience is a relatively new concept, we have not been able to assess the relative success of the term and to what degree resilience is being applied on the ground by the INGOs. Thirdly, we have decided to focus on UK actors in the aid sector that took up resilience. We therefore were not able to explore why some actors did not publicly incorporate the concept of resilience into their initiatives. Finally, another limitation is evoked by the many fields in which resilience is used as a concept. Most prominently with regard to this report, it is used as an approach to climate change, disasters and

²⁴ Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003

²⁵ UNOCHA, 2012

²⁶ MSF, 2012

conflict. Although the academic literature tends to take up disaster resilience and conflict resilience as separate strands, DFID is discussing taking a 'consolidated approach' to climate resilience, conflict resilience and disaster resilience²⁷. Considering that this report focuses on analysing resilience in emergencies, where it potentially intersects with humanitarianism, the terms 'disaster', 'climate' and 'conflict' will be referred to as components of an emergency framework. We will focus on disaster-resilience as it relates to communities in the section tracing the academic narrative on resilience, because UK INGOs primarily refer to resilience in the context of disasters.

²⁷ DFID, 2011b, 10

3. Resilience in Theory

This section explores the academic narrative of resilience in the context of disasters. To arrive at an integrated understanding of resilience to emergencies, its relationship to other, more established concepts like disaster risk reduction, adaptive capacity and vulnerability are examined. Moreover, this section considers critiques of resilience in academic literature, also exploring problems of measurement. Finally, the section examines possibilities for the future of resilience within the aid discourse.

3.1. Resilience and Disasters

In the 1970s, the term resilience was first used in ecology to measure the ability of a system to absorb negative influences and persist.²⁸ As the term expanded into other disciplines such as economics, engineering, psychology and urban planning, it retained the fundamental definition of persistence of a system.²⁹ Other components have been added to the concept, such as ‘bouncing forward’³⁰ in the face of shocks and stress in both man-made and natural disasters. The incorporation of resilience into the fields of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation occurred parallel to the rise of global phenomena of climate change and urbanisation.³¹ For instance, the rapid increase

in disasters between 1975 and 2000 illustrates the evolving need for mitigation strategies.³²

The meanings of adaptive capacity, DRR, vulnerability and resilience are interconnected, though the relationships among them are debated and sometimes opaque.³³ However, it is worth mapping discussions of how these concepts relate to each other, in order to understand where resilience is situated within existing theories of disaster response.

Resilience and adaptive capacity

Adaptive capacity refers to the development of coping strategies in the context of climate change-induced fluctuations in the socio-ecological environment, ranging from disasters to conflict over resources.³⁴ The terms adaptive capacity and resilience are often used interchangeably, as both are concerned with transformation in light of change.³⁵ However, resilience can be understood as the mediator between adaptive capacities and a positive development track.³⁶

²⁸ Klein et al., 2003, 39; Birkmann, 2006, 46

²⁹ Castleden et al., 2011, 370

³⁰ Manyena et al., 2011

³¹ Apart from the incorporation of resilience into development in relation to disasters, it was also taken up in the context of fragile states, relating to states’ ability to build strong institutional capacity to improve good governance in the context of fragile states (Carpenter, 2008, 27). However, this section focuses on resilience in the context of disasters because the narrative on resilience

among UK INGOs foremost refers to resilience in relation to disaster risk reduction.

³² Between 1975 and 2000, 450 natural disasters were recorded, whereas in the century preceding 1975, only 100 natural disasters were on record (Gerard & Dorothy, 2011, 4).

³³ Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 3

³⁴ Overseas Development Institute, 2012, 71

³⁵ Jones et al., 2010, 5; Manyena, 2006, 439

³⁶ Norris et al., 2008, 130; Bahadur et al., 2010, 2. However, Klein et al. rather view adaptive capacity as an umbrella term, of which resilience is one contributor (Klein et al., 2003, 35).

Resilience and DRR

The momentum towards DRR arguably accelerated following Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the South Asian tsunami in 2004.³⁷ Thereafter, the Hyogo Framework for Action³⁸, which essentially laid out how DRR could be mainstreamed into climate change and risk mitigation strategies in 2005,³⁹ then triggered the close interaction of resilience and DRR. Accordingly, DRR and resilience can both be understood as contributing to the reduction of the negative effects that shocks and distresses have on communities. However, whereas in DRR a stronger focus is placed on the reduction of risks, resilience - as understood in this report⁴⁰ - focuses more on communities in the context of sustainable livelihoods.⁴¹

Resilience and Vulnerability

The third closely connected term to resilience is vulnerability. Often, vulnerability and resilience are interpreted as located on the extreme ends of a scale.⁴² In this understanding, resilience-building is displayed as reducing vulnerability. However, this perspective on the relationship between vulnerability and resilience is also problematic. As Manyena points out, the way

disaster resilience is used, it includes more than just the absence of vulnerability.⁴³

3.2. Resilience: A Useful and Consistent Concept?

A broad concept

The variety of definitions proposed by academics is also demonstrated increasingly by pluralistic usages of resilience. Carpenter, for instance, applies the concept to fragile states and how they are able to cope with conflict and disaster⁴⁴. Jones and Klein focus on resilience specifically with regard to adaptive capacities and climate change.⁴⁵ Similarly do Bahadur et al. by focusing specifically on climate resilience.⁴⁶ Further, Castleden et al. examine the concept of resilience with regard to health protection.⁴⁷ Additionally, there are differing understandings of whether resilience refers to an outcome or a process – to give an example of how it is conceptualised differently. Recently, however, it seems that in the literature, resilience is mostly perceived as a process in the literature.⁴⁸ Owing to this range of conceptions, it is difficult to define resilience coherently. Furthermore, the lack of a shared definition substantially complicates the establishment of

³⁷ Gerard and Dorothy, 2011, 14

³⁸ UNISDR, 2005

³⁹ Jones et al., 2010, 9

⁴⁰ Cf. methodology section for more information

⁴¹ Jones et al., 2010,, 10

⁴² Klein et al., 2003, 40; Bahadur et al., 2010, 5

⁴³ Manyena, 2006, 446. This argument can be understood as an analogy to the discussion about health, including more than just the absence of illness and it ties in with the emerging recognition that resilience as understood as 'bouncing forward' ability in light of shocks and stresses (Manyena et al., 2011) is not a value-neutral concept.

⁴⁴ Carpenter, 2008, 5

⁴⁵ Jones, 2011; Klein et al., 2003

⁴⁶ Bahadur et al., 2010

⁴⁷ Castleden et al., 2011

⁴⁸ Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 2

an operational definition.⁴⁹ As a result, this has made the term difficult to apply in practice. Even though researchers try to specify their definitions of resilience in relation to their specific focus, the fact that the term is so widely used across fields arguably creates confusion regarding its applicability and also leads to problems with its measurement.

Measurement

Researchers have proposed various measurement methods based on their perspectives of resilience. For instance, Twigg's focus on community disaster resilience led him to devise a meta-analysis of experience and good practice (Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 3). Birkmann focuses on the measurement of vulnerability to promote disaster-resilience (Birkmann, 2006). However, agreeing on a unified definition of resilience is a prerequisite for measuring it; otherwise different 'objects' are measured and the results are not comparable. Accordingly, Mitchell and Harris criticise measuring methods of not essentially measuring resilience, but a closely related, more specific concept as risk or vulnerability (Birkmann, 2006).

Strength and weakness of the concept

The lack of a commonly shared definition illustrates a serious weakness of resilience as a concept. It raises the question how it should be evaluated whether a resilience-approach presents an added value to previously adopted

approaches to disaster mitigation. However, the breadth of resilience also poses an opportunity. Due to its breadth, it can be a vehicle for mobilising joint research efforts around disaster mitigation. It is an 'integrating'⁵⁰, 'inclusive'⁵¹ concept, a 'holistic' approach⁵². Arguably, it is exactly the imprecision of the concept which allows for its far-reaching support.

A Value-neutral term?

By definition, resilience is value neutral. The notion of 'bad' forms of resilience⁵³ although noted in a few recent articles is generally omitted from the literature on disaster resilience. Within aid and development circles, resilience is portrayed strictly as a positive characteristic of a system.⁵⁴

3.3. Resilience and Humanitarian Aid in Academic Literature

On the basis of the conducted research, this report finds a lack of academic literature on the relation of resilience and humanitarian aid. Questions regarding reasons for the inclusion of humanitarian aid in resilience-building and the potential contributions of humanitarian aid towards resilience-building remain essentially unanswered. Twigg's guidance note on disaster-resilient communities which stresses the need for greater coherence in resilience-building

⁵⁰ Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 6

⁵¹ Castleden et al., 2011, 375

⁵² Harris, 2011; Bahadur, interview with authors, 2012; Jones, interview with authors, 2012

⁵³ Meaning that a resilient system is not necessarily a 'good' system. Cf. Bahadur, interview with authors, 2012; Brown, 2012; Carpenter, 2008, 5

⁵⁴ Bahadur et al., 2011

⁴⁹ Cf. Klein, interview with author, 2012

interventions⁵⁵, however, can be interpreted as calling on humanitarian actors to contribute to a coherent long-term strategy. The frequent depiction of resilience as a holistic concept can be interpreted in the same light.⁵⁶

There is even less literature regarding the second question. Although Twigg elaborates on emergency response⁵⁷, there is no clear connection to humanitarian aid. Rather, he highlights the need for local capacity building and governance mechanisms⁵⁸. The lack of literature elaborating on the recent incorporation of resilience into humanitarian aid exhibits that there is an urgent need for academic research in this area.

3.4. Future Evolution of Disaster Resilience?

As illustrated by this section, the disaster-resilience narrative as discussed in academia has evolved conceptually in response to changes in socio-ecological systems affecting population vulnerabilities – arguably induced by climate change and urbanisation. These new, emerging vulnerabilities in turn demand solutions both in the short-term in the field of disaster response and the long-term, for instance regarding climate change adaptation. In this context, it is important to note that the term resilience might increasingly be shaped by political and economic interests - it being so closely related to

highly political phenomena such as climate change. Additionally, resilience has already become a term of multilateral international interest, taken up in policy frameworks such as the HFA 2005-2015.⁵⁹ Possibly, resilience could develop similarly to other terms that enjoy fashionable moments in development circles, such as ‘good governance’⁶⁰ for they share essential characteristics: broad definition, no clear measurement methodology. Although it can only be speculated how the discourse on resilience will evolve, with regard to the amount of recently published literature on disaster resilience, it seems that the concept is here to stay (at least for a bit).

⁵⁵ Twigg, 2009, 38

⁵⁶ Castleden et al., 2011, 373; Harris, 2011; Bahadur, interview with authors, 2012; Jones, interview with authors, 2012

⁵⁷ Ibid., 43

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Birkmann, 2006, 10

⁶⁰ Cf. for instance Doornbos, 2001

4. Resilience in the UK Aid Sector

Lord Ashdown's early 2011 *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review* (HERR) emphasised that 'humanitarian responses should be seen in a wider context that correlated better with development efforts'⁶¹. The review called for strengthening relationships with actors affected by disaster and attention towards the consequences of short-term immediate relief. Further, it advocated an approach to disasters within which 'the "development" aid budget and humanitarian aid should be seen and used as a coherent whole'⁶². Emergencies such as the 2012 food crisis in the Horn of Africa raised similar questions about the mechanisms of short-term relief and its effects on long-term development paths. It is in this context that the recent enthusiasm of policymakers and practitioners to come together in an attempt to bridge the gap between development and humanitarian assistance under the umbrella of resilience has to be understood.

Since the release of the HERR, a wide range of UK actors has begun using the term resilience in statements, reports and organisational structures.⁶³ The actors below represent a selection of the voices currently shaping the

⁶¹ Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011, np

⁶² DFID, 2011c, 10

⁶³ As pointed out in the methodology section, this paper will not be able to address the UK humanitarian sector in its entirety, and will therefore focus on the organisations that have made clear responses to HERR and incorporated 'resilience' into their overall working structures.

debates in policy and practice. This section firstly considers the policies of the UK government, articulated mainly through DFID. Secondly, opinions from UK think tanks such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) are presented. Thirdly, a variety of statements from UK NGOs are examined with regard to narratives on resilience and funding efforts. Finally, this section discusses the actors' push for a cross-sectoral understanding of the term and how (if stated) they see the concept of resilience as compatible with humanitarian assistance.

4.1. The UK Government: DFID

From a focus on adaptive capacity and vulnerability in 2010, the UK government's narrative on emergencies has moved towards a stronger emphasis on resilience in 2011. Tim Waites from DFID explains that 'while DRR got a knock in the HERR, because ... [it] was regarded as ... not well integrated into either development or humanitarian thinking, resilience was seen as a positive and forward looking concept'⁶⁴.

DFID's 2011 *UK Government's Humanitarian Policy*⁶⁵ outlines how 'humanitarian assistance should be delivered in a way that does not undermine existing coping mechanisms and helps a community build its own resilience for the future'⁶⁶. Thus, advocating for a longer-term

⁶⁴ Waites, 2011a, 3

⁶⁵ The full title of the report is: 'Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy' (DFID, 2011c)

⁶⁶ DFID, 2011c, 10

perspective, DFID understands resilience as an objective in international humanitarian assistance, stressing how ‘the right combination of humanitarian, development and political action can reduce unnecessary loss of life and suffering, in the long-term reducing the need for humanitarian aid.’⁶⁷ DFID also takes into account that humanitarian aid should be delivered on the basis of need, not according to political or strategic objectives.⁶⁸ However, this is more easily said than done, especially since much of the humanitarian aid DFID distributes goes to organisations with mandates expanding across humanitarian and development ‘silos’. By 2015, DFID aims to embed disaster resilience as a valid concept in its country programmes⁶⁹ and key institutions in order to establish ‘coherent links’ between the humanitarian and development sectors.⁷⁰ The growing importance of resilience with regard to DFID’s projects is already evident. The below graphs are taken from DFID’s project

database.⁷¹ Figure 1 shows the breakdown of resilience-related funding in project sector groups, while Figure 2 (next page) shows the amount of funding having gone to different ‘resilience’ related projects. This shows a clear increase of the usage of ‘resilience’ in DFID’s project descriptions from 2008 to 2012.




Figure 1




Figure 2

⁶⁷ Ibid., 5

⁶⁸ Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011

⁶⁹ Six priority countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal and Bangladesh, 2nd tier: Pakistan, Niger, Chad, South Sudan, Zimbabwe and Burma; 2 regions: Sahel and Caribbean. (Waites, DFID, 2011b, slide 11)

⁷⁰ Waites, 2011b, slide 4. DFID’s funding for NGO’s development initiatives will come from the Global Poverty Action Fund’s new resilience line, whilst the humanitarian budget lines are still being developed (Waites, 2011b, slide 10). Building on current practices, DFID will be working with actors such as the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR), the European Commission (EC) and ECHO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), IFRC, NGOs, and others to gain support for resilience within policy circles and country level stakeholders (Ibid.).

⁷¹ Keyword used: resilience.

Additionally, searches were made for ‘resilience’ in humanitarian projects.⁷² A comparison between the findings on February 3, 2012 and March 12, 2012 showed that the first returned 157 project hits and the second returned 384 project hits. This proves the increasing use of the term in DFID’s projects with references to humanitarian assistance in 2012. The graphs also illustrate how funding for ‘resilience + humanitarian’ goes into both the ‘emergency response’ and the ‘conflict prevention’ project sector groups.⁷³

More concretely, most of the resilience-projects listed in DFID’s database⁷⁴ emphasise resilience-building in a development context of climate change and disaster mitigation. However, from 2010, resilience-building projects with more explicit humanitarian mandates have emerged. Examples include the *2011 Kenya Humanitarian Interventions* to ‘save lives, alleviate suffering, maintain dignity and enhance resilience’⁷⁵ and the *South Sudan Humanitarian Response*⁷⁶ ‘addressing acute and chronic relief and protection needs efficiently

and effectively, and building resilience against future needs’⁷⁷.

Moreover, several research initiatives were initiated in 2011, including, for instance, *Developing a coherent humanitarian and resilience framework*⁷⁸ and the *DFID Humanitarian and Emergency Operations Support Service*⁷⁹. DFID has further created a ‘Growth and Resilience Department’ as well as Humanitarian Disasters and Resilience Research, in order to ‘review existing innovative approaches and identify gaps in the humanitarian and resilience knowledge-base’.⁸⁰ This represents a clear change of policy-orientation and efforts to bridge the gap between humanitarianism and development.

4.2. UK-Based Think Tanks

The main UK think tanks active in this field can be seen as contributing substantially to increasing efforts of integrating resilience in aid practices, as they understand the concept to bring about coherency and a more systematic approach towards dealing with interconnected issues. However, many are also critical of to compatibility of resilience with needs-based humanitarian assistance.

⁷² Keywords used: ‘resilience + humanitarian’

⁷³ See Appendix C: DFID Project Figures.

⁷⁴ Project purpose/mandate include references to enhancing resilience, DFID Project Database.

⁷⁵ DFID Project Database, see Appendix B or <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=202478>

⁷⁶ DFID Project Database, see Appendix B or <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=20280>.

Underlying assumptions for the delivery of emergency services in the South Sudan Response point out that ‘DFID builds synergies between its development and humanitarian programmes’, but no detailed description is given of how this is played out in these contexts or how resilience will be achieved.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ DFID Project Database, see Appendix B or <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=202790>

⁷⁹ DFID Project Database, see Appendix B or <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=202741>

⁸⁰ DFID, 2012b

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

ODI understands resilience as a framing concept for ‘power to recover quickly’⁸¹, an agenda shared by those concerned with development threats of various kinds. Comparing DFID’s resilience approach to other resilience approaches, ODI concludes that all approaches have i) an ex-ante prevention or risk reduction aspect, ii) a preparedness aspect and iii) an ‘effective response’ aspect.⁸² Despite the well-meaning attempt to establish conceptual and practical links between different resilience-building strategies, ODI notes that advancing institutional and organisational coherence between them will be challenging.⁸³ Furthermore, ODI has raised many important questions, such as whether a common definition can be reached and whether the whole focus on resilience might simply be a good opportunity to facilitate dialogue across policy areas.⁸⁴ In addition, ODI stresses that resilience is hard to measure and apply in different operational contexts, meaning another framing and concept may be better suited for ‘resilience work’⁸⁵. A final concern ODI raises is to what extent a too narrow focus on resilience can become less responsive to future threats or positive transformation.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Mitchell, 2011

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Mitchell and Harris, 2012, 2

⁸⁵ Ibid., 6

⁸⁶ Ibid., 5

The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)

HPG notes that DFID’s enthusiasm towards providing aid on the basis of need alone and not according to political or strategic objectives will be problematic in the context of resilience-building.⁸⁷ HPG further recognises the relevance of acting quickly and building resilience in the face of slow onset disasters, in order to prevent them from becoming larger emergencies. However, the group is not sure whether DFID is ready to ‘take on’ the multi-faceted nature of such an approach.⁸⁸

Chatham House

UK think tank Chatham House notes the opportunity of resilience leading to ‘real’ risk management, meaning the building of resilient communities to prevent public health threats such as cholera.⁸⁹ However, Chatham House has not disclosed a clear definition of resilience or its application to humanitarian disaster responses.

Hence, although only a handful of UK think tanks have commented on the resilience discourse, existing responses have provided a constructive perspective to the debate, for instance by posing critical questions.

4.3. UK-Based INGOs

As a result of DFID’s strong emphasis on resilience, the number of reports, briefing notes and articles on the topic has increased

⁸⁷ Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011

⁸⁸ Ibid., 2

⁸⁹ Heymann, 2010

substantially and consequentially induced changes in INGOs' online statements, project descriptions, research focus and job descriptions.⁹⁰ So far in 2012, resilience is being used frequently as a concept by many UK INGOs to address both development and humanitarian issues. A selection of current resilience-narratives and changes in organisational structures can be found in Appendix E.

CARE

CARE highlights that development must lead to disaster resilience and stresses that emergency response cannot be conceived of as isolated from longer-term consequences.⁹¹

Tearfund

Tearfund, rather than trying to maintain the divide, emphasises the good economic returns of investing in disaster risk reduction and could therefore be seen as an advocate of a partial replacement of humanitarian assistance with development in terms of disaster preparedness.⁹²

Oxfam UK

Oxfam UK places a strong focus on climate change and food security, and highlights that 'building resilience – whether in response to a specific threat... or more generally – is emphatically not a separate, stand-alone area of

activity', and stresses how resilience will drive progress at multiple agendas at the time.⁹³

Practical Action

Practical Action, recognising how operationalising resilience is a problem for many organisations, has developed an approach called 'From Vulnerability to Resilience' (V2R), which aims for 'sustainable livelihoods'.⁹⁴ The organisation further highlights important challenges for resilience to become an objective for short-term and long-term assistance in terms of the 'lack of appropriate tools and incentives in organisations to support integration of sectors, a lack of scenario planning methods and clear indicators on which to base planning, monitoring and evaluations.'⁹⁵

Action Aid

ActionAid's involvement in emergency work is discussed in terms of 'relief that helps recovery', 'resiliency and preparedness', and how funding needs to be more flexible to 'better reflect the kind of responses informed by the long-term approach.'⁹⁶

ACF

ACF also sees the need for a more coherent approach which will synergise efforts across sectors, but stress the importance of maintaining the principles of humanitarian

⁹⁰ See Appendix D

⁹¹ CARE, 2012

⁹² Tearfund, 2011

⁹³ Evans, 2011, 7

⁹⁴ Upton and Ibrahim, 2012, 10

⁹⁵ Ibid., 54

⁹⁶ ActionAid, 2011, 41

aid.⁹⁷ Moreover, ACF raises the concern of need-based aid, calling for DFID to set up the necessary mechanisms to ensure that the divide between the politics and humanitarian work is safeguarded in the design of its funding mechanisms.⁹⁸

Trends

UK INGOs' statements reflect how multi-mandate organisations engaging in both humanitarian relief and long-term community building are not concerned with keeping a clear divide between humanitarian aid and development. Resilience is currently being integrated into their policies, mandates and strategies. In these documents, the INGOs that took up resilience generally reflect the idea that collaboration across sectors and vulnerabilities will be paramount for strengthening resilience. However, the lack of sufficient case studies with the aim of 'enhancing resilience'⁹⁹ poses difficulties for measuring relative success of integrating resilience-building into humanitarian aid efforts.

The organisations are thus far focusing on establishing practices that will not cause negative long-term consequences rather than deliberately situating themselves on either side of the humanitarian aid/development continuum. In other words, they are more concerned with how they can contribute to

resilience-building, rather than integrating resilience as an objective.

Emerging challenges

This trend to challenge the clear distinction between humanitarian aid and development poses several difficulties arising from applying resilience-building concepts in practice. The findings suggest that INGOs acknowledge that the relative strength of resilience on the ground must be determined before conclusions are drawn. The lack of official material on resilience through a humanitarian lens shows that INGOs have not yet articulated how resilience will play out in the context of immediate humanitarian assistance and principles.

Most organisations are in the first phases of articulating their related policies. The adoption of resilience into organisational structures and policies¹⁰⁰ and research departments will inevitably lead to a broader understanding of how resilience can contribute to current practices. This said, interviews conducted with key actors such as Save the Children and World Vision highlight the intricate politics that accompany the inclusion of a new term¹⁰¹. World Vision emphasises how 'incorporating resilience into project proposals does not necessarily mean something radically different to anything in the sector'¹⁰². Save the Children, fully aware of how other INGOs are latching on

⁹⁷ ACF, 2011

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Cf. Bahadur et al. 2010, 19

¹⁰⁰ See Appendix D

¹⁰¹ See interviews with Midgely, 2012; and Martlew 2012

¹⁰² Midgely, interview with authors, 2012

to resilience as a concept has thus far not officially adopted the term.¹⁰³

Emphasising resilience-building in humanitarian assistance could be crucial for UK organisations in securing funding, as it shows compliance with DFID's focus and can provide INGOs with access to both humanitarian and development aid resources.¹⁰⁴

4.4. Current Status of the Term

There is no well-defined approach towards resilience among relevant UK actors, as evidenced in multiple sources. This is also reflected in how resilience is currently used in practice among INGOs with humanitarian assistance as an important component of their mandate. The 2011 debates on resilience raise questions regarding how a resilience-approach in the humanitarian aid sector will differ from a resilience-approach in development and also to what extent having a common definition will pose opportunities and constraints for humanitarian agencies.¹⁰⁵

At this point, there seems to be a common understanding among DFID and INGOs (multi-mandate and DFID-funded in particular) that resilience will provide positive synergies to the 'grey' overlaps between humanitarian work and development. It is seen as a step towards a common language across many issues. Many

reports highlight that resilience as a concept has the potential to 'radically transform' how development challenges are currently addressed. However, the relation of resilience and short-term humanitarian responses is not adequately (if at all) analysed.

Finally, the growing discourse around resilience is likely to lead to increasing debates and potential cooperation in the policy circles on cross-sectoral work in highly volatile contexts and how immediate relief can be provided without undermining long-term goals. The attempt to establish a common, cross-sectoral understanding of the concept can also pose constraints – a too wide-ranging definition could still bring about project overlap if not managed properly and cause a fall-back on familiar scenarios where organisations have practical experience.¹⁰⁶ The practical experience of organisations with resilience-building is addressed in the next section.

¹⁰³ Martlew, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁰⁴ As noted in the interview with Barker, 2012. Additionally, some INGOs have independent emergency funds, where resources are going to mainly short-term relief, but which also feeds into longer-term assistance.

¹⁰⁵ See e.g. notes from the ActionAid and VOICE Panel, 2011

¹⁰⁶ ODI, 2012, 6

5. Resilience in Practice

This section examines the application of resilience on the ground. Specifically, it explores a case study of a CARE resilience-building programme in the Manderu Triangle, the border region straddling Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The cash-in-hand contingency fund project within CARE's Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) initiative illustrates an attempt to integrate resilience building into a humanitarian aid project.¹⁰⁷ After exploring the project, local criticism on the project and the lack of coherent measurement methods for resilience are examined.

5.1. The Project: Contingency Funds in the Manderu Triangle

The Manderu Triangle's population, primarily ethnic Somali pastoralists, is chronically vulnerable to extreme droughts, malnutrition and outbreaks of conflict. Because of these vulnerabilities, the pastoralists' livelihoods are often thought to be unsustainable.¹⁰⁸ Although numerous early warning systems exist to predict

when disaster will strike, humanitarian aid continually fails to intervene in early stages to prevent livelihood crises among pastoralists, despite the economic feasibility of such a plan.¹⁰⁹ In order to support livelihoods and keep herds alive CARE has taken an approach to build resilience and increase the viability of pastoral living.

The RREAD I initiative (2008-9)

The RREAD I initiative aimed to improve resilience to drought and other disasters such as flooding and climate change by providing locals with financial resources and education and permitting them flexibility to evaluate and respond to situations themselves.¹¹⁰ The four contingency funds of 100,000 Birr each (roughly £4,600 in 2010 value) for the districts of Yabello (Kenya), Dire (Ethiopia), Teltele (Ethiopia) and Moyale (straddling the border of Kenya and Ethiopia) were distributed through community planning committees composed of district level government officials¹¹¹. The contingency funds were coupled with skills training, including building understanding of how contingency funds should be established, crisis alleviation techniques, and the need for early warning systems. The use of the money demonstrated

¹⁰⁷ The funding for the project came from the ECHO (Roberts, 2010, 3). 6.5 million Euro of humanitarian aid funding was allocated to target Kenyans and Ethiopians who were victims of drought and insecurity, particularly pastoralists. (European Commission – Humanitarian Aid, 2007). The relevance of a cash-in-hand case study in the context of humanitarian aid is also highlighted by the HERR, stating that “DFID should follow the lead of ECHO and make cash based responses the usual relief and recovery position for its partners. Partners should be required to explain *why they are not using cash*, rather than the converse.” (Italicization in original. Ashdown, 2011, 24)

¹⁰⁸ Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2006

¹⁰⁹ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Comprehensive Africa Development Programme, 2010, 1-2

¹¹⁰ Roberts, 2010, 3, 5

¹¹¹ In the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), it is stated “DFID should follow the lead of ECHO and make cash based responses the usual relief and recovery position for its partners. Partners should be required to explain *why they are not using cash*, rather than the converse.” Italicisation in original document. Ashdown et al., 2011, 24

differing priorities in the four districts. Three districts allocated the money between long-term development initiatives and emergency interventions, whereas the information on the fourth district is lacking.¹¹²

Internal evaluation

Following RREAD I's completion, the project was evaluated by independent contractors. Paradoxically, community leaders who were interviewed for the evaluation identified the need for both more and less collaboration with CARE. Community committees wished to have greater control over the use of contingency funds, and to be able to direct more funds into longer-term disaster prevention in the absence of emergency need. This indicates a local preference for longer-term involvement in the context of chronic emergency. All three participatory districts felt that CARE should have involved themselves more in the community planning aspects of the fund. There was demand for CARE representatives to be present at planning meetings and greater support from CARE (including use of CARE resources). Finally, there was a strong desire for the establishment of some sort of accountability mechanism overseen by CARE. Lack of monitoring and evaluation was identified by a committee head as the programme's greatest weakness.¹¹³

¹¹² In Teltele district, no official receipts were produced for CARE, and it is thought that the money was used for the personal benefit of one of the committee members. A full breakdown of each community's budget can be found in Appendix F.

¹¹³ Roberts, 2010

5.2. Implications for Practicability and Validity

Despite RREAD I's lack of quantitative evaluation, positive effects of the contingency fund are evident. In the Dire district, it contributed to repairing a dam which had broken. As a result, the immediate flooding situation was alleviated and the likelihood of it occurring again was mitigated, as a new overflow reservoir was built as part of the process.¹¹⁴ Overall, much of the money went to alleviating immediate humanitarian concerns, such as distribution of food and water. Furthermore, local governments were empowered through having been given the ability to direct funds as they see fit, rather than imposing humanitarian aid distribution as the donor sees fit. However, much of the communities' vulnerability is a result of consequences outside of their control, including political and economic marginalisation, reduced access to natural resources, climatic changes, and increased population growth that has led to natural resource degradation.¹¹⁵ These issues cannot be addressed by contingency funds.

Analysis

While RREAD I has had successes and has contributed to the adoption of best practices in latter programmes, its self-evaluation as a humanitarian aid project may be misplaced. The significant benefit of teaching locals to

¹¹⁴ Roberts, 2010, 8

¹¹⁵ Roberts, 2010

resourcefully direct contingency funds is only achieved after involvement over multiple fiscal terms. Although portions of the contingency fund were put towards emergency relief, the overarching aim of the programme is to build capacity, which is primarily a developmental objective. That the communities' suggestions focused on more integration and greater accountability further supports the finding that this project should be one of development aid. Accountability and involvement necessitate longer-term presence on the ground, and a commitment to staying in an area once the initial disaster has subsided. Though this project has been framed as a resilience-building project, it fails to fundamentally differentiate itself from preceding projects of disaster risk reduction. This is a rather general problem, for there is relatively little methodology on measuring resilience in the field. This can be attributable to the recent emergence of the term: few organisations have had the time to implement resilience-building programmes that have reached completion, and even fewer have been evaluated.

A general note: measuring resilience in practice

Some earlier studies that purport to build resilience have failed to make any meaningful distinction between it and DRR, and have effectively evaluated the latter.¹¹⁶ In one such programme, building food security in Malawi, a natural experiment region was maintained as

the control.¹¹⁷ The cost-benefit ratio was found to be 1:24.¹¹⁸ However, this is likely a conservative estimate, as the evaluation failed to identify quantitative indicators of qualitative benefits. Additionally, benefits of resilience accrue over a number of years following the programme, while this analysis took place in its immediate aftermath.¹¹⁹ In a destocking intervention programme, the cost-benefit ratio was evaluated at 1:41.¹²⁰ Though these analyses demonstrate individual programme successes and laudable cost effectiveness, they fail to contribute to the advancement of resilience as a stand-alone concept. Some organisations have developed their own frameworks,¹²¹ though there are few collaborative efforts. Resilience lacks a unified concept of what defines it, and resultantly, it is difficult to define what should measure it. Accordingly, it is very challenging to examine whether there is an added value in aid projects framed as resilience projects and therefore also, whether or how they differ from previous aid projects.

Conclusion

There is a lack of meaningful analysis of RREAD and other resilience projects, making it difficult to determine how they differ from previous aid projects. Though resilience is applied in humanitarian projects in the context of chronic emergencies, there is no compelling

¹¹⁶ Tearfund, 2010

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 12

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 3

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 13

¹²⁰ Pantuliano and Pavanello, 2009, 2

¹²¹ Upton and Ibrahim, 2012

evidence of humanitarian aid building resilience. Additionally, drawing on the local criticism of this project, building resilience seems to be closely connected to development objectives. If actors managed to agree on a measurement for resilience, development aid and resilience-building objectives could be compatible in practice. However, this does not seem to be the case for humanitarian aid and resilience.

6. Resilience: A Valid Objective for Humanitarian Aid?

In order to examine whether resilience can be a valid objective for humanitarian aid, this section firstly discusses several assumptions underlying the idea that humanitarian aid can and should contribute to resilience. Secondly, actions required to provide ‘resilience-promoting’ relief against four core humanitarian principles (independence, impartiality, neutrality and humanity) are examined. Finally, resilience as an objective for humanitarian aid is evaluated.

6.1. Underlying Assumptions

The UK Government’s 2011 Humanitarian Policy frames resilience as an ‘objective’ to which humanitarian aid can and should contribute.¹²² Yet two omissions within the policy are surprising, considering its emphasis on better collecting ‘evidence on what works through research, evaluations and reviews’¹²³ and ‘respect for humanitarian principles to support greater acceptance of humanitarian actors and improved humanitarian access’¹²⁴. First, resilience is advocated as a valid objective within a humanitarian framework without discussion of robust, peer-reviewed evidence that humanitarian projects improve resilience.

¹²² DFID, 2011d, 10. The policy outlines particular humanitarian contributions: ‘investment in infrastructure [and]...human capacity...consideration of pre-existing vulnerabilities at a community level...support for community and government capacity...better anticipation’ (Ibid.).

¹²³ Ibid., 14

¹²⁴ Ibid., 4

Second, within the policy, there is no open reflection on the compatibility of resilience-building with humanitarian principles or the access they help secure.

Instead, the policy relies on several assumptions to situate resilience as a practical objective for humanitarian actors. These assumptions fail to reflect humanitarian capacities and principles. It is useful to examine the assumptions as a starting point in analysing whether resilience is in fact a valid objective for humanitarian aid.

Resilience as an evident characteristic

First, it is assumed that resilience is an evident characteristic. That is, humanitarians can quickly access or gain enough contextualised knowledge about the vulnerabilities that led to an emergency and then discern ways to build resilience around those specific threats. This presumes adequate staff, time, material and financial resources, suited to a range of hostile environments, to facilitate information exchange with individuals who are knowledgeable about, and therefore potentially implicated in, causes of vulnerability. It presumes there are solutions to these vulnerabilities known and available to humanitarian actors.

Compatibility with effective need-based response

Second, it is assumed that resilience is compatible with effective response to immediate humanitarian needs. What is needed to build resilience does not divert resources from the most effective strategies for meeting needs in an

emergency. It may even enhance the efficacy and quality of response. This assumption relates to debates over whether supplying and then withdrawing highly effective but unsustainable, cost-inefficient relief ‘of last resort’ (e.g., ‘Western-standard’ medical supplies and surgeons, and even search-and-rescue teams) is justifiable or irresponsible.

Capacity to contribute to resilience

Third, it is assumed that the assistance provided and the professionals who supply it are capable of contributing to resilience. In other words, what Global Humanitarian Assistance labels ‘traditional relief’ (‘Material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines, etc.) [;] emergency food aid...[; and] relief coordination, protection and support services’)¹²⁵ can be provided by humanitarian professionals in a manner that improves resilience in the long term. This assumption leaves ambiguous the roles played by individuals with humanitarian or longer-term development expertise (or both). It presumes value added by locating resilience-building within humanitarian response. The channels (including funding sources and cycles) and types of relief are believed appropriate for both humanitarian and resilience-building aims.

Consistency with humanitarian principles and objectives

Fourth, it is assumed that the range of activities required to put resilience-building into practice are consistent with humanitarian principles and

objectives. This presumes that when, where, how and with whom humanitarians would work to build resilience does not undermine the humanity, independence, neutrality, impartiality and needs-focus of their aid. Whether resilience-building is consistent with core humanitarian principles will be analysed in the next section.

6.2. Resilience and the Core Humanitarian Principles

This subsection examines actions required to provide ‘resilience-promoting’ relief against four core humanitarian principles: independence (in operational design and ‘fieldcraft’¹²⁶), impartiality, neutrality and humanity. It also includes a note on solidarity. The analysis views these principles not simply as ‘aspirational’ norms—though that is an important function they serve. Rather, they are treated as pragmatic instruments for negotiating humanitarian access, for improving the security of aid recipients and aid workers, for minimising the capacity of relief to inflict harm, and for maximising the quality of relief delivered. They are essential tools in the course of humanitarian fieldcraft.

Independence of Operational Design

It is impossible to prove that funding has driven the popularity of resilience. But the term resilience has been picked up along funding chains. CARE UK’s 2010 Annual Report reveals nearly half of its income that year came

¹²⁵ Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2012

¹²⁶ Bradbury, 2010, 17

from DFID sources.¹²⁷ When a single donor provides a substantial share of funding, an actor's independence is called into question. Autonomy is essential in both the design and operation of interventions to ensure they best meet needs.¹²⁸

In addition, DFID has identified six 'priority countries' and six 'important' countries for 'work on resilience' that is 'already underway' or soon to be 'incorporated'¹²⁹. Humanitarian actors who accept DFID funds for projects in these countries may find their work recast as promoting resilience, regardless of whether that matches the opinions of the actors themselves. Considering the 'pull' factor (DFID funds available for resilience work) and the 'push' factor (DFID's eagerness to integrate resilience as the core of its humanitarian aid and perhaps re-brand existing projects as 'resilience-building'), it is unclear whether all UK aid actors would be inclined to objectively evaluate the concept's utility.

¹²⁷ It was calculated that 44.9% of CARE UK's incoming resources in 2011 were from DFID (CARE 2011a).

¹²⁸ The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy gives assurances that '[o]ur humanitarian action will be based on need, and need alone, and will be autonomous from political, military, security or economic objectives' (DFID, 2011d, 6). Yet DFID's resilience approach paper notes that the agency 'can usefully take a consolidated approach...to resilience across natural and conflict-related areas [which] requires a focus on strengthening institutions at national, regional and local levels incorporating political, security, humanitarian and development considerations' (DFID, 2011b, 10). How humanitarian action DFID supports will be autonomous in a policy designed 'to improve the coherence of our development and humanitarian work' is unclear (DFID, 2011b, 4).

¹²⁹ DFID, 2011b, 14

Independence in 'Fieldcraft'

Co-opting humanitarian relief into the objective of building resilience inserts humanitarianism into what is in fact state-building policy¹³⁰. Wide-ranging characteristics attributed to resilient systems include 'effective governance and institutions', 'community involvement', and 'social and economic equity'¹³¹. Once the catch-all term resilience is considered an objective to which *humanitarianism* should contribute, it exposes humanitarian action to the influence of policies on all these fronts. Such policies (or the people who implement them) may prioritise approaches, locations, social groups, or even particular moments for action that conflict with humanitarian needs.

Additionally, the UK Secretary of State for International Development states resilience will contribute to 'accountability...and value-for-money for the British taxpayer'¹³².

DFID adds that its new humanitarian policy intends to 'deal with...complex, chronic humanitarian situations'¹³³ and break what have elsewhere been described as cycles of 'care and maintenance'¹³⁴. Yet arguing that humanitarian relief—which is designed to be emergency,

¹³⁰ For example, the idea of 'build[ing] resilience to future shocks' (DFID, 2012d) featured at a side meeting in the recent London Conference on Somalia, 23 February 2012. The conference aimed to 'to inject new momentum into the political process' and continue work toward 'stabilising' the region (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2012).

¹³¹ Bahandur et. al, 2010, 2-3

¹³² Mitchell, A. quoted in DFID, 2011c, 4

¹³³ DFID, 2012d

¹³⁴ Milner and Loeschner, 2011, 7

stopgap assistance—should be folded into longer-term, state-building processes, where redundancies with development activities exist, is a peculiar approach to ending permanent humanitarian operations and ensuring ‘value for money’. Ironically, it restricts humanitarian actors’ independence in determining when their assistance is no longer required and exit is appropriate.

Humanitarian concern with immediate human welfare requires relationships with power, politics and people quite different from those required to negotiate developmental outcomes. Relief is only ever present where gatekeepers are convinced of its utility.¹³⁵ The President of MSF France, Marie Allié, has observed that ‘the political exploitation of aid is not a misuse of its vocation, but its principal condition of existence’.¹³⁶ All parties involved in negotiation are opportunistic, utilising ‘negotiation, power games and interest-seeking’.¹³⁷

These on-going, self-interested negotiations are necessary to secure humanitarian access and deliver relief. But the politicisation that enables humanitarian presence in an emergency may be incompatible with long-term development processes. Linking expedient negotiations to long-term objectives quite dangerously risks entrenching, in the long term, power networks that may have caused or temporarily arisen in an emergency. It may lead humanitarians to inflict harm in the long run.

¹³⁵ Allié, 2011, 2

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2

Impartiality: ‘Need and Need Alone’

A fundamental requirement of humanitarian assistance is that it be given impartially, based on need and not on a recipient’s affiliations or on political, economic or security expediencies.¹³⁸ Within the idea of impartiality is the firmer statement, echoed in the UK Humanitarian Policy: aid should be given ‘according to need and need alone’¹³⁹. A last refinement comes from organisations like MSF¹⁴⁰: to be justifiable, given the scale of humanitarian need globally and the paucity of resources to address it, relief should aim to address ‘unmet need’.¹⁴¹ But no UK-based aid actor has proffered evidence to suggest resilience-oriented approaches effectively respond to unmet humanitarian needs.

Among the UK government actors, resilience appears to have gained its currency from disaster risk reduction cost-benefit analyses¹⁴², and even more abstractly, to questions of British aid’s international credibility. The HERR

¹³⁸ IFRC and ICRC, 1994

¹³⁹ DFID 2011d, 8

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Brauman, 2011

¹⁴¹ Ironically, ‘redundancy’ is among the characteristics attributed to a resilient system (Bahadur et al., 2011, 3). Aid pipelines would themselves be more resilient to shocks if they were redundant. The UK government’s emphasis on value for money would likely be hostile to intentional redundancy.

¹⁴² The methodology of the analysis is not disclosed, however, the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy states, ‘Every £1 invested in disaster risk reduction saves at least £4 in relief at a later stage.’ (DFID, 2011d, 9)’. However, this analysis is drawn from disaster risk reduction activities said to fit with resilience, and DFID notes that ‘[e]vidence on the cost-effectiveness of resilience-building activities is also still lacking in many areas’, requiring ‘further research’ (DFID, 2011d, 14).

concluded this credibility had ‘waned’, having been ‘squandered in frustration’ by DFID’s ‘shrill’ and ‘inconsistent’ criticism of ‘the international system’.¹⁴³ Where humanitarian needs fit into these calculations is unclear.

Additionally, portrayed as an objective for humanitarian aid, resilience-building fits with existing developmental perspectives within multi-mandate organisations.¹⁴⁴ Nearly all interview subjects confirmed that the resilience discourse weaves together aims, philosophies and activities already embraced within these organisations. That the term reaffirms such predispositions raises questions about whether ‘resilience’ directly reflects and responds to an unmet humanitarian need. A staff member of Save the Children UK felt the term lacked traction in the organisation because it did not represent a meaningful programmatic contribution.¹⁴⁵ Building ‘resilience’ also implies demand for the full range of multi-mandate organisations’ activities. It remains unclear whether resilience-focused approaches reflect unmet humanitarian needs or reflect entrenched perspectives and ‘existential’ pressures to reaffirm organisations’ relevance.

¹⁴³ The implied incoherence of DFID’s criticisms also recalls arguments for ‘coherence’ of humanitarian, development and policy goals, which provoked wide debate over a decade ago.

¹⁴⁴ See Appendix A.

¹⁴⁵ Martlew, interview with authors, 2012

Neutrality

Often, communities are vulnerable to crisis for reasons beyond their geographic location or lifestyle. Pastoralists confronted with ‘villagisation’¹⁴⁶ programmes or the sale of rangeland to industrial farm interests, for example, face hostile or exclusionary policies. Some of these very policies might be described as resilience-building (e.g., improving access to staple crops or public services). Thus, with whom humanitarian actors would work (and through what mechanisms) to contribute to resilience requires reflection in light of the neutrality principle. Developmental objectives take a long-term perspective on human welfare that requires collaboration with state authorities recognised as ‘legitimate’. In fact, these objectives are partly designed to entrench that authority (e.g., building the capacity of state ministries). Coordination with state authorities may be necessary for humanitarians, but humanitarian neutrality demands caution about entrenching the authority of powerful actors during crisis.

Equally, trying to ‘neutralise’ developmental processes within humanitarian response obscures the politics behind emergencies. Monetised relief (cash transfers to impoverished households) has been the primary emergency assistance claimed to ‘build resilience’.¹⁴⁷ This replicates over-simplified development models that claim reducing poverty will also reduce conflict or vulnerability in an apolitical vacuum.

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, 2012

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Care-UK case study and DFID 2011b, 10

Dangerously, ‘resilience-building’ relief may enable interested parties to ‘suspend disaster’¹⁴⁸—in other words, to perpetuate a crisis while appeasing those who wish to see its resolution. This is one scenario in which resilience can be a negative characteristic: where it entrenches a harm-inflicting status quo.

Humanity

The ICRC has described the principle of humanity as the compulsion ‘to prevent, to alleviate, to protect, to ensure respect’¹⁴⁹. It is the principle that informs the ‘humanitarian imperative’, sometimes described as a ‘right of initiative’ when specific to conflict¹⁵⁰. The impact of resilience-building approaches on the humanitarian imperative is ambiguous. Some analysts argue it makes the imperative (put simply, ‘saving lives’) more sophisticated (‘building systems to save lives’ or ‘saving livelihoods’).¹⁵¹ Others might fear a dilution of the imperative: by expanding the humanitarian mandate to consider systems, the ‘object to which we are conferring resilience’¹⁵² risks moving away from individual people. Yet it is their welfare that is at the heart of ‘humanity’.

¹⁴⁸ Cf., reference to Opher, A., and Azoulay, A. (2004) quoted Abu-Sada, 2011, 104-5

¹⁴⁹ ICRC, 1996

¹⁵⁰ ‘The “right of initiative” clearly establishes the right of an impartial humanitarian entity to offer its services in a conflict situation without this offer being interpreted by states as an unfriendly or hostile act. Others do not possess such a right, no matter how salutary their work.’ (DuBois, 2007, 9)

¹⁵¹ Gordon, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁵² Manyena, 2006, 439

Still others say it has little positive or negative impact and does not affect access at all.¹⁵³

A note on solidarity

Humanitarian aid offers modest and often inadequate relief. Where relief is particularly unable to improve a situation, showing solidarity with crisis-affected communities through presence and dialogue may offer some comfort. The RREAD I programme manager went further, however, suggesting a resilience-minded approach actually empowers communities: they identify priorities and choose coping strategies.¹⁵⁴ Several analysts observed that the constructive language inherent to resilience discourse (‘building’, not ‘reducing’ or ‘eliminating’) may improve collaboration with crisis-affected people¹⁵⁵. As observed in the RREAD I project, communities requested both more and less collaboration with CARE in the future, but either effect seemed unrelated to the aspects of the project CARE identified as resilience-building.

However, the illusion that resilience significantly helps to shift agency to affected communities takes pressure off the international community to act. Communities in crisis have a practical need for outside assistance: reduced coping capacity necessitated aid in the first place, and aid often brings bureaucratic burdens that in emergencies should shift elsewhere. The illusion also downplays other essential links in

¹⁵³ Martlew, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁵⁴ Hopkins, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁵⁵ Gordon, interview with authors, 2012; and Barker, interview with authors, 2012

the disaster prevention chain, like functional early warning systems to which donors and implementing agencies quickly respond.¹⁵⁶ The problem of disaster suspension discussed in Section 5 equally apply to the illusion that problem ‘resolution’ lies in the hands of emergency-affected communities.

Concluding remarks

The analysis finds that resilience approaches currently discussed among UK aid actors in fact diminish the ability to leverage the four, core humanitarian principles to deliver effective relief. Resilience discourse presents challenges to humanitarian principles that commonly arise in attempts to design ‘developmental relief’. Therefore, resilience-building approaches may circumscribe humanitarian action, by demanding actions that constrain fieldcraft, rather than somehow freeing humanitarian action from operating in a ‘silo’¹⁵⁷.

6.3. Resilience: a Valid Objective?

Strengths and Opportunities

Humanitarian actors in the UK interpret and instrumentalise humanitarian principles according to traditions their institutions have developed over time. For some multi-mandate organisations, a more liberal interpretation of the principles follows naturally from their engagement in both humanitarian and developmental activities. Reflecting this

position, a senior humanitarian policy adviser at Save the Children argued, ‘If you start raising humanitarian principles willy-nilly, they lose their value’.¹⁵⁸ Many multi-mandate organisations have the inclination and perhaps capacity to engage in resilience-building activities. And as the same adviser observed, resilience may offer a positive contribution in ‘getting development actors to think about disasters’ or using ‘humanitarian analysis and responding through development mechanisms’.¹⁵⁹

Furthermore, resilience-building has been described as more sophisticated than risk management: management addresses those risks are known, while building resilience helps brace for the unimaginable ‘unknowns’¹⁶⁰. In terms of saving lives and meeting humanitarian needs, there is indeed a legitimate argument for approaches that change the flat-footed, reactive tendency to respond to crises late and inadequately.

Weaknesses and Threats

In spite of the opportunities above, the vagueness of resilience discourse at present makes it meaningless in designing programmes.

¹⁵⁸ Martlew, interview with authors, 2012

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ An example of an unimaginable unknown is the cholera outbreak in Haiti that followed the January 2010 earthquake. In February 2010, the Centers for Disease Control in the United States dismissed cholera as a potential threat. While the CDC recognised that the weak national water and sanitation system could facilitate a cholera epidemic, the risk of cholera introduction to the island was believed to be ‘very unlikely’ (Centers for Disease Control, 2010, 2).

¹⁵⁶ Cf. discussion in Hillier and Dempsey, 2012

¹⁵⁷ Barker, interview with authors, 2012; also DFID, 2011b, 16

When, where and at what threshold should resilience-building become a concern? Is it possible to build resilience to conflict during conflict? And if addressing vulnerability is to be a humanitarian objective, how do humanitarians value ‘vulnerability’ on the scale of humanitarian needs? How do humanitarian actors justify spending emergency funds on interventions that share redundancies with development work?

Additionally, to build resilience requires certain minimum capacities within emergency-affected communities and humanitarian organisations. But as was seen in the case study discussion in Section 5, the absence of crucial capacities (e.g., budget management training) posed serious problems for ‘resilience-building’ within RREAD I. Work to contribute to resilience would be highly context-specific, and any perceived compromise to humanitarian principles might threaten the safety of humanitarian aid recipients and workers in conflict settings, especially.

Above all, the UK Government’s 2011 Humanitarian Policy ascribes to humanitarian actors a level of engagement with developmental problems few have ever promised. While contributing to resilience would be a desirable side-effect of humanitarian assistance, orienting humanitarian assistance to this discrete objective is highly problematic. Resilience is not a valid objective for humanitarian aid.

Resilience as ‘Developmental’ Relief

Resilience-building in the UK’s humanitarian policy appears to be another attempt to design ‘developmental relief’¹⁶¹. DFID and several other UK aid actors tend to see a direct relationship between humanitarian assistance and progressive recovery from crisis: the assistance should be designed to leave communities better off than they were before the emergency. These actors, including many ‘multi-mandate’ INGOs discussed in Sections 4 and 5, also direct their assistance to both development and humanitarian objectives.¹⁶²

DFID articulates the supposed developmental path: humanitarian relief oriented toward resilience supports disaster risk reduction¹⁶³, traditionally the purview of development assistance; ‘poverty reduction’¹⁶⁴; progress through ‘bounce back better’¹⁶⁵; and ultimately, ‘[the achievement of] the Millennium Development Goals’¹⁶⁶.

Resilience therefore shares some critical, general problems with developmental relief. Nearly 15 years ago, Macrae described ‘the “developmentalist attack” on humanitarian principles’¹⁶⁷, which Bradbury¹⁶⁸ later argued redefines ‘chronic instability and accompanying

¹⁶¹ Bradbury, 1998

¹⁶² CARE International UK, for example, directed 75.3 per cent of its FY2011 expenditures on emergency and humanitarian relief, and 24.6 per cent on development activities. (CARE 2011a, 39)

¹⁶³ DFID 2011b, 5

¹⁶⁴ Waites, 2011b, slide 8.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 9

¹⁶⁶ DFID, 2011d, 10

¹⁶⁷ quoted in Bradbury, 1998, 328

¹⁶⁸ Bradbury 1998

humanitarian crises...as opportunities for development'¹⁶⁹. 'Normalising' crisis by considering it a developmental opportunity does not merely have an impact on humanitarian principles; it influences response on the ground. Bradbury concludes it provokes 'a creeping acceptance of higher levels of vulnerability, malnutrition and morbidity'.¹⁷⁰ The impact of current resilience discourse on humanitarian principles and action parallels known problems within developmental relief.

Evidence of the most effective ways to deliver humanitarian aid while minimising the infliction of harm should be the primary guide to humanitarian operations. The core humanitarian principles are living repositories of this evidence. Humanitarian organisations have developed strategies over time to leverage their independence, impartiality, neutrality and humanity to negotiate the access needed to provide the best relief possible. DFID itself seems to recognise this point. Among the four, primary challenges articulated in the introduction to its 2011 Humanitarian Policy is the 'clear need for increased protection and security as part of humanitarian response, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states.' The strategy continues, 'The UK will promote respect for humanitarian principles to support greater acceptance of humanitarian actors and improved humanitarian access.'¹⁷¹ But aiming to build resilience through

humanitarian relief would pose challenges to humanitarian actors' credibility and access that exclude it as valid humanitarian objective.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 330

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ DFID, 2011d, 4

7. Conclusion and Next Steps

This report aimed to present a detailed description and analysis of current narratives around resilience, in relation to the provision of aid, among UK-based INGOs, the UK Government and research centres. The development of the term resilience in theory and its introduction into the aid sector were described. This was followed by an overview of how relevant UK actors have incorporated resilience on the ground and on paper. To analyse ‘humanitarian’ aid in practice, a case study of a cash-in-hand contingency fund project (CARE’s RREAD I 2008/09) was examined. Finally, resilience was analysed against core humanitarian principles to inform an assessment of whether resilience is a valid humanitarian aid objective.

Resilience is widely-discussed in aid and development theory, specifically in the context of climate change and DRR, as a holistic approach to understanding systems. Yet the broad applicability of the term is also its great weakness. As a result, there is no coherent way of measuring resilience to allow practitioners to demonstrate its added value. Furthermore, there is little academic literature at present examining resilience with regard to humanitarian aid, particularly in conflict settings.

Since 2011, the UK government has developed resilience policies not only in the context of disasters, but also in response to conflict.

Several UK-based INGOs have incorporated resilience into their statements, strategies and objectives for both the emergency response and development branches of their operations. This could result in better assessments of the long-term consequences of aid. However, it risks pushing humanitarian aid to ‘cohere’ with developmental aims not appropriate for a humanitarian mandate. UK organisations recognise resilience as a desirable outcome for long-term development. However, it is not yet clear how resilience-building might be achieved within the context of short-term humanitarian assistance.

Resilience work is difficult to evaluate in practice. CARE’s RREAD I was framed as a humanitarian aid project with strong aspects of resilience-building. However, it remains largely indistinguishable from earlier disaster risk reduction projects. There was no evidence the project built resilience. This may result from the difficulty of applying and measuring resilience theory; evaluations lack common indicators. Alternatively, there may be wider problems with the framing of resilience as compatible with objectives within the humanitarian aid sector. Local criticisms of the project raise general questions about resilience as an objective of humanitarian assistance: if building district capacity is the main goal of a cash-in-hand contingency fund, what is the value of framing it as a humanitarian project? Much of the criticism of the RREAD project could be resolved by adopting the time frame of a development project; this suggests that if

actors managed to agree on a measurement for resilience, development aid and resilience-building objectives could be compatible in practice.

The report concluded that resilience is not a valid objective for humanitarian aid. Several assumptions within current resilience discourse challenge humanitarian 'fieldcraft' and capacities: first, that resilience is an evident characteristic; second, that resilience is compatible with response to immediate humanitarian needs; third, that the assistance provided and the professionals who supply it are capable of contributing to resilience; and fourth, that the range of activities required to put resilience-building into practice are consistent with humanitarian principles and objectives. Furthermore, the approaches required to orient humanitarian aid toward resilience as an objective conflict with the independence, impartiality, neutrality and humanity that humanitarians leverage to gain access to communities in emergencies. The belief that relief can be 'developmental' normalises crisis as an opportunity for improving underlying structural weaknesses, entrenches power relationships, and compromises humanitarian access and ultimately the quality of assistance provided to crisis-affected communities.

In sum, there is a growing body of policy papers and organisational responses to DFID's push to incorporate resilience work into humanitarian action. However, there is a dearth of research on how resilience plays out

in humanitarianism, especially in conflicts. The impact of different resilience-building strategies has been little studied, and results-monitoring remains more anecdotal than rigorous. How a focus on resilience could be critical for effective humanitarian responses has also not been convincingly established. Despite the term being put forward as a way to view complex systems holistically, resilience theory has yet had little effect on project design. Certain factors contributing to vulnerability (e.g., political exclusion, marginalisation) cannot be addressed with short-term, apolitical approaches. Furthermore, the CARE case study revealed that cash transfers without long-term involvement and oversight fail to resolve poor budget management capacity, a lack of community-level consultation, and individual corruption. Single-faceted projects do not appear to reflect the supposed evolution a resilience-oriented approach advocates.

7.1. Next Steps

The following open research questions and recommendations highlight areas for further investigation into whether resilience could contribute to the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in the future.

Within the Current Disaster Resilience Discourse

Research Gaps:

1. All emergency situations are unique and context-specific. The utility of resilience-oriented approaches for different humanitarian specialisations and in various humanitarian

emergencies, particularly conflicts, should be thoughtfully assessed. A robust evaluation of any benefits to using humanitarian funding streams and capacities to promote resilience is needed. A methodology for measuring resilience must be established to facilitate this robust evaluation.

2. Inter-agency consortia and DFID research programs are attempting to define resilience and develop the measures described above.¹⁷² As their efforts unfold, the collaborative process itself may generate findings of interest.

2. Recently, practitioners and researchers have begun to recognise the notion of ‘harmful resilience’¹⁷³. However, these discussions are not yet represented in the literature. Further discussion and critique of the primarily positive take on the resilience is needed, especially because this informs policy design.

Relevant UK Aid Actors:

1. Researchers and UK aid organisations are increasingly interested in resilience as possibly ensuring complementary humanitarian and development responses to emergencies. This will have a variable impact on humanitarian actors and projects on the ground. Resilience may be seen as positive to an actor that engages in both humanitarian and development work; has an existential interest

in concepts that imply its multi-mandate, ‘bridging’ position is useful; and has experience juggling humanitarian and developmental interventions simultaneously. By contrast, if an actor believes humanitarian aid is best kept wholly apart from development aid, resilience would seem a developmental threat. The latter group actors might anticipate renewed questions about the long-term effects of their work by those who embrace resilience as a valid concept.

Beyond the Current Disaster Resilience Discourse

1. The difficulties with measuring resilience highlight serious challenges with the concept. Absent hard evidence of the added value of resilience for project design, motivations for the proliferation of the concept must be scrutinised.¹⁷⁴ Recognising that innovation against donor fatigue is likely to be contributing to increased use of resilience in the context of disasters, political and economic motivations need to be examined.¹⁷⁵ From where does the funding come? What funding is used for which projects? Policy-makers could also benefit from conducting research on the

¹⁷² See Appendix E

¹⁷³ Meaning that a resilient system is not necessarily a ‘good’ system. Cf. Bahadur, interview with authors, 2012; Brown, 2012; Carpenter, 2008, 5.

¹⁷⁴ In this context, it is interesting to see how DFID Project Database search results have changed over the time of two months (February to March) with regard to project sectors with resilience components. See Appendix C for more information.

¹⁷⁵ Mitchell, 2011. Mitchell further notes how research on the politics associated with the use of resilience will “be a key factors if the UK is going to achieve ‘commitment 8’ in the Humanitarian Policy: ‘We will integrate resilience and disaster risk reduction into our work on climate change and conflict’.” (Ibid.)

politics of policy processes associated with building resilience.

2. If it cannot be proven that humanitarian projects build resilience, and it seems that resilience-building projects are essentially developmental, why are some of them still framed as humanitarian projects and funded with earmarked humanitarian funding? There is a need to evaluate what types of funding mechanisms could best enable resilience-building in aid project.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – Interviews

Relevant academics and key practitioners in the fields of emergency response, disaster relief and resilience were interviewed, as listed in the appendix. The interviews conducted were semi-structured, qualitative interviews with open questions to provide useful insights into the way the organizations understand and seek to build resilience.

Interviewee	Reason for interview	Details	Main points
Tim Midgely	Resilience Unit World Vision, Policy and Program Innovation Team + DDR	1 February 2012 3pm Phone interview London	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID has not gotten to the bottom of what they mean by resilience, recommendations within humanitarian work, taking account of more than immediate response and beyond. • It is a question of politics: incorporating resilience into project proposals does not mean something radically different to anything in the sector. • For humanitarian actors, it is about being aware of longer term effects.
Prof. Richard Klein	Expert on the science and policy of adaptation to the impacts of climate change, one of the authors of 'Resilience to natural hazards: How useful is this concept?', 2003	29 February 2012 1-1.30pm Skype interview from Linköping, Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When resilience was introduced beyond the original literature where it was invented (ecological, natural sciences, etc.), it became a metaphor for talking about complex systems. The term lacks specificity as to what it actually is. • Because of the lack of specificity of the term there is no distinct theoretical definition, therefore no operational definition and finally no methodology of how measure it. • Still, potentially resilience might have a positive impact in practice. But if you start using that word quite a lot, make funding applications or policy decisions dependent on it, need to some extent be able to assess if interventions are having an impact.
Richard Roberts	Conducted the 'Regional Resilience Against Drought (RREAD) Phases One and Two: Best Practices and Lessons Learned', 2010.	24 February 2012 12.30-1.30pm Direct interview London, Farringdon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RREAD I seemed to be a project for longer-term development that was being implemented quickly. A major obstacle was inadequate training for the funds managers beforehand. As a result, in some areas the funds did not achieve their potential impact. What the funds managers were reporting against, to whom they were accountable, and what should inform contingency planning should have been clear from the start. A better approach is training, consultation and planning as the first step, before beginning implementation. • On community participation: The planning committee comprised regional or district-level government heads of departments, the district education officer, pastoralist officer, etc. It was not really inclusive of community members. Not all of the heads of the ministry were included.

Matthew Castleden	One of the authors of 'Resilience thinking in health protection', 2011.	26 February 2012 Email	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Measurement of resilience: Can be evaluated qualitatively by looking at indicators such as governance, existing emergency plans, communication, adaptability, community involvement, social cohesion etc. Some of these factors can also be measured quantitatively, but not all of them. Narrowing the scope of enquiry to similar communities facing similar threats may make it easier to come up with a consistent range of contributing factors (and a quantitative 'resilience index') but then you sacrifice some of the idea's utility in addressing completely unexpected threats (things like the Icelandic volcano ash cloud, which was completely unanticipated). ● Future development of resilience: The underlying ideas are sound and it will continue to be relevant, but the terminology may evolve. It is easy to criticise it as an imprecise term, particularly when you consider its diverse origins, so unless a universal definition is agreed (such as the UNISDR definition) or efforts are made to always use qualifiers, e.g. 'psychological—', 'disaster—', 'community—' the word itself may fall back out of fashion, even if the ideas live on. The most important test is whether disaster planners and responders (and humanitarian workers) find it a useful concept.
Nick Martlew	Save the Children-UK	10 February 2012 6pm Direct interview, London, Farringdon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The added value of resilience, perhaps, is in getting development actors to think about disasters. The idea could be to use humanitarian analysis and respond through development mechanisms. That could mean building contingency funds into development projects to respond to crises. Ideally, there is no firewall between the two funding streams, as often is true for donors.
Stuart Gordon	Academic research on resilience	27 January 2012 5pm Direct interview London, LSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A resilient system has two components: capacity to withstand shocks and frictions and the ability to retain its structure and substance in the face of external problems. The other component is to bounce back positively in the face of shocks and frictions; being able to recover from really profound shocks or protracted frictions. ● Resilience theory forces to think about complex microsystems. Some of which are in collapse, some of which are conforming to a better situation and are integrated in a broader eco-system. Thinking in terms of systems and reinforcing host nation and host community responses is very valuable. ● Resilience in practice: To force the different sectors of humanitarianism together in a cross-sectoral working group on resilience would be a

			<p>nightmare. But thinking about mainstreaming resilience-thinking makes sense. The danger is, however, it becomes a new sort of 'tick-box'.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maybe resilience makes the humanitarian imperative more sophisticated. It is about saving systems that save lives, about how to support a community to support itself.
Marcus Oxley	Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction	<p>20 January 2012</p> <p>Phone interview</p> <p>from London</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are three basic elements of resilience: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Ability to absorb and survive shocks and stresses 2) Ability to recover and re-establish an acceptable level of functionality 3) Ability to from to learn and adapt, to change to changes in shocks and stresses • Humanitarian assistance is primarily about supporting the first and second elements – the ability to survive and recover. • Strengthening local resilience is about good development in hazard-prone areas in a changing climate. • The donors are looking to fund specific adaptation interventions on the premise that man-made climate change can be programmatically differentiated from ongoing measures that communities make to cope with climatic conditions. • People at the local level do not differentiate between different problems - they are inter-related, they live in a multi-risk environment and their approaches are holistic.
Duncan Barker	Humanitarian Resilience Adviser in the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department with DFID	<p>9 February 2012</p> <p>3-4.30pm</p> <p>Direct interview,</p> <p>London, DFID office</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One of the key things about resilience is that it makes you think outside the box and across sectors. Resilience is about planning for the expected and being aware that there will be unknown unknowns. • Implications of disaster resilience-thinking for humanitarian aid actors: For instance, with the provision of health care, expectations of communities for health care are built up which cannot be fulfilled afterwards. Therefore, you have to make sure that the humanitarian response does not negatively impact the future development of the health-systems. There maybe some trade-offs between short and long-term activities. • Measurement of resilience: DFID is focused on results and value for money but measuring resilience to disasters poses a specific challenge. Until a disaster strikes it is not possible to know how resilient a community has become and a counter-factual is rarely available, i.e. it is difficult to know and quantify how much damage was prevented and hence measure results and assess value for money.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Cost-effectiveness of resilience-related funding: Investing in prevention and preparedness is much more cost-effective than responding to a humanitarian crises (cf Horn of Africa) ● Resilience is more than DRR, because DRR should come from development programming (not only after reconstruction). When there is a crisis, it is strange to talk about DRR, but not about resilience.
Charles Hopkins	Current RREAD project manager with CARE International	<p>8 March 2012</p> <p>5:30-6:30 pm</p> <p>Skype interview</p> <p>from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● RREAD I responded to a disconnect between the community planning that was occurring, and the funding communities were receiving. ● Often, even when there is early warning of a threat or emergency, the NGO response is late. ● The greatest aspect of resilience building is having resources invested early on. Communities have traditionally done a good job of this. ● NGOs must be aware that even though projects are short-term humanitarian, they are likely to have continually renewed funding sources, and they should anticipate donors wanting to see measurable results. ● We approach development and humanitarian aid too often as dealing with different people, but often they are the same. They should acknowledge the necessary overlap between themselves, and the need for some level of integration. ● The Somali government is playing a very active role in these types of projects, auditing communities and NGOs, imposing restrictions, and funding projects they see as having been 'best practices projects. In some instances, they are actually leading the way in development. There is close interaction between CARE and the government, and increased accountability is emerging out of this. ● Room for resilience in both chronic and acute emergencies. We must focus on early warning and early preparedness, since with adequate technology, most disasters can be predicted ahead of time.
Aditya V. Bahadur	Author of 'The resilience renaissance? Unpacking of resilience for tackling climate change and disasters', 2011.	<p>1 March 2012</p> <p>11-11.30am</p> <p>Phone interview</p> <p>from Brighton</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resilience is the ability to deal with a range of disturbances, e.g. climate change, with cross-sectoral effects. ● Resilience means looking at problems systemically, it is about holistic solutions. ● There is something like negative resilience. The kind of resilience that we is explored in 'The Resilience Renaissance' is certainly not value-neutral, we focused on the kind of resilience that we think is good. ● At the moment, there seems to be very little evidence how resilience is implemented in the

			<p>field. Therefore, there are a lot of problems with talking about cost-effectiveness. But if you look at the concept, it is probably more value-for-money as opposed to, for instance, a repeated transfer of resources. However, it is impossible to make that claim without any good documented evidence.</p>
Lindsey Jones	<p>Research Officer at ODI, one of the authors of ODI's Working Paper 319 on 'Responding to a changing climate: Exploring how disaster risk reduction, social protection and livelihoods approaches promote features of adaptive capacity', 2010.</p>	<p>7 March 2012 4pm Phone interview London</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In the context of development, resilience is a buzzword. ● The concept of resilience itself, is not actually new. First everyone was talking about sustainability and sustainable livelihoods, then about adaptation and adaptive capacity and now, they talk about resilience. ● The difficulty with resilience is, that it evolved from ecology and has then been introduced to socio-ecological systems (SES) and development and humanitarianism. ● There are a lot of overlaps between resilience and adaptive capacity, they are often confused with one another. ● Humanitarianism and development are very interconnected and overlapping. This is very relevant in the context of resilience because it promotes a holistic approach. ● Measuring resilience is difficult. It is often done as a crude assessment. Many of the characteristics of resilience are intangible. Understanding what factors contribute to resilience, and how development/humanitarian interventions can best support it at the local level is a starting point.

APPENDIX B – DFID Programmes

A selection¹⁷⁶ of programmes from DFID’s project database¹⁷⁷ found using the keywords ‘resilience + humanitarian’. The programmes with a reference to resilience in the humanitarian mandate were all initiated in 2011.

Project title	Project Mandate	Sector Group	Budget	Date	Reference
Kenya Humanitarian Interventions 2011	<i>To save lives, alleviate suffering, maintain dignity and enhance resilience</i>	Emergency Response, Principal sector: Material relief assistance and services 56%	£11,250,000	11/05/2011 - 31/03/2012	202478
South Sudan Humanitarian Response Programme	<i>Humanitarian coordination and interventions in South Sudan address acute and chronic relief and protection needs efficiently and effectively, and build resilience against future needs.</i>	Emergency Response, Principal sector: Material relief assistance and services 69%	£19,700,000	31/08/2011 - 31/12/2013	202850
Somalia Humanitarian Interventions 2011	<i>To meet the most urgent humanitarian needs of conflict and disasters affected populations. To save lives, maintain dignity and support the livelihoods of vulnerable people in Somalia.</i>	Emergency Response, Principal sector: Material relief assistance and services 55%	£57,270,000	11/05/2011 - 15/07/2012	202479
Developing a coherent humanitarian and resilience framework	<i>Developing a coherent humanitarian and resilience indicator framework</i>	Other multi-sector, Research/scientific institutions 100%	£41,190	04/08/2011 - 30/09/2011	202790
Exploring the cost effectiveness of investments in disaster resilience	<i>To develop evidence based resource that can support effective policy development which can be used to inform the investment decisions on Disaster Risk Reductions and resilience of other donors, partner governments, multilaterals and implementing agencies</i>	Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, Participation in international peacekeeping operations 100%	£30,000	01/07/2011 - 31/03/2013	202845

¹⁷⁶ DFID are also involved in a wide range of climate, DRR and vulnerability projects where resilience is used frequently in the mandates and descriptions. This selection however, focuses only on resilience articulate in humanitarian terms.

¹⁷⁷ DFID Project Database, accessed at <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk>

DFID Humanitarian and Emergency Operations Support Service	<i>To enable DFID to deliver immediate humanitarian support that saves lives in response to countries afflicted by disasters and conflicts, and increase preparedness and resilience for potential humanitarian crises.</i>	Emergency Response, Principal sector: Material relief assistance and services 100%	-	01/05/2012 - 30/04/2017	202741
Ids Consortium - Effective Resilience to Disasters and Climate Change	<i>To enhance the ability of governments and CSOs in developing countries to build the resilience of communities to disasters and climate change as part of their development work.</i>	Sector group: Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security, Principal sector: Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 100%	£1,106,860	30/09/2009 - 31/03/2012	201075

APPENDIX C – DFID Project Figures¹⁷⁸

1. Overall DFID 'resilience' project sectors and funding

Number of projects: 130.

Date: March 12 2012.




Figure 1




Figure 2



Figure 1 shows the breakdown of resilience-related funding in project sector groups, while Figure 2 shows the amount of funding having gone to different 'resilience' related projects. This shows a clear increase of the term 'resilience' through the incorporation of the term in DFID projects from 2008 to 2012.

2. Comparing resilience in humanitarian projects from February to March 2012

Search I: 'Resilience + humanitarian' in the DFID database.

Number of projects: 171.

Date: February 5 2012




¹⁷⁸ All graphs were retrieved from the DFID project database, accessed at <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/>

Search II: 'Resilience + humanitarian'

Number of projects: 384.


Date: March 12 2012.



A comparison of the above keyword searches I and II for 'resilience + humanitarian' shows that Search I returned 157 project hits on February 3, 2012 and Search II returned 384 project hits on March 12 2012. This proves the increasing use of the term from 2011 to 2012 in DFID's humanitarian projects. 'Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security' has also been added to DFID database search indicators for 'resilience', which also reflects the growing incorporation of the 'conflict' component into the resilience discourse. It is unclear however, why the project budget graphs have changed substantially within the two months, but this could be due to an internal alteration of projects descriptions. 'Disaster prevention and preparedness' and 'developmental food aid' have also disappeared in search II, where 'unallocated/unspecified' and 'other' have been added.

3. Kenya Humanitarian Interventions 2011


Retrieved February 3 2012.



Kenya Humanitarian Interventions 2011 is listed as an emergency response, aiming 'to save lives, alleviate suffering, maintain dignity and enhance resilience', thus furthering DFID's 2011 humanitarian policies.

4. South Sudan Humanitarian Response Program

Retrieved February 3 2012.



South Sudan Humanitarian Response is an humanitarian intervention aiming to address acute and chronic relief, but also building resilience against future threats, bridging both 'silos' of 'humanitarian' and 'development'. The project was started in August 2008 and can represent DFIDs novel humanitarian approach.

APPENDIX D – Recent Job Listings

Organisation	Job title	Location	Description ¹⁷⁹	Date
CARE UK ¹⁸⁰	Regional Resilience Enhancement Against Drought (RREAD) Coordinator	Kenya (Nairobi)	Responsible for overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the RREAD programme. The main objective of the project is to build community resilience against drought in the Horn of Africa. This person coordinates the implementation of the project between the various countries in the Horn of Africa and helps to strengthen links between them.	Active
DFID	Humanitarian Resilience Advisor	United Kingdom (London)	None	Active
Christian Aid ¹⁸¹	Humanitarian Projects Unit Manager	West Africa	Have a key role in the development of disaster risk reduction and resilience work across Africa and work to ensure coherence between the emergency and longer term work. Country, regional or Pan-Africa managers influenced to ensure coherence between humanitarian and development programmes in line with corporate strategies. Effective capacity building in place for staff and partners on emergency response, resilience and disaster risk reduction strategies and implementation. Direct reports are variable but could include emergency programme staff and Resilience and/or Emergency staff, particularly during the implementation of the West Africa appeal and the DFID funded humanitarian PPA.	Closed on 13 Sep 2011
Christian Aid ¹⁸²	Humanitarian Projects Unit Manager	West Africa	Have a key role in the development of disaster risk reduction and resilience work across Africa and work to ensure coherence between the emergency and longer term work. Country, regional or	Closed on 13 Sep 2011

¹⁷⁹ In part (resilience-component emphasised)

¹⁸⁰ <http://onjobskenya.blogspot.com/2010/08/project-coordinator-regional-resilience.html>

¹⁸¹ http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/Regional%20emergency%20manager,%20West%20Africa%20REM-BF-01_tcm15-58420.pdf

¹⁸² http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/Regional%20emergency%20manager,%20West%20Africa%20REM-BF-01_tcm15-58420.pdf

			Pan-Africa managers influenced to ensure coherence between humanitarian and development programmes in line with corporate strategies. Effective capacity building in place for staff and partners on emergency response, resilience and disaster risk reduction strategies and implementation. Direct reports are variable but could include emergency programme staff and Resilience and/or Emergency staff, particularly during the implementation of the West Africa appeal and the DFID funded humanitarian PPA.	
PLAN ¹⁸³	Head of Disaster Resilience and Response, Programme Department, Disaster Risk Management Unit	United Kingdom (London)	The post holder will lead the DRMU towards becoming a recognised centre of excellence within the Plan network whilst building our reputation as an effective humanitarian response partner within the UK sector and particularly within the DEC where you will be required to represent Plan UK at the highest level, deputising for the CEO where necessary. The role requires a full understanding and knowledge of the current humanitarian international architecture and policy debates and proven ability to formulate, represent and influence policy.	Application pack released on 31 October 2011
DFID	Humanitarian Resilience Advisor	United Kingdom (London)	None	Active since 11 November 2011
CARE UK ¹⁸⁴	Senior Advisor- Livelihoods Resilience, Climate Change and Food Security Department	United Kingdom (London)	The post holder will lead CIUK's work on resilience building and disaster risk reduction. S/he will lead analysis of current risk reduction and resilience building paradigms and debates. S/he will oversee the development of a strategic resilience building initiative in east Africa, while playing a broader leadership role for the CIUK Humanitarian Team within the CARE confederation around risk and vulnerability reduction and resilience building. S/he will engage in design and development of new programmes addressing chronic vulnerability, risk reduction, resilience building and adaptation and ensure links to emergency	Active since 11 November 2011

¹⁸³ <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Application-Pack-Plan-UK-1110-Final.pdf>

¹⁸⁴ http://www.careinternational.org.uk/attachments/1922_Job%20Description.pdf

			response, preparedness and recover	
Oxfam UK ¹⁸⁵	Resilience & Emergency Response Manager, Horn of Africa	Uganda (Kampala)	Lead in refining and evaluating the resilience strategy, programme plans on the short and medium term and operational modalities. Support the Oxfam geographic programmes during proposal design, capacity building, knowledge management and project implementation to ensure cross country consistent and quality disaster risk reduction and climate change programme. Manage the implementation of Oxfam's national level resilience programme projects (mainly Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Advocacy) to ensure attainment of programme objectives and outputs in line with Oxfam and other agreed standards.	Closed on 10 January 2012
Oxfam ¹⁸⁶	Resilience & Horn of Africa Plan of Action Policy and Advocacy Adviser Horn, East and Central Africa.	Kenya (Nairobi)	Support Regional Director and other colleagues to develop regional and country advocacy programmes on resilience, DRR and future of pastoralism with reference to humanitarian programs.	Closed on 27 January 2012
World Vision ¹⁸⁷	Administrative Assistant to Quality, Strategy and Humanitarian Policy Group and Community Resilience Community of Practice Administrator	United Kingdom (London)	To provide administrative support to the Director of Disaster Risk Reduction with specific focus on coordination of the Community Resilience Community of Practice.	Closed on 28 January 2011
CARE UK ¹⁸⁸	Senior Advisor-Resilience, Climate Change and Food Security Team	East Africa	The main purpose of this role is to develop and lead CIUK's resilience building portfolio and provide critical technical support to existing and new risk reduction, resilience building and climate change adaptation programmes. Key tasks will be assigned in line with CIUK's strategic plan, the CIUK Humanitarian Team strategic plan, and CIUK's Climate Change and Food Security Team plan.	Closed on 30 January 2012

¹⁸⁵ http://africajobstation.com/component/jobs/print_job/10480-resilience-amp-emergency-response-manager?tmpl=component

¹⁸⁶ <http://www.careersmartkenya.com/2012/01/oxfam-policy-and-advocacy-adviser-horn.html>

¹⁸⁷ <http://preventionweb.net/go/17659>

¹⁸⁸ <http://www.alnap.org/node/8097.aspx>

Tearfund ¹⁸⁹	Food Security Programme Coordinator	The Sahel Region (focus on Niger)	The main purpose of this role is to provide support to, monitor and develop the capacity of agreed partners in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso to implement disaster resilient, emergency relief and post-conflict recovery.	Closing date on 20 March 2012
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¹⁸⁹ <http://reliefweb.int/node/479497>

APPENDIX E – Examples of Cross-Sectoral Collaboration

Date	Event	Contributors	Main Points
June 2011	VOICE and ActionAid Panel 'From Disaster Risk Reduction to Comprehensive Resilience – Towards a Common Understanding'	<p>Organized alongside the VOICE DRR Working Group meeting and attended by representatives from NGOs, academia, networks and donors.</p> <p><u>Speakers:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • John Abuya (International Thematic Programmes Manager, ActionAid International); • Mags Bird (Programme Coordinator, VOICE); • Tim Waites (Humanitarian and Disaster Reduction Policy Advisor, CHASE, DFID) and • Cynthia Gaigals (Manager of the Peacebuilding Issues Programme, International Alert). • Chaired by Marcus Oxley (Founding Chair of the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furthering the concept of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and how it relates to comprehensive resilience, with the aim of moving towards a common understanding of the increasingly prominent concept of 'resilience'. • An attempt to distinguish resilience from other 'buzzwords' such as 'good governance' or 'sustainable development'.¹⁹⁰ • How resilience needs to be understood in terms of transformation out of poverty, and not simply in terms of 'bouncing back'.¹⁹¹ • Concluded that resilience needs to be made more 'attractive' to donors and the wider public, and the impact of humanitarian principles needs to be considered.
November 2011	Bond Annual Conference, 'Cross-sectoral Resilience'	<p>75 staff from member agencies of Bond (the UK NGO network) linked to the Bond groups on DRR, Adaptation, and Conflict Policy.</p> <p><u>Speakers:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tim Waites, DFID: "What does disaster resilience mean for DFID?" • Marcus Oxley, Global Network for Disaster Reduction: "Toward a common resilience framework – local governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasised the need for INGOs to transcend existing specialisations, such as in livelihoods, conflict or natural disasters • Outlined steps to 'turn resilience from a cross-sectoral buzzword into a practical reality'.¹⁹² • Key steps forward included deciding on whether to aim for one single framework of resilience, a set of principles and on what level of governance resilience efforts should be taking place.¹⁹³ • A common notion that the current semantic gap between humanitarianism

¹⁹⁰ ActionAid. "Human Security in Emergencies and Conflict Theme Communiqué: Panel Discussion: From Disaster Risk Reduction to Comprehensive Resilience – Towards a Common Understanding." 2011.

¹⁹¹ <http://www.actionaid.org/publications/panel-discussion-towards-comprehensive-resilience>

¹⁹² ActionAid. "Human Security in Emergencies and Conflict Theme Communiqué: Panel Discussion: From Disaster Risk Reduction to Comprehensive Resilience – Towards a Common Understanding." 2011.

¹⁹³ Notes from the 11 November 2011 Cross-Sectoral Resilience Event

		<p>elements"</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maggie Ibrahim, Practical Action: "Resilience in practice" • Kelly Hawrylyshyn, Katherine Nightingale & Fran Seballos - Plan, Christian Aid, IDS: "Strengthening climate resilience – the CSDRM approach in practice" • Nidhi Mittal & Daniel Walden, Save the Children, "Resilience findings from ACCRA" • Daniel Yeo, WaterAid: "Water security" • Tim Midgley, World Vision: "Conflict and resilience" • Mike Wiggins, Tearfund: "Resilience, adaptation, or sustainable development?" 	<p>and development was problematic, as well as the lack of a platform for cooperation outside of DRR and CCA.¹⁹⁴</p>
	<p>Initiative: Interagency DFID Group: DRR and Building Resilience? "Sharing experience and learning on DRR and Resilience from an inter-agency group"</p>	<p>Composed of ActionAid, Christian Aid, Plan International, Practical Action and Tearfund</p>	<p>Reports: 'Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community (Twigg, 2010) and the 'Disaster Risk Reduction NGO Inter-agency Group Learning Review' (Twigg, 2010)</p>
	<p>Initiative: Interagency Network - the Sahel Working Group</p>	<p>The Sahel Working Group (SWG) is an informal inter-agency network based in the UK, focusing mainly on Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report: 'Escaping the Hunger Cycle- Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel' • Observation: both agencies and governments working in the Sahel region focused too much on short-term emergency and failed to address more fundamental issues such as chronic vulnerability- "by failing to prevent the great loss of assets of the most vulnerable households, years of development work was reversed." (Ibid, p. 5)

Note: Since the above selection, many other collaborative efforts have been organised in order to arrive at a common understanding of resilience. The question of how to link the language and policies of humanitarianism and development have been brought up frequently, resulting in a range of reports on how to harmonise monitoring and evaluation frameworks and indicators across programs.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

APPENDIX F – RREAD I: Budget Breakdown for Community Funds

Yabello District - Activity¹⁹⁵	Percentage of Money Spent
Training early warning committees	24%
Food security assessments	28%
Buying grain for drought affected areas	32%
Distribution of grain in drought affected areas	6%
Water rationing (fuel cost for water tanker)	2%
Pest infestation assessment	8%
Portion of budget spent	87%

Moyale District - Activity¹⁹⁶	Percentage of Money Spent
Repairing broken dam	74%
Educational support to children who had lost caretakers through drought	7%
Support to pastoralist whose herd had largely been lost	2%
Early warning training	16%
Portion of budget spent	94%

Dire District - Activity¹⁹⁷	Percentage of Money Spent
Water rationing	12%
Rangeland reclamation – clearing invasive plants	59%
Rangeland reclamation – hiring tractor to till and sow land	12%
Purchase of farming tools and seeds for drought affected area	18%
Portion of budget spent	85%

¹⁹⁵ Roberts, 2010, 6

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 8

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 10